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1603-1642

VOL. V.

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HISTORY OF ENGLAND

FROM THE

ACCESSION OF JAMES I.

TO

THE OUTBREAK OF THE CIVIL WAR

1603-1642

BY

SAMUEL R. GARDINER, D.C.L., LL.D.

LATE FELLOW OF MERTON COLLEGE, OXFORD, ETC.

IN TEN VOLUMES

VOL. V

1623-1625

NEW IMPRESSION

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HISTORY OF ENGLAND.

CHAPTER XLIII.

THE JOURNEY TO MADRID

ALMOST a year had passed since Gondomar received from the lips of the Prince of Wales the assurance of his intention to visit Spain. To Baby Charles, as his father appropriately named him, the impolicy of the step which he was about to take appeared not to be worth a moment's consideration. Of the intrigues which

1623.
January.
The pro-
jected jour-
ney.

would gather round him, of the strange expectations to which his mere presence at Madrid would give rise, he had simply no conception whatever. What he saw before him was a gay ride across a continent, a lovers' meeting, a brilliant adventure, with the spice of peril which made the enterprise all the more attractive to his irresolute mind, incapable, as it was, of weighing calmly the advantages and the dangers likely to ensue. If he

Charles and
Buckingham.

had not himself approved of the plan, doubt would have been impossible in the presence of that brilliant creature, so self-confident and so insinuating, to whom his father in his weakness had entrusted the companionship of his tender years. A worse guide for such a youth it was impossible to select. Charles, ready now, as in future life, to resent opposition which presented itself in the name of popular rights, or of a higher wisdom than his own, had no objection to raise against the boisterous familiarity of his friend. For

Steenie, as he was called from some real or imaginary resemblance to a picture of St. Stephen in the King's possession, never asked him to trouble himself with the painful operation of thinking, whilst he took care to represent his own foregone conclusions with all outward forms of respect. He had early discovered how easy it was to make a tool of Charles. The inertness of the father, which had so often refused to comply with his sudden freaks, had no place in the son. Had Charles been on the throne in James's place, there can be little doubt that England would have been engaged in a war with the Emperor in 1620, in a war with the Netherlands in 1621, and in a war with Spain in 1622.

At what time the King was first acquainted with the plan is uncertain ; but, on the whole, it is most probable that before ^{The journey proposed to James.} the end of the year his consent had been won to the project, though in a different shape from that which

it afterwards assumed. If Buckingham was to go as Admiral of the Fleet to fetch the Infanta home in May, there would be comparatively few objections to his taking the Prince on shipboard with him. By that time the dispensation would have arrived, and the conditions of the marriage would be irrevocably settled. It could not, therefore, be said that there was any likelihood of Charles being treated as a hostage for the enforcement of new and exorbitant conditions.¹

¹ "And I have it *de bond manu*, and under the rose, that the Prince himself goes in person." Chamberlain to Carleton, Jan. 4, *S. P. Dom.* cxxvii. 5. This puts out of the question Clarendon's story of the journey being suggested at once just before the Prince started. It must be remembered that our only knowledge of the scene which follows is derived from him. He undoubtedly obtained his information from Cottington, and that part of his narrative which relates to things which passed before Cottington's own eyes may be at once accepted. But the remainder of his story, though doubtless generally true, is liable to error whenever it touches upon those circumstances of general history with which Clarendon had not made himself familiar. Clarendon, for instance, incorrectly asserts that the Marquis and the Prince had been at variance up to this time, that the journey to Spain was the beginning of James's dissatisfaction with Buckingham, and that Frederick had already 'incurred the ban of the Empire in an Imperial diet,' all of which statements are manifestly incorrect. I suspect that the first conversation took place about New Year's Day, and related only to

This was not, however, what Charles and Buckingham wanted. To arrive after all difficulties were at an end was far

^{February.} They ask leave to go at once. too commonplace an arrangement to suit their fiery imaginations. One day in February, after binding the King to secrecy, they told him that they wished for his leave to go at once. It would be a long time before the fleet could be ready. A pass to travel through France would not be granted without delay. Why should they not travel *incognito*? It would surely not be difficult, by hard riding, to reach the Spanish frontier before they were missed at Whitehall.

Never in the whole course of his life did James find it easy to say "No" to those with whom he was on terms of familiar intercourse, and of late years his fatal habit of irresolution had increased. His body was racked with terrible attacks of gout, and his mind was deadened by a sense of failure, which did not exercise the less influence upon his temper because he was unwilling to confess its existence. If he had been asked to do anything himself, he would undoubtedly have resisted any pressure that could be brought to bear upon him. As it was, he gave way without difficulty, and accorded the required permission.

Before the morrow came, the mistake which he had committed rose before James's mind. As soon as the spell of Hesitation of the young men's presence was removed, he was able the King. to think of the dangers into which his beloved son was about to run, and of the extreme probability that the Spanish ministers would raise their demands as soon as they had such a hostage in their hands.¹ Accordingly, when the Prince returned with the Marquis the next morning to make arrangements for the journey, James adjured him to think of

going with the fleet, and that there was an interval of some weeks before the question of the journey by land was mooted. Bristol was informed of Buckingham's intention to come to Spain to the Infanta's marriage.

¹ I do not insert the whole of the arguments used by James as given by Clarendon, as I have a suspicion that they were embellished by knowledge acquired after the event; I have adopted so much as would probably have occurred to James under the circumstances.

the danger into which he was running. If any evil befell the Prince, he added, turning to Buckingham as he spoke, it was at his door that the blame would be laid, and his ruin would be unavoidable. Then, bursting into tears, he begged them not to press him to a thing so mischievous in every way, the execution of which was sure to break his heart.

Neither Charles nor Buckingham took the trouble to argue the question. With Buckingham, at least, it was a fundamental article of faith that opposition and difficulty must give way before him. The Prince contented himself with reminding his father of the promise which he had given the day before, and with assuring him that if he were forbidden to go to Spain, he would never marry at all. The insolent favourite took higher ground, and told the King that if he broke his promises in this way, nobody would ever believe him again. He must have consulted some one, in spite of his engagement to secrecy. If the rascal who had suggested such pitiful reasons could be discovered, he was sure the Prince would never forgive him.

The poor King was completely cowed. He swore that he had never communicated the secret to anyone, and allowed the young men to discuss the details of the journey, as if there had been no question of stopping it. Cottington and Porter were soon mentioned as proper persons to accompany the Prince. Upon this the King sent for Cottington, in the hope that he would prove more successful than himself in combating the idea.

As Cottington entered the room, Buckingham turned to Charles. "This man," he whispered in his ear, "will be against the journey." "No," answered the Prince, "he dares not." "Cottington," said the King, after engaging him to silence, "here are Baby Charles and Steenie, who have a great mind to go by post into Spain, to fetch home the Infanta, and will have but two more in their company, and have chosen you for one. What think you of the journey?" In his amazement, Cottington, cool as he generally was, could scarcely speak. It was only upon the question being repeated that he answered, in a trembling voice, that he could not think well of it. In his

opinion it would render everything that had been done fruitless. As soon as the Spaniards had the Prince in their hands, they were certain to propose new articles, especially with respect to religion. When he heard these words, the King threw himself upon his bed. "I told you this before," he shrieked out passionately. "I am undone. I shall lose Baby Charles."

Buckingham turned fiercely upon Cottington. It was his pride, he told him, which had led him to condemn the journey because he had not been sooner consulted. No one

James gives his final permission.

The King only wanted to know which was the best road to Madrid. It was in vain for some time that James tried to take Cottington's part. In the end he was obliged to confess himself beaten, and gave his final consent to the journey.¹

Headlong as he was, there was one precaution which Buckingham did not omit to take before starting. For some days

Repayment of money to Mandeville. it had been observed that he seemed more than usually anxious to be reconciled with all to whom he had given any cause of offence. On January 28,

Mallory, one of the four members of the late House of Commons who were still restrained to their country houses, received permission to go where he would, though a similar relaxation was not accorded either to Coke, to Phelips, or to Pym. A few days afterwards, Lord Saye, who was still in the Tower for his opposition to the Benevolence, was allowed to go down into the country, to remain in confinement in his own house.² At last, too, Buckingham had begun to make preparations for repaying, or for giving security to repay, the purchase-money with which Mandeville had bought the temporary possession of the White Staff, upon the understanding that he would consent to a marriage between his eldest son, the future general of a parliamentary army, and Susan Hill, one of the

¹ *Clarendon*, i. 15. Cottington's objections are mentioned by Valaresso,

Feb. 28
March 10th *Venice MSS.* and in a letter of Dudley Carleton's, Feb. 27, *S. P. Dom.* cxxxviii. 99.

² *Privy Council Register*, Jan. 28, Feb. 4.

many penniless kinswomen of the favourite.¹ At the same time, young Monson, who five years before had been selected by the Howards as a possible rival to Buckingham in the King's good graces, was knighted, and sent to travel on the Continent. A more formidable opponent was treated in the same way. For some time the discordance between the parsimony of Middlesex and the lavish ostentation of Buckingham had threatened to lead to an open rupture, and it was even supposed that the Lord Treasurer had fixed his eye upon his brother-in-law, Arthur Brett, a handsome gentleman of the bedchamber, as one who might possibly supplant the favourite. Of the particulars of the quarrel we have no information. Just as he was ready to start, Buckingham sought a reconciliation. Brett, like Monson, was knighted, and recommended to keep out of the way.

On the 16th, Cottington, who had by this time made his peace with Buckingham, was created a baronet, and was ordered

Feb. 17.
The Prince sets out.

to take Porter with him to Dover, and to hire a vessel for crossing the Straits. The next day Charles took leave of his father at Theobalds, and rode off, accompanied by Buckingham, to the Marquis's house in Essex.

Feb. 18.
Adventures on the way.

On the morning of the 18th the real difficulties of the adventure began. Disguised with false beards, the two young men started from Newhall, under the names of Tom and John Smith. They had no one with them but Sir Richard Graham, the Marquis's master of the horse and confidential attendant. At the ferry opposite Gravesend they surprised the boatman by ordering him to put them ashore on the outskirts of the town instead of at the usual place of landing. His astonishment was complete when one of the party handed

¹ Chamberlain to Carleton, Feb. 10, *S. P. Dom.* cxxxviii. 23. It appears from Buckingham's defence (*Rushworth*, i. 387), that the King promised to grant lands in fee farm of his own instead. It also appears, from the Patent Rolls, that a large grant was passed, under the Great Seal, to Mandeville by Charles almost immediately after his accession, and it was expressly stated that this was done in fulfilment of James's promises. It is true that money was paid for the land. But this may easily have been a mere blind, the land being undervalued. Pat. 1 *Charles I.*, Part 2

him a gold piece, and rode away without asking for change. Supposing that the two principal gentlemen were duellists, about to cross the sea for the purpose of settling their differences with the sword, he at once gave information to the magistrates, who sent off a postboy to Rochester, with orders to stop them ; but the freshest horse in Gravesend was no match for the picked steeds from Buckingham's stable, and the party had left Rochester long before the arrival of their pursuer. A little later they were exposed to a more serious risk. Just as the three riders got out of the town, they saw advancing to meet them a train, in which they recognised the royal carriage, which was conveying the Infanta's ambassador, Boisshot, under the escort of Sir Lewis Lewknor, the master of the ceremonies, and of Sir Henry Mainwaring, the Lieutenant of Dover Castle. To avoid detection, they spurred their horses off the road, and galloped across the fields. Mainwaring, who fancied that the party might contain two of Barneveld's sons, who had recently been concerned in an attempt to assassinate the Prince of Orange, sent a messenger back to Canterbury with orders to detain them. It was only by pulling off his beard, and by assuring the mayor that he was the Lord Admiral going down to Dover to make a secret inspection of the fleet, that Buckingham obtained leave to continue his journey. At Dover,

Feb. 19.

Cottington and Porter had a vessel in readiness, and early the next morning the whole party, five in number, put off without further hindrance for Boulogne, from whence they pushed on in the afternoon to Mon-treuil. Two days' more riding brought them to Paris.¹

Feb. 21.
Arrival in
Paris.

The next day they spent in strolling about the French capital. They caught a sight of the King and of Mary de Medicis ; and in the evening, upon the plea that they were strangers in Paris, they contrived to obtain admission to the rehearsal of a masque, in which the Queen and the Princess Henrietta Maria were to take part.

¹ *Reliquiae Wottonianæ* (1672), i. 212. Mainwaring to Zouch, Feb. 22, Chamberlain to Carleton, Feb. 22. Dudley Carleton to Carleton, Feb. 27, *S. P. Dom.* cxxxviii. 58, 59, 99. Calvert to Carleton, Feb. 27, *S. P. Holland.*

Of his future wife, Charles seems to have taken but little notice. "There danced," he wrote, as soon as he had left the scene of gaiety, "the queen and madame, with as many as made up nineteen fair dancing ladies ; amongst which the queen is the handsomest, which hath wrought in me a greater desire to see Feb. 23. her sister."¹ The next day they were up at three in the morning, riding hard for Bayonne.

Meanwhile James, who had gone down to Newmarket to be out of the way, put the best face possible upon the business. ^{Carlisle sent to Paris.} As soon as the news had spread, those of the Privy Council who were on the spot fell upon their knees, and implored him to inform them whether the Prince was really gone. He assured them that there was no doubt about the matter. His son was only imitating the example of his father, of his grandfather, Darnley, and of his great-grandfather, James V., who had all gone into foreign countries to fetch home their wives. Beyond doubt a general peace in Christendom would be the result. To prevent danger, however, he would send Lord Carlisle to Paris, to interpose his good offices in favour of the Prince's journey.

With this answer the councillors were forced to be content. They did not, however, conceal the apprehensions which they ^{Feeling in England.} felt, and their apprehensions were shared by the whole nation. Prayers were put up in all the churches for the Prince's preservation. If the marriage, it was said, were forward enough to justify the presence of the Prince at Madrid, why did he not go on board a fleet with an equipage suitable to his station ? If everything was still uncertain, why should he risk his person, and give such an advantage to the King of Spain, by putting himself in his hands ? It was generally felt that from this dilemma no escape was possible.²

The popular dislike found a mouthpiece in the shrewd and

¹ The Prince and Buckingham to the King, Feb. 22. Goodman's *Court of King James*, ii. 253. *Ellis*, series i. vol. iii. 121.

² Calvert to Carleton, Feb. 27, *S. P. Holland*. D. Carleton to Carleton, Feb. 27, *S. P. Dom.* cxxxviii. 99. Salvetti's *News-Letter*, ^{Feb. 28.} March 10.

cautious Williams. "Your journey," he wrote to the Prince, Feb. 25. "is generally reputed the depth of your danger, which Letter of Williams to the Prince. in my fears and representations your arrival should be. You are in a strange state—for aught we know uninvited, business being scarce prepared—subject to be stayed on many and contrary pretences; made a plot for all the wisdom of Spain and Rome, for all the contemplations of that state and that religion to work upon. And peradventure the detaining of your Highness's person may serve their turn as amply as their marriage, at leastwise for this time, and the exploits of the ensuing summer."¹

Especially loud was the outcry against Buckingham. Great lords, who were not afraid to say what they meant, declared their Outcry against Buckingham. opinion that he had been guilty of high treason in carrying the Prince out of the realm, and that he would one day have to answer in Parliament for what he had done. Even James began to hesitate, and seemed inclined to cast the blame from his own shoulders upon those of his favourite and his son.²

Whilst James was fretting at home, his 'sweet boys, and dear venturous knights, worthy to be put in a new romanso,'³ March 2. The Prince arrives at Irun, were speeding across France, leaving to Carlisle the empty task of demanding at Paris a safe-conduct which was no longer necessary. A few miles beyond Bayonne they met Bristol's messenger, Gresley, carrying despatches to England. They opened his packet, but found that the greater part of the enclosed papers were in a cypher which they were unable to read. They then told Gresley that he must come back with them as far as Irun, as they wished him to be the bearer of a letter written to the King upon Spanish soil. Gresley afterwards reported in England that the Marquis looked worn and weary with his long ride; but that

¹ Williams to the Prince, Feb. 25, *Hacket*, 116.

² Williams to Buckingham, Feb. 25, *Hacket*, 116. Valaresso to the Doge, ^{Feb. 28} ~~March 10~~, *Venice MSS.*

³ The King to the Prince and Buckingham, Feb. 26, *Hardwicks S. P.*

he had never seen the Prince so merry. As soon as Charles stepped on the southern bank of the Bidassoa, he danced about for joy.

Yet even in that part of Bristol's letter which he was able to read, there was enough to have made Charles doubt the wisdom of his enterprise. "The temporal articles," he now told his father, "are not concluded; nor will not be till the dispensation comes, which may be God knows when; and when that time shall come, they beg twenty days to conceal it, upon pretext of making preparations." Charles was, however, sanguine enough to imagine that these difficulties would vanish in a moment before the sunlight of his presence.¹

About eight o'clock in the evening of March 7, the two young men, having outridden their companions, knocked for

March 7.
and reaches
Madrid. admittance at Bristol's door at Madrid. No one knew better than the ambassador what mischief was likely to result from the giddy exploit; but he had long learned to command his countenance, and he took good care to receive his unexpected guests with all the deference due to their rank.²

For that night at least, as he fondly hoped, the secret would be kept; but Gondomar was not to be deceived. In a few

March 7.
Gondomar
hears the
news.
He informs
Olivares. minutes he had learned that his long-cherished wishes had been gratified, and he at once proceeded to the Royal Palace, where he found Olivares at supper. "What brings you here so late?" said the favourite, astonished at his beaming face; "one would think that you had got the King of England in Madrid." "If I have not got the King," replied Gondomar, "at least I have got the Prince." Olivares, stupefied at what he heard, remained silent for some time. At last he congratulated Gondomar on the news he brought. It could not be, he thought, but that the Prince's arrival would in some way redound to the advantage of the

¹ The Prince and Buckingham to the King, March 2, *Hardwicke S. P.* i. 403. *Salvetti's News-Letter*, March ⁷/₁₇.

² 'A True Relation,' &c., Nichols' *Progresses*, iii. 818. This account was compiled by Bristol himself.

Catholic Church. Olivares then went to find the King, and the strange news was discussed between them in the royal bedchamber. On one point they were soon agreed. If Charles had not made up his mind to change his religion, he would not have come to Spain. Philip, turning to a crucifix which stood at the head of his bed, addressed Him whom the image represented. "Lord," he said, "I swear to Thee, by the crucified union of God and man, which I adore in Thee at whose feet I place my lips, that the coming of the Prince of Wales shall not prevail with me, in anything touching Thy Catholic religion, to go a step beyond that which thy vicar the Roman Pontiff may resolve, even if it may involve the loss of all the kingdoms which, by Thy favour and mercy, I possess. As to what is temporal and is mine," he added, looking at Olivares, "see that all his wishes are gratified, in consideration of the obligation under which he has placed us by coming here."¹ With these words he dismissed Olivares for the night. During the first months of the year, the position of the Spanish minister had been one of extreme difficulty. If, indeed, a choice became inevitable, he would undoubtedly elect to stand by the side of the Emperor in war, rather than leave the cause of his Church without support. But the prospect was most unwelcome, and he had strained every nerve to bring Ferdinand and James to consent to terms, which, in his ignorance of the temper of Protestant nations, he fancied would prove acceptable to both parties. Already his dream had begun to melt away before the hard realities of life.

Difficult position of Olivares. It was known at Madrid that the Emperor was not to be bribed to relinquish his fixed intention by the promise of the Infanta's hand for his son. For some weeks Olivares had been tormented with renewed demands that the Spanish Government should take a side. Khevenhüller, the Imperial Ambassador, and De Massimi, the Papal Nuncio, had been urging him, in no measured terms, to secure his master's approbation for the transference of the Electorate, whilst Bristol had been no less persistent in pressing him to

¹ Roça, *Add. MSS. 25,689, fol. 65.* Appendix to *Franciseo de Jesus.*
325.

take active steps in thwarting a measure which he truly represented as ruinous to the prospects of peace. Under the circumstances, the perplexities of the Spanish Government had been overwhelming. If the Emperor would not yield, it might be possible, it was thought, to induce him to create an eighth Electorate, and this proposal had been allowed to reach Bristol's ears, coupled with the suggestion that Frederick's son should be educated at Vienna ; though it is needless to say that no hint was given him of the scheme for bringing up the boy in the Roman Catholic religion.¹ Sanguine as his temperament was, Olivares can hardly have concealed from himself during these weeks that there was at least a possibility that his efforts to patch the rent might not be so successful as he had wished. Nor were the prospects of the marriage more favourable than those of his German diplomacy. The Infanta, as he well knew, had set her face against it as sternly as ever ; yet he could not draw back from the treaty if he would. The penalty of his own dissimulation, and of the dissimulation of those who had gone before him, was being exacted to the uttermost. With a smiling face, he had to await the coming of the evil day which, unless the Pope chose to come to his help, would expose his falsehood to the world. At one time he had been obliged to make arrangements for the Infanta's voyage and for the selection of the noblemen who were to take charge of her and her attendants ; at another time he had been compelled to look on whilst the King wrote an autograph letter to the Pope pressing him to accord the dispensation, although the Pope must have been perfectly aware that the granting of the dispensation was the last thing for which Philip really wished.²

From this horrible-dilemma he was now, as he fancied, relieved for ever. The Prince, he supposed, was come with the intention of professing himself a convert to the Catholic Church. Every difficulty, therefore, was now at an end. The marriage would be concluded to the satisfaction of all parties ; the Emperor would concede the point of the eighth Electorate, and the Prince of Wales

Olivares ex-
pects the
Prince to
change his
religion.

¹ Bristol to Calvert, Feb. 23, *S. P. Spain.* *Khevenhüller*, x. 71-79.

² Bristol to the King, Feb. 22, *S. P. Spain.*

would use all his influence in favour of the education of his nephew in the religion which would be his own ; the Palatinate and the British Isles would, within a few years, be added to the spiritual dominions of the Roman see. Spain, so long maligned as aspiring to universal monarchy, would not ask for a foot of territory which was not legitimately her own. If she was from henceforth to look down upon the other kingdoms of the world, it would be from the height of the moral supremacy which self-abnegation alone could give. Olivares would be the Philip II. of peace.¹

Such was the latest form of the long-enduring Spanish hallucination.² The next morning Gondomar, summoned to

March 8.
The Prince
of Wales an-
nounces his
arrival.

Bristol's house, was, for the first time, as the English Ambassador imagined, entrusted with the great secret. He was to tell Olivares that Buckingham had arrived,

but he was to say nothing about the Prince. Accordingly in the afternoon, the two favourites met in the palace gardens. Every form which the most precise rules of Spanish courtesy demanded was observed between them ; and, as soon as it was dark, Buckingham was admitted to the royal apartments

Buckingham
presented to
the King.

to kiss his Majesty's hands. The next day, although the secret of the Prince's arrival had been communicated to Philip, a mysterious silence was ordered to be preserved upon the subject. Philip, accompanied by the Queen and the Infanta as well as by his two brothers, the Infants Charles and Ferdinand, drove backwards and forwards through the streets, whilst the Prince of Wales, whose arrival was supposed to be still unknown, was placed

¹ The scheme of Olivares may be not unaptly compared to the ideas which dictated the maps of Europe which were published in Paris during the Second Empire. In them France always appeared without additional territory, though everything else is changed.

² The extract from the despatch in which Coloma, the Spanish Ambassador in England, announced the Prince's journey, will show how deep-seated this idea was. The Prince, he says, has gone 'á tomar las leyes que V. Mag^d. le diere, no solo en la materia del casamento, sino en las demás que miran á la confusión de nuestros enemigos, que sentirán este golpe como mortal para ellos.' Coloma to Philip IV., ^{Feb. 19} ~~March 1~~, Madrid Palace Library.

in another coach, from which he might catch a sight of the royal family as they passed. Once the King took off his hat to him, but there was no other sign of recognition. The streets were thronged, but no outward demonstrations were allowed, though everyone knew who the stranger in the coach was. Amongst that vast crowd there was not one whose heart did not swell with triumph at the thought that the Prince of heretic England had come to bow his knee at the altars of the national faith.

When the procession was ended, Olivares joined the Prince and assured him that his master was dying to speak to him, and intended to visit him in the evening. Charles would not hear of this, and offered to pay his compliments to the King at once. The proposal was, however, declined, on the ground that the Prince's retinue was not sufficiently numerous to enable him to appear with the dignity befitting his rank ; and it was finally arranged that the meeting should take place in the open air.

As soon as they met, Philip invited Charles to come into his

^{March 9.} ^{Meeting of} coach. Bristol was taken with them as an interpreter, Philip and and they remained together in friendly conversation Charles. for half an hour.¹

In the midst of these ceremonies Olivares had an eye to business. "Let us despatch this matter out of hand," he said to Buckingham, "and strike it up without the Pope." "Very well," replied the Englishman ; "but how is it to be done ?" "The means," replied Olivares, "are very easy. It is but the conversion of the Prince, which we cannot conceive but his Highness intended upon his resolution for this journey." Against this idea, it would seem, Buckingham protested, doubtless in less vehement language than he took credit to himself for after his return to England. "Then," said Olivares, "we must send to Rome."

The next morning Olivares appeared with a letter which he had written to the Pope's nephew, Cardinal Ludovisi. The King of England, he told him, had put such an obligation

¹ 'A True Relation,' &c., Nichols' *Progresses*, iii. 818. Spanish Account. Guizot, *Projet de Mariage Royal*, 107. Francisco de Jesus, 54.

on his master by sending his son, that he trusted there would be no further delay in granting the dispensation, for there was nothing in his kingdom which he could now deny him. Some months afterwards,

March 10.
Olivares writes to Rome.

Buckingham asserted that he found the Spaniard's language 'heavy and ineffectual,' and that he had all but quarrelled with him about it. In a letter written by himself and the Prince to James that very day, nothing of the kind is to be found. "We find," they say, "the Count Olivares so overvaluing our journey, that he is so full of real courtesy, that we can do no less than beseech your Majesty to write the kindest letter of thanks and acknowledgment you can unto him." That very morning, Olivares had said, with truly Spanish exaggeration, that if the Prince could not have the Infanta as his wife, he should have her as his mistress. "We must hold you thus much

Question of acknowledging the Pope.

longer to tell you," the writers went on to say, "the Pope's Nuncio works as maliciously and as actively as he can against us, but receives such rude answers that we hope he will be soon weary on it. We make this collection of it, that the Pope will be very loth to grant a dispensation ; which, if he will not do, then we would gladly have your directions how far we may engage you in the acknowledgement of the Pope's special power. For we almost find it, if you will be contented to acknowledge the Pope chief head under Christ, that the match will be made without him."¹

The old King was sadly puzzled by this last paragraph when it arrived in England. "I have written," he replied, "a letter

March 25.
James's reply.

to Conde de Olivares, as both of you desired me, as full of thanks and kindness as can be devised, and indeed he well deserves. But in the end of your letter ye put in a cooling card, anent the Nuncio's averseness to this business, and that thereby ye collect that the Pope will likewise be averse ; but first ye must remember that in Spain they never put doubt of the granting of the dispensation ; that themselves did set down the spiritual conditions, which I fully agreed unto, and by them were they sent to Rome, and the

¹ Buckingham's relation, *Lords' Journals*, iii. 222. The Prince and Buckingham to the King, March 10, *Hardwicke S. P.* i. 401.

Consulta¹ there concluded that the Pope might, nay ought, for the weal of Christendom, to grant a dispensation upon these conditions. These things may justly be laid before them, but I know not what ye mean by my acknowledging the Pope's spiritual supremacy. I am sure ye would not have me renounce my religion for all the world, but all that I can guess at your meaning is that it may be ye have an allusion to a passage in my book against Bellarmin, where I offer, if the Pope would quit his godhead and usurping over kings, to acknowledge him for the Chief Bishop, to which all appeals of churchmen ought to lie *en dernier ressort*, the very words I send you here enclosed, and that is the farthest that my conscience will permit me to go upon this point, for I am not a monsieur who can shift his religion as easily as he can shift his shirt when he cometh from tennis."²

It is not probable that either Charles or Buckingham was seriously thinking of acknowledging the authority of the Pope.

March 10. Attempts to convert the Prince. A game of duplicity was being played on both sides. By constantly referring to the reluctance of the Pope to grant the dispensation, Olivares, no doubt, hoped to terrify Charles into the hoped-for conversion, whilst, at the same time, if he found his religious convictions to be unassailable, he was preparing him for the announcement that the Pope had refused to grant the dispensation. Charles, on the other hand, instead of meeting the difficulty in the face, was inclined to temporise, thinking it good policy to allow hopes to be entertained which he never intended to realise. Not long after his arrival, he threw away a splendid opportunity of clearing his position. Olivares was talking to him about his grandmother. The Queen of Scots, he said, had suffered for

¹ i.e. the junta at Madrid.

² "As for myself, if that were yet the question, I would with all my heart give my consent that the Bishop of Rome should have the first seat. I being a Western King, would go with the Patriarch of the West. And for his temporal principality over the Signores of Rome, I do not quarrel at either. Let him, in God's name, be *primus Episcopus inter omnes Episcopos, et princeps Episcorum*, so it be no otherwise but as St. Peter was *princeps Apostolorum*." The Kirg to the Prince and Buckingham March 25, Hardwicke S. P. i. 411.

the true faith, and her blood which had been shed would not cease to cry to heaven till her children who came after her were brought back to a knowledge of the faith. Instead of taking the chance, thus thrown in his way, of stating plainly what his religious position was, Charles affected in his reply to treat the whole matter as a mere historical question, and offered to show the Spaniard a portrait of his grandmother, and to enlighten him on some points relating to her execution.¹

The Spanish ministers were much perplexed. At last they came to the conclusion that Charles was afraid of Bristol. Gondomar accordingly undertook to remove the obstacle, and adjured the ambassador not to hinder the pious work of the Prince's conversion, to which, as he said, Buckingham was ready to give his aid. Bristol, knowing what the common rumour was, and having no doubt noticed the Prince's deportment, accepted Gondomar's account without difficulty, little dreaming that his mistake would one day be imputed to him as a crime. Going straight to the Prince, he asked him with what object he had come to Spain. "You know as well as I," answered Charles, briefly. "Sir," said Bristol, who was too much a man of the world to be surprised at anything, "servants can never serve their masters industriously unless they know their meanings fully. Give me leave, therefore, to tell you what they say in the town is the cause of your coming : 'That you mean to change your religion, and to declare it here.' I do not speak this that I will persuade you to do it, or that I will promise you to follow your example, though you will do it. But, as your faithful servant, if you will trust me with so great a secret, I will endeavour to carry it the discreetest way I can." By this time Charles began to show signs of vexation, hardly knowing, perhaps, how much he was himself to blame for the suspicions to which he had given rise. "I wonder," he broke in, indignantly, "what you have ever found in me that you should conceive I would be so base and unworthy as for a wife to change my religion." Bristol replied that he hoped he would

¹ *Francisco de Jesus*, 57. Compare Roça's narrative in the Appendix,

pardon what he had said, and then proceeded to give him some good advice. Unless he let it be known plainly that he had no intention of allowing himself to be converted, there would be no real effort made to obtain the dispensation. Nothing would be settled as long as that question remained open.¹

It can hardly be doubted that both Gondomar and Olivares were well pleased when the day came on which the Prince was March 16. to be removed from Bristol's house. On March 16 The Prince lodged in the Palace. he was conducted in state to the apartments prepared for him in the Royal Palace. The King himself came to accompany him, forcing him to take the right hand as they rode. A week before, Gondomar had been created a Councillor of State, and had been ordered to accept his dignity at the Prince's hands. All prisoners, who were not confined on account of the most heinous crimes, were set at liberty. English galley-slaves, who had been captured when serving in pirate vessels, saw hope beam on them once more, and were freed for ever from their life of wretchedness. The sumptuary laws which had been recently imposed in the vain hope of restoring by such expedients the exhausted finances, were relaxed, and the Court was ordered to deck itself in all its ancient splendour.² As the Prince passed through the streets, the populace applauded him to the echo, and the song of Lope de Vega, which told how Charles had come, under the guidance of Love, to the Spanish sky, to see his star Maria, was sung by high and low.³

Yet, even amidst the gorgeous festivities which followed, the old question was ever returning. "For our main and chief business," wrote the two young men to the King, March 17. The conversion still looked for. "we find them, by outward shows, as desirous of it as ourselves, yet are they hankering upon a conversion ; for they say that there can be no firm friendship with-

¹ Seventh Article against Bristol. Answer to the Seventh Article. Charles I. to Bristol, Jan. 20, 1626, *State Trials*, ii. 1285, 1406, 1277.

² 'A True Relation,' &c. Nichols' *Progresses*, iii. 818.

³ "Carlos Estuardo soy
Que, siendo amor mi guia,
Al cielo d'Espana voy
Por ver mi estrella Maria."

out union in religion, but put no question in bestowing their sister ; and we put the other quite out of question, because neither our conscience nor the time serves for it, and because we will not implicitly rely upon them." This was certainly but a faint resistance, and it is hardly to be wondered at that Charles added, in his own hand, "I beseech your Majesty advise as little with your Council in these businesses as you can."¹

In truth, Charles was more than ever anxious to avoid giving offence to the Spaniards. He had found an opportunity

Charles's opinion of the Infanta. of seeing the Infanta more closely than when she had passed him in her brother's coach. "Without flattery," wrote Buckingham, "I think there is not a sweeter creature in the world. Baby Charles himself is so touched at the heart, that he confesses all he ever yet saw is nothing to her, and swears that, if he want her, there shall be blows."² Of love, in the higher sense of the word, there can have been no question between two persons who had never exchanged a syllable with one another in their lives ; but it is impossible to doubt that Charles's fancy and imagination were deeply impressed, even if something is to be set down to his reluctance to return to England baffled and alone.

At last, however, the time came when it was necessary to think of more serious business. Buckingham was now, for the

Buckingham as a diplomatist. first time in his life, to try his powers as a diplomatist. He began by requesting Olivares to join him in putting the marriage treaty into its final shape, the Prince having come to Spain upon the understanding that the King had already given his sincere assent to the match.³

It is not to be supposed that Olivares would leave anything unattempted to obtain better terms from Buckingham than those which he had wrung from Bristol. Before him rose the dreaded phantom of a war with England, a war which

¹ The Prince and Buckingham to the King, March 17, *Hardwicke S. P.* i. 408.

² Buckingham to the King, March 17 (?), *ibid.* i. 410.

³ Corner to the Doge, March 27
April 6, *Venice MSS.* Desp. Spagna.

could hardly be averted if Charles were sent back with wounded feelings. Yet, in the Infanta's present temper, the marriage was impossible. One expedient only seems to have presented itself to the mind of the Spanish minister. It was almost certain that if the dispensation were granted at all it would be accompanied by a reiteration of the old demand for liberty of worship in England. If Charles could be persuaded to make this concession, was it likely that the Infanta would persist in her opposition to terms which had received the hearty approbation of the Vatican?¹

The Spaniard, accordingly, informed Buckingham that the King was most anxious for the conclusion of the marriage. It depended, however, entirely on the Prince whether Olivares demands fresh concessions. it would take place or not. The King had done his best to obtain the dispensation from the Pope; but it was thought at Madrid that, if a favourable answer was to be obtained, it would be necessary for the King of England to grant liberty of worship, according to the Pope's request. In this way all other difficulties would be easily surmounted.²

Buckingham was ignorant of much, but he at least knew England better than Olivares. It was impossible, he replied, Bucking-ham's reply. for the King to admit such a proposition without danger of tumult, and even of rebellion, from which the Catholics would be the first to suffer. He had no power to promise anything beyond that which was contained in his master's

¹ In ascribing this reasoning to Olivares, I have not followed any authority. But it appears to be the only possible way of accounting for his actions, taking them into consideration as a whole.

² "Olivares rispose, che il Rè persisteva non solo nell' assento, et lo confermeva a pieno, ma che gradendo appunto la dimostratione del Prencipe di trasferirse qui, desiderava medesimamente che si concludesse et s'ultimasse : che tuttavia questi stava solo nella volontà del Prencipe ; perchè si era sempre con tal conditione trattato per il che più volte havea S. Mtà. supplicato il Papa della gratia, et che rinoverebbe con efficace colore le supplicationi ; ma accio più facilmente fossero essaudite, si stimava necessario che il Rè d'Inghilterra si risolvesse permettere la libertà della coscienza nella maniera che insta il Pontifice, sperandosi che così tutte le altre difficoltà si superebbono." Corner to the Doge, March 27,
April 6 Venice MSS. Desp. Spagna.

letter written in 1620.¹ James was ready to promise that the Catholics should not be persecuted, and that they should not be meddled with as long as they confined their religious observances to their private houses. It was possible that time might bring them further advantages, but, for the present, nothing more could be done.

With this reply, Olivares betook himself to the junta of the Council of State for English affairs, a committee It is com-
municated to which had recently been formed by excluding the Nuncio, ecclesiastics who had taken part in the original junta to which the marriage articles had been submitted. From it he received authority to consult the Nuncio on the subject.

It is better to see many things clearly than to be a man of one idea; but a sharp-sighted ecclesiastic, like De Massimi, possesses an undeniable advantage over a shifty politician like Olivares. What Olivares wanted might vary at any moment, according as the danger of offending the Emperor, or the danger of offending the King of England, was uppermost in his mind. The Nuncio's object was ever the same. To the Infanta's feelings, and to the impending bankruptcy of the Spanish monarchy, he was entirely callous. All he wanted to know, as each proposition was brought before him, was, how far it would conduce to the extension of his Church. Under his scrutiny, therefore, it is not to be wondered at if Buckingham's proposal was weighed and found wanting. The Pope, he told Olivares, would do everything for the King of Spain that his honour and conscience would permit, but the decision had been entrusted to the Congregation of Cardinals, and it must be some very extraordinary cause which would move the Pope to set aside the resolution which they had taken. For his part, he thought that, unless liberty of worship were accorded, the dispensation would not be granted. If James did not choose to render real and effective service to the Catholics at a moment when he was so eager to gain the Pope's consent to the marriage, it was vain to expect his good-will at a future time. Was it not ground for suspicion that he acknowledged that he was afraid of his own subjects, and that he was unable to induce them to

¹ See Vol. III. p. 346.

consent to the very change which he professed himself to be most anxious to grant? If it was true that the King of England's power was limited by the will of his Parliament, was it likely that, when the Infanta was once in England, he would be able to keep any promises which he might now make?

This was, indeed, going to the root of the matter. After all, the liberty accorded to the Catholics would depend upon the will of the English people. If Gondomar and Olivares had been able to understand this, they would have saved themselves much discredit.

Olivares, however, was not yet ready to acknowledge the weight of the Nuncio's objections. He tried to turn the subject, by alleging that he had not come to ask advice upon the general question. That had been carefully examined by the Council of State. All he wanted to know was, whether the Pope would assent to its decision.¹

The Nuncio's reply showed that, if he was more alive than Olivares to the general conditions of human action, his knowledge of special English feeling was limited in the extreme. Without some benefit to religion, he said, success was unattainable. If it were granted that, from fear of the Puritans and other heretics, the King of England was unable to permit the free exercise of the Catholic religion in his dominions, it was all the more necessary that he should give security that the concessions which he was willing to make would not be withdrawn. Let him, therefore, make over some fortified town to the Catholics, to be held by them in the same way that Rochelle was held by the French Huguenots.²

Charged with this monstrous proposition, the Spanish minis-

¹ Corner to the Doge, ^{March 27,} _{April 6,} *Venice MSS.* Desp. Spagna.

² "Monsignor Nuntio replicò che, senza beneficiare la Religione et assicurarla, non sarebbono riuscibili i tentativi. Propose che, escusandosi il Rè di Inghilterra che in se non stava di ammettere publicamente l'esercitio Cattolico per non pericolarsi coi Puritani, et con gli alteri Heretici; che, almeno, perchè vi fosse sicurtà che non venissero fra poco tempo di nuovo travagliuti et molestati i Cattolici, et al exemplo di Francia con gli Ugonotti, conseguesse alcuna fortezza o luogo da fortificarsi in mano di esse Cattolici per sicuro ricovero et difesa loro." *Ibid.*

ter hurried back to Buckingham, who at once made short work Rejection of of the proposal. The circumstances of the French
the proposal by Buckingham. Huguenots and of the English Catholics, he said, were not the same. When the strong places were granted to the Protestants in France, it was done as a means of obtaining peace from a powerful body, which not only had the fortresses already in its possession, but was well able to keep them. The English Catholics were in a very different case. Living a retired and timid life in private, they had no following in the kingdom. The King could find no pretext to submit the proposition just made to Parliament. If Olivares thought of bringing forward any such demands as these, it would save trouble if he understood at once that they would not even be taken into consideration.¹

It is withdrawn by Olivares. Olivares saw that he had made a mistake. He threw the blame of all that he had said upon the Nuncio, and assured Buckingham that he would write at once to the Pope to hasten the dispensation.²

Everything now appeared, to Buckingham's inexperienced eye, to be going on smoothly. On March 25, he received from Olivares an engagement that no time should be lost in making preparations for the Infanta's journey.³

March 27. Satisfaction of Buckingham. Two days afterwards, his Majesty's humble and obedient son and servant, Charles, and his humble slave and dog, Steenie, were able to send home still more favourable news. "We think it not amiss," they wrote,

¹ "Il Conte di Olivares riportò il pensiero a Buckingham, qual maravigliendosene, esplicossi che non concorrea in parità di case lo succeduto nella Francia con quello che si ricercava deliberare il Rè suo Signore, perchè la consegnazione delle Piazze a quelli della Religione Reformata fu da stimolo et da desiderio di quiete del Regno, perchè si ritrovavano armati in furore, et con acquisti di Piazze ; cosa che non era de' Cattolici in Inghilterra, che nascosti, timidi, et senza alcuna existimatione viveano ; onde che il Rè, non havendo pretesto, non ardirebbe porter nel Parlamento simil propositione ; manifestando al Conde che, quando si pretendesse di nuovo queste dimande, si poteva riputar caduta e svanita qualunque trattica, ancorche avanti si trovasse." *Venice MSS. Desp. Spagna.* ² *Ibid.*

³ The Prince and Buckingham to the King, March 25, *Harl. MSS. 6987*, fol. 44.

"to assure you that, neither in spiritual nor in temporal things there is anything pressed upon us more than is already agreed upon. Fain would they, in this time of expecting the dispensation, have treated upon the ends and effects of friendship ; but we have avoided it with so many forcible arguments that they now rest satisfied. They were likewise in hope of a conversion of us both, but now excuses are more studied than reasons for it, though they say their loves shall ever make them wish it. To conclude, we never saw the business in a better way than now it is ; therefore, we humbly beseech you, lose no time in hastening the ships, that we may make the more haste to beg that personally which now we do by letter—your blessing."¹

For some weeks the Duke of Pastrana, a Spanish grandee—the natural son, if rumour was to be trusted, of Philip II.—

Pastrana's mission to Rome. had been preparing to start on a mission to Rome. He was now ordered to leave Madrid at once, and it was given out that he was to use every means in his power to hasten the dispensation. Before he left Madrid, he came to kiss the Prince's hand, and assured him that 'the chiefest errand of his employment was to do his Highness service.'² Charles would indeed have been startled if he had known that Pastrana carried secret instructions from the King of Spain, requiring him to inform the Pope of the state of affairs at Madrid, and to urge him to refuse to grant the dispensation, which was no longer desired, now that all hope of the Prince's conversion was at an end.³

¹ The Prince and Buckingham to the King, March 27, *Hardwicke S. P.* i. 413.

² Aston to Carleton, April 2, *S. P. Spain.*

³ "Tardandosi tanto a sentire la nuova della conclusione del matrimonio del Principe d'Inghilterra, et sapendosi che la dispensa di quà fu inviata gran tempo fu, habbiamo procurato d'intendere con fondamento il vero stato di questo importante negotio, et da persona principalissima che ha havuto gran parte in questi maneggi habbiamo havuto la seguente relatione :—che la dispensa fu inviata in Spagna quasi contra la volontà de Spagnuoli, che per loro interessi tenevan volontieri questo negotio in piedi, ma anco per lor importanti rispetti non volevan per adesso venir a conclusione alcuna, et volevan servirse con Inghilterra per pretesti che non potevano cavar il consenso Ponteficio nè la dispensa, et che questo era uno

That the secret was not communicated to the majority of the Spanish ministers there can be little doubt. It was a private arrangement between the favourite and the King.

Olivares' anxiety about the Palatinate. Knowing what was impending, Olivares, constant to his original policy, began to show renewed anxiety on the subject of the Palatinate. The war with England which, in any case, was probable enough, would be inevitable unless he could manage to smooth matters down in Germany. The news

His conversation with the Nuncio. of the actual transference of the Electorate had by this time reached Madrid, and Buckingham had been speaking warmly about it. Olivares hurried to the Nuncio, begging him to urge the Pope to put forward his influence in favour of peace, and to invent some scheme by which the Catholic religion might be promoted, and the promise given by the King of Spain to James in favour of his son-in-law might be at the same time fulfilled. The best thing, he said, would be that the Emperor should deposit the whole of the Lower Palatinate in the hands of the Infanta Isabella, with a view to its restitution either to Frederick or to his son. He hoped that the Emperor would give an express engagement that after Maximilian's death the Electorate should return either to the Count Palatine or to the young Prince, leaving, however, the selection between the two an open question, till it was known what were the final wishes of the King of England.

Olivares was now to learn once more how little a Roman ecclesiastic cared for the interests of Spain apart from the interests of the Church. De Massimi answered coldly that the Pope would doubtless do everything in his power to keep up a good understanding between the Emperor and the King of Spain, but that it would never do to treat the new Elector of Bavaria with disrespect. It would be well if Oñate received instructions to congratulate him on his advancement.¹

Two or three days after this interview the subject came on

de' principali negotii che portasse il Duca di Pastrana." Soranza and Zen to the Doge, July ⁵₁₅, *Venice MSS.* Desp. Roma. Compare note to p. 32, and the extract from Zen's former despatch quoted at Vol. IV. p. 395.

¹ Corner to the Doge, ^{March 27}_{April 6}, *Venice MSS.* Desp. Spagna.

for discussion in the Council of State. It would be in vain to look for an original or statesmanlike view of affairs from any one of the members of that body. There was a general feeling that a continuation of the war was almost unavoidable, and that the only chance of averting the calamity lay in getting as much of the Palatinate as possible into Spanish hands, in order that James might in due time be propitiated by its surrender. Olivares concurred in this advice ; but he added an opinion that a great error had been made in form, if not in substance, by the irritating language which Oñate had used in dealing with the Emperor. It would have been far better to have acted in harmony with Ferdinand and Maximilian ; and he would now recommend that whilst the fortresses in the Palatinate were brought as far as possible into Spanish hands, their surrender to the King of England should be made a matter of friendly negotiation with the Emperor.¹ Olivares' faith in the possibility of patching up the peace of Europe was not yet completely overthrown.

Scarcely had Pastrana left Madrid when news arrived from Rome that, though the dispensation was not yet drawn up, the

April.
News that
the dispen-
sation will
probably be
granted

Cardinals had made up their minds not to withhold it any longer.² It was a sad blow to Olivares, for he could not now hope, by throwing blame upon the Pope, to soften down in the Prince's eyes the asperity

of the impending announcement that the marriage was impossible, excepting upon conditions to which even he could hardly expect a Protestant to consent ; and the effect of the intelligence was easily to be perceived in the spasmodic efforts which he once more made to smooth away the almost insuperable obstacles by which the progress of the match was obstructed.

The Infanta, as was well known to the few who were allowed to penetrate the secrets of her domestic life, had fallen into a

¹ Consulta of the Council of State, March 29, Simancas MSS. 2404
April 8 fol. 11.

² Aston to Carleton, April 2, *S. P. Spain*

profound melancholy. She warmly protested that, unless the Prince became a Catholic, she would never consent to be his wife. To Olivares and Gondoinar the Infanta, she spoke in terms of the strongest condemnation of the mischief they had done both to the King and to herself. Olivares, who seems merely to have wished to extricate himself from the entanglement in which he was involved, did his best to quiet her. He tried to impress upon her a sense of the merit which she would acquire, both in this world and in the next, by assisting in the spread of the faith. It was not impossible, he added, that the Prince might still become a Catholic, although he was too much in dread of his father to make a public acknowledgment of his conversion.¹ To the Infanta such arguments were addressed in vain. Strong in her own feelings of right, she was not left without warm sympathy from other members of the Royal family. The Queen, Elizabeth of France, took up her cause, and the King himself was disposed to share her ideas. But her stoutest champion was her second brother, Charles, who threw himself with all the ardour of his boyish nature into the struggle, and who saw clearly how little reality there was in the supposition that the Prince of Wales intended to become a Catholic. Already, when after his first interview with the Prince, Philip expressed his belief that his guest had come with the intention of acknowledging his conversion, the boy had muttered that it would be well for his Majesty to take care that his sister were not carried away into heresy ; and he now lost all patience when he heard some one telling the Infanta that she was elected by God to be the means of redeeming England. "I hope," he said, "that the devil may not tempt us to send her there to her own destruction."²

In despair of prevailing with the Infanta, Olivares turned once more to the Prince, hoping that he might win from him at

¹ "Et segli da anco speranza, che il Prencipe possa anchè inclinar ad essere Cattolico ; ma che, per timor del Padre, non lo pubbliche." Cornei to the Doge, April ⁴₁₄, *Venice MSS. Desp. Spagna.*

² *Ibid.*

least a private acknowledgment of a change of religion. His first step was to appeal to the Nuncio. If the Prince, he said, would give the private assurance required of him, would it not be possible to proceed with the marriage at once without waiting for the dispensation.¹

Olivares hopes for a private conversion of the Prince.

The Nuncio replied in the negative, but Olivares was not discouraged. He determined to make his first attempt upon Buckingham, who had, whilst repelling the overtures of the Spaniards, been doing his best to simulate the appearance of one who was not unwilling to be converted, whenever the proper time should arrive. He had taken good care never to attend the Protestant service, which was regularly celebrated at the English Embassy by Bristol's chaplain. When he visited a church he did not omit to bow the knee reverently before the Sacrament on the altar.² So successful had he been in conveying the desired impression, that the Imperial Ambassador, writing to his master about this time, informed him that the English were assuming, as much as possible, the appearance of Catholics.³

Thus encouraged, Olivares lost no time in talking to Buckingham on the subject. What a pity it was, he said, that the Prince should not seize the opportunity of informing himself on the doctrines of the Catholic faith. No compulsion was intended ; but it could not be taken otherwise than as an insult, if he refused even to listen to what was to be said in its favour. Buckingham was all politeness. Truly or falsely, he asserted that he had brought orders not to throw obstacles in the way of a discussion upon religious subjects. He should be glad, however, to try the effect of such a conversation upon

¹ "Il Conde de Olivares nondimeno ha ricercato Monsignor Nuntio, se il matrimonio si poteva effettuare senza permissione del Pontefice, mentre il Prencipe occultamente abjurasse o di segreto professasse la nostra religione, non comportando gli interessi suoi pubblica professione n^a palese culto." Corner to the Doge, April ⁴₁₄, *Venice MSS.* Desp. Spagna.

² Articles against Buckingham, *State Trials*, ii. 1288.

³ "Stellen sich sehr Catholisch." Khevenhüller to Ferdinand II., April ⁷₁₇, *Khevenhüller*, x. 79.

himself before he recommended it to Prince. It did not occur to Olivares that all that Buckingham wanted was to gain time.

April 4. Religious discussion with Buckingham. The offer was thought to be a serious one, and on April 4 the Marquis was carried in profound secrecy to the monastery of San Gerónimo, to engage in a theological disputation with Francisco de Jesus, a Carmelite friar, who had taken a principal part in the discussions upon the marriage treaty. For four hours the debate lasted. Buckingham listened patiently, said something whenever he could find anything to say in a paper which he had brought with him, and when he could not find an argument to the purpose held his tongue. At last the friar began to suspect that he had taken all his trouble for nothing. Buckingham did not appear to understand that he had been well beaten according to all the rules of logic, and that it was his business to surrender at discretion.¹

A few days before this curious scene was enacted, the Marquis of Inojosa, the Viceroy of Navarre, was ordered to prepare to go as Extraordinary Ambassador to England,² ostensibly to thank James for allowing his son to visit Madrid. He was, however, privately instructed to urge James to make yet further concessions to his Catholic subjects.³

It was impossible any longer to avoid coming to a conclusion on a point still more delicate. As yet Charles had never been allowed to see the Infanta except in public, and had never had an opportunity of speaking to her at all. Every excuse which Spanish customs could suggest had been made without giving the slightest satisfaction. The knotty point was seriously debated in the Council of State, and it was at last decided that on Easter Day the long-desired visit should take place. Accordingly the King, accompanied by a long train of grandes, came to fetch the Prince, and led him to the Queen's apartment, where they found

¹ *Francisco de Jesus*, 58.

² Aston to Carleton, April 2, *S. P. Spain*.

³ Corner to the Doge, April $\frac{13}{23}$, *Venice MSS. Desp. Spagna*.

her Majesty seated with the Infanta by her side. After paying his respects to the Queen, Charles turned to address his mistress. It had been intended that he should confine himself to the few formal words which had been set down beforehand, but in the presence in which he was, he forgot the rules of ceremony, and was beginning to declare his affection in words of his own choice. He had not got far before it was evident that there was something wrong. The bystanders began to whisper to one another. The Queen looked annoyed at the daring youth. Charles hesitated and stopped short. The Infanta herself appeared to be seriously displeased; and when it came to her turn to reply, some of those who were watching her expected her to show signs of her dissatisfaction. It was not so very long ago that she had been heard to declare that her only consolation was that she should die a martyr. But she had an unusual fund of self-control, and she disliked Charles too much to feel in the slightest degree excited by his speeches. She merely uttered the few commonplace words which had been drawn up beforehand, and the interview was at an end.¹ Nevertheless, Charles was in no way disconcerted. In writing home he declared that the Infanta was even more beautiful than he had expected.²

¹ "Doppo molte consulte fu gratiato, il giorno dietro Pasqua di cumplire con essa per l'uso dell'annuntio delle SSMe. Feste, accompagnandolo il Rè con seguito di tutti li Grandi et comitiva de' Cavalieri nell'appartamento della Regina, appresso la quale si pose a sedere il Prencipe, et il Rè a canto alla sorella. Annuntiato che ebbe felicità alla Regina si approssimò il Prencipe alla Infanta, et gli espone complimento assai lungo, et con maniera affettuosa, di che si susurrava nella stanza, et perciò finì prima dele suo gusto vedendo anco certi segni della Regina, et che si annoiava la Infanta: qual rispose compitamenta et con la puntualità prescritta di pochissime parole d'ufficio, et si notò per osservazione principale che ella si tenne tanto composta et senza minimo segno di mutatione, che tutte gli astanti rimasero stupidi, parlandosene con maraviglia universale, perchè è certissimo che ella ha una estrema antipathia et timore di queste nozze, non si consolando con altro se non col dire che morirà martire."

Corner to the Doge, April ¹³₂₃, *Venice MSS.* Desp. Spagna. As might be expected, Bristol passes over the Prince's repulse. Bristol to Calvert, April 8, *S. P. Spain.*

² Copy of Caron's letter, *Madrid Palace Library.*

The unlucky termination of this visit did not hinder Olivares from making one more attempt upon Buckingham's religion.

Fresh attempts to convert Buckingham. Before Easter week was over, he invited him to a second disputation. Seeing that the friar's eloquence produced but little effect, Olivares himself came to the rescue, and took part in the argument. Of course it was all in vain, and no further assault was made upon the conscience of the magnificent Englishman.¹

Such were the expedients by which Buckingham hoped to occupy the attention of the Spanish ministers till the dispensation arrived.

He expects to return soon. He could not now, he thought, have much longer to wait. On April 18 he wrote to

England, to countermand the sending out of some horses for tilting, which had been ordered for Charles. Before they could possibly reach Spain the Prince would have left Madrid.² On the same day he wrote to Conway, informing him that he had been privately assured that the dispensation had been conceded at Rome.³

Buckingham's information was correct. The news of the Prince's arrival in Spain reached Rome on March 15. There,

March 15. Discussions at Rome. too, as at Madrid, it was the universal opinion that he intended to become a Roman Catholic, or at least

to grant extraordinary concessions to the professors of that religion. On the 19th,⁴ the question was solemnly discussed by the Congregation of Cardinals. Under the impression caused by the Prince's journey, they resolved not to be content with the articles to which James had signified his assent in January, and though they no longer pressed their original demand for public liberty of worship, they put forward several by no means unimportant amendments of the treaty. These questions, however, were very far from forming their chief difficulty. Though even before Pastrana arrived, care had been taken to let the cardinals know that Philip had no real wish to have the dispensation granted, it had been

¹ *Francisco de Jesus*, 58.

² Buckingham to Graham, April 8, *S. P. Spain*.

³ Buckingham to Conway, April 8, *Harl. MSS.* 6987, fol. 65.

⁴ *Francisco de Jesus*, 56.

impossible for them to look upon the question with Philip's eyes. No one who was not a Spaniard could imagine that if Charles returned without his bride, he would return otherwise than filled with indignation against those by whom his disappointment had been caused. Nor, on the other hand, was the comfortable arrangement by which Olivares proposed to discharge that indignation upon the broad shoulders of the Pope likely to be received with much favour at the Vatican. If James were led to understand that his failure was owing to

April. the obstinacy of the Pope, he would be sure to vent
 The responsibility of a his displeasure upon his Catholic subjects. It would
 breach to be cast on be better, therefore, so to arrange matters that his
 Philip. quarrel—if quarrel there was to be—should be a personal one with Philip.¹

With amusing gravity, therefore, which recalls the well-known formula with which the clergy were wont to hand over offenders to the secular arm, the cardinals proceeded to wash their hands of the whole business. They were shrewd enough to suspect that, as soon as Charles was safe in England with his bride, he would forget all the promises which he had made in Spain, and they entirely refused to be in any way responsible for the consequences. All they had to say about the matter was, that Charles must give some sort of security for his fidelity to his engagements. What that security ought to be it was not

¹ The passage, part of which has been already quoted at p. 24, goes on as follows :—“ Ma stimandosi qui pregiudicialissimo à Cattolici, che questa tardanza fusse tutta caricata al Pontifice, perchè ciò levarebbe dall' animo del Rè della Gran Bretagna qualche inclinazione ch' egli tiene alla sede Apostolica, et havarebbe potuto venir a qualche severa risoluzione contra li Cattolici che si trovano sparsi per l'Inghilterra che sono infiniti ; per il chesi risvoli sua Santità,” etc. Soranzo and Zen to the Doge, July 5, *Venice MSS.* Desp. Roma. That the belief that Pastrana had a secret mission really prevailed at Rome is shown from a decipher of an extract from a letter of his which I found on a scrap of paper at Simancas :— “ Entráron en recato de que los queríamos por disculpa, y no para facilitar el negocio ; y este fué la razon de aprocurar la dispensacion pasada, sin aguardar á que yo llegase, porque desean siempre quedar bien con Inglaterra.” *Simancas MSS.* 1859, fol. 21.

their business to judge. All such questions must be referred to the consideration of his Catholic Majesty. The dispensation would be placed in the hands of the Nuncio at Madrid, who was to have orders not to grant it till Philip had sworn, in his own name and in that of his successors, that the promises made in accordance with the treaty would be faithfully observed by both parties ; and that neither his Catholic Majesty, nor the King of Great Britain, nor any of their successors, would ‘do or execute anything, nor consent that any should do or execute anything to the contrary ; though it should concern the conservation of their kingdoms.’ Moreover, within one year, so concluded this strange proposal, the King of Spain ‘shall send unto his Holiness the said capitulations, approved, confirmed, and assured by the King of Great Britain, and also allowed and received by his Councils and Parliament ; and, besides this, his said Catholic Majesty shall promise and swear that he and his successors in that Crown shall always be ready with their arms, army, and armadas, to the end that, so soon as any of the conditions shall be broken, without any delay he oppose himself with all his power and force against that Prince or King which shall break it, or not observe it.’

Cardinal Ludovisi at once wrote to De Massimi announcing the decision.¹ The dispensation, he informed him, would shortly be sent, though it would be accompanied by certain conditions, upon which he was at all hazards to insist. The letter, immediately upon its arrival, was imparted by the Nuncio to Olivares, with the strictest injunctions to secrecy ; but, much to De Massimi’s disgust, the Spaniard could not resist the temptation of currying favour with Charles, by being the first to acquaint him with the news. The Prince was soon overwhelmed with congratulations on every side, as if all difficulties had now been surmounted.²

¹ Cardinal Ludovisi to De Massimi. Translation in Cottington’s handwriting. *Harl. MSS.* 1583, fol. 297.

² Corner to the Doge, May $\frac{10}{20}$, *Venice MSS.* Desp. Roma ; De Massimi to Olivares, April $\frac{14}{24}$, *Bibl. Nat. MSS.* *Harl.* 228, 16 fol. 183 ; the King to the Prince and Buckingham, March 17, *Hardwicke S. P. i.* 408.

It is only by conjecture that we can penetrate the secret feelings of Philip when he learned that the long intrigue had finally broken down, and that the Pope had refused to stand between his sister and her unwelcome lover. The only symptom of his agitation which came to the surface was one more desperate attempt to convert the Prince. A third theological discussion, in which Charles himself was to take part, was fixed for the evening of April 23.

That day, St. George's Day, the Prince and Buckingham dined in state. Some weeks before, his father, in one of his St. George's Day. garrulous letters, had encouraged them to keep the festival of the patron of England with unusual magnificence. "I sent you," he wrote, "your robes of the order, which ye must not forget to wear on St. George's Day, and dine together in them, if they can come in time, which I pray God they may, for it will be a goodly sight for the Spaniards to see my two boys dine in them." The Spaniards, however, did not appear to appreciate the display.¹ They had been thoroughly disgusted by Buckingham's proceedings with respect to the religious conferences, and they now began to take it for granted that it was by his arts that the Prince's conversion had been hindered. Before the day ended a violent quarrel had broken out between the English favourite and Don Fernando Giron, a member of the Council of State, and the angry disputants were only pacified by an assurance that the misunderstanding had been caused by the ignorance of an interpreter.

As soon as the evening came, Charles and Buckingham were carried off to the appointed conference. The King him-

Another religious discussion. self accompanied them to the place, though he withdrew immediately on the plea that it was unfit for a King of Spain to listen to a single word directed against his religion.

One friar had been thought sufficient to confront Buckingham. No less than four were summoned to convince the Prince. For some minutes after Charles had taken his seat, there was complete silence. At last one of the friars asked

¹ Corner to the Doge, May $\frac{10}{20}$, *Venice MSS.* Desp. Spagna.

him if he had no matter to propose for their consideration. "Nothing at all," replied the Prince; "I have no doubts whatever." Olivares then suggested that an attempt should be made to enlighten him. Upon this Antonio de Sotomayor, the King's confessor, argued at some length in behalf of the Pope's claim to be the Vicar of Christ. To clinch the argument, Father Zacharias chimed in with the passage in which the Saviour addressed the failing apostle, "And thou, when thou art converted, strengthen thy brethren." Charles at once replied that they were straining the text by forcing such an interpretation upon it, and requested that it might be read again in French. After it had been twice repeated, he said something to Buckingham in English. Regardless of those decencies of life which were so dear to the Spanish heart, Buckingham leapt from his seat, and, after expressing his contempt for the friars by unseemly gesticulations, threw his hat upon the ground, and stamped upon it. After this the conference was of course brought to an end.¹

That Charles gave any direct support to the prevailing opinion that he intended to change his religion, is contradicted by every scrap of evidence which exists. He was ready, he told one of the friars who had taken part in the discussion, to abjure his religion as soon as he was convinced of its falsehood. Under ordinary circumstances, such language is usually taken as a polite form of refusal, but, situated as Charles was, it would have saved much misapprehension if he had absolutely declined to take part in religious conversations, lest they might give rise to those false hopes to which it was his duty to put an end.²

It was not with James's good-will that the slightest ground was given to the Spaniards for supposing that they could effect a conversion of the Prince. A ship which sailed from England crowded with the attendants whose presence was needed to enable Charles to keep his Court

Chaplains sent by James.

¹ *Francisco de Jesus*, 58.

² "Le voci continuano che il Prencipe inclina assai all abjurare le heresie, quando ne sia illuminato, cosi si e espresso col Capucino." Corner to the Doge, May ¹⁰/₂₀, *Venice MSS.* Desp. Spagna.

in state, carried also two of the Prince's chaplains, Mawe and Wren. From these men James expected great things. When they arrived at Madrid they were to take care to have 'a convenient room appointed for prayer,' which was to 'be decently adorned, chapel-wise, with an altar, fonts, palls, linen coverings, demy carpet, four surplices, candlesticks, tapers, chalices, patens, a fine towel for the Prince, other towels for the household, a traverse, wafers for the Communion, a basin, flagons, and two copes.' The chaplains were further directed to see that prayers 'be duly kept twice a day, that all reverence be used by every one present being uncovered, kneeling at due times, standing up at the creeds and gospel, bowing at the name of Jesus.' The Communion was to 'be celebrated in due form, with an oblation of every communicant, and admixing water with the wine.' In the sermons there were to be 'no polemical preachings,' but the doctrine of the Church of England was to be confirmed 'by all positive arguments either in fundamental or moral points, and specially to apply ourselves to moral lessons to preach Christ Jesus crucified.' The chaplains were not to engage in disputation, excepting at the request of Bristol or Cottington ; and, lastly, they were to carry with them 'the articles of religion in many copies, the book of Common Prayer in several languages, store of English service books,' and 'the King's own works in English and Latin.'

"The Spanish Ambassador," wrote James a month later, "let fall a word to Gresley, as if there would be some question made that my baby's chaplains should not do their service in the King's palace there ; but he concluded that that business would be soon accommodated. Always in case any such difficulty should be stuck at, ye may remember them, that it is an ill preparation for giving the Infanta free exercise of her religion here, to refuse it to my son there ; since their religion is as odious to a number here as ours is there. And if they will not yield, then, my sweet baby, show yourself not to be ashamed of your profession ; but go sometimes to my Ambassador's house and have your service

¹ Directions to the Prince's chaplains, March 10, S. P. Spain.

there, that God and man may see ye are not ashamed of your religion. But I hope in God this shall not need.”¹

No doubt there was enough of folly in the idea that it was possible to make a Protestant service palatable to the Spaniards; but there are few persons of upright minds who will not prefer the folly of the father to the prudence of the son.

James's plan for exhibiting what he considered to be a service ‘decent and agreeable to the purity of the Prince’s English Church, and yet as near the Roman form as can service pro- lawfully be done,’² was never carried into execution. bited in the Royal Olivares sent for Cottington, and told him plainly Palace. that any attempt of the chaplains to enter the Royal Palace would be resisted by force.³ Against this intimation Charles was powerless. Once, indeed, it appears, in a moment of pique, Buckingham caused Charles to attend the ministrations of his religion in Bristol’s house; but the practice was not continued, and a month later, in the instructions given to Cottington when he was about to return to England, the Prince charged him ‘to give his Majesty satisfaction in that his Highness hath not had the exercise of his religion in hearing sermons.’⁴

On April 24 the dispensation was placed in the hands of the Nuncio at Madrid, accompanied by a letter to Philip from

The dispen- sation in the hands of the Nuncio. the Pope, exhorting him to do everything in his power for the advantage of the Catholic religion in Eng-

land, and by secret instructions in which the Nuncio was recommended to urge the concession of complete freedom of worship. He was also informed that the dispensation was

Oath re- required of Philip. absolutely null till the King of Spain had sworn that the King of England would perform his obligations, and would obtain the consent of the Privy Council and the Parliament to the articles, and had engaged that he

¹ The King to the Prince and Buckingham, April 7, Goodman’s *Court of King James*, ii. 297.

² The King to the Prince and Buckingham, March 17, *Hardwicke S. P. i.* 406.

³ *Francisco de Jesus*, 59.

⁴ Instructions to Cottington, May 21, *Clarendon S. P. i.* App. xviii.

would himself keep his fleets ready to enforce at any time the execution of the treaty.¹

That Olivares should object strongly to such a startling demand, as derogatory to the honour of his master, was natural enough ; but the Nuncio simply referred to his orders, and the Spanish minister was forced to inform the Prince of Wales how matters stood. The reception with which he met, as may well be supposed, was not a favourable one. The alterations made at Rome in the articles themselves were by no means unimportant. The age at which the education of the children by their mother was to cease was now fixed at twelve ; whilst James had only expressed his willingness, as an extreme concession, to go as far as ten. The Infanta's church, it was again required, was to be open to all, and the oath drawn up by the Pope for her servants was to be substituted in the case of every English Catholic for that oath of allegiance which had been settled by Act of Parliament. After these demands, the question of the King of Spain's oath, excepting so far as it led to fresh claims, was in reality unimportant. The articles themselves were utterly incompatible with James's notion that he was about to grant favours to his Catholic subjects of his own free grace. For a sovereign to agree with a foreign power to set aside the laws is to sign away the independence of his crown, whatever may be the form in which the concession is couched ; and the Pope's demand that Philip should become a guarantee for James's conduct, and should hold himself in readiness to enforce the execution of his engagements, merely ripped away the veil from the ill-concealed monstrosity behind.

The meeting between Olivares and Buckingham was a stormy one, and for two days after it the favourites refused even to speak to one another. By the English it was alleged that when the Prince came to Madrid he did not expect to be asked to make fresh concessions. They were answered that the Prince had come of his own accord ; that, if Gondomar had spoken to him on the subject, he had done so merely as a private

¹ *Francisco de Jesus*, 64.

person, and that, as it had always been understood that the Pope was to be satisfied, nothing added at his request could be properly regarded as a new demand.¹

The quarrel thus begun was hushed up for the time, and on May 3 the whole question was referred to the Marquis of Montesclaros, the Count of Gondomar, and the Secretary Ciriza, who were appointed to treat as commissioners with Buckingham, Bristol, Aston, and Cottington on behalf of the Prince.

Before this body Charles appeared. He and his father, he said, were ready to swear that the penal laws should be suspended, and they would also do their best to obtain as soon as possible from Parliament a confirmation of the articles and also of the suspension of the laws, if it were impossible to have them altogether repealed.

To this offer the Spanish Commissioners replied by asking how soon all this was likely to happen, and Charles, who knew perfectly well that there was not the slightest chance that Parliament would do anything of the sort, answered boldly that it might possibly be in three months, or in six. It would probably be in a year ; but it would certainly, and without fail, be done in three.

The next day was taken up with hearing Charles's arguments against the additional articles. It was needless, he observed, to state that the nurses of the children must necessarily be Catholics, as they were in any case to be selected by the Infanta herself. To admit the Catholics generally to the Infanta's church was an uncalled-for innovation, as they would have the benefit of their religion in their own houses. He would promise, however, to connive at their occasional presence. To do more would amount to a public toleration of the free exercise of the Roman Catholic religion, to which, as the King of Spain knew well, his father had always refused to accede. To the universal application of the new oath he also objected as unnecessary. Besides, he added, it was unfit that the Pope should dictate the

¹ Du Fargis to Puisieux, May $\frac{3}{15}$, Bib. Imp. MSS. Harl 228, 16, fol. 190.

form of oath due to the King of Great Britain by his subjects. With respect to the concession of two additional years of education he would intercede with his father, but he could not engage what the result would be.¹

The declaration thus made was duly reported to the Council of State, where it was resolved that the articles must be accepted as they came from Rome, or not at all; and that the Prince's offer was altogether insufficient. The oath required from the King of Spain must be sworn if the marriage was to take place, and the question what the conditions were which would justify him in swearing should be referred at once to a junta of forty theologians, to be summoned for the purpose.²

This decision, unacceptable as it was certain to be to Charles, did not go far enough for Olivares. It was impossible, he

Olivares urges James to be serious in the promises that he was willing to make, for it was altogether contrary to his interests to allow a religion differing from his own to grow up in his State. It would therefore be well to retain the Infanta in Spain till the engagements of the King of England had been actually put in execution.

It was, no doubt, under the impression caused by this opinion that the whole question was brought up again for

May 7. discussion on the following day, when Olivares repro-
His speech duced his ideas at greater length. "This marriage,"
in the Coun- he said, "has been treated of solely with a view to
cil of State. the good of the English Catholics. Yet, though the King of Great Britain desires its accomplishment with all the anxiety which he has already shown, and with such eagerness as may be understood from the pledges which he has given, he says that he is unable to do more for the Catholics in his kingdom than to extend to them a mere connivance, and that without force of law, nor any confirmation greater than his own word, and that of the Prince, and although that is of great value, nevertheless, as it is in opposition to what they hold to be right,

¹ Account of the negotiation. Translated from the original at Simancas, by M. Guizot, *Un Projet de Mariage Royal*, 132.

² *Francisco de Jesus*, 66.

it is not obligatory on them in conscience, especially as oaths to the contrary have been made, and legally established, in so many Parliaments ; it is therefore to be supposed that everything that is now offered is only done in order to obtain the marriage, for if, though the King desires it so much, he can do no more than this, and if we are told that the people may become so unruly at his mere condescension to a simple connivance that it may be impossible for him to do even this, how can it be argued that, after the marriage is over, either the King or the Prince will wish to preserve, or to favour, in their kingdoms a religion which they consider in their conscience to be contrary to their own ? And so little power have they, according to their own public acknowledgment, that even with the best wishes of the King and the Prince, they cannot introduce the free exercise of religion now. How, then, is it to be supposed that they will do it after the marriage ? ”

If he could hear that either the King or Prince were likely to become Catholic, Olivares went on to say, it would be a different thing ; as it was, it was impossible to trust their mere word. Let us propose to them to celebrate the marriage at once ; but let us at the same time inform them that the Infanta must remain here till we see them act as well as talk. When the release of the Catholics from the penal laws is accepted by the Council, and confirmed by Parliament ; when offices of trust are placed in the hands of declared Catholics, then, and not till then, it will be safe to allow the Infanta to go. For by this means the Catholics would increase in number and strength, so that it would no longer be in the King’s power to depress them again. He would then be obliged to temporise, and perhaps even to adopt their religion for his own safety.¹

In the Council of State Olivares found himself alone. It was not that the other ministers were less desirous to impose their own religion upon a foreign nation, but that they underrated the difficulties in their way. The idea of securing toleration for their co-religionists in England was utterly foreign to their minds. They wanted supremacy for their Church,

and they were on the whole inclined to think with Gondomar, that a little more cajolery would be sufficient to obtain it.

Olivares waited his time. Favourite as he was, it was not his habit to take violent measures with men who disagreed with him ; and he was anxious to be regarded by the English as the firm friend of the match. He determined to apply once more to Charles, and asked him what in his opinion would be sufficient security to enable the King of Spain to take the oath ? His father's oath and his own, Charles now said, should be confirmed by that of the Privy Council, and he would do his best that it should be confirmed by Parliament as well. Shortly afterwards he declared himself ready to engage that he would never allow a word to be breathed in the Infanta's presence which was prejudicial to her faith ; and that on the other hand he would be ready, whenever his wife requested him, to listen privately to the discourses of Catholic theologians.

Upon this reply the Spanish Commissioners met once more, and laid the Prince's propositions before the Nuncio. De

The Nuncio refuses to dispense. Massimi's answer was decisive. On these terms the dispensation could not be granted. The articles must be accepted precisely in the form in which they

had been sent from Rome. Such a reply was peculiarly irritating to Buckingham. Confident, as usual, of the irresistible weight of his personal influence, he sought a secret interview with the Nuncio at the dead of night. For three hours he poured forth every form of argument and entreaty, descending even to threats. "There is no way," he said at last, "to treat for this marriage, but with the sword drawn over the Catholics."¹ Bristol was next sent to the Nuncio, with no better success. Charles was plainly told that without the consent of the Pope the articles could not be restored to their original form. The King of Spain would indeed be ready to refer the matter again to Rome, and it would be well if Charles would send to England to obtain his father's consent to the concessions which were required. As for the King of Spain's oath, the question should be laid before the theologians.

¹ *Francisco de Jesus*, 72.

CHAPTER XLIV.

THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT.

IT was not only by the slow progress of his wooing that Charles was made to feel how little he was in favour at Madrid.

^{May.} ~~Dismissal of the Prince's attendants.~~ Scarcely had he heard of the impending arrival of the retinue with which he had thought of keeping up his princely state, than he was given to understand that the presence of so many Englishmen would not be well taken by the Spanish Court. He accordingly despatched a messenger to meet them on their arrival at Santander, with directions to the greater part of them to return at once to England. Some few, including the two chaplains, got as far as Burgos, and made their homeward journey through France, carrying with them many strange stories of the rough fare with which they had met in Spain. A few who, more lucky than the rest, were allowed to make their way to the capital, soon found that their services were not needed. The rooms assigned to the Prince in the royal palace were few and small, and it had been arranged that his attendants should sleep at the other end of the town, with the evident intention of making their stay as inconvenient as possible. For six or seven days they were to be seen strolling about Madrid. They passed the greater part of their time in playing cards, and in grumbling at their enforced idleness. At last, Charles came to the conclusion that it was useless to detain them longer, and ordered them, with one or two exceptions, to hasten home as soon as possible.

It was afterwards stated, with great glee, in England, that one

of these attendants, James Eliot by name, being admitted to
Story of take leave of the Prince, expressed a hope that his
James Eliot. Highness would not remain much longer in Spain.
“ It is a dangerous place,” he said, “ to alter a man and turn
him. I myself in a short time have perceived my own weak-
ness, and am almost turned.” To the Prince’s demand, what
he meant by being turned, he replied, that he was turned in
his religion. “ What motive,” said Charles, “ had you ; or
what hast thou seen which should turn thee ? ” “ Marry,”
replied Eliot, “ when I was in England I turned the whole
Bible over to find Purgatory, and because I could not find it
there, I believed there was none. But now I have come to
Spain, I have found it here, and that your Highness is in it ;
whence that you may be released, we, your Highness’s servants,
who are going to Paradise, will offer unto God our utmost
devotions.” So little, however, did Charles understand in what
a net his feet were entangled, that he actually laid a wager with
another of his followers that he would be in England before
July 10.¹

The blunder which Charles had committed in coming to Spain at all was now plainly visible. If he had never left England, either the dispensation would have been refused, or the conditions with which it was accompanied would have been quietly referred by Bristol to his master, to be discussed in England upon their own merits. If it were not hazardous to affirm that James would have come to a settled resolution upon anything, there can be little doubt as to the result of that discussion. Weak as his conduct had been, he was not prepared for so barefaced an attempt to ride roughshod over the prerogatives of his crown, as well as over the laws of his kingdom. The leading idea with which he had entered into the treaty had been a readiness to offer, in return for political support, and for the large portion which was to be brought by the Infanta, a full guarantee for the free exercise of her own religion, and a

¹ Meade to Stuteville, June 21, Ellis’s *Orig. Letters*, Ser. i., vol. iii.
152. Gwynne’s Relation in the Appendix to Hearne’s edition of *Vita Ricardi II.*, 299.

considerable alleviation of the condition of the English Catholics. That he had been led step by step to offer more than this is certain ; but it is no less certain that he had never intended to bargain for the opening of a public church, and still less to enter into any discussion about the abolition of the penal laws, a question which, as he well knew, it was useless to moot in the presence of the House of Commons, and which he would himself have been indisposed to consider, regarding, as he did, the retention of the power of putting those laws in force as a safeguard against possible disloyalty.

“Do you think,” said James to Williams, “that this knight-errant pilgrimage will be lucky to win the Spanish lady and to convey her shortly into England?” “Sir,” replied the Lord Keeper, “if my Lord Marquis will give honour to the Count Duke Olivares ; or if Olivares will show honourable civility to my Lord Marquis, remembering he is a favourite of England, the wooing may be prosperous ; but if my Lord Marquis should forget where he is, and not stoop to Olivares ; or if Olivares, forgetting what guest he hath received with the Prince, bear himself haughtily and like a Castilian grandee to my Lord Marquis, the provocation may be dangerous to cross your Majesty’s good intentions.”¹ The observation, shrewd as, like most of Williams’s recorded sayings, it undoubtedly was, was only superficial. Buckingham’s temper, however exasperating to those who had to deal with him, was very far from being the cause of the ultimate failure of the negotiation. What the Spaniards wanted was to accomplish by intrigue what Philip II. had failed to accomplish by force, namely, to make England once more a Roman Catholic country. Gondomar and Olivares might differ as to the means to be used, but there was no difference as to the end. And yet, with the evidence of this before his eyes, Charles could see nothing but the lovely vision of his hoped-for bride. For months he lingered at Madrid, sacrificing his country to his love—making promises, into the full meaning of which he did not care to inquire, and satisfying himself with the prospect of being able to explain them away, if at any time they should

¹ Hacket, 115.

prove inconvenient. By this course, he only succeeded in confirming the Spanish ministers in their belief that he was of so malleable a nature that, with careful manipulation, he might be led to promise anything ; whilst at the same time he failed to impress them with the slightest confidence in the probability of his ever keeping his promises without compulsion.¹

If it had been in his power, Buckingham would have broken off the treaty at once.² It was enough for him that the additional articles were a personal insult to himself, and to the Prince who had taken the trouble to come to Madrid on the under-

May 11. Charles announces his intention to leave.

standing that the old ones were to form the basis of the treaty. But great as his influence was with Charles, it was not enough to tear him away from the neighbourhood of the Infanta. The answer given by the Prince to the last resolution of the Spanish Government was indeed sufficiently decisive in appearance. He was quite willing, he said, that a courier should be despatched to Rome, in order to induce the Pope to give way. He was also willing to communicate with his father, but he considered that he was himself the only fit person to carry the communication. He, therefore, requested permission to return at once to England.

The next day Buckingham sent a message to Olivares, informing him that the Prince intended to leave Madrid immediately. It soon appeared that all this meant nothing. The messenger was delayed for some hours, and before he met with Olivares, Gondomar had made the discovery that Charles only needed a little pressure to induce him to remain.

May 12. Buckingham's message to Olivares.

Charles promises to stop. The pressure which Charles required was extremely slight. A few friendly words from the King, begging him to stop, at least till the Junta of Theologians had delivered its report, was sufficient to make him alter his determination. Nor was it only from the irresolution of the Prince that the Spaniards derived encouragement. Buckingham

¹ *Francisco de Jesus*, 73.

² Corner to the Doge, May $\frac{17}{27}$, *Venice MSS.* Desp. Spagna.

was the least reticent of men, and he allowed Francisco de Jesus to discover, in the course of conversation, two important facts—the one that he was chiefly moved by pique in his dislike of the additional articles ; the second, that the Prince was not likely to make any difficulty in surrendering all other objections, if he could only escape from an obligation to procure the repeal of the penal laws.¹ Even on this last point the Spanish ministers had no reason to expect to find him obstinate, as within the last few days Buckingham had offered to engage that the King would see that the laws were repealed, though he had added that it would require some time before he could obtain the assent of Parliament to the change.

Question of the repeal of the penal laws, “Will he do it,” said the Nuncio, “within a year?” Buckingham answered that it was impossible to fix a time, as the longer the appeal to Parliament was delayed, the more chance there would be of obtaining the consent of the Houses.²

The extreme readiness of Charles and Buckingham to make concessions was probably caused by the care which Olivares and of the Infanta remaining in Spain. had taken to allow the news of the proposed retention of the Infanta to reach their ears. He himself, he declared, was quite satisfied that the King of England's bare engagement was enough to enable his own sovereign to take the required oath, but the Nuncio was of a different opinion. It is probable that the course which had been adopted by Olivares in the Council had been suggested by De Massimi. At all events, he now came forward to defend it.³ The marriage, he said, might take place, but it must be a mere ceremony. The Prince must go back at once to England, to obtain from his father the execution of the

¹ *Francisco de Jesus*, 73.

² Corner to the Doge, May $\frac{14}{24}$, *Venice MSS. Desp. Spagna*.

³ In the letter just quoted, it is said impersonally “si respondi.” But the despatch of May $\frac{17}{27}$ attributes the idea to De Massimi. “Perche la negativa di dar subito la Infanta al Principe era persuasa del Nuncio,” etc. It had been suggested to the Nuncio by the Congregation of Cardinals. *Francisco de Jesus*, 60.

promises made. As might have been expected, both Charles and Buckingham were enraged at the very notion of delay, and the Nuncio, fearing that if he said anything more on the subject, the Prince would really return to England, consented, in appearance at least, to give way.

Yet the threat, though abandoned for the present, had done its work. Rather than go home without the Infanta, Charles was ready to agree to anything. His wife, he now said, might have the care of her children till they were twelve : the oath of allegiance should be altered so as to please the Pope. The Infanta's church should be open to the public. He and his father would bind themselves to the immediate suspension of the penal laws, and the King would engage to persuade Parliament to repeal them in three years.

With these concessions Philip professed himself satisfied. If James confirmed his son's engagements, he would himself be ready to take the oath, and would allow his sister to accompany the Prince to England. But just as Cottington was about to start with the news, a fresh obstacle arose. A certain Father Pedrosa, a great opponent of the match, had been appointed to preach in the royal chapel. He did not throw away his opportunity. Turning to the King, he warned him to decide from the interests of religion rather than from considerations of state policy. Jehu, who had slaughtered Ahab and the priests of Baal, had met with disasters because, however good in itself the action was, he had not served God with his whole heart. In the present case, it could not even be said that the action was good. To marry the Infanta to a heretic was doubtful, and to take an oath that this heretic would keep his word was more doubtful still. Philip, whose conscience was always sensitive to considerations of this kind, was the more ready to take alarm as he knew that the marriage was generally unpopular amongst his subjects, now that it was known that Charles had not come to be converted. People were every day talking about the prophecy of Daniel, who had predicted ruin to fall upon the King of the South that is to say upon the

Unpopularity of the marriage.

King of Spain of the House of Austria—*Rex Austri*, as it stood in the Vulgate—for giving his daughter in marriage to the King of the North. Under these circumstances, Philip hesitated and drew back, waiting to see what relief the Junta of Theologians would bring.

Even this rebuff could not cure Charles of his incorrigible habit of holding out hopes which he had no intention of gratifying. When the Nuncio presented him with a letter from the Pope, in which he was exhorted to return to the true Church, he not only spoke respectfully of the writer, but he added that, although he could not listen to any theological discussion now, he would be willing to hear anything as soon as the marriage was over.¹ In the written answer which he returned to the Pope, he expressed himself in more guarded terms. Yet even this contrasts most unfavourably with the letter which had been written a few months previously by his father. James had urged the Pope not to allow difference of religion to stand in the way of a common understanding for the re-establishment of the peace of Christendom. Charles talked of those differences as the seed sown by the inveterate malice of Satan, and promised to employ all his energies in effecting a reconciliation in the Church. So far, he said, was he from feeling any abhorrence for the Roman Catholic religion, that he would take every opportunity, with the help of time, to remove all sinister suspicions, ‘so that as we all publicly confess one undivided Trinity, and one Christ crucified, we may unite with one mind in one only faith, and in one Church.’² If Charles only meant that he looked forward to the establish-

¹ Corner to the Doge, May $\frac{14}{24}$, $\frac{17}{27}$, $\frac{\text{May 24}}{\text{June 3}}$, *Venice MSS.* Desp. Spagna. Corner's authority is quite good enough, and is not invalidated by the fact that there is no mention of the engagement to listen to discussion in the answer as given in *Goodman*, ii. 260. Charles may have said it in conversation after the formal reply was given.

² The Prince to Gregory XV., *Hardwicke S. P.* i. 452. The letter, contrary to the general belief in England at the time, was written either by the Prince himself, or by his direction, without any reference to his father. See the letter of June 6, *Hardwicke S. P.* i. 419.

ment of a re-united Church, such as that which De Dominis had lately advocated to unwelcome ears, why did he not say so, except because, though he objected to a downright falsehood, he had no objection to an equivocation? Of all men who have expressed an opinion on Charles's actions, surely no one was so likely to form a favourable judgment of them as Clarendon, and yet it was from that statesman, at a time when he was in exile for his devotion to his sovereign, that the bitterest condemnation of this letter proceeded. "The letter to the Pope," he wrote to Sir Edward Nicholas, "is, by your favour, more than compliment, and may be a warning that nothing is to be done and said in that nice argument but what will bear the light."

At last, on May 23, the Junta of Theologians pronounced its sentence. They held that if Philip was to take the oath

May 23. with a good conscience, the Infanta must remain in
Decision of Spain for at least a year after the marriage ceremony
the Theo- had been performed; within which time the suspen-
logians to sion of the penal laws, and the concession to the
keep the Infanta for a year. Catholics of the free exercise of their religion in
private houses, must be publicly proclaimed in England. The King, the Prince, and the Privy Council must swear that the favours thus accorded would never be withdrawn; and, finally, they must manage either to obtain the assent of Parliament within the year to what they had done, or at least they must have proceeded so far that there could no longer be any doubt that it would not be refused.

Olivares had his way, without violence or menace. In the face of the opposition of the Council he had summoned to his aid the Junta of Theologians.

In the hands of the Spanish minister, these learned canonists and divines now occupied the place which had been previously assigned to the Pope. From them came the demands to which it might well be thought even Charles would find it impossible to agree. It was now the turn of Olivares to express his regret for the decision taken, at the same time that he announced the necessity of conforming to whatever it might be. In the presence of a bold and decided politician with

a definite scheme of action before him, and who shrank from no deception, however gross, in the attainment of the objects he had in view, a poor lovesick youth like Charles, with his petty reticences and dissimulations, had no chance whatever.

The very evening on which the Theologians had delivered their sentence, Olivares presented himself before the Prince ^{The Prince informed.} with a smiling face, to inform him of their decision.¹ Furious at the news, Buckingham lost his temper, and poured forth a torrent of abuse. There was nothing but trickery and deceit, he said, in the whole business. "It would have been better," replied Olivares, coldly, "if you had never meddled with it, but had left it in Bristol's hands." The next day Cottington was sent once more to ask leave for the Prince to return to England. The request was politely received, but Charles was entreated not to forget his promise to remain at least till he had time to communicate with his father. As usual, Charles gave way, and Cottington was ordered to make every preparation to start for England as soon as the Spanish ministers could find time to furnish him with copies of the documents in which the late proceedings were recounted.

It was apparently about this time, that in defending the right of the King of Spain to make fresh demands, Olivares ^{Olivares urges the Prince to concessions.} resorted to the perilous course of referring to the words which had been spoken by Philip III. upon his deathbed, and proceeded to argue that as the match was not really intended by the late King, his son was perfectly at liberty to propose new conditions.² As soon as this outrageous inference was reported to Bristol, he at once

¹ *Francisco de Jesus*, 76.

² The conversation is given by Hacket, 146, as taking place at a later date. But this writer is not to be trusted for details, and Valaresso, writing on the ^{20th} of June, says that in a letter written to him by some one about the Prince on ^{May 28} _{June 7}, he was told 'che Spagnoli portando l'affare come non più lor ma fatto del Pontefice, aggionti ai proprii moti anco gl' eccitamenti degli Inglesi Catolici, lasciassero il vecchio trattato con la stabilità conivenza, ed in suo luogo dimandassero aperta libertà de coscienza; che ad indolenza del Principe di questa innovatione fosse

appealed to Sir Walter Aston, who repeated the strong language in which the present King had, within eight days after his father's death, declared his intention of going on seriously with the marriage treaty. Olivares then changed his tone, and began talking of the Infanta's aversion to marry anyone who was not a Catholic. Upon this, Bristol produced the paper containing the opinion delivered by Olivares on November 28, in which he had recommended that the Prince of Wales should be married to an Archduchess, and showed that the opinion thus given was rejected by the Council of State, and that the articles which Olivares now wished to set aside, had been officially agreed to four days afterwards. As to the Infanta's alleged dislike of the marriage, he attributed it entirely to the influence of her confessor, who was now dead.¹

Bristol's inference from all this was that Charles should withstand the temptations of Olivares, and summon the Spanish ministry to abide by the articles as they originally stood. If, indeed, he had been allowed to take the matter into his own hands, it is almost certain that nothing more would have been heard of the marriage treaty. Charles, however, was not so to be dealt with. Deaf to all questions of policy, he could neither think nor speak of anything but the Infanta. It was but a day

Charles attempts to speak to the Infanta. or two since that he had startled the rigid propriety of the Spanish Court, by leaping into a garden in which the lady of his affections was walking. The poor girl shrieked and fled, and it was with some difficulty that the Prince was persuaded, by the supplications of her guardian, to leave the place.²

Under these circumstances, Charles had recourse to Bristol, in the vain hope that he might be able to obtain what had been risposto che le trattationi prima della sa andata si tenevano di sola mostra, et esser falso opinione che nella sua ultima volontà i fu Rè ordinasse questo matrimonio; mentre anzi lasciò l'Infanta al figliuolo del Imperator.' Valaresso to the Doge, *Venice MSS.* Desp. Ingh.

¹ Bristol to the King, Aug. 18, *S. P. Spain.*

² The story is told by Howell, in a letter said to have been written on the 10th of July. It is, however, referred to by Corner in his despatch of June 3, *Venice MSS.* Desp. Spagna.

refused to Buckingham. The Ambassador, ever ready to carry out his orders, went to the Nuncio, and painted in glowing colours the great things that would be done for the Catholics as soon as the Infanta was safely in London. If they had any doubt, he said, on this point, they might at once send the bishop who was to preside over the clergy of her household, whose admission to the country would be a sure proof of the King's sincerity. Finding no signs of yielding in De Massimi, Bristol next asked to plead his master's cause before the Junta of Theologians. It was all in vain. The Infanta, he was told, would certainly not be allowed to leave Spain for a year ; though a hint was dropped that the Prince might be married at once, if he would be content to remain with his wife in Spain.¹ Finding that nothing was to be done, Charles desisted from his efforts for the time, and

Cottington and Inojosa sent to Eng- land. Cottington at last started for England. The Marquis of Inojosa left a day or two later on his special mission.² Cottington had been hastened away before the Spaniards had furnished the promised documents. When they at last came they were forwarded by a special messenger, accompanied by a letter which bears in every line the impress alike of the vain hopes with which Charles was accustomed to solace himself, and of the petty trickery by which he fancied that he could deceive such a bold dissembler as Olivares. "We make no doubt," wrote the young man, "but to have the opinions of these busy divines reversed, so your Majesty will be pleased to begin to put in execution the favour towards your Roman Catholic subjects that ye will be bound to do by your oath, as soon as the Infanta comes over ; which we hope you will do for the hastening of us home with this protestation, to reverse all, if there be any delay of the marriage. We send you here the articles as they are to go, the oaths private and public, that you and your Baby are to take, with the Council's, wherein, if you scare at the least clause of your private oath, where you promise that the Parliament shall revoke all the penal laws against the Papists within three years, we

¹ *Ibid.* Aston to Calvert, June ¹⁰₈₀.

² See p. 29.

sought good to tell your Majesty our opinions, which is, that if you think you may do it in that time,—which we think you may,—if you do your best, although it take not effect, you have not broken your word, for this promise is only as a security that you will do your best.”¹

James was beginning at last to open his eyes to the difficulties with which his darling scheme was surrounded. When

^{March.} Bonfires in London. the news of his son’s arrival at Madrid first reached him he ordered bells to be rung and bonfires to be lighted. For some time, no one who wished to be in favour at Court spoke otherwise than hopefully of the marriage. None but the envious, wrote Conway, or vile almanack-makers, who argue from the conjunction of the planets, talk of delay any longer.² James’s chief occupation

^{April.} Rutland to command the fleet. during the month of April consisted in hastening on the equipment of the fleet which was to sail in May, under the command of the Earl of Rutland, who, as Buckingham’s father-in-law, was preferred before all other competitors. To the complaints which were everywhere to be heard against his favourite, he resolutely turned a deaf ear. He amused himself with writing gossiping letters to Lady Buckingham, and in playing with her child.³ He raised Christopher Villiers to the earldom of Anglesea. To Buck-

^{May 18.} ingham himself he gave the proudest title which was Buckingham created a duke. in the gift of an English sovereign. Since Norfolk’s execution, there had been no dukes in England. The high dignity was now revived in the person of the Duke of Buckingham. In order to save the feelings of Lennox, who had for some years borne the title of Earl of Richmond in

¹ The Prince and Buckingham to the King, June 6, *Hardwicke S. P.* i. 419.

² Conway to Wentworth, April 4, *S. P. Dom.* cxlii. 34.

³ “This day . . . his Majesty came to Hyde Park, at the entry whereof he found a fair lady, indeed the fairest Lady Mary in England, and he made a great deal of love to her, and gave her his watch, and kept her as long pleased with him as he could, not without expression to all the company that it was a miracle that such an ugly, deformed father should have so sweet a child.”—Conway to Buckingham, May 3, Goodman’s *Court of King James*, ii. 290.

the English Peerage, and whose connection with the Royal family made him unwilling to yield precedence to a subject, the Scottish nobleman was first created Duke of Richmond.

Preparations for the Infanta's reception were now hurried on with speed. Denmark House and Saint James's were ordered to be made ready for her reception by the skilful hand of Inigo Jones. The Prince's ship, men said, was as richly furnished as if it was intended to receive a goddess.¹

In the midst of the bustle of preparation, James first heard of the conditions with which the dispensation was clogged;

Full powers granted to Charles. but his son had treated them lightly, and he was not inclined to attach much more importance to them himself.²

The intimation had been followed in a few days by a strange letter from Charles. "Sir," he had written almost immediately after the terms of the dispensation were known to him, "I do find that if I have not somewhat under your Majesty's hand to show whereby that ye engage yourself to do whatsoever I shall promise in your name, that it will retard the business a great while; wherefore I humbly beseech your Majesty to send me a warrant to this effect:—'We do hereby promise by the word of a King, that whatsoever you our son shall promise in our name, we shall punctually perform.' Sir, I confess this is an ample trust that I desire, and if it were not mere necessity I should not be so bold."³ To this exorbitant request the fond father had at once acceded. "It were a strange trust," he answered, "that I would refuse to put upon my only son and upon my best servant. I know such two as ye are will never promise in my name but what may stand with my conscience, honour, and safety, and all these I do fully trust to any one of you two."⁴

¹ Chamberlain to Carleton, May 3, *S. P. Dom.* cxliv. 11.

² The Prince and Buckingham to the King, April 22, *Hardwicke S. P.* ii. 414. The King to the Prince and Buckingham, May 9, Halliwell's *Letters of the Kings*, ii. 203.

³ The Prince to the King, April 29, *Hardwicke S. P.* ii. 417.

⁴ The King to the Prince and Buckingham, May 11, *ibid.* 46. The King to the Prince, May 11, Goodman's *Court of King James*, ii. 298.

On May 11, the powers thus demanded were sent to Madrid. Though the secret was closely kept, sharp-sighted observers detected that the King was growing anxious. Preparations for the Infanta's arrival. He seemed like a man who was doing things against his will, and was continually showing signs of ill-humour. Coloma reported that he was not to be trusted to carry out any promises that he might make. In speaking of the chapel which he was to build for the Infanta, not only he could not avoid crying out, "We are building a temple to the devil!" but also expressed a hope that before many years went over the building might be used as a pheasant-house.¹ It would seem therefore, added the Spanish ambassador, that the marriage treaty was more likely to produce war than peace.

In spite, however, of the King's occasional despondency, the preparations went gaily on. He visited the building at St. James's of which he had spoken so harshly, and gave money to the workmen to encourage them to haste. Richmond, Middlesex, Pembroke, and Hamilton were sent down to Southampton to see that everything was in readiness to greet the Infanta on her landing.² On May 26, instructions were issued to Rutland, ordering him to proceed at once to Corunna, and but for the contrary winds which detained him for a whole fortnight in the Downs, he would soon have dropped down the Channel on his way to the coast of Spain.

All this time the King's anxiety must have been daily increasing. For four whole weeks not a single letter June 14. Arrival of Cottington. reached him from Madrid. It was not till the evening of June 14 that Cottington appeared at Greenwich and told him the whole wretched story.³

James's worst fears were realised. The refusal to send the

¹ Valaresso to the Doge, May $\frac{16}{26}$, *Venice Transcripts*. Coloma to Ciriza, $\frac{\text{May } 25}{\text{June } 4}$, *Madrid Palace Library*.

² Rutland's Instructions, May 26. Chamberlain to Carleton, May 28. D. Carleton to Carleton, June 3, *S. P. Dom.* cxlv. 33, 65; cxlvi. 6. Salvetti's *News-Letter*, June $\frac{13}{23}$.

³ Valaresso to the Doge, June $\frac{6}{16}$, June $\frac{20}{30}$, *Venice Transcripts*.

Infanta at once ; and, above all, the suggestion that Charles might remain a year longer at Madrid, pierced him to the heart. That very night he poured out his James begs his son to return ; grief. " My sweet boys," he wrote, " your letter by Cottington hath stricken me dead. I fear it shall very much shorten my days ; and I am the more perplexed that I know not how to satisfy the people's expectation here ; neither know I what to say to our Council for the fleet that stayed upon a wind this fortnight. Rutland, and all aboard, must now be stayed, and I know not what reason I shall pretend for the doing of it. But as for my advice and directions that ye crave, in case they will not alter their decree, it is, in a word, to come speedily away if ye can get leave, and give over all treaty. And this I speak without respect of any security they can offer you, except ye never look to see your old dad again, whoni I fear ye shall never see, if you see him not before winter. Alas ! I now repent me sore that ever I suffered you to go away. I care for match, nor nothing, so I may once have you in my arms again. God grant it ! God grant it ! God grant it ! Amen, Amen, Amen. I protest ye shall be as heartily welcome as if ye had done all things ye went for, so that I may once have you in my arms again, and God bless you both, my only sweet son, and my only best sweet servant : and let me hear from you quickly with all speed, as ye love my life. And so God send you a happy and joyful meeting in the arms of your dear dad." ¹

The next day James had time to look into the affair with greater deliberation. For two hours he was closeted with Cottington and Conway. But it was the tenderness of a father, not the regret of a statesman, which was uppermost in his mind. Of the hard terms which the Spaniards were exacting, of the impolicy of the concessions which were wrung from him, he had not a word to say. If the Spanish ministers, he now wrote, could not 'be moved to reverse the conclusion of their devils,' he would confirm the articles as they came from them. Charles might then be married at once, and come away immediately upon receiving but engages to confirm the articles.

¹ The King to the Prince and Buckingham, June 14, *Hardwicke S. P.*
ii. 421.

security that the Infanta would follow in due time with her portion. He need not be afraid to marry her, he went on to say, lest they should afterwards 'free her by a dispensation from the Pope.' "For," he explained, "I will warrant you our Church shall free you better here; and I am resolved, if God shall spare me days, to become a Master Jack Cade myself, and the great governor of the mutineers in England. For, believe me, I can turn myself in any shape but that of a knave, in case of necessity."¹

"His Majesty," wrote Conway at the same time to his patron, "desires your speedy return before all other respects, and your honour's counsel. He presseth you to admit of no delays. If his Majesty ratify the articles propounded, and the King and Council of Spain will not recede from the forced and devised delay of the Junta, you must apparel necessity like virtue, and make choice of continuing the treaty, by according to their time for the solemnising of the marriage in all the requisite parts by proxy, as is used in marriage of most kings and princes; or by his Highness espousing of her personally, and presently to come thence to give life and being to the performance and execution of the things contracted, which will not, cannot, in his Highness's absence be executed. There is nothing can be of so evil consequence as admittance of delay. I protest my heart cannot think that the worst of men, or better sort of devils, could practise so base and monstrous falsehood and unthankfulness as to stop his Highness' return."²

Never were the evils of personal government presented in a clearer form. Neither James nor Conway appear to have bestowed one thought upon the English nation. Never, since the days of Pandulph had there been so gross a violation of its independence as these articles contained. The rights, and it might be the religion, of the country were to be sacrificed for the sake of securing the safe return of a headstrong young man who was really in no

¹ The King to the Prince and Buckingham, June 15, *S. P. Spain*. Compare Instructions to Cottington, May 28, *Clarendon S. P.* App. xviii.

² Conway to Buckingham, June 15, Goodman's *Court of King James*, ii. 291.

No thought
for the
nation.

danger whatever. No wonder that James tried to wrap his proceedings in profound secrecy, and that for some days even Calvert was kept in ignorance of all that had taken place.¹ The fleet, indeed, which had just left the Downs, was intercepted and ordered to return. But it was merely announced that a temporary delay had occurred in the arrangements.² James went about with a smiling face, hunting as usual every day ; yet, when men's eyes were not upon him, the thought that he might never again see his beloved son seemed to break him down. "The King," said a keen-sighted observer, "is now quite stupified."³ "Do you think," said James one day to a confidential attendant, bursting into tears as he spoke, "that I shall ever see the Prince again ?" At another time, Holderness, presuming on his long familiar service, blamed the King to his face for his weakness in suffering himself to be tricked by the Spaniards. A month earlier, James would have rated him soundly for his insolence : now, he only turned away in disgust, and asked to be allowed to go to sleep in quiet.⁴

Whilst James was thus wasting his time in unprofitable regrets, his son was occupied, with Bristol's assistance, in unavailing efforts to induce the Spanish Government to alter its decision. A long paper was drawn up under The Prince's directions, in which he proved to his own satisfaction that his word was the best possible guarantee for the fulfilment of any promises which he might think fit to make.⁵ But the Theologians could not be induced to agree with him; and the Prince was forced to wait in patience for his father's reply.

From all these efforts Buckingham stood aloof.⁶ He had quarrelled with Olivares, and he had quarrelled with Bristol,

¹ Salvetti's *News-Letter*, Jan. $\frac{20}{30}$.

² Rutland to Conway. Conway to the Navy Commissioners, June 15, *S. P. Dom.* cxlii. 93, 94.

³ "Già fatto stupido." Valaresso to the Doge, June $\frac{20}{30}$, *Venice Transcripts*.

⁴ Valaresso to the Doge, June 27, July 7, *ibid.*

⁵ The Prince's Reply, June, *Clarendon S. P. i. App.* xxiii.

⁶ Corner to the Doge, June 21, July 1, *Venice MSS. Desp. Spagna.*

whom he had accused of placing too great trust in Spanish promises. Like so many others, he was to find that, though there was no difficulty whatever in instilling the most pernicious advice into the mind of Charles, it was very difficult to lead him right. Charles would not hear of breaking off the treaty. His state of mind, indeed, was most miserable. He no longer took pleasure in amusements of any description ; he spent his time, whenever he had a chance, in gazing upon the Infanta ;—Olivares sarcastically said, as a cat watches a mouse ;—he wrote verses in her praise, which, if she ever cared to read them, she would need an interpreter to understand ; and was frequently seen stretching forward out of the window of his own apartment, in the hope of catching sight of her as she was sitting in her room.¹

Olivares was playing with Charles as an angler plays with a salmon. He had, indeed, a difficult part to act. Again and again voices were raised in the Council of State Olivares. against the folly of exasperating the Prince in deference to a pack of theologians who knew nothing about State affairs. Gondomar declared himself on the side of a policy of confidence.² But Olivares knew his ground. Sure of the support of the King, he never ceased to screen himself behind the authority of the Junta. With a grave face, he informed Charles that he was doing his best to change the opinion of the Theologians.³

There can be no doubt that if the general voice of the English Catholics had been listened to, Gondomar's opinion would have prevailed. Sir Toby Matthew, the sharp-witted and intelligent son of the Archbishop of York, who had lost his father's favour by his desertion to the Church of Rome, was now in Madrid, having been despatched by Williams with the hope of inducing the Spanish ministers to listen to reason.⁴

¹ “Non sta mirando se non la Infanta, et con ogni licentia nella conspicua piazza si facea fuori della sua finestra per colpire con l'occhio in quella dove ella sedea, sfogando poi anco al solito delle inamoratile fiamme in versi.” *Venice MSS. Desp. Spagna.*

² Consulta of the Council of State, *June 25, Simancas MSS. 2516, fol. 39. July 5*.

Corner to the Doge, *July 5, Venice MSS. Desp. Spagna.*

³ The Prince and Buckingham to the King, *June 26, Hardwicke S. P. i. 122.*

⁴ *Hacket, 135.*

The advice which he gave was such as to deserve attention. If the match were broken off, he said, the King would be thrown into the hands of the Parliament, and from the Parliament no Catholic could expect anything but the extremity of rigour. If the Catholics suffered persecution, their blood would be required at the hands of those who advised the rejection of the reasonable terms to which the Prince was ready to consent.¹

Such arguments fell flat upon Olivares. The two men were not aiming at the same object. Whilst Matthew was pleading for relief from persecution for the English Catholics, Olivares had his eye fixed upon the Palatinate, and as far as England was concerned, would be content with nothing short of the absolute predominance of his Church.

It may be considered as certain that Olivares at this time did not expect that the marriage would ever take place. Four weeks before, he had requested Khevenhüller to renew the proposal for a marriage between the Prince of Wales and the Emperor's daughter.²

Charles was, however, too deeply in love to be easily shaken

June 26. On June 26, Sir William Croft arrived with James's promise to agree to the articles as they stood, and with directions for his son's immediate return.

Arrival of James's consent to the articles. The next morning the Prince sent for Olivares,

thinking, no doubt, that all resistance to the Infanta's journey

would now be at an end. "This morning," wrote

June 27. Fresh attempts to gain Philip's assent. the Prince and his companion, "we sent for the

Conde of Olivares, and, with a sad countenance, told him of your peremptory command, entreating him in the kindest manner we could to give us his advice how we might comply with this and not destroy the business. His answer was, that there were two good ways to do the business, and one ill one : the two good ones were either your Baby's conversion, or to do it with trust, putting all things freely, with the Infanta, into our hands ; the ill one was, to bargain and stick upon conditions as long as they could. As for the first, we

¹ Matthew to Philip IV., *Cabala*, 303.

² *Khevenhüller*, x. 255.

absolutely rejected it, and for the second, he confessed if he were king, he would do it ; and, as he is, it lay in his power to do it ; but he cast many doubts lest he should hereafter suffer for it, if it should not succeed ; the last he confessed impossible, since your command was so peremptory. To conclude he left us with a promise to consider of it, and when I, your dog, conveyed him to the door, he bade me cheer up my heart, and your Baby's both. Our opinion is, that the longest time we can stay here will be a month, and not that neither without bringing the Infanta with us. If we find not ourselves assured of that, look for us sooner.”¹

After some further fencing,² Olivares returned on July 6 with the final resolution of the Theologians and the King. It

July 6.
Charles informed of
Philip's final
determination. was impossible, he told the Prince, that his wish could be gratified. The utmost that could be done would be to shorten the delay by four months. The

marriage might take place in September, and the Infanta would then sail for England in March. His master could not act otherwise, as he was bound by the oath imposed upon him by the Pope. Charles received the message very quietly, and asked if this was a final determination. Being told that it was, he requested to have it in writing. He had, he said, received orders from his father not to consent to leave the Infanta behind him, and he must consider the treaty at an

Declares his
intention of
leaving. end. To Aston, who was sent to demand a reply, Olivares spoke in the most friendly manner. The

King, he said, could never abate anything of his demands ; but if the Prince liked to leave, no obstacle whatever would be thrown in his way. His Majesty would accompany him many days' journey, in order to show the respect in which he held him, though he would be much grieved if the Prince refused to consent to so brief a delay, as it would seem to the world as if he had no real intention of carrying out his engagements.³

¹ The Prince and Buckingham to the King, June 27, *Hardwicke S. P.* i. 423.

² The Prince and Buckingham to the King, June 29, *ibid.* i. 425.

³ Corner to the Doge, July 9, *Venice MSS.* Desp. Spagna.

The next morning Charles sent to demand audience of the King, in order that he might take leave. He was accordingly admitted the same evening to the Royal presence, where he found Philip fully prepared to bid him adieu ; but, to the King's astonishment, it soon appeared that the Prince had come on a very different errand.

July 7. Changes his mind ; and accepts the terms offered. "I have resolved," said Charles, "to accept with my whole heart what has been proposed to me, both

as to the articles touching religion, and as to the security required." He had found great difficulties, he proceeded to say, and he had done his best to lessen them ; but it was better to consent to all that was required, rather than to abandon the hope of so close an alliance with the Spanish Crown. Some of the bystanders who had heard him speak so differently a few days before, naturally asked one another how they were to know what they were really to believe.¹ The truth was that Charles had been merely haggling over the bargain, and he fancied that, by yielding now, he might perhaps win back some of the price hereafter.²

For the time, Charles was allowed to dream that the prize, for which he had sacrificed so much, was all his own. Philip

The marriage agreed upon. embraced him as a brother. For four successive nights the streets of Madrid were ablaze with illuminations.

The President of the Treasury, venturing to speak against the match, was summarily dismissed from his post. The Infanta was openly spoken of as the Princess of England, and was allowed to appear in public at the Court Theatre.³ Lord Andover was at once despatched to bear the happy news to England.⁴ So decided were the advances made

¹ *Francisco de Jesus*, 81.

² Writing two days earlier, the Venetian Ambassador shows that there was a general impression amongst those best able to judge, that the Prince would give way. "Quei di più fondato discorso," he says, "stimano impossibilità che una delle parti non declini dal presupposto, ma dal Principe si pensa sarà la declinazione, et che si accomoderà al volere di quā."

Corner to the Doge, July ⁵₁₅, *Venice MSS.* Desp. Spagna.

³ Aston to Conway, July 8. Bristol to Carleton, July 9, *S. P. Spain*. Bristol to Cottington, July 15, Prynne's *Hidden Works of Darkness*, 49.

⁴ Williams to Buckingham, July 21, *Hacket*, 145.

to him that Charles imagined he would have no difficulty in obtaining the removal of the bar placed upon the Infanta's journey. He fancied that, if only his father performed his part of the stipulations punctually, there would be little more heard of the demand for a Parliamentary confirmation, and that he would be permitted to take his bride home with him at Michaelmas.¹ He did not know that Olivares, Spaniard though he was, had a clearer idea than himself of the place and functions of Parliament in the English Constitution.

Whilst Andover was on his way to England with the news, James was still hesitating before he could make up his mind to take the required oath to those articles to which he had already given his consent. To many of them, against which objections might reasonably be raised, he seems to have felt no repugnance ; but he considered it an insult to himself that he should be bound to obtain an oath from the Privy Council in confirmation of his own, and—what was of far greater importance—he objected strongly to the engagement that the penal laws should never be reimposed under any circumstances, and to the promise to do his best to obtain from Parliament a confirmation of the articles.

" In the first," wrote Conway, " his Majesty foresaw an infinite liberty and a perpetual immunity granted to the Roman Catholics ; which if it should bring them to a dangerous increase, or encourage them to the acting of insolencies, his conscience opposeth his wisdom of government, and his sovereignty runs a danger.

" Touching the Parliament, his Majesty saw it impossible for him to effect, neither did his affection and reason incline to exercise his power that way if it were in his hand."²

To this James had come at last. Nine months before he had soothed himself with the dream that the Infanta and her ducats were to be had for a mere connivance at the breach of the penal laws, which he would be at liberty to withdraw if

¹ The Prince and Buckingham to the King, July 15, *Hardwicke S. P.* i. 426.

² Conway to Buckingham, July 17, *Ellis, Series I.*, vol. iii. 154.

matters took a serious turn. Yet how could he now go back? In an evil moment he had pledged his honour that he would confirm whatever promises his son might make; and even if he could be brought to understand that it was better that he should break his word than that he should inflict so serious a wound upon the nation entrusted to his care, he could not forget that his son's liberty might depend upon his decision. In common with almost everyone with whom he conversed on the subject, he fully believed that if the articles were now rejected the Prince would never be allowed to leave Madrid.

It was, therefore, with a heavy heart that James summoned his principal councillors to meet him at Wanstead on July 13,

July 13. and after laying his perplexities before them, left them
The principal councillors consulted. to consider the advice which they might decide upon giving him. He had no sooner quitted the room than it became evident that they, too, shared in his perplexity. Long unaccustomed to be asked by their hitherto self-sufficient monarch to take a decisive step in a matter of such importance, they were unwilling to incur responsibility, and scarcely one of them could think of anything better to suggest than some scheme or other for getting the Prince out of Spain before the oath was taken.

Never was the extraordinary ability with which Williams managed to smooth away a difficulty which he did not attempt
Advice of Williams. to overcome more conspicuously exhibited than on this occasion. It can hardly be doubted that he saw that James was only looking out for an excuse to yield, and that the opinion which he delivered was influenced by this supposition. After what they had heard from the King, he said, he did not see how they could give any advice at all, for they must first know whether his Majesty had conscientious scruples against the oath. Until they had received information on that point, they could not tell what to recommend. The councillors, glad to relieve themselves from the responsibility of advising the King either to act against his conscience or to leave his son a prisoner for life, leapt at Williams's suggestion, and replied, as soon as James returned, by asking whether he felt any conscientious scruples. "My

conscience," said the King, turning to the Lord Keeper as he spoke, "stands as I said before ; but I am willing to hear anything that may move me to alter the same." Upon this hint Williams spoke. He was aware, he said, how little it became him, whose studies had been so frequently interrupted, to discuss a point of divinity with one of his Majesty's deep learning. Yet he could not but remember that the Prince had already acceded to the articles. He was sure that the Prince was as good a Protestant as any in the world ; and in this case he thought that his Highness was in the right ; for he had not been asked to be slack in the advancing of the true religion, or even to give his consent to the predominance of Popery. All that was demanded was that he would withdraw from any attempt to suppress or to extirpate the Roman Catholic faith. No one thought of accusing the King of France of sinning against his conscience because he did not suppress the Protestants in his dominions ; nor were the States-General thought to be false Protestants because they did not suppress the Roman Catholics. Even his Majesty himself had often relaxed the penal laws, and it was inconceivable that in so doing he had offended against his conscience. "I conclude, therefore," he ended by saying, "that his Highness—having admitted nothing in these oaths or articles, either to the prejudice of the true, or the equalising or authorising of the other religion, but contained himself wholly within the limits of penal statutes and connivances, wherein the State hath ever challenged and usurped a directing power—hath subscribed no one paper of all these against his own, nor—I profess it openly—against the dictamen of my conscience."

The King satisfied. As a speech in favour of the principles of toleration the Lord Keeper's argument was an admirable one ; but anything more utterly alien to the point at issue it is impossible to conceive. For, as Williams must have known perfectly well, the question was not whether it was wise to relax or repeal the penal laws, but whether it was wise to enter into an engagement with a foreign power that they should never again, under any circumstances, be put in force.

Yet, beside the mark as Williams's reasoning was, it was

enough for James. It gave him what he wanted—an excuse for a questionable act, which he regarded as the inseparable condition of his son's return. With a cheerful countenance he declared himself fully satisfied, and the councillors present, as in duty bound, coincided with the opinions of their master.¹

Three days later the whole Council was summoned to Wanstead. Almost with tears in his eyes, James told them

July 16.
Assent of the Spain ; but what could he do, if he did not mean to
Council.

that he knew he had been hardly dealt with by
desert the Prince? He wished now to have their opinion whether they thought good to take the oath which would be required of them. He would tell them, however, that he meant to give explanations to the Spanish ambassadors to the effect that he could not bind himself to obtain the consent of Parliament, and that the safety of the realm must always be paramount to any obligation entered into by treaty in favour of the Catholics.² As soon as he had finished, Abbot, who, for obvious reasons, had not been asked to attend the former deliberation, led the way by asking inconvenient questions. He was at once interrupted by the King, who told him that the matter was already settled, and that all that was wanted was to know if he was willing to join in taking the oath. No further opposition was offered, and the whole Council agreed to swear

¹ Williams to the Prince, July (?), *Hacket*, 141. Conway to Buckingham, July 17, *Ellis*, Series 1, vol. iii. 154.

² "Invitò bene ogn'uno a consigliarlo liberamente in si importante occasione ; ma artificiosamente li constrinse, per non mostrarsi poco desideroso del ritorno d'esso Principe et male amatori del loro futuro Rè, di approbar propositione et di essibirse pronti a suoi comandi in ogni punto. Disse delli due articoli più importanti, cioè di convocare il Parlamento, et del non offendere Cattolici, che li ammetterebbe con le restrizioni ; a quello di procurarlo a suo potere, et a questo di farlo salva la salute del Regno. I Consiglieri eccettuarine due che fecero in contrario alcune poche considerationi prometterono cieca ubbidienza ad ogni volere di Sua Maestà. Certo del Rè si può ben dire che ne' proprii danni tenghi un eccellente artificio, et de' Consiglieri ch' habbino dato l'ultimo saggio della loro debolezza, havendo perduto quest' opportunità di parlar liberamente a servizio del Regno et di far conoscer al Rè che il vero mezzo, non di recuperar il Principe, ma di far crescer le dimande a Spagnuoli, sia questa facilità alle loro sodisfattioni." Valaresso to the Doge, July ¹⁸ 28, *Venice Transcripts*.

to the articles on condition of receiving orders to do so under the Great Seal.

The King's authority, and the fear of leaving the Prince a hostage in Philip's hands, had prevailed over every other consideration. Yet it was with no good-will that the great majority of the Privy Councillors had given their consent. Questions were asked in a whisper amongst them which showed that they were ill at ease. What, it was said, had become of the temporal articles in which the amount of the dowry was to be settled? What obligation had the King of Spain entered into? When was the marriage to be performed? "All which," adds the reporter, "ended with wishes that the Prince were well returned, with much doubt what use will be made of his being there."¹

Sunday, July 20, was fixed for the important ceremony. In the Royal Chapel at Whitehall, after the morning sermon was

^{July 20.} ended, the public articles of the treaty were read by ^{The articles} Calvert in the presence of the Spanish ambassadors, sworn to. Inojosa and Coloma, and of the great majority of the Privy Council. When Calvert had finished, James swore to observe them, thereby engaging that, not only should his son's wife be surrounded by a household nominated by her brother, the King of Spain, but that the spiritual guidance of this little knot of foreigners should be provided for by the exorbitant number of twenty-four priests and a bishop, not one of whom was to be amenable to the laws of England, or to any jurisdiction excepting that of his ecclesiastical superiors; and that wherever the Infanta might fix her dwelling, there should be erected a public church to which all Englishmen who pleased might have access. To these and to other relatively unimportant engagements, James added a promise that he would do everything in his power to obtain their confirmation by Parliament.²

¹ Conway to Buckingham, July 17 (a different letter from the one quoted in the last note), *Harl. MSS.* 1580, fol. 309.

² "Insuper verbo regio fidem daturi sumus, nos omnem operam nava-turos ut omnia suprà capitulata per Parlamentum stabiliantur." *Clarendon State Papers*, i. App. 25.

The solemnity was followed by a banquet, given by the King to the ambassadors ; but it was observed that, of the English who were present, only two appeared in the gay attire usually worn on occasions of rejoicing, and that those two were the Roman Catholic Gage, who had lately returned from Rome, and Carlisle, who would probably have decked himself with gold and jewels if he had been invited to a funeral.¹

As soon as the banquet was at an end, the Privy Councillors repaired to their usual place of meeting, where, one after another, they took the required oath not only to observe the public articles, but also to abstain, either personally or by their officers, from exacting any penalty imposed upon the Catholics by the penal laws.

Of the whole number, six were absent. Naunton was now only nominally a member of the Council, and had not been asked to attend. Arundel was at Ghent, hanging over the death-bed of his eldest son ; Pembroke and Brooke were detained by serious illness ; whilst the absence of Southampton and Zouch can hardly be explained on any other ground than that of disinclination to take the oath.²

James kept the ambassadors with him till the evening, when he informed them that he was now ready to proceed to swear to the private articles. They were four in number. He was to promise that no law which pressed upon the Catholics, without affecting their fellow-subjects, should ever be put in force against them ; that whilst no fresh laws should be passed against them in future, a perpetual toleration, which was to extend to Scotland and Ireland as well as to England, should leave them free to exercise their religion in private houses ; that neither he nor the Prince would ever allow the Infanta to witness anything repugnant to her faith, or attempt to induce her to renounce it ; and, finally, that they would interpose their authority, and do their utmost to obtain

¹ Chamberlain to Carleton, July 26, *S. P. Dom.* cxlix. 48.

² The oath seems finally to have been taken by all except perhaps Zouch, who was about to take it when the breach with Spain took place. Whether he took it or not does not appear.

a parliamentary confirmation of these private articles, would ask Parliament to repeal the penal laws, and at all events, would never give the royal assent to any fresh ones directed against the Catholics.¹

James's word was not always to be trusted ; for it was but seldom that, when the time came for the performance of his promises, some new gust of feeling had not swept over his mind ; but to deliberate hypocrisy he never stooped.

^{Explanation given by the King.} It was abhorrent to his nature to enter into an engagement which he had no intention of performing. He therefore took good care to explain to the Spanish ambassadors, in the hearing of Cottington and the two secretaries, in what sense he understood the oath which he was about to take. When he promised to obtain the consent of Parliament, he said he merely meant that he would do his best. As to the relaxation of the penalties imposed on the Catholics, he did not mean to bind himself never, in any case, to reimpose them. If a great state necessity occurred, he should hold himself free from any engagement now made. With this explanation he took the oath, and with this the ambassadors were forced to be content.²

James had, indeed, paid a heavy price for his son's freedom. Since the days of King John, no act so imprudent had been committed by any English sovereign. He had taught his Catholic subjects that it was better for them to depend upon the favour of a foreign state than upon their own king. He had made it a matter of bargain with a foreign Government that he would rule at variance with the wishes of his people lawfully expressed in Parliament. He had expressly stipulated that he would never put in force the existing laws, although in the eyes of his subjects it was most important for the safety of the nation that they should be executed with rigour. If he had of his own motion adopted the policy which was sketched out in the private articles, he might have had a hard struggle before he could carry it into execution ; but he would probably at least have gained the respect of his contemporaries, and he would certainly have

^{Conse-}
^{quences of}
^{the treaty.}

¹ *Clarendon State Papers*, i. App. 25.

² Conway to Buckingham, July 23, *Hardwicke S. P.* i. 429.

earned the admiration of posterity. By making the progress of religious liberty dependent upon a treaty with Spain, he struck a deadlier blow against the rising spirit of tolerance than if he had been in league with all the fanatics in the world. From henceforth the religious Protestant and the patriotic statesman would be banded together in a common determination that a Church which sought to win its way by foreign aid, and which publicly professed its contempt for the laws of England and for the independent action of Parliament, should not be allowed to enjoy even that ordinary fair play for which, under other circumstances, it might have asked. The Spanish marriage treaty was the signal that the milder spirit of the new age had received a check, and that all hope of smoothing down religious differences, and of quenching the fires of religious bigotry, must be indefinitely postponed.

All through the past week the popular mind had been more than usually excited. The acts, the words, the very countenances of the members of the Privy Council, had been eagerly scanned by multitudes who were anxious to draw from them an augury of the fate of the country. Never were the newsmongers more busy. Strange tales of what had happened in the Council and at Court passed from mouth to mouth, some of them perhaps true, but the greater part of them evidently invented for the occasion. It was thus that James was said to have exclaimed triumphantly, after signing the articles, that all the devils in hell could not now prevent the marriage ; and that one of the courtiers, who heard what he said, whispered to another that there were none left there, for they had all gone to Spain to assist in making the match.

At last some one, bolder than the rest, forged a letter to the King, in the name of the Archbishop of Canterbury.

“Your Majesty,” Abbot was supposed to say, “hath propounded a toleration of religion. I beseech you to take into your consideration what your act is, and what the consequence

Forged letter attributed to Abbot. may be. By your act you labour to set up that most damnable and heretical doctrine of the Church

of Rome, the whore of Babylon. How hateful will it be to God, and grievous to your subjects, the true professors

of the gospel, that your Majesty who hath often defended and learnedly written against those wicked heresies, should now show yourself a patron of those doctrines which your pen hath told the world, and your conscience tells yourself, are superstitious, idolatrous, and detestable. Also what you have done in sending the Prince, without consent of your council, and the privity and approbation of your people. For although, sir, you have a large interest in the Prince, as the son of your flesh, yet have your people a greater, as a son of the kingdom, upon whom next after your Majesty, are their eyes fixed, and their welfare depends. And so slenderly is his going apprehended that, believe it, sir, however his return may be safe, yet the drawers of him into that action so dangerous to himself, so desperate to the kingdom, will not pass away unquestioned and unpunished.

“ Besides, this toleration you endeavour to set up by your proclamation, it cannot be done without a Parliament, unless your Majesty will let your subjects see that you now take unto yourself a liberty to throw down the laws of the land at your pleasure. What dreadful consequences these things may draw after, I beseech your Majesty to consider, and above all, lest by this, the toleration and discountenance of the true profession of the gospel, wherewith God hath blessed us, and under which the kingdom hath flourished these many years, your Majesty doth draw upon the kingdom in general, and yourself in particular, God’s heavy wrath and indignation.

“ Thus, in discharge of my duty to your Majesty, and the place of my calling, I have taken the humble boldness to deliver my conscience. And now, sir, do with me what you please.”¹

The letter was at once disavowed by Abbot to the King,² Disavowed and attempts were made to discover the author. by Abbot. When these proved unavailing, some dissatisfaction was expressed at Court with the Archbishop, who appears to have

¹ Printed with the name of the Archbishop of York, *Cabula*, 108.

² Valaresso to the Doge, Aug. $\frac{1}{11}$, *Venice Transcripts*. This shows that the letter must have been written in July. Mrs. Green places it conjecturally under the date of Aug. 8.

been backward in making public his disavowal. It is possible, indeed, that he was unwilling to make a statement which could hardly fail to be accompanied with something like a renunciation of the opinions which the letter contained ; and there can be little doubt that, however much he had lately withdrawn himself from opposition to James, he continued to nourish those sentiments which had been put forward in his name. However this may have been, it is certain that, whether the forger had accurately adopted the ideas of the Archbishop or not, he had felicitously expressed the thoughts of the great majority of the people of England.

Meanwhile James was doing his best to make light of what he had done. In the letter which, on July 21, the day after he had taken the oaths, he wrote to his son and his favourite, he had a word to say in praise of the unexpected compliance of Pembroke and Abbot, but nothing about that of which everyone else was talking.

James complains of the expense to which he will be put. His thoughts were running upon the expense to which he was likely to be put by the delay in the Infanta's voyage. "Since it can be no better," he wrote, "I must be contented ; but this course is both a dishonour to me, and double charges if I must send two fleets. But if they will not send her till March, let them, in God's name, send her by their own fleet ; and forget not to make them keep their former conditions anent the portion, otherwise both my Baby and I are bankrupts for ever." Other matters of infinitely greater importance were passed over in far fewer words. "This bearer," he informed his son, "will bring you power to treat for the Palatinate, and the matter of Holland."¹

The wretched affair of the Palatinate was at this moment more hopelessly entangled than ever. Almost the first thing

March. Resumption of negotiations with the Infanta Isabella. which James had been called upon to do, after his son had left him, was to open negotiations with Coloma and Boischot for the sequestration of Frankenthal, which were to be followed by an agreement for a suspension of arms, to prepare the way for a congress

¹ The King to the Prince and Buckingham, July 21, *Hardwicke S. P.* i. 428.

to discuss the final terms of peace in the Empire. Commissioners were appointed to treat, and the first conference was held on March 3.¹ Their discussions had not proceeded far when the news of the transference of the Electorate reached England, and the Commissioners at once wrote to the King. "We cannot," they said, "with our duties, but humbly deliver our opinions unto your Majesty, that, as things now stand, we hold it most dishonourable for you, and unworthy your greatness, to hearken to any further treaty of the suspension of arms."² Being asked to reconsider their advice, they repeated it more emphatically than before. Frankenthal, they said, had better be delivered to the Infanta on any terms that could be had, in order to keep it out of the hands of the Duke of Bavaria. But a suspension of arms would only serve to ruin the Protestants of Germany. Nor were the men who unanimously tendered this advice by any means partisans of either side. Together with the names of Pembroke and Hamilton, of Chichester, and of Viscount Grandison, who as Sir Oliver St. John, had succeeded Chichester in Ireland, appeared those of Arundel, of Middlesex, of Calvert, and of Weston.³

As might be expected, however, the protest of the Commissioners went for nothing. The treaty of sequestration was

Sequestra-
tion of
Frankenthal. signed on March 19. Frankenthal was to be placed in the hands of the Infanta Isabella for eighteen months.

If at the end of that time no reconciliation had been effected between Frederick and the Emperor, an English garrison was to be re-admitted. In the meanwhile the religious worship of the inhabitants was to be secured from attack.⁴ The treaty was carried into immediate execution. On April 14, the Spanish commander, Verdugo, entered the town, and Sir John Borough, with his garrison, prepared to march out with the honours of war.

The treaty for a suspension of arms was the next to follow.

¹ The Commissioners for the Treaty to the King, March 3, *S. P. Germany*.

² The Commissioners to the King, March 6, *S. P. Germany*.

³ The Commissioners to the King, March 9, *ibid.*

⁴ Treaty of Sequestration, March 19, *ibid.*

On April 21 it was agreed to by the Commissioners.¹ It bound Suspension James and his son-in-law to enter into no leagues or arms. or confederacies by which the peace of the Empire might be disturbed, and to abstain from actual hostilities for fifteen months, during which time negotiations were to be opened at Cologne for a definite peace. The article relating to the associates of Frederick, that is to say to Christian and Mansfeld, was purposely left in obscurity. If they continued to carry on war, they were to be considered as enemies of the Empire, and to be disavowed by James and his son-in-law. Three months were to be allowed for completing the arrangements for the conferences at Cologne.

Saving so far as it might pave the way to a general treaty, this agreement was evidently of no importance whatever. James had no intention of sending an army into the Empire if he could by any possibility avoid it, and Frederick, who would have been delighted to send as many armies as he could, was unable to dispose of a single man.

Scarcely, indeed, had the treaty been ratified by the Infanta, when it appeared that the prospect of a general peace

*Frederick
refuses his
signature.* was as distant as ever. Without Frederick's signature the treaty was worth no more than the paper on which

it was written, and that signature Frederick resolutely refused to give. Then ensued a long and bitter controversy between James and his son-in-law, James imperiously insisting upon negotiation as the only way in which past losses could be made good, and Frederick no less obstinately refusing to believe that anything could be regained excepting by force of arms.

In truth the controversy was one of those the details of which are worthy only of oblivion. Both parties were thoroughly in the wrong. There was doubtless large scope in Germany for diplomacy. There was doubtless large scope for military resistance; but nothing but ruin could come either from an attempt to make peace under the guidance of James, or from an attempt to carry on war under the guidance of Frederick.

What James proposed was, not to discover an arrangement

¹ *Treaty of Suspension, April 21, S. P. Germany.*

which would suit the altered circumstances of the case, and Impracticability of James's diplomacy, would have been acceptable in the existing state of opinion to the German princes and the German people, but simply to blot out the history of the last four years as though they had never been. He fancied that with the help of Spain he could wring from the Emperor a complete restitution of all of which his son-in-law had been in possession before his acceptance of the Bohemian crown. Against this, as the Commissioners for the treaty wisely asserted, the transference of the Electorate effected at Ratisbon was a complete bar. It was certain that Ferdinand would never be induced solely by diplomatic pressure to undo that day's work ; and when James continued to speculate on the possibility of such a concession, he was plainly talking in ignorance both of the special facts of the case, and of the general laws by which human nature is guided.

Frederick was therefore undoubtedly in the right in pronouncing against his father-in-law's proposal. He saw clearly and of Frederick's military designs. that the complete restitution which he sought was only to be obtained by victory. How victory was to be obtained he was the last man in Europe to know.

In fact, there were two courses before him, neither of which was likely to yield the results at which he was aiming. He might hound on Mansfeld and Christian to their bloody work, and might once more summon Bethlen Gabor with his hated allies, the Turks, to pour ruin and desolation over Ferdinand's hereditary dominions. Or, on the other hand, by an almost superhuman effort of self-sacrifice, he might have declared that his own personal claims should not be an obstacle to a general pacification, and might thus have paved the way, by his own abdication, for that reconciliation with the Lutheran States of Northern Germany which would have given the surest guarantee for the future stability of Protestantism in the Empire.

Such was the choice which lay before Frederick ; but the unfortunate man did not even comprehend that there could be His wild expectations. any choice at all. What he pictured to himself was a general league, in which the Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg, the Kings of England and Denmark, and the

States-General of the Netherlands, should agree, in loving union with Christian and Mansfeld, to fight out the quarrel which he had done more than any living man to embitter. Of course all this was but a dream. The Lutheran Princes may have been sluggish and unwarlike. They may have cared quite as much about the security of their domains as they cared about their religion. But if one thing was clearer than another, it was that they detested the armies of freebooters which Frederick was ready, without the slightest compunction, to pour over Germany, far more than they detested the Emperor's treatment of their fellow-Protestants in Bohemia and the Palatinate. A meeting of the two Protestant Electors ended in nothing more than a resolution to levy troops enough to protect their own territories from invasion. A meeting of the States of Lower Saxony ended in an almost similar manner. From all this, however, Frederick learned nothing. He had not indeed much to expect from Mansfeld, who was not likely to quit his comfortable quarters in East Friesland as long as anything remained to plunder; but from Christian he hoped great things. That headlong warrior ^{Christian of} had been taken into pay by his brother the Duke of Brunswick. Brunswick, and efforts had been made, not without success, to obtain his pardon from the Emperor. But all the while his head had been teeming with vaster projects. Covering himself with the negotiations for a pardon, he intended to wait till Bethlen Gabor was ready to move. He would then throw himself suddenly upon Silesia, and before their joint efforts Bohemia and Moravia would once more be snatched from the House of Austria.

These wild plans received a sudden check. The Elector of Saxony prudently refused to Christian and his men permission to pass through his dominions,¹ and the Circle of Lower Saxony ordered them not to presume to make its territories the seat of war. Christian knew that Tilly was approaching, and his first thought was to throw himself upon the enemy. He succeeded in obtaining an advantage over a detachment of Tilly's forces. The old general,

¹ Frederick to Bethlen Gabor, June 17, July 3. Nethersole to Calvert, July 1, *S. P. Germany.*

however, knew his man. Placing his troops in an unassailable position, he waited till Christian was compelled to retreat for want of supplies. He had not long to remain in inaction. As usual, Christian had no money to pay his men, or provisions with which to feed them, and in the face of so wary an enemy it was impossible to scatter them in search of spoil.¹ An immediate retreat was necessary, and Christian had no choice but to hurry on for the Dutch frontier, with Tilly following hard upon his heels. Before he reached the boundary, Tilly had been joined by reinforcements which gave him a decided superiority. At Stadtloo, with the Dutch territory almost in sight, Christian reached a heath to which the only entrance was a narrow road amongst the marshes. There, on July 27, he took up a position which he fondly imagined to be unassailable ; but the troops which he had placed to guard the entrance, whilst the rest of the army continued its march, gave way almost at the first shock, and the whole of the cavalry, seized with sudden panic, fled at the sight. Christian, seeing that the day was lost, followed their example. A terrible butchery ensued amongst the infantry, which was only stopped by the personal interference of Tilly. Of the whole army which had marched against the enemy little less than twenty thousand strong, five thousand five hundred men alone sought refuge under the flag of the Republic.²

As in 1622, so in 1623, Frederick's design of reconquering his position by the help of adventurers without money or

means had ended in disaster. As in 1622, so in 1623,

Aug. 16. *Frederick signs the treaty of suspension of arms.* a defeat wrung from him a grudging compliance with his father-in-law's wishes. The battle of Stadtloo was fought on July 27. On August 16 Frederick

accepted the treaty for the suspension of arms.³ It was then too late. The three months prefixed for making the arrangements for the conference at Cologne had already expired, and all that the Infanta could say when the treaty was presented to her at Brussels was that she wished well to the success of the

¹ Nethersole to Calvert, July 25, *S. P. Germany.*

² Carleton to Calvert, July 30, Aug. 1, Aug. 16, *S. P. Holland.*

³ Carleton to Conway, Aug. 16, *ild.*

negotiations, but that it would now be necessary to consult the Emperor afresh.¹

Such were the results of the divergent efforts of James and Frederick during the summer of 1623. It would be strange, indeed, if Charles at Madrid were able to reduce the chaos into order.

The proposed attack upon the Dutch. It might be thought that in his treatment of the affairs of Germany James had done his worst ; but, in dealing with the other difficulty to which he had referred in his letter of July 21,² he had strayed even farther from the paths of common sense. It might well have been supposed that after the final settlement of the long disputes between the two East Indian Companies, nothing more would have been heard of that senseless project for a joint invasion of the free Netherlands by Spain and England. Yet it was this very project which James chose to revive at the critical moment when he was talking of engaging in a Continental war, unless the Emperor gave his consent to abandon all the advantages which he had gained during so many weary years.

The renewal of the war between Spain and Holland had been accompanied by the imposition of a strict blockade upon the Flemish ports. Deprived of all share in the privateers. commercial enterprise upon which their northern kinsmen were thriving, the seafaring populations of Dunkirk and Ostend gave themselves up to privateering. The swift-sailing vessels which from time to time contrived to slip through the blockading squadron were the terror of the smaller Dutch trading vessels, and especially of the fleet of herring boats, which, as James had bitterly complained, were engaged in reaping the harvest of the sea along the whole line of the east coast

^{1622.} September. Dunkirk vessels in Leith and Aberdeen. of England. It happened that, in the summer of 1622, two of these privateers, chased by Dutch men-of-war, took refuge, the one in Aberdeen and the other in Leith, and that in the ardour of the chase, the Dutch captain, who was in pursuit of one of them, had continued to fire his guns after entering Leith harbour, and

¹ Trumbull to Calvert, Sept. 5, *S. P. Flanders.*

² See p. 73.

had even struck with his balls some of the houses in the town. Against this outrage James had remonstrated with the Dutch Commissioners who were at that time in England, and had demanded that their countrymen should remain in port two tides after the Dunkirk vessels had sailed.¹ The demand was, however, rejected, and during the winter months the Dunkirk vessels at Leith and Aberdeen were closely watched by Dutch men-of-war lying in the harbour.²

At last, after some months' delay, James sent orders to Carleton to repeat his demand in the presence of the States-General. Carleton, in addition to his public declaration, spoke in private to the Prince of Orange, who, as he found, was not inclined to yield. Maurice, reasonably enough, declared that what was now asked would be the ruin of Dutch commerce. If every Flemish privateer could be certain of a refuge in an English harbour, from which it might issue forth unmolested by the enemy till two tides were past, there would no longer be a chance left to the honest trader.³

Thus pressed, James withdrew his most arrogant pretensions, and laid down the rule which even now prevails in maritime warfare. He had never meant, he said, to deny the Dutch their right of blockade. As long as they remained outside a harbour, they were at liberty to pursue their enemies wherever they could find them. It was only when they entered his ports that they were bound to wait two tides after the enemy's vessel had sailed. The present case, however, was not a mere case of blockade. The Dutch captain had fired guns in his harbour and had knocked down some chimneys in the town. It was in reparation for this wrong that he expected that the blockaded vessels at both ports should be allowed to escape.⁴

¹ *Aitzema*, i. 200. The vessel is called in the correspondence sometimes a Dunkirker, and sometimes an Ostender.

² The Council of Scotland to the King, Feb. 15, *Melros Papers, Abbotsford Club*, ii. 497. Best to Conway, July 23, *S. P. Dom.* cxlix, 28.

³ Carleton's Proposition, March 5; Carleton to Calvert, March 6, *S. P. Holland*.

⁴ Conway to Carleton, March 19, *ibid.*

To this declaration the States-General returned answer, accepting at once the King's exposition of maritime law, and apologising for the error of their sailors. On the mode of reparation suggested by James they were altogether silent, hesitating naturally enough to let the caged privateers loose upon their fishermen who were toiling on the billows of the North Sea.¹

To the considerations by which they were influenced James was indifferent. Both at Leith and at Aberdeen the Dutch vessels had actually entered his harbours, and they must be prepared to take the consequences of relinquishing the blockade. He ordered two ships of the Royal Navy to be got ready for service in Scotland. He would set his ports free, he said, one way or other.²

As ill luck would have it, just at the moment when James's displeasure was at its height, news arrived of a fresh violation

April. of an English harbour. A few days before two Dutch captains, one of whom was the noted Moy Lambert, came to an anchor in Cowes roads. Their sight at the Dutch. once fell upon a vessel manned by countrymen of their own, which they knew to have been engaged in piracy. As soon as they notified the fact, the pirate officers were arrested by the Commander of the Castle, and information was sent to London. The question whether the ship and its crew should be delivered up to the Dutch was being examined by the Privy Council when Lambert, acting on his own authority, took possession of the vessel and sailed away with it to Holland.³

Worse than this was to follow. On the night of May 3 the captain of the Dunkirk ship at Leith, weary of his long deten-

¹ Carleton to Calvert, April 7; Answer to the States-General, April 16, *S. P. Holland.*

² Conway to Carleton, May 6, *ibid.* Calvert to Buckingham, April 24; Conway to Buckingham, May (?), *Harl. MSS.* 1580, fol. 158, 287.

³ Conway to Carleton, May 15, with enclosed statement of the proceedings of the Dutch, *S. P. Holland.* Caron to the States-General, April 17, *Add. MSS.* 17,677 K, fol. 278.

tion, made an effort to escape, and ran his vessel aground upon a sandbank, just as it had passed the pier-head. When the morning dawned, the crews of the Dutch men-of-war caught sight of their enemy in this disabled position. Ranging up alongside, they poured broadside after broadside into the stranded vessel, till the falling tide compelled them to sheer off. So close were they to the shore that a man standing on the pier-head was killed by the shot. In vain the Lord Chancellor, Sir George Hay, with other members of the Privy Council, hurried down from Edinburgh to stop the slaughter. Before noon the Dunkirker was lying a hopeless wreck, abandoned by her crew.

The fugitive sailors had no sooner reached the shore than a new danger awaited them. Nowhere was the Spanish flag more thoroughly detested than in Scotland. By the ties of religious and of commercial sympathy the inhabitants of Leith and Edinburgh were brought into close communication with the Dutch. The moment, therefore, that the unfortunate sailors set foot on shore they were set upon by an angry mob, and were robbed and ill-treated in every possible manner. The Privy Councillors were powerless. No one would assist them in maintaining order, or would give information where the stolen property had been concealed.

. The next day, in spite of repeated orders, it was found that no aid was to be got in Leith for the preservation of the aban-

doned ship. Equally in vain was an attempt to obtain assistance from Edinburgh. The Provost came, but scarcely a man accompanied him. Guns were at last brought down from the castle, and on the following day, after the King's flag had been hoisted on the wreck, an attempt, which proved fruitless, was made to get the vessel into the harbour. The Lord Chancellor himself lent a hand to the work, only to find on his

return to land that the Edinburgh men, who had been induced with much difficulty to guard the cannon, had gone off leaving the guns to their fate. His labours were at last drawing to a close. That night the

May 4.
Attempt of
the Dun-
kirker at
Leith to
escape.

It is
attacked by
the Dutch.

The sailors
robbed on
shore.

May 5.
The ship
burnt.

Dutchmen set fire to the wreck, and spared him any further trouble.

The Council contented themselves with reporting to the King the misconduct of the Dutch. The Secretary, Melrose, who, as Lord Binning, had tyrannised over the clergy at the Assembly at Perth, following the dictates of his harsh and despotic nature, reserved his bitterest indignation for his unruly countrymen. The only remedy for the evil, he said, lay in the possession of sufficient treasure to enable the King to keep on foot a standing force, which could be trusted to obey orders, whether they were pleasing to the populace or not. Utterly impracticable as the suggestion was for the moment, it was one which, without fail, would be again heard of, if the antagonism between the Stuart kings and their subjects proved to be of long continuance.¹

The infraction of English neutrality by the Dutch had now reached such a pitch as to be intolerable to any Government which retained the slightest feeling of self-respect. Carleton's remonstrances. Carleton was directed to remonstrate seriously at the Hague, and to demand the arrest of the captains in command of the ships at Leith, and the withdrawal of the Dutch men-of-war from Aberdeen.² About the same time Conway wrote a private letter to the Prince of Orange, adjuring him to avert so great a disaster as a war between England and the Netherlands.³

It was not long before an answer came from Maurice. The seizure of the ship at Cowes he declared to have been the result of a pure mistake. With respect to the affair at Leith, June 10. The Prince of Orange's letter. he did his best to explain it away. The captains, he said, had been unable to restrain their too fervent zeal when they saw themselves in the presence of men who had exercised such cruelties upon the poor fishermen. About a fortnight later, a formal letter from the States-General,

¹ The Council of Scotland to the King, May 7, *S. P. Dom.* cxliv. 20. Melrose to the King, May 7, *Melrose Papers*, ii. 512. Statement of Juan de Sagasticaval, May 7, *S. P. Flanders*.

² Carleton's Proposition, May 23, *S. P. Holland*.

³ Conway to the Prince of Orange, May 22, *S. P. Holland*.

acknowledging the fault which had been committed, and expressing a hope that the King would pass it over, was placed in Carleton's hands.¹

This letter the ambassador refused to accept. There was nothing in it, he said, about allowing the ship at Aberdeen to proceed to sea.² Great was the perplexity of the Dutch. They were evidently prepared to offer any reasonable reparation ; but they could not forget that to allow the privateer to set sail unpursued from Aberdeen, would subject hundreds of poor fishermen to utter ruin, if not to a cruel death.

For all this James, in his present state of exasperation, was without the slightest consideration. His two ships were already Best sails for on the way to Scotland, under the command of Aberdeen. Captain Best. Scarcely had they started when news arrived that four more Dutch men-of-war had cast anchor in Aberdeen roads. Immediate orders were despatched to send four more ships from the Royal Navy to join Best in the North.³

The King's wrath was not appeased by the active measures July 21. which he had taken. Scarcely had the orders been given, when he wrote to his son to look after the matter of Holland ; and by looking after the matter upon the Nether-lands. of Holland, he meant nothing short of putting into execution the old scheme for the partition of the Netherlands.⁴

Two days later, formal powers were despatched to Buckingham, July 23. directing them to enter upon negotiations with the Spanish ministers for the attainment of this object.

"Having now brought," he wrote, "the main and principal business, which is the match of our son, to a happy conclusion,

¹ The Prince of Orange to Conway, June $\frac{10}{20}$. The States-General to the King, $\frac{\text{June } 27}{\text{July } 7}$, *S. P. Holland*.

² Carleton to Calvert, July 5, *S. P. Holland*.

³ Conway to Calvert, July 17, *ibid.*

⁴ The King to the Prince and Buckingham, July 21, *Hardwicke State Papers*, i. 428.

as we have lately understood both from himself and by your despatches, there riseth two other particulars of great importance, as you know ; the one whereof is public, namely, the restitution of our son-in-law and his posterity to the Palatinates and dignity electoral ; the other private, concerning the transposing of some part of the Netherland Provinces, and annexing them to our crown, both which will now fall fitly to be treated on. And, because this letter is a matter of supreme secrecy, and not communicable to many, we have thought fit only at this time to give you authority by this letter, under our hand and signet, as hereby we do give you full authority and commission jointly and severally, to proceed to the treaty of both those particulars aforementioned with the commissioners to be appointed on that side by our good brother the King of Spain, according to such instructions or directions as you have heretofore had from us. And whatsoever further powers shall be necessary to be given you in this behalf, you may cause it to be drawn up there formally and legally, transmitting the same hither unto us, whereupon we shall pass the same under our signature and great seal of England, and so return it back unto you. In the meantime, you may proceed to the treaty according to the authority here given you, and whatsoever you shall thereupon conclude in our name, we shall ratify and confirm ; not doubting but that you will acquaint our dear son, the Prince, with all your proceedings, from time to time, whilst he remains in that Court, and assist yourselves also continually with his advice and directions, for so is our pleasure.”¹

Never probably, in the history of the civilised world, was a war of conquest against a neighbouring nation projected so lightly, and on so utterly inadequate grounds. That They are never acted on. the consequence of this wild and iniquitous proceeding, if by any strange chance it happened to be successful, would have been the ruin of England as well as of the Dutch Republic, and the unchecked supremacy of the Pope and the Catholic monarchies in Europe, James never paused to consider for an instant. Fortunately, he had at least one amongst

¹ The King to Buckingham and Bristol, July 23, *Sherborne MSS.*

his servants who was able to think for him. The letter bears on the back the brief indorsement, in Bristol's handwriting, "The King's letter touching Holland, 23rd of July, 1623. His Majesty's pleasure to be first known."

Long before an answer could be received from England, James's anger had cooled down. Upon Caron's assurance that

^{Compromise with the Dutch.} the Dutch captains would refrain from further aggression, the preparation of the four additional ships was

countermanded. In point of fact, in the very midst of the quarrel, a compromise had been struck out which, if James had not been too angry to understand what was passing before him, would have saved him from disgracing himself by his ignoble despatch to his representatives in Spain. Best

^{Best's orders.} had carried with him orders not, as had been James's original intention, to let loose the privateer upon the

fishing-boats of his neighbours, but to convoy her safely to Dunkirk or Ostend, without suffering her to do any damage by the way. In a Flemish port she would be watched closely by the blockading squadron, and the Dutch would be in no worse position than they had been before.¹ Nor was there any fear that the States-General would be dissatisfied with this solution. As early as June 7, they had issued directions to their captains to accompany the privateer to the Flemish coast, without firing a shot, unless she attempted to leave the convoy.² Fearing lest this should not be enough, they placed in Carleton's hands,

August. on August 9, a passport, by which their commanders on the Flemish coast were directed to allow the vessel from Aberdeen to pass unharmed through the blockading squadron.³

But for the folly of the Dunkirk captain, this affair, which had at one time threatened to embroil two nations in war,

^{July.} would have given no further trouble to anyone. Best ^{The voyage from Aberdeen.} and the Dutch captains came to a mutual understanding. standing before they left Aberdeen, and the convoy sailed away, steering south, accompanied by four out of the

¹ Conway to the Prince of Orange, July 26, *S. P. Holland*.

² Best to Conway, July 23, *S. P. Dom.* cxlix. 28.

³ Carleton to Calvert, Aug. 9; Carleton to Conway, Aug. 16, *S. P. Holland*.

six vessels which were watching over the interests of the Republic. Unluckily, the privateer captain was not content with the humble position assigned to him, and, wishing to show that he could go faster through the water than any of the others, crowded all sail, and speedily outstripped both friends

Fight between the Dunkirker and the Dutch. and enemies. The Dutch captains, either fearing for the fishing-boats, or, simply from the pleasure of catching their enemy unprotected, started in pursuit, and came up with the privateer after he had shortened sail, and was waiting for the English convoy, which was already nearly two miles astern. Before Best's slow-sailing vessels had come up, the Dutch ships opened fire, shot away the main yard of the Dunkirker, and killed the captain and five men. The English vessels now appeared upon the scene, and poured in their fire in return ; but they soon found that they were no match for their adversaries in speed. The Dutchmen sheered off, and keeping well out of gunshot, amused themselves by sailing round his Majesty's ships at a respectful distance, till Best anchored in the Downs, when they took up a position of observation near the South Foreland.¹

Best could not be ignorant that the Dunkirk captain had no one but himself to blame ; yet the old sailor was filled with indignation at the attack which had been made upon Best's attack upon the Dutch. a vessel under his charge. By daylight, as he was aware, it was impossible to bring the Dutch captains to task, unless they chose to lie to for the approach of the sluggish vessels with which the Navy Commissioners had provided him. He, therefore, waited for a dark night, and dropping down unperceived amongst the Dutch squadron, fired a broadside into their hulls, and drove them triumphantly out of the roads.²

A fortnight earlier this thoughtless act of violence upon the crews of a friendly nation who had been doing no more than their duty, would probably have met with the warmest approbation at Court. But it was not in James's nature to retain his indignation long. Already he had forgotten all about his

¹ Best to Conway, Aug. 4, 11, *S. P. Dom.* cl. 18, 83.

² Best to Conway, Aug. 6 ; Best to the Council, Aug. 11, *S. P. Dom.* cl. 33, 84.

wish to proceed to the partition of the Netherlands. Orders were sent down to Best to bring his own ship and the Dunkirker up the Thames, where they would be in safety from the vengeance of the Dutch, and to present himself before the Council, in order to give an account of his proceedings.¹

Two or three days later, Carleton's messenger arrived with the fresh passport from the States. With this, and with the accompanying acknowledgment of the justice of his demands, James was highly delighted. He now began to speak of the Republic in the most friendly terms, and even went so far as to declare openly, that as soon as his son came home, he was September. 'firmly minded to do something' for the States.²
 Bingley takes the Dunkirk vessel to Mardike. Best was, therefore, superseded in his command by Sir Richard Bingley, who carried the vessel which had been the cause of so much contention into the Flemish harbour of Mardike, without any further interruption from the Dutch.³

So ended James's scheme for subduing the Netherlands with Spanish aid. It could hardly be long before his other scheme, for regaining the Palatinate with the same assistance, would break down still more ignominiously.

¹ Calvert to Conway, Aug. 12, *S. P. Dom.* cl. 86.

² Dudley Carleton to Carleton, Aug. 21, *S. P. Holland.*

³ Locke to Carleton, Sept. 14, *S. P. Dom.* clii. 140. The Infanta Isabella to the King, ^{Sept. 30}
_{Oct. 10}, *S. P. Flanders.*

CHAPTER XLV.

THE PRINCE'S RETURN.

SELDOM has there been a stranger position than that occupied by Olivares in the July of this extraordinary year. Like a dishonest jockey, he had ridden the race with the settled purpose of losing it ; but, do what he would, he had won every heat in spite of all his efforts. It was in vain that he had trusted to the obduracy of the Pope. It was equally in vain that he had strained his demands upon Charles to the uttermost. There had been hesitation and distrust, but in the end neither the Pope nor Charles had ventured to deny him anything.

Even the secret articles sworn to in England had not contaminated the whole of the demands of the Spanish minister. As the treaty was now drawn up at Madrid it included four additional engagements, which Olivares had taken care to bring before Charles's notice some weeks before.

“Moreover,” the Prince was required to declare, “I Charles, Prince of Wales, engage myself, and promise that the most illustrious King of Great Britain, my most honoured lord and father, shall do the same both by word and writing, that all those things which are contained in the foregoing articles, and concern as well the suspension as the abrogation of all laws made against the Roman Catholics, shall within three years infallibly take effect, and sooner if it be possible, which we will have to lie upon our conscience and Royal honour.

“That I will intercede with the most illustrious King of

Great Britain, my father, that the ten years of the education of the children which shall be born of this marriage with the most illustrious Lady Infanta, their mother, accorded in the twenty-second article, which term the Roman Pontiff desires to have prorogued to twelve years, may be lengthened to the said term; and I promise freely and of my own accord to swear that, if it so happen that the entire power of disposing of the matter be devolved to me, I will also grant and approve the said term.

"Furthermore I, Prince of Wales, oblige myself upon my faith to the Catholic King that, as often as the most illustrious Lady Infanta shall require that I should give ear to divines or other whom her Highness shall be pleased to employ in matters of the Roman Catholic religion, I will hearken to them willingly, without all difficulty, and laying aside all excuse.

"And for further caution in point of the free exercise of the Catholic religion and the suspension of the laws above named, I Charles, Prince of Wales, promise and take upon me in the word of a king, that the things above promised and treated concerning those matters shall take effect and be put in execution as well in the Kingdoms of Scotland and Ireland as of England."¹

Of the articles thus offered to Charles, the first three were such as no man of honour could accept. In the first he promised that which, as he well knew, he would never be able to perform. In the second he gave a secret engagement which converted the public one into a mere deception. In the third he not only sacrificed his own self-respect in his domestic relations, but he held out hopes of future conversion which he had no intention of justifying. But Charles was deeply in love, and forgot for the time what was due to his honour. At first, indeed, if it is to the formal presentation of these articles that we must refer a rather vague account which has reached us, he shuffled, and asked leave to refer the question to his father. When this was refused, he said that he would return an answer in a few hours. Before the day was over he sent Gondomar to Olivares to tell him that

¹ Rushworth, i. 89. The original marriage contract is in Latin. Add. MSS. 19,271.

he would give way once more. So astonished was Olivares when he heard it, that it was some time before he could speak. "Is it possible?" he cried out at last; "I should as soon have expected my death."¹

From that moment Olivares changed his tactics. He had at last discovered, what he ought to have known long ago, that

Olivares changes his plans. a man who could bear such treatment was not to be easily shaken off. The idea of marrying the Infanta to the son of the Emperor must be definitely abandoned.

The English marriage must in some way or other be made palatable to her, and the six months which had been gained by the refusal of the Theologians to allow her to leave Spain at once, must be made use of to come to a definite understanding upon the terms which the King of England was willing to impose upon his German son-in-law.

His first difficulty was with the Infanta herself. Fortunately for his object, he would now have a warm ally in his own wife,

Persuades the Infanta to accept the marriage. who was constantly in attendance on the Princess, and who had always wished well to the match as a means for the conversion of the Prince. Whatever opposition there was, he took immediate steps to quell.

Sending for one of the Infanta's ladies who had encouraged her in resistance, he charged her in the King's name to be more discreet for the future. One morning, as the Infanta was preparing for confession, the Countess of Olivares had a long interview with her, and it was observed that she left her in tears. At the same time her confessor² was closeted with Olivares himself. As far as it is possible to judge, all this was not without effect. She may have been in some degree impressed by the assiduous attention shown to her, and though the marriage was still personally distasteful to her, it was easy to impress her with the

¹ *Khevenhüller*, x. 271. The additional demands are not specified, and are said to have been made after Cottington's return to Spain. But I can find no trace of any such demands after Cottington came back, on August 5, and those above given were undoubtedly accepted before July 25. Whatever date may be given to the story, the facts of Charles's acceptance of the articles, and of Olivares' change of policy about this time, are beyond a doubt.

² He was a different man from the one who had warned her against the marriage so strongly, and who had lately died.

idea that she would find, in the handsome youth who loved her so well, a fit instrument for bringing back the whole of England to the bosom of the Church.¹

On July 25 the marriage contract, with its additional clauses, was duly signed by Charles and Philip. It now included a

July 25. special acknowledgment by the Prince that he was willing that the Infanta should not commence her journey till the following spring, though the marriage was to take place as soon as news arrived that James had sworn to the articles and that the Pope had given his consent to the celebration of the rite. With regard to the last condition some slight delay was expected, as the death of Gregory XV. had been known at Madrid for some days ; but it was considered probable that the Dean of the College of Cardinals would think himself justified in giving his approbation, and that even if it were necessary to wait for the approbation of the new Pope, no serious delay was to be apprehended.²

On the 28th a messenger arrived with the intelligence that the English Council had consented to take the required oath.

July 28. The next day Charles and Buckingham returned answer to the King's letter. That James should have entertained any conscientious objections to his oath was perfectly unintelligible to his favourite and son.

Charles is astonished at his father's scruples. “We are sorry,” they wrote, “that there arose in your conscience any scruples ; but we are confident, when we see your Majesty, to give you very good satisfaction for all we have done.” They then proceeded to speak of their hopes and designs. “Sir,” they wrote, “we have not been idle in this interim, for we can now tell you certainly that, by the 29th of

¹ “A che,” i.e. to assent to the marriage, “se bene già stava lontanissima, essendo stata tuttavia impressa che grandissimo merito aquisterebbe appresso il Signor Dio col maritarsi con questo Principe, perche beneficiava tanto la Religione, si havea ella accommodato l'animo, confidando che ritrovandosi da dovero esso Principe innamorato di lei, con progresso di tempo gli sia per esser facile anco il ridurlo con tutto il Regno alla chiesa.”

Corner to the Doge, Aug. $\frac{8}{18}$, Venice MSS. Desp. Spagna.

² Bristol to Cottington, July 15, Prynne's *Hidden Works of Darkness*, 49.

July 29.
Hopes to
bring the In-
fanta with
him.

your August, we shall begin our journey, and hope to bring her with us. . . . Marriage there shall be none without her coming with us ; and in the meantime, comfort yourself with this, that we have already convinced the Conde of Olivares in this point, that it is fit the Infanta come with us before winter. He is working underhand with the divines, and, under colour of the King's and Prince's journey, makes preparations for hers also. Her household is a-settling, and all other things for her journey ; and the Conde's own words are, he will throw us all out of Spain as soon as he can. There remains no more for you to do, but to send us peremptory commands to come away, and with all possible speed. We desire this, not that we fear that we shall have need of it, but in case we have, that your son, who hath expressed much affection to the person of the Infanta, may press his coming away, under colour of your command, without appearing an ill lover.¹

The letter, indeed, was in Buckingham's handwriting ; but the thoughts which it contained, the little contrivances and the

Charles and
Buck-
ing-
ham.

empty hopes with which it is full, came straight from the brain of Charles. After his return to Eng-

land, it suited the favourite to declare that both he and the Prince had stood together in manful resistance to the trickery of Olivares ; and, as a natural result, those who have been unable to reconcile his narrative with admitted facts, have thrown the whole blame of the breach upon Buckingham's insolence. "If the Prince," said the Spaniards, when all was over, "had come alone, he would not have returned alone." Yet, natural as the explanation was, it was not in accordance with the truth. The real cause of Charles's failure lay partly in the exorbitant pretensions of the Spaniards to religious supremacy in England, but still more in the belief which Olivares had always consistently held, that he would be able to bring the negotiation to an end without difficulty, because the terms which he himself regarded as indispensable would never be accepted in England. Annoyed as he was at being unable to

¹ The Prince and Buckingham to the King, July 29, *Hardwicke S. P.*
i. 432.

relinquish a negotiation which he disliked, the Spanish minister was likely to look with especial disfavour upon Buckingham's insolence. Different as they were in every other respect, Bristol and Buckingham had been of one mind in objecting to the fresh terms imposed upon the Prince in consequence of his presence at Madrid ; but what Bristol had said gravely and respectfully, Buckingham had said petulantly and rudely. Ill at ease in the part which he was playing, he had vented his displeasure upon all towards whom he dared to show

^{Who caused}
the failure of
the match ?

his real feelings. He had quarrelled with Bristol, and he had quarrelled with Olivares ; but even he, utterly void of self-restraint as he was, dared not quarrel with Charles. In all ordinary matters he could impose his will upon him by sheer force of audacity. The rude familiarity with which he treated the Prince caused the greatest astonishment to the Spaniards. Accustomed as they were to the most rigid etiquette, it was with the deepest disgust that they saw a subject sitting without breeches in his dressing-gown at the Prince's table, or standing in public with his back towards him, or rudely leaning forward to stare at the Infanta.¹ All this Buckingham allowed himself to do. But he knew that he could not thwart Charles in the one object upon which he had set his heart; that he must carry his messages, and make himself the instrument of all those petty compliances so dear to the heart of the youth whom he served, knowing all the while that he was regarded at home as the author of concessions which, in reality, he detested.

Sometimes, indeed, Buckingham's feelings were too strong for him. Once, on receiving a visit from Khevenhüller, he showed his consciousness of being duped. "The affairs of our masters," he said, "appear to clash at

Buckingham
and Kheven-

hüller.

present. I hope that this marriage will accommodate them. If not, before a year is over, an army will be sent into Germany strong enough to set everything right by force." The Imperial Ambassador replied, that the door of grace had been opened to Frederick, but that he had refused to walk in ; and Buckingham, who probably could not trust himself to pursue

¹ Wadsworth to Buckingham, Nov. 11, *Goodman's Court of King James*, ii. 314.

the conversation further, changed the subject to an inquiry about Khevenhüller's horses.¹

Even when Buckingham was writing to James this feeling of doubt as to the ultimate issue of the business pierces through

^{July 30.} ^{Buck-}
^{ham's ac-}
^{count of the}
^{state of the}
^{negotiation.} the surface. It was thus that, on July 30, he allowed adverse details which had been absolutely banished from the joint composition of the day before, to find a place in his private letter to the King. "In the meantime, sir," he wrote, "know that, upon the King's Council's and Court's expression of joy that the Prince had come into and accepted of their own offers here to be contracted and stay for the Infanta's following him at the beginning of the spring, we thought it a fit time, in the heat of their expressions, to try their good natures, and press the Infanta's present going.

^{He is sent to urge Olivares to give way;} Whereupon the Prince sent me to the Conde of Olivares with these reasons for it: that, first, it would lengthen much your days, who best deserved of them in this and many other businesses; it would add much to the honour of the Prince, which otherwise must needs suffer; the Infanta would thereby gain the sooner the hearts of the people, and so consequently make her desires and their ends sooner and easier to be effected in favour of the Catholics; that otherwise we should compass but one of those ends for which we came, for marriage, and not friendship, and so it would prove but like the French alliance;² that the affairs of Christendom would easilier and sooner be compounded; that if he had any reason of state in it which he hoped to gain at the spring, I would show him how he would better compass it now than when distrust would beget the same in us; how your Majesty had been this year at a great charge already, and how this delay would but be of more to both kingdoms. With this I entreated him to think of my poor particular, who had waited upon the Prince hither, and in that distasted all the people in general; how he laid me open to their malice and revenge, when I had brought from them their Prince a free man, and should return

¹ Khevenhüller to Ferdinand II., *Ann. Ferd.* x. 271.

² That is to say, the alliance between France and Spain by the double marriages of Louis XIII. and Philip IV. with each other's sisters.

him bound by a contract, and so locked from all posterity till they pleased here ; how that I could not think of this obligation, if he would not¹ relieve me in it, without horror or fear, if I were not his faithful friend and servant, and intended thankfulness. He interrupted this with many grumblings, but at last said I had bewitched him ; but if there was a witch in the company, I am sure there was a devil too.

“ From him I repaired to his lady, who, I must tell you by the way, is as good a woman as lives, which makes me think and to the Countess. all favourites must have good wives ; whom I told what I had done. She liked of it very well, and promised her best assistance. Some three or four days after, Day fixed for the Prince's departure. the Prince sent to entreat him to settle her house, and to give order in other things for their journey. He asked what day he should go away ; but himself named the 29th of your August, which the Prince accepted of.

“ Some two days after, the Countess sent for me, the most afflicted woman in the world, and told me the Infanta had told her the Prince meant to go away without her ; and, Message from the Infanta. for her part, she took it so ill, to see him so careless of her, that she would not be contracted till the day he was to take his leave. The Countess told me, the way to mend this was to go to the Conde, and put the whole business in the King's hands, with this protestation, that he would rather stay seven years than go without his mistress, he so much esteemed her ; and if I saw after that this did not work good effects, that the Prince might come off upon your Majesty's command at pleasure.

“ With this offer I went to the Conde. He received it but doggedly. The next day I desired audience of the Infanta.

Buckingham's interview with the Infanta. To taste her, I framed this errand from your Majesty, that you had commanded me to give her a particular account of what you had done, and that you had overcome many difficulties to persuade the Council to come into these articles, and that you yourself was come into them merely in contemplation of her ; and that you had given order

¹ “ If he would relieve me,” in Buckingham's handwriting, *Harl. MSS.* 6987, fol. 129 b.

for present execution, and since you had done thus much to get her, you made no question but her virtues would persuade you to do much more for her sake. When I had done this, I told her of the Prince's resolution, and assured her that he never spake of going but with this end, to get her the sooner away ; but that hereafter he durst use no diligences for her and himself, since he was subject to so ill offices ; except she would take this for granted, that he would never go without her, which she liked very well of. When I had done this, I told her, since she was the Prince's wife, all my thoughts were bent to gain her the love of that people whither she was to go ; and I showed her how the articles contained no more than for the time to come, but there were many Catholics who at this day were fined in the Exchequer, and though it would be some loss to your Majesty,—though I think it would be none,—yet, if she would make a request to the Prince for them, your Majesty would quit it.

“I hope I have not done ill in this : but sure I am it hath

Assurance from the Countess that the Infanta will be allowed to go. not done ill to our business ; for what with this, and that news of the sending the four ships to Leith, this morning the Countess hath sent the Prince this message, that the King, the Infanta, and the Conde are the best contented that can be ; and that he should not now doubt his soon going away, and to carry the Infanta with him.”¹

Already, some days before this letter reached England, the suggestion thus thrown out by Buckingham about the recusancy

July 24. The fleet ordered to sail. fines, had been carried out by the King. Almost immediately after the solemnity at Whitehall, James had set out on his progress towards Salisbury, where the Spanish ambassadors were invited to join him on August 4. Orders were at once sent off to Rutland to set sail for Santander as soon as possible,² and Conway, in his usual hyperbolical language, had wished him for his return ‘a wind like lovers’ embracements, neither too strong nor too slack, and a sea as smooth as a lady’s face so embraced.³

¹ Buckingham to the King, July 30, *Hardwicke S. P. i.* 433.

² The King to Rutland, July 24, *S. P. Dom.* xl ix. 36.

³ Conway to Rutland, July 24, *ibid. cxlix.* 37.

In the meanwhile, Calvert, who had remained in London, was busily engaged in consulting with other members of the

July 26. Council in what mode the favours recently promised to the recusants should be granted.¹ James had Favours to proposed to issue a warrant to the Attorney-General, the recus- directing him to abstain from all fresh proceedings against ants. Catholics still unconvicted of recusancy. With this offer the Spanish ambassadors were discontented, and pointed out that the convicted recusants, who were bound to pay their fines into the Exchequer for the remainder of their lives, would receive no benefit whatever. James replied that, though he intended to comply with their wishes, he was resolved to show that he did so as an act of free grace, by reserving his release from penalties already incurred for some future occasion of public rejoicing. This subtle distinction between convicted and unconvicted recusants was lost upon the ambassadors, and James soon found that in his attempt to maintain his dignity he had laid himself open to the charge of having refused

July 27. to fulfil his obligations. Inojosa at once wrote to Remon- Calvert to complain of a decision which he represented strances of as a breach of promise. If it were not re- Inojosa. voked, he proceeded to hint, it would be impossible for him to make a satisfactory report to his master.² Thus pressed, James gave way at once, and Calvert was ordered to include in the remission past offences as well as future.³ To effect this a pardon was to be issued under the Great Seal, relieving con- Question of victed recusants from the future payment of penalties the mode of already incurred, accompanied by a dispensation granting the pardon. from all future penalties. Even with this the am- bassadors were not contented. They asked for a public pro- clamation declaring his Majesty's purpose to grant entire relief from the penal laws. It was not till some time had been spent in explaining to them that a proclamation, according to English law, had no binding effect whatever, whereas a pardon

¹ Calvert to Conway, July 24, *S. P. Dom.* cxlix. 38.

² Inojosa to Calvert, July 27, 28, *S. P. Spain.* Calvert to Conway, July 28, *S. P. Dom.* cxlix. 79.

³ Conway to Buckingham, Aug. 1, *S. P. Spain.*

under the Great Seal might safely be pleaded in court, that they consented to give way.¹ It is impossible to resist the conviction that more was meant by the ambassadors than they chose to avow. What they wanted was a public and notorious act, which would ring in the ears of all men, and would test the readiness of the English people to submit to the repeal of the obnoxious laws by Parliament. For such a purpose a proclamation would undoubtedly have served far better than hundreds of pardons quietly granted to individuals.

As soon as the ambassadors reached Salisbury, Conway and Carlisle were appointed to treat with them on this important

Aug. 8. Agreement made at Salisbury. matter. At last, after some discussion, an agreement was come to, and was signed by both parties. A general pardon was to be passed under the Great Seal, of which all Roman Catholics who had been convicted, or had been liable to be convicted, in past times, would be allowed to take the benefit at any time during the next five years. A declaration was also to be issued suspending for the future all the penal laws by which the Roman Catholics were affected, and releasing them from all penalties to which they might be subject 'by reason of any statute or law whatsoever for their consciences, or exercise of their Roman Catholic religion in their private houses without noise and public scandal, or for any other matter or cause whatsoever for their consciences, by what law or ordinances soever to the observation whereof the rest of his Majesty's subjects are not bound.' The King would, after conference with the Bishops, contrive a way for relieving the Catholics from the penalties consequent upon excommunication. Orders should be sent to Ireland to grant similar concessions there. As for Scotland, his Majesty would 'according to the constitution of affairs there, and in regard to the public good and peace of that kingdom, and as soon as possible, do all that shall be convenient for the accomplishment of his promise.'²

¹ Conway to Calvert, Aug. 5, *S. P. Spain.* Conway to Buckingham, Aug. 5, *Hardwicke S. P.* i. 436.

² Agreement made at Salisbury, Aug. 8, *Harl. MSS.* 1583, fol. 287.

Two points only amongst the ambassadors' demands¹ had been passed over. To a request that the forfeited rents and fines which had been given away by patent should be restored, James could only reply by giving permission to the aggrieved persons to try the question at law. The other claim was of a more serious nature. Not content with the immunity which they had secured for those who refused to take the oath of allegiance, the ambassadors pressed hard that schools and colleges might be rendered accessible to the Roman Catholics. On this point James stood firm. It would not look well, he held, 'that he should not only at one instant give unexpected grace and immunity to his subjects the Roman Catholics, but seem to endeavour to plant a seminary of other religion than he made profession of.'

To this answer Coloma raised no objection; but Inojosa, who no doubt had been to some extent initiated into the plans of Olivares, was evidently dissatisfied. At last, he promised to write to Madrid that James had done all that was to be expected, and, on leaving Salisbury, both the ambassadors joined in expressions of hope that the immediate marriage and departure of the Infanta would be the result of these negotiations.²

On August 10, two days after the signature of the agreement, Buckingham's letter arrived, with renewed hopes of the immediate delivery of the Infanta. James was of course delighted with the news.³ In return, he sent the command to leave Spain immediately, for which Charles had asked in order

^{Aug. 10.} ^{The King orders his son to return.} to excuse his rudeness to the Infanta. "My dearest son," he wrote, "I sent you a commandment long ago, not to lose time where ye are, but either to bring quickly home your mistress, which is my earnest desire; but if no better may be, rather than to linger any longer there, to come without her, which, for many important reasons, I am now forced to renew; and therefore I charge you, on my

¹ Demands of the ambassadors, Aug., *Harl. MSS.* 1583, fol. 285.

² Conway to Buckingham, Aug. 5, Aug. 10, *Hardwicke S. P.* i. 436. *Harl. MSS.* 1580, fol. 326.

³ The King to Buckingham, Aug. 10, *Ellis's Ser.* i., iii. 158.

blessing, to come quickly either with her or without her. I know your love to her person hath enforced you to delay the putting in execution of my former commandments. I confess it is my chiefest worldly joy that ye love her ; but the necessity of my affairs enforceth me to tell you that you must prefer the obedience to a father to the love ye carry to a mistress.”¹

Before this letter reached Madrid, there had been a fresh struggle between Charles and the Spanish Court. The conferences with Olivares and the messages to the Infanta had failed in producing the expected result. Philip utterly refused to give up his sister a day sooner than he had promised ; but in one respect he now changed his tactics. If Charles would consent to remain in Spain till Christmas, he might then be married in person, and would be allowed to live with the Infanta as his wife, though she would not be permitted to leave Madrid till the appointed time in the spring.

That there were the gravest objections to such a plan was evident to anyone less deeply in love than Charles ; and no doubt there were not a few around him who reminded him that, if he accepted the offer, he would not only be placing himself in Philip’s hands as a hostage for another half-year, but that if, before the spring came, there were a prospect of the Infanta becoming a mother, fresh excuses for delay would arise, which would, in all probability, end in placing in Spanish hands another heir to the English throne—another hostage for James’s subserviency to Spain in the affair of the Palatinate. Yet, in spite of these reasonable objections, Charles told Philip that he was ready to accept the conditions, and even sought an audience of the Queen in order to assure her, in the Infanta’s presence, that he had made up his mind to remain.²

Scarcely was this resolution taken when Cottington arrived, bringing with him the signatures of the King and Council to the marriage articles. Once more Charles tried, by a renewed

¹ The King to the Prince, Aug. 10, *Hardwicke S. P.* i. 447.

² *Francisco de Jesus*, 32.

threat of immediate departure, to induce the Spaniards to give way, and to allow him to carry home his bride at once. The request was referred to the Theologians, and the Theologians, as usual, proved obdurate, and refused their consent.¹

Charles could not make up his mind what to do. Although he was unable to resist the impression that he was being made a tool of by Olivares, he could not resolve to tear himself away from the Infanta. It was observed that when the refusal of the Theologians was brought to him, he did not repeat his threat of leaving Madrid ; yet he had hard work to hold his own. Buckingham had again lost his temper, and had for some days been talking of setting out alone to meet Rutland's fleet at Santander.² All the Prince's little Court were of one mind in denouncing the hypocrisy of the Spaniards, and the hard words which were freely used were returned with interest by those who were assailed. One day a Spanish gentleman going into the Prince's room found on the table a richly bound copy of a translation of the English Catechism into his own language, and carried it off in triumph to Philip ; whilst at the same time charges, true or false, of an attempt to make proselytes to their faith were brought against Charles's attendants. The accusation might certainly have been retorted upon the Spaniards.

One day Cottington was suddenly taken ill, and believing himself to be dying, sent for Lafuente, and was by him reconciled to the Church of Rome. A few days afterwards, as soon as he began to get better, he declared himself a Protestant again. The next case was that of Henry Washington, a dying youth, who summoned an English Jesuit, named Ballard, to his bedside. His English companions were terribly excited. Gathering in a knot about the door, they barred the entrance, as they said, by the Prince's orders; and one of them, Sir Edmund Verney, struck the priest on the face with his fist.* The people without, seeing what had

¹ Corner to the Doge, Sept. $\frac{10}{20}$, *Venice MSS.* Desp. Spagna.

² Aston (?) to Trumbull, Aug. 13, *S. P. Spain.*

happened, naturally took the part of the priest, and, but for
 A priest struck by Sir E. Verney. the timely arrival of the alcalde, backed by the
 interposition of Gondomar, the tumult which ensued would hardly have been quieted without bloodshed.

It was no doubt with a feeling of triumph mingled with sorrow, that Verney and his friends attended the funeral of Washington in the burial-ground in the garden behind Bristol's house, which was the only resting-place allowed to the lad whom they had prevented from acknowledging with the lips the belief which he entertained in his heart. At Philip's Court the tidings were received with indignation. How can it be expected, it was asked, that these men should behave better to the Catholics in England than they do in Spain? To meet

^{Dispute about punishing Verney.} the opposition which had been raised, Charles ordered Verney to leave Madrid; but this was not enough to satisfy the Nuncio; and, at his complaint, the King sent Gondomar to demand that the offender should be rigorously punished. The Prince was deeply annoyed, and demanded in return that the alcalde should be punished for laying hands upon his servant. At last Philip cut the matter short by sending a message to Charles, to tell him that, if he wished to spend the winter at Madrid, he must dismiss all his Protestant attendants.¹

Such a collision between the two Courts made Charles's stay at Madrid more difficult than ever. At last, therefore, he

^{Aug. 20. Charles writes that he will leave Madrid.} gave way to the solicitations of those around him, and announced to his father his resolution to leave Spain. "The cause," he explained, "why we have been so long in writing to you since Cottington's coming, is that we would try all means possible, before we would send you word, to see if we could move them to send the Infanta before winter. They, for form's sake, called the divines, and they stick to their old resolution, but we find, by circumstances, that conscience is not the true but seeming cause of the Infanta's stay. To conclude, we have wrought

¹ *Francisco de Jesus*, 83. Corner to the Doge, Sept. ¹⁰/_{2c}, *Venice MSS.* Spagna. Howell's *Letters*, Book i., Ser. 3, Letter 20.

what we can, but since we cannot have her with us that we desired, our next comfort is that we hope shortly to kiss your Majesty's hands."¹

Such was the meagre account which Charles thought fit to give to his father of that fortnight of weakness and vacillation, of promises unfulfilled, and of words only uttered to be recalled. What he meant by the circumstances which, in his opinion, were the cause of the Infanta's stay, it is impossible to tell ; but those who have attentively perused the true narrative of his proceedings will hardly join in the cry, which has been repeated from century to century, that the Spaniards were deeply to blame in refusing to send the Infanta at once to England, excepting so far as they deserve blame for not taking a wider and more generous view than they did of the crisis through which the world was in that day passing. There can be little doubt that they would have preferred not to send the Infanta at all, if it could have been done without exasperating Charles and his father into declaring war, and that they looked upon her detention, not merely as affording them time to ascertain how James would treat his Catholic subjects, but as enabling them to come to some definite understanding as to the resistance which he was likely to offer to their scheme for the forced conversion of the Palatinate to their creed. From this point of view it is hard to blame Olivares for the course which he took ; for he had learned by a strange experience to know Charles as his countrymen were, to their sorrow, to know him in coming years. He had discovered that he was at the same time both weak and obstinate. How was Philip to entrust his sister to such a man? Who was to guarantee that the moment the wedded pair landed in England the whole of the edifice of religious liberty, which was one day to become the edifice of religious supremacy for the Catholics, would not be overthrown, with a shout of triumph?

Olivares was a liar of a very different stamp from Charles. He, at least, was perfectly aware whether his words were intended to be true or not, whilst Charles was, probably, perfectly

¹ The Prince and Buckingham to the King, Aug. 20, *Hardwicke S. P.*
1. 448.

How far
were the
Spaniards
in fault?

unconscious of his prevarications. As far as the marriage went, the course was now straight before the Spanish minister. He had only to keep the English to the very hard bargain which he had driven, and to make use of the winter to drive an equally hard bargain for the Palatinate. Strange to say, however, he had at last been beguiled by the irresolution of Charles into the idea that the task of gaining his consent to his scheme for the pacification of Germany was a mere trifle in comparison with that which he had already effected. On August 12, in the midst of all his difficulties with Charles, Olivares proposes the marriage of Prince Frederick Henry with the Emperor's daughter. he calmly gave it as his opinion that it would be well to interest the Prince of Wales in the marriage of Frederick's son with the Emperor's daughter. James, he added, would make no difficulty, as the scheme would relieve him from all further annoyance, and it was certain that he would rather see his grandchildren Catholic than Puritan. To Gondomar the future did not present itself in quite so rosy a light. The chief thing, he observed, was to contrive that the boy should be brought up as a Catholic. It would, therefore, be well to have him sent to Vienna before the Prince left the country ; for, if Charles were once gone, it was probable that he would take arms against the Emperor and the King of Spain.¹

Olivares did not know how completely Charles had set his heart upon his sister's restoration, and that since his arrival in Spain he had twice despatched a special messenger to assure her that she should not be forgotten.² Not long ago he had told the Prince, in his grand Spanish way, that his master was ready to place a blank sheet of paper in his hands, which he would be at liberty to fill up with what conditions he pleased about the Palatinate. He now recited the old scheme which had been originally sketched out by his uncle, of course taking care to make no reference to the boy's expected conversion. The Electoral Prince, he said, was to be educated at Vienna, and married to the Emperor's daughter. "But," replied Charles, "if the Emperor proves refractory, will the King your master assist us with arms to reduce him to reasonable terms?"

¹ Consulta of the Council of State, Aug. ¹²₂₂, *Simancas MSS.* 2404.

² Sir W. Croft and Sir George Goring.

"No," replied Olivares, in a moment of frankness, "we have a maxim of state, that the King of Spain must never fight against the Emperor. We cannot employ our forces against the House of Austria." "Look to it, sir," said the Prince, "for if you hold yourself to that, there is an end of all; for without this, you may not rely upon either marriage or friendship."¹ It was probably after this conversation had taken place, that the question was once more brought before the Council of State. By this time Olivares' faith in his powers of cajolery had been somewhat shaken, and he had fallen back upon his old position. "Even if the Emperor," he said to the Council, "were to give the King a blow in the face, and to call him a knave, it would be impossible for his Majesty to abandon him or to become his enemy. If he can preserve the friendship of the King of England as well as that of the Emperor, well and good. But if not, we ought to break with England, even if we had a hundred Infantas married there. Such conduct is necessary for the preservation of Christendom and the Catholic religion, and of the glorious House of Austria." The King, he went on to say, was much indebted to the Elector of Bavaria, and must not take part against him. The proposed marriage between the Emperor's daughter and the Palatine's son, should not be left out of consideration. But it must be brought about by his Majesty's intercession. The boy must be educated as a Catholic, and either the Emperor or the Elector of Bavaria must have the administration of the Palatinate during his minority. It was impossible that the father should be restored to the whole of his dominions, but he might have a certain portion of territory assigned to him. The number of Electors might be raised to nine, the Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt being rewarded by this honour for his fidelity.

The question was then put to the vote, and the proposition of Olivares, counting his own voice, was approved by a majority of one, Gondemar voting in the minority.²

¹ Buckingham's Relation, *Lords' Journals*, iii. 226.

² *Khevenhüller*, x. 95. There is some confusion about the dates; but I think that I am following the probabilities of the case in placing Olivares' declaration here.

Nine months before, the Council of State had declared in opposition to Olivares in favour of a temporising policy, and The decisive vote in the Council of State. had driven him to take refuge in a series of intrigues by which he had hoped first to get rid of the marriage altogether by the intervention of the Pope, and then to make the acceptance of his terms by Charles as difficult as possible. In these intrigues he had been signally foiled. The Pope had refused to take upon himself the burden of withholding the dispensation, and Charles had been ready to promise anything that was asked of him. Very few months now remained before the time would come for the Infanta's marriage, and before that time came the affairs of the Palatinate must be arranged one way or the other. It is easy to say that the decision adopted by the Council of State produced the exhaustion and ultimate ruin of the Spanish monarchy ; but this is only to say, in other words, that the Spanish ministers ought to have risen above the traditions of their creed and country. Frederick had for months refused to set his hand even to the preliminary suspension of arms, and he had only been induced to agree to it at last by the terrors of Tilly's victory at Stadtloo. It was therefore more than ever evident that no real peace was to be purchased in Germany on any reasonable terms, and the Spanish ministers, being what they were, naturally preferred oppressing Protestants in the name of their own creed, to standing by whilst Protestants were plundering Catholic lands, and annexing Catholic dioceses by force of arms.

It was under the influence of these considerations, no doubt, that, in opposition to Gondomar's plea for further procrastination, the Spanish Council of State adopted the more decisive policy of Olivares. The question to which they now required an answer was whether James and his son would consent to such a settlement as would please the Emperor ; and, excepting upon grounds far higher than any of which a Spaniard was likely to take cognizance, there can be little doubt that they were in the right.

The Prince was accordingly given to understand that he must not expect to have everything his own way in Germany. The King of Spain, he was told, would not engage to obtain

for Frederick himself a restitution of the Electorate. But he might have the territory, and after Maximilian's death his son should have the title.

Charles was very sore. He had come to Spain with the idea that he would find the whole world at his feet. He had assured his sister that he would take care of her interests as his own, and now he was told that the decision rested in the hands of the Emperor, and that the Emperor would not readmit his brother-in-law into the Electoral College. It was therefore not without the gravest dissatisfaction that he found that Bristol, after making some reservations, had much to say in favour of the Spanish plan, and even declared it to be his opinion that his Majesty would not be averse to the boy's education at Vienna if only the dignity as well as the land were at once restored, and if the young Prince 'might be brought up in his own religion, and have such preceptors and such a family as his Majesty and his father should appoint, and they to have free exercise of their religion.'¹ At this unexpected declaration, Aston, who happened to be present, was startled. "I dare not," he said, "give my consent, for fear of my head." "Without some such great action," answered Bristol, "the peace of Christendom will never be had."²

These words were long afterwards raked up by Charles and Buckingham, and were made by them the subject of a grave charge against the ambassador. It is indeed impossible to acquit him entirely of at least an error in judgment. It was true, no doubt, as he afterwards explained, How far was he right? that the sons of Protestant princes³ were at that very time being brought up at Vienna, without danger to their religion; but the stake to be played for in the present case was a far higher one. With the religion of the whole of the two Palatinates depending on the issue, a skilful Jesuit, supported as he would be by the bright eyes of the young archduchess, would probably

¹ Bristol's answer to his impeachment, *State Trials*, ii. 1411.

² Charles I. to Bristol, Jan. 20, 1626. Ninth Article of Bristol's Impeachment, *State Trials*, ii. 1278, 1286.

³ The son of Christian of Anhalt, for instance.

find little difficulty in eluding the vigilance of the prince's Protestant tutors. Yet, in spite of these objections, the spirit of Bristol's advice was undoubtedly right. No man who knew what human nature was, could fancy that without some serious guarantee for the future, the Emperor would ever again place power in the hands of the ally of Mansfeld and of Bethlen Gabor; and however lightly Charles and Buckingham might talk about using compulsion, Bristol was justified in shrinking from a renewal of the conflict in which the great cause of Protestantism had been stained with greed and cruelty and with every anarchical passion.

In truth, it is impossible to do justice to Bristol without recollecting that at every step he was liable to be controlled by others who had not a tithe of his sagacity. It was against his recommendation that the Spanish match had originally been accepted by the King; but when once it had been accepted, he proceeded to carry out his instructions, and to manage the negotiations so that the greatest possible good might accrue to his country. Resisting the direct interference of Spain with the internal affairs of England, he was in favour of any alleviation of the bitter lot of the English Catholics which might proceed from the spontaneous act of his own sovereign. It was in this spirit that, when he returned to Spain in 1622, he had attempted to carry on the negotiations entrusted to him. When, after the unexpected demands of the Pope, alterations were made in the treaty by which the King was bound to a special mode of dealing with his Catholic subjects, it was only upon Gondomar's assurance that he had often heard James express his willingness to consent to these conditions that the changes were even acknowledged by Bristol, as fit to send home for his master's approval. After that approval was given, he then believed, and it is certain that he was right in so believing, that but for the unlucky arrival of the Prince at Madrid, the affair would have been settled one way or another in the spring of 1623. Either the Pope and the King of Spain would assent to the marriage on the conditions agreed to in the preceding winter, or they would not. If they did, the whole question was settled. If they did not, it would

His policy with respect to the marriage.

have to be considered afresh with reference to any new conditions that might be laid down. His expectations had been baffled by the sudden arrival of the Prince. New demands were made, which he evidently considered to be exorbitant, but which he was powerless to resist. Questions which would affect deeply the future welfare of the English nation, were taken out of the hands of grave diplomatists and statesmen, to be settled in accordance with the fleeting desires of a lovesick youth, and of an ignorant, headstrong courtier. Charles himself behaved in such a manner as to tempt the Spanish ministers to put forward the most indefensible propositions. With the acceptance of these propositions Bristol had nothing whatever to do. Though he was treated with studied rudeness by the insolent Buckingham, and shut out from any serious part in the negotiations which ensued, he held, like a man of honour as he was, that a treaty which had been sworn to in the most solemn manner, was intended to be kept. In his eyes, it was now too late for the Prince to break off the marriage without the deepest discredit to himself.

Straightforward as Bristol's conduct had been in relation to the marriage, it was equally straightforward in relation to the And with respect to the Palatinate. Ever since the failure, through James's fault, of his plan for imposing by the sword a com-

promise upon the contending parties in Germany, he had advocated a close understanding with the Spanish Government, and had hoped that if his master at home could succeed in bringing his son-in-law to reasonable terms, it might be possible, partly by the fear of a ruinous contest with England, partly by the wish to retain the advantages which were offered by the proposed marriage, to induce Philip to lend his assistance to the attempt to bring about a pacification in Germany upon some rational basis. Unhappily, such a policy had one irreparable fault. It was too much in advance of the times to meet with acceptance on either side. In spite of all that Bristol could say, in spite of the conviction of the advantages, and even of the necessity, of peace, which was cherished by Philip's ministers, they would not cease to believe that it was possible, by some petty diplomatic contrivance, to snatch a glorious victory for their Church ; and, equally, in spite of all that might be urged

in favour of concession, Frederick and his confederates would never cease to sow discord in the Empire, and to forward that reign of plunderers and bandits which some of them, at least, imagined in all sincerity to be the highest achievement of patriotism.

However unpractical Bristol's ideas had by this time become, they were the highest wisdom when contrasted with those passing fancies which floated in the brains of Charles and Buckingham. To Bristol the question of the restitution of the Palatinate was one to be entertained on its own merits. It depended partly on the nature of the concessions which Frederick was willing to make, partly on the state of public feeling in Germany, and it was therefore impossible to make the settlement of an intricate European problem a condition of the marriage treaty. Yet this was precisely what Charles, if his words meant anything, was prepared to do. He expected that Frederick should be replaced in his old position, without the slightest reference to the interests of the Empire, on the mere ground of his happening to be the brother-in-law of the Prince of Wales. It was with this expectation that he had come to Madrid, and he felt that it would be an insult to himself if, when the time came for his departure, the question were still unsettled.

Charles was at least in the right in thoroughly distrusting Olivares. The Spaniard, adept in falsehood as he was, had been too early in life a favourite of fortune to make a good hypocrite. After weeks of flattery and dissimulation, he would overthrow, in some moment of confidence or of passion, the edifice of deceit which he had raised so painfully. At an interview with the Prince and Buckingham, he cried out that it must certainly

Olivares produces the King's letter. be a match now, for the devil himself could not break it. "I think so too," said Buckingham, ironically ; "it had need to be firm and strong, for it has been seven years in soldering." "Nay," replied Olivares, forgetting all that was implied by his words, "it has not really been intended these seven months." To this Buckingham answered that in that case the settlement was plainly the result of his negotiations, and he must therefore have the credit of it. Stung

by the tone in which the words were uttered, Olivares walked to his desk and produced not only his own written opinion against the marriage which had been placed by Bristol in Charles's hands some months before, but even the short letter in which Philip himself had ordered him to break off the match, and had stated that neither the late King nor Zuñiga had ever really intended to allow the marriage to take place.

Well may Aston, when he heard of this letter, have held up his hands in astonishment, remembering as he did the assurances which he had so often received from Philip's own lips. The importance of the revelation it is impossible to estimate too highly. It could no longer be held, as Bristol had supposed, that the plan for throwing off the Prince of Wales had originated either in Olivares' newness to business or in a passing fancy of the Infanta's. Philip himself stood convicted as having taken part in the long deceit.

Of this letter Charles was not allowed to take away a copy. But, with Aston's assistance, he carried with him the meaning of the words in English, and wrote them down as soon as he had left the room.¹

In spite of all that had now occurred, Charles could scarcely make up his mind to leave Spain. Almost at the last moment,

^{Charles re-}
Bristol wagered with him a ring worth 1,000*l.* that ^{solves to go.} he would spend his Christmas at Madrid.² It is possible, that, but for one circumstance, he might still have

¹ Buckingham's Relation, *Lords' Journals*, iii. 226. A difficulty arises as to the date of this extraordinary revelation. Hacket apparently places it in July (i. 146), but he is no authority whatever in details. A more serious question arises as to the probability of its having been made during the conversations in May, which have been narrated at p. 38. But if so, it would surely have been mentioned in Bristol's letter of Aug. 18, which is there quoted, unless Charles concealed it from him. This, however, is very unlikely, as he seems at that time to have spoken freely with him. Again, there is this to be said in favour of placing it, as I have done, where it is placed by Buckingham, that if it came just before the Prince's departure, it supplies an explanation for the sudden question raised about the Infanta going into a nunnery, of which nothing had been heard for months, but which would have been brought freshly before his mind by the reading of these papers.

² Buckingham's Relation, *Lords' Journals*, iii. 220.

resolved to disregard his father's commands. The new Pope, Urban VIII., had fallen ill almost immediately after his election, and till he was able to send the necessary powers by which the Nuncio would be authorised to hand over the dispensation to Philip, the marriage could not take place. Whilst Charles was thus kept in inaction, he asked leave of Philip to present to his future bride a magnificent chain of pearls, a pair of diamond earrings, and another single diamond of priceless value. The King took them from him, showed them to his sister, and returned him word that he would keep them safely for her till after the marriage. Annoyed at the fresh rebuff, Charles once more announced his positive intention of returning to England; yet those who watched him closely doubted whether he would not have lingered on, if Philip, who was by this time thoroughly tired of his guest, had not taken him at his word, and assured him that his presence with his father would be the best means of facilitating those arrangements which were the necessary conditions of the Infanta's journey in the spring.¹

It was, therefore, now arranged that the Prince, being unable to wait any longer for tidings from Rome, should make out a proxy in the names of the King of Spain and his brother the Infant Charles, and that this proxy should be lodged in Bristol's hands. Before he went, he was himself to swear solemnly to the marriage contract which he had signed on August 4.

If Charles had possessed one spark of that 'heroical virtue' for which he allowed himself to take credit a few months later, he would surely have paused here. For many months he had known that the Spaniards were not dealing fairly by him. He had now learned that, whatever they might have said when they were hard pressed, they had not the slightest intention of assisting his brother-in-law to recover the Palatinate by force of arms. That he was thoroughly dissatisfied with the discovery there can be no doubt whatever.² Still less can there be any doubt that it was his plain duty to make up his mind before he took

¹ Corner to the Doge, Sept. ¹⁰₂₀, *Venice MSS.* Desp. Spagna.

² In a letter written about the end of September to Aston (*S. P. Spain*), Buckingham reminded Aston that the Prince had expressed himself to this effect before leaving Madrid.

the oath whether or no he meant to demand a promise of armed assistance as a condition of his marriage. But in Charles's mind such considerations found no place. On the 28th he took the solemn oath binding himself to the marriage, and engaged to leave his proxy behind to be used within ten days after the arrival from Rome of the Pope's consent.¹

The next day Charles went to take his leave of the Queen, in whose presence he saw the Infanta for the last time. With his parting words he assured her that he had taken the Catholics of England under his protection, and that they should never again suffer persecution. The rest of the day was spent in giving and receiving presents, and on the following morning he started for the Escurial, accompanied by Philip and his brothers.

It is probable that, in urging Charles to go home to see the marriage treaty carried out, Philip was giving expression to his real wishes; but, whatever may have been his real feelings about Charles, there can be no doubt whatever as to the disgust with which he regarded Buckingham, whose Arrogance of insolence was every day becoming more and more Bucking- unbearable. Strange words were now heard from ham. the lips of the polite and courteous Spaniards. "We would rather," said one of them, speaking of Buckingham to Bristol, "put the Infanta headlong into a well than into his hands." Bristol was in great distress. Ever since he had had the misfortune to differ from the favourite he had, as he said, been treated worse than a dog; but he had never allowed his resentment to get the better of him, and had, if possible, been

more respectful than before.² He saw that it was at last time to speak out. "I must here," he wrote to his master, "like a faithful and much obliged servant unto your Majesty, presume to deal freely and clearly with you, that if your Majesty's great and high wisdom find not means to compound and accommodate what is now out of

¹ *Francisco de Jesus*, 84. Spanish Narrative in Nichols's *Progresses*, iii. 907.

² Bristol to the King, Aug. 20, *Cabala*, 95.

order,—although I conceive it not to be doubted that the match will, in the end, proceed,—yet your Majesty will find yourself frustrated of those effects of amity and friendship which by this alliance you expected. For the truth is, that this King and his ministers are grown to have so high a dislike against my lord Duke of Buckingham, and, on the one side to judge him to have so much power with your Majesty and the Prince, and, on the other side, to be so ill affected to them and their affairs, that if your Majesty shall not be pleased in your wisdom either to find some means of reconciliation, or else to let them see and be assured that it shall no way be in my lord Duke of Buckingham's power to make the Infanta's life less happy unto her, or any way to cross and embroil the affairs betwixt your Majesties and your kingdoms, I am afraid your Majesty will see the effects which you have just cause to expect from this alliance to follow but slowly, and all the great businesses now in treaty prosper but ill. For I must, for the discharge of my conscience and duty, without descending to particulars, let your Majesty truly know that suspicions and distastes betwixt them all here and my Lord of Buckingham cannot be at a greater height.”¹

It is probable that no other man amongst the ministers of the Crown would have been bold enough to write such a letter.

Two whole days were spent by Charles at the Escurial, and, according to one account, he did not omit to plead once more for the Palatinate, and received in return an assurance from Philip that he would leave no means untried to obtain its cession from the Emperor, in order that he might bestow it upon the

Sept. 2.
Charles
leaves the
Escurial. Prince as a marriage gift.² When, on September 2, the moment of parting came, nothing could exceed the effusiveness of cordiality between the two young men. Philip pressed Charles to allow him to attend him to the coast, and Charles, in refusing the offer, pointed to the effect which the journey might have upon the Queen, who was daily expecting her delivery. At last the moment for separation came. The King and the Prince enjoyed one last hunt together, and after a repast which had been prepared for them

¹ Bristol to the King, Aug. 29, *Hardwicke S. P.* i. 476.

² *Hacket*, 163.

under the shade of a wood, they took an apparently affectionate farewell of one another, by the side of a pillar which had been raised to commemorate the event.¹

Buckingham had not been present at this last interview. Fierce words had passed that morning between him and Olivares.

Buckingham quarrels with Olivares. He was going away, he said, under the greatest obligations to his Majesty. As to Olivares, he had come with the hope of making him a friend ; but he had found it impossible to carry out his intention, as he had discovered the bad offices he had done him both with the King of Spain and with his own master. He hoped, however, that in spite of this he would hasten on the conclusion of the marriage with all his power. To this petulant outbreak Olivares replied with offended dignity. The marriage, he said, was for the good of the Catholic religion. As for the friendship which he had lost, he looked upon it as of no importance. It was enough for him that he had always acted as a gentleman and as a man of honour.

The loud tone in which these words were spoken attracted the attention of the bystanders, and the King called Olivares away, to put an end to the unseemly altercation.² Soon afterwards Buckingham rode away on horseback, in spite of all remonstrances against the imprudence of exposing himself to the heat, leaving the Prince to follow in the coach which had been provided for him.³

The Prince's journey resembled a Royal progress. The President of the Council of the Indies, with three members of the Council of State, accompanied him to do him honour, and a large retinue of officials had been sent to see that he wanted nothing. After their return they were loud in praise of his courtesy and liberality.⁴ Only once did he betray the sentiments which were lurking beneath the smooth surface of his speech. Cardinal Zapata had asked him whether he wished the carriage to be open. "I should not

¹ Narrative in Nichols's *Progresses*, iii. 907.

² Corner to the Doge, Sept. $\frac{10}{20}$, *Venice MSS. Desp. Spagna*.

³ *Francisco de Jesus*.

⁴ Bristol to Calvert, Oct. 24, *Hardwicke State Papers*, i. 473.

dare," he replied, "to give my assent without sending first to Madrid to consult the Junta of Theologians."¹

In truth Charles's feelings towards the Infanta were rapidly undergoing a change. At the best, his love for her had been largely compounded of vanity; and it was a sore blow to him, after giving way to every exorbitant demand till he had all but crawled in the dust at Philip's feet, to be sent back to England without the bride whom he had sacrificed every honourable consideration to win. If he had expressed himself openly in indignant remonstrance, no one would have thought the worse of him. Even if he had simply restrained his impatience, and had confined himself to unmeaning compliments till he was safely out of Spain, wise men might have shaken their heads at a prudence which did not promise well for the future of so young a man; but nothing more would have been said. As it was, he did that which forces us to regard Buckingham, petulant and arrogant as he was, almost as a model of virtue by his side.

It seems that the reference to the possibility of the Infanta's taking refuge in a nunnery from dislike of the marriage, which

His doubt
about the
Infanta. was contained in the papers produced by Olivares a few days before, had sunk deeply into his mind, and

that he now fancied it possible that she would be allowed thus to dispose of herself even after the marriage. With this thought he was undoubtedly justified in asking for an explanation; but to speak out where he felt doubt was not in his nature. It is true that he said something on the subject to Bristol before he left the Escurial, but he took no further action

Sept. 3.
His letters to
Philip from
Segovia. in the matter at the time. On the 3rd, the day after he had parted from Philip, he reached Segovia, where he found a friendly letter from the King. He at once sat down to answer it. "I have," he wrote, after expressing his regret for the necessity which compelled him to leave Spain, "a firm and constant resolution to accomplish all that my father and I have treated of and agreed with your Majesty; and, moreover, to do everything else that may be necessary as far as possible to draw tightly the bonds of brotherhood and

¹ Corner to the Doge, Oct. $\frac{6}{16}$, *Venice MSS. Desp. Spagna.*

sincere amity with your Majesty. Even if all the world conjoined were to oppose itself, and seek to trouble our friendship, it would have no effect upon my father or myself ; but we would rather declare those who attempted it to be our enemies.”¹

Within a few hours² after this letter was written, Edward Clarke, a confidential servant of Buckingham’s, started for Madrid with another of widely different import.
 His letter to Bristol asking whether the Infanta will go into a nunnery. “Bristol,” wrote Charles, “you may remember that, a little before I came from St. Lorenzo,³ I spake to you concerning a fear I had that the Infanta might be forced to go into a monastery after she is betrothed ; which you know she may do with a dispensation. Though at that time I was loth to press it, because I thought it fit, at the time of my parting, to eschew distastes or disputes as much as I could ; yet, since, considering that, if I should be betrothed before that doubt be removed, and that upon illgrounded suspicions, or any other cause whatsoever, they should take this way to break the marriage, the King my father, and all the world might justly condemn me for a rash-headed fool, not to foresee and prevent this in time ; wherefore I thought it necessary by this letter to command you not to deliver my proxy to the King of Spain, until I may have sufficient security, both from him and the Infanta, that, after I am betrothed, a monastery may not rob me of my wife ; and after ye have gotten this security send with all possible speed to me, that, if I find it sufficient, as I hope I shall, I may send you order, by the delivery of my proxy, to despatch the marriage.”⁴

The worst is yet to come. Clarke was ordered to inform the ambassador that he had been sent back to Madrid on Clarke ordered not to deliver it at once. Buckingham’s private business, whilst he kept the important document in his pocket till the arrival of the Pope’s approbation. He was then to hand it to Bristol, when, as the date had been intentionally omitted, he

¹ The Prince to Philip IV., Sept. 3, *S. P. Spain.*

² It was written from Segovia. *Francisco de Jesus*, 87.

³ The Escorial.

⁴ The Prince to Bristol, Sept. 3 (?), *S. P. Spain.* The original is amongst the *Sherborne MSS.*

would be able to represent it as having only just come to hand. The meaning of this manœuvre is unfortunately but too easy to understand. Bristol would be compelled to postpone the betrothal for more than three weeks, whilst he was communicating with Charles in England, although the Prince had solemnly consented to the arrangement by which the ceremony was to be performed ten days after the arrival of the news from Rome. It would seem, therefore, that the scheme was one carefully prepared by Charles in order to take revenge for the slights which he had received, by the outrageous device of rendering the redemption of his own promise impossible ; if, indeed, the explanation is not rather to be sought in his burning desire to throw off his engagements, without consideration for the nature of the method by which he proposed to gain his object.¹

Unconscious of the disgrace which he was bringing upon himself in the eyes of all honourable men, Charles pursued his

The Prince continues his journey. way to Santander, taking care every day to indite a few words of greeting to the Sovereign who little

dreamed of the insult which had been so elaborately prepared for him. As he drew near the coast his anxiety increased to know whether the fleet, which had been long detained by contrary winds in the English Channel, had yet arrived to bear him away from the now detested soil of Spain. Early in the morning of the 12th, when he was about six leagues from Santander, he was met by Sir John Finett, and Sir Thomas Somerset, who had been riding all night to greet

Sept. 12. His embarkation. him with the welcome tidings. The news, he afterwards assured Finett, made him look upon him ‘as one that had the face of an angel.’² As the Prince entered Santander, the bells were rung, and the cannon of the fort were fired, in honour of his coming ; but Charles, whose heart was in the fleet which bore the English flag, did not respond to these signs of welcome. Late as it was in the after-

¹ Francisco de Jesus says that the letter was to be kept back till one or two days before the marriage ; but, from Clarke’s own letter to Buckingham (*Cabala*, 199), there can be little doubt that his orders were as I have given them.

² Finetti *Philoxenis*, 120.

noon, he put off to Rutland's ship, the 'Prince,' which was appointed to carry him home, and which had been fitted up with a gorgeously decorated cabin for the Infanta. As he was returning in his barge, after nightfall, the wind rose, and the rowers found it impossible to make head against the tide, which was sweeping them out to sea. Fortunately, Sir Sackville Trevor, in the 'Defiance,' was aware of the danger, and threw out ropes attached to buoys with lanterns, which might attract the notice of the Prince amidst the increasing gloom. One of these ropes was seized by the crew, and Charles, saved from imminent danger, passed the night on board the 'Defiance.'

For some days the fleet remained windbound at Santander. Between Charles and his Spanish train, the utmost cordiality appeared to prevail. There were festivities in the town, and festivities on board. At last, on the 18th, Sept. 18.
He sails for England. the wind changed. Orders were given to weigh anchor, and this strange episode of the Spanish journey was at an end.¹

No doubt, as he was tossing upon the waves of the Bay of Biscay, Charles did not cease to brood over the prospects of his scheme for springing a mine under Philip's feet. Happily, however, for his own reputation, his deep-laid plot had already been disconcerted by a lucky accident. Almost immediately after he reached Madrid, Clarke was taken ill, and was thus unable to glean the news of the day by his own personal observation. About a week after he appeared at the Embassy, Bristol, either suspecting that he had been entrusted with a secret mission, or being himself under some misapprehension, told him that the Pope's approbation had arrived.

Sept. 11.
Clarke gives Bristol the Prince's letter. supposing that the time indicated had come, produced the letter as one which he had just received. Bristol looked grave after he had read it, and charged him not to breathe a word about it to anyone. "If the Spaniards," he said, "should come to the knowledge of it, they might give orders to stay the Prince."²

¹ Pett's Autobiography, *Harl. MSS.* 6279, fol. 86. Compare Nichols's *Progresses*, iii. 920.

² Clarke to Buckingham, Oct. 1, *Cabala*, 199. Clarke says this took place on the day that the Prince arrived at Santander, *i.e.* the 12th. But Bristol's letter shows that it must have been on the 11th.

Bristol at once despatched a courier to England, acknowledging the receipt of the letter, and assuring Charles Bristol promises to make inquiries. that as soon as he heard that he was out of Spain, he would make every inquiry on the subject which he had named.¹

Ten days afterwards he communicated to Charles the result of his investigations. "Since your Highness's departure," Sept. 21. he wrote, "there have been divers suspicions raised, The result which chiefly have grown from letters of some that communicated to accompanied your Highness to Santander, as though Charles. there might a doubt be made of your Highness's affection to the Infanta, and of the real performance on your Highness's part of what had been capitulated ; which some of your Highness's old friends about the Infanta have taken several occasions to intimate unto her ; but, I dare assure your Highness, it hath not been possible for any to raise in her the least shadow of mistrust or doubt of want of your Highness's affection, but she hath with show of displeasure reproved those that have presumed to speak that kind of language ; and herself never speaketh of your Highness but with that respect and show of affection that all about her tell me of it with a little wonder.

"There was of late in some a desire here that, before your Highness's embarking, the Princess might have sent unto your Highness some token ; whereunto I assure your Highness that the Countess of Olivares was not backward, nor, as I am

¹ "This day Mr. Clarke, that lyeth sick in my house, delivered me a letter from you ; but without date either of time or place. The contents of it your Highness will remember, and I will see as faithfully performed as, God willing, all your commandments to me shall be ; though, for just respects, I shall forbear the clearing of that doubt your Highness maketh for some few days, until I heare of Lewis Dyve."—Bristol to the Prince, Sept. 11, *S. P. Spain*. The allusion is obscure, but it is explained by a passage in the letter of the 21st, which is quoted in the text further on. Lewis Dyve was no doubt attached to the embassy, and may have been sent to accompany the Prince to Santander. Bristol may well have shrunk from saying plainly that he could not do anything till Charles had left Spain, as it would convey an indirect censure on the letter which he had received.

assured, the Princess herself ; but this was not to be done without the allowance of the junta ;¹ and they, for a main reason, alleged that, in case your Highness should fail in what had been agreed, she would by these further engagements be made unfit for any other match ; which coming to her knowledge, I hear she was infinitely much offended, and said that those of the junta were blockheads,² to think her a woman for a second wooing, or to receive a congratulation twice for several husbands. The truth is that, now in your Highness's absence, she much more avowedly declareth her affection to your Highness than ever she did at your being here ; and your Highness cannot believe how much the King and she and all the Court are taken with your Highness's daily letters to the King and her.

"Since I understood of your Highness's embarking, I have begun to speak of the doubt which your Highness seemeth to make, that the Infanta might enter into religion after the marriage. The Countess of Olivares broke it unto the Infanta, who seemed to make herself very merry that any such doubt should be made, and said that she must confess that she never in all her life had any mind to be a nun, and thought she should hardly be one now only to avoid the Prince of Wales, to whom she had such infinite obligation. After this, I replied that your Highness no way doubted of the favour that the Infanta did you ; but she might be forced to that which others would have her ; for that you said there was nothing done but either what the Theologians or the Junta ordained. Hereupon it was answered me, after conference with the Princess, that, after the marriage the Princess would be her own woman, and that the King neither would, nor the Junta should, have to do with her in things of that nature ; but that she doubted not but, when it were fitting for her to write unto the Prince herself, she would both quickly clear that doubt, and any other that should be made, of her affection to the Prince of Wales. And

¹ Not the junta of Theologians, which was now dissolved, but the junta of Councillors of State and others, who were appointed to treat on all things connected with the marriage.

² "Maxaderos" in the original.

the truth is that I never speak of this marriage but the Countess of Olivares falleth a laughing extremely, and telleth me that the Princess doth so too. And, to tell your Highness my opinion, like an honest servant, if this doubt should be insisted upon, I conceive there will at the instant be such satisfaction given, as to stand upon it would rather seem a colour or pretext sought than otherwise ; and therefore, once again, I humbly crave your Highness's speedy direction herein.

"I shall conclude this letter by telling your Highness that commonly once a day I wait upon the Princess on the Queen's side.¹ I receive from her most gracious usage, and ever affectionate and sometimes long messages.² I pray God send your Highness as happy in everything else as you are like to be in a wife ; for certainly a worthier or more virtuous Princess liveth not."³

It is true that, for his knowledge of the Infanta's secret feelings, the ambassador was altogether dependent upon the reports which it pleased the Countess of Olivares to put in circulation. But there is no reason to doubt that the statements in his letter were at least in the main correct. Whether any trace of her original repugnance to Charles still lurked in her mind it is impossible to say ; but it is certain that she had begun to regard the marriage as a settled thing, and it is by no means impossible that, as Bristol suggested, Charles's absence may have fanned into a flame the sparks of affection which the daily sight of her hoped-for convert had kindled in her bosom. She was now officially styled Princess of England, and she was diligently occupied in studying the language of her future country. Nor was it merely by the help of dictionaries and grammars that she was preparing herself for her new position. By her brother's command, she was receiving instructions from the Bishop of Segovia, and from two of the royal preachers, by which, as it was hoped, she would be prepared to fulfil those duties of her

¹ The Queen's side of the palace.

² "Recaudos" in the original.

³ Bristol to the Prince, Sept. 21, *Clarendon State Papers*, i. App. 19.

married life of which such great expectations had been formed.¹

Yet already doubts were beginning to be entertained at Madrid whether, after all, those expectations would be realised.

Misled by Charles's readiness to make every concession that was required of him, Olivares had committed the blunder of forgetting the large part which vanity had in his professions of love for the Infanta. He had calculated that because Charles was ready to do anything, and to swear to anything, in order to carry with him his promised bride, he would therefore be equally ready to redeem his engagements in the hope of obtaining her in the spring. Having omitted in his calculations the consequences of offended pride, he was now to learn that Charles, who would have accepted all his terms in order to obtain the credit of success, would be equally ready to shake off the most binding engagements in the vain hope of wiping away the disgrace of failure.

In one respect, at least, the Spanish minister appears to have resolved to surrender his hopes. From the moment that Charles began to show any spirit of independence, nothing more was heard about the Parliamentary repeal of the penal laws, which had been so marked a feature in the previous discussions. It almost seems as if Olivares would have been content to allow that point to drop out of sight, in spite of the long and arduous struggle which it had cost him.

Even before Charles arrived in England, the news forwarded by the Spanish ambassadors must have created some doubt in

the mind of Olivares whether even the ground which had been gained by the agreement of Salisbury was not slipping from under his feet. For three weeks after the signature of that agreement the question of the form in which the promises then made were to be clothed in legal phraseology had been the subject of warm discussion ; and, though there does not appear to have been any intention to raise delays, the length of time thus occupied brought forth grievous complaints from the Spanish ambassadors, and especially from the hot-

¹ *Francisco de Jesus*, 88.

tempered Inojosa.¹ At last, on the 28th of August, Conway was able to inform the Lord Keeper that the pardon and dispensation had been signed by the King,² who had at the same time directed him to prepare a warrant for the liberation of the imprisoned priests, and to write a letter to the judges and magistrates, desiring them to take note of the pardon which had been granted, and to allow it to be pleaded in court.³

The instructions thus conveyed by Conway were a concession to Williams. The ambassadors had been asking for something very different—for a direct command restraining the judges from allowing the institution of proceedings against the Catholics. To this the Lord Keeper, not without reason, objected. It was customary, he urged, to grant dispensations from penalties incurred by the breach of the laws, and such dispensations would render any judicial sentence inoperative. He was, therefore, willing to write to the judges, informing them that the dispensation had been granted, and directing them to take note of the fact whenever it was pleaded in arrest of judgment. But it was utterly contrary to reason and precedent to forbid the judges and the justices of the peace to execute that law which they were sworn to administer. Such a proceeding, he justly declared, would provoke a storm of reprobation from one end of England to the other.

Through the efforts of Williams, the ambassadors were induced to postpone their demands. It was agreed that the question should not be mooted again till the Infanta had been six months in England.⁴

If Williams had stopped here he would have done nothing more than his duty as a guardian of constitutional right, but it soon became evident that he had something more than the mere exercise of his duty in his mind.

¹ The correspondence on both sides is amongst the State Papers, but has unfortunately been divided without any sufficient motive. Some of the letters will be found in the Domestic Series, others in the Spanish.

² See p. 98.

³ Conway to Williams, Calvert, and Weston, Aug. 28, *S. P. Dom.* cli. 77. Conway to Gage, Aug. 29, *S. P. Spain.*

⁴ Williams to Buckingham, Aug. 30. Printed with a wrong date in *Catala*, 272.

Question of writing to the judges.

Knowing, as he did, that the Prince would in all probability soon be home from Spain, he turned all the resources of his brain to the one object of postponing the settlement of any single question by which the recusants were affected till Charles was once again in England. Shrewd enough to foresee that the Prince would probably come back in a high state of discontent, the Lord Keeper was already trimming his sails to suit the changing breeze ; but in this, as in most other human actions, there was, no doubt, a mixture of motives at work. The last concessions to the Catholics had been wrung out of the King by the fear that a refusal would be visited upon his son. Would not James therefore, Williams may have thought, be justified in replacing himself in the position which he would have occupied if the Prince had remained quietly in England ? To do this, indeed, would cost some amount of manœuvring, from which an honourable man would have shrunk ; but the episcopal Lord Keeper was ready to take all this upon his own shoulders, and it is probable that the game which he proposed to play was the more enjoyable to him because it involved a trial of skill not altogether restrained within the limits of truthfulness and honesty.

To a certain point, at least, Williams had the clear support of the King. James was really desirous of fulfilling his promises, but he wished first to make sure that the King of Spain was in earnest too. The instrument containing the pardon and dispensation was therefore ordered to be got ready on the distinct understanding that it was not to be published or in any way made use of until the return of the Prince, or the arrival of satisfactory tidings from Spain. An exemplification of it was, however, to be made under the great seal for the purpose of being placed in Inojosa's hands, though he was strictly charged to keep his possession of it a profound secret.¹ A day or two afterwards he was told that this restriction would be taken off, and the Catholics would be allowed to

¹ Conway to Williams, Calvert, and Weston, Sept. 1. Conway to Gage, Sept. 1. Conway to Calvert, Sept. 4, *S. P. Dom.* Conway's Letter Book, 81, 82. Calvert to Conway, Sept. 2, *S. P. Dom.* clii. 4. Conway to Calvert, Aug. 31. Conway to Inojosa, Sept. 4, *S. P. Spain.*

benefit by the pardon as soon as it was known that the marriage ceremony had taken place at Madrid.¹

Great as must have been the annoyance felt by Inojosa at the delay, it was as nothing to his disgust at what followed. It happened that a certain Preston was one of the very few Roman Catholic priests who had taken the King's side in the controversy on the oath of allegiance. He was in consequence excessively unpopular amongst the members of his own Church, and was living under the constant fear of punishment by his ecclesiastical superiors for the courageous firmness with which he had maintained his opinions in the face of the worst of oppositions, the opposition of those who had once been his intimate friends. He had now for some time been imprisoned in the Marshalsea with his own consent, in order that if he were summoned to Rome to give an account of his actions, he might be able to plead the bar of physical impossibility.

This was the man, of all others, who was selected by James and Williams to be named in the first pardon, a copy of which was to be placed in Inojosa's hands. Care was taken at the same time that he should not be sent away from England without the King's permission.²

A day or two after Williams had received orders to get this pardon ready, news arrived that the Prince had left Madrid.

From that moment the Lord Keeper set himself resolutely to evade, and even to disobey, the orders which he received from his Sovereign. Again and again Inojosa complained that no copy of the pardon had been given to him, and that the promises which he had received in the King's name had not been fulfilled. Again and again James sent messages to assure him that he had given distinct orders, and that it was not his fault if they had not been carried out.³ Williams, whenever he was applied to, answered unblushingly

¹ Conway to Inojosa, Sept. 6, *S. P. Spain*.

² Conway to Williams, Sept. 6. Warrant, Sept. 8, *Hacket*, 158.

³ Calvert to Conway, Sept. 12, *S. P. Dom.* cli. 36. Conway to Calvert, Sept. 12. Inojosa to Conway, Sept. 15. Conway to Inojosa, Sept. 16, *S. P. Spain*. Conway to Williams, Sept. 17, *Hacket*, 158.

that it was impossible to get ready such a multitude of instruments in so short a time. At last, however, James, who did not like to see his orders trifled with, sent peremptory commands to the Lord Keeper to obey. Williams, thus thrown back upon himself, acknowledged that there had been no truth in the excuses which he had made, and pleaded the danger of incurring opposition in a future Parliament by too great readiness to give way in matters of religion. Such underhand proceedings were not to the taste of James. All this, he said, would have been good counsel if no promises had been passed. As it was, 'the truth of a King must be preferred before all other circumstances,' and within three days the ambassadors must be satisfied.¹ Thus pressed, Williams replied that he was ready to obey orders. The copy of the pardon was given to Inojosa, and the letter directing the judges to admit its validity was to follow as soon as possible.²

At last, on October 5, the Prince landed at Portsmouth. Hurrying up to London, he reached York House a little after daybreak on the following morning. Already the news Oct. 5.
Arrival of
the Prince. of his arrival had spread like wildfire. That he had come without the dreaded Infanta by his side was sufficient to awaken the long-suppressed loyalty of the English people. They saw in it a pledge that the prolonged rule of Spanish ministers and of Spanish counsels was coming to an end. At last, they believed, the Prince had burst the bonds which had been woven around him by designing men, and had

Oct. 6.
Rejoicings in
London. come back free to withstand the insidious aggressions of Popery. When Charles landed from the barge in which he crossed the Thames, he found that the news of his coming had preceded him. The bells rang out their merriest peals on every side. The streets were thronged with happy faces. But he did not care to linger in London. After

¹ Conway to Williams, Oct. 18, Oct. 19, *Hacket*, 159. Williams to Conway, Oct. 18, *S. P. Dom.* clii. 46.

² Hacket (i. 159), states that everything was put off till the return of the Prince; but he himself admits that the order for the letter had been given; and Salvetti, in his *News-Letter* of October 24, distinctly states that the pardon was in the ambassador's hands.

receiving complimentary visits from the Privy Councillors, he rejected an ill-timed demand that he would give audience to the Spanish ambassadors, and ordered a coach to be got ready, that he might join his father at Royston with all possible speed. As he drove along the Strand, it was with the utmost difficulty that he could make his way through the enthusiastic crowd. "Long live the Prince of Wales!" was heard on every side, from voices mingled in one universal roar of gladness. When he was gone, men felt that it was impossible to settle down to their usual avocations. Wealthy citizens brought out tables laden with food and wine, and placed them in the streets. Prisoners confined for debt were set at liberty by the contributions of persons whose names were utterly unknown to them. A cartload of felons, wending its melancholy way to Tyburn, and happening to cross the Prince's path, was turned back, and the condemned men were astonished by an unexpected release from death. When the evening closed in, lighted candles were placed in every window, and the sky was reddened with bonfires. One hundred and eight blazing piles were counted in the short distance between St. Paul's and London Bridge. In one place a cart laden with wood was stopped by the populace, and as soon as the horse had been taken out, a light was applied to the load as it stood. Never before, according to the general testimony of all who have left a narrative of the scenes which passed before their eyes, had rejoicing so universal and so spontaneous been known in England.¹

¹ *Nichols*, iii. 935. Valaresso to the Doge, Oct. $\frac{10}{20}$, *Venice Transcripts*.

Salvetti's *News-Letter*, Oct. $\frac{10}{20}$.

CHAPTER XLVI.

THE BREACH WITH SPAIN.

WITH the shouts of welcome ringing in his ears, Charles hastened to meet his father. After the first warm greetings were

Oct. 6.
Charles at
Royston.

over, the King took his son and his favourite into an inner room, and closed the doors. Charles spoke with angry dissatisfaction of the refusal of the Spaniards to allow him to bring his bride to England, and of their ill-treatment of him during his stay at Madrid. “I am ready,” he said, as soon as his tale was ended, “to conquer Spain, if you will allow me to do it.”¹ What else passed between the father and son after this boyish outburst, we do not know. The courtiers without listened long to the outbursts of merriment or of indignation which expressed the varying feelings of the speakers, in the vain hope of catching some indication of the turn which the conversation was taking. At last the doors were thrown open, and the King came forth to supper. Once more all ears were on the alert, and it was not long before the listeners were rejoiced by the sound of words to which they had been long unused from Royal lips. James, it seemed, after all, was not displeased at the delay of the marriage, as long as he had no

¹ In his despatch of March ⁹₁₉, 1624, in the Madrid Palace Library, Carondelet stated that James told him that the first thing the Prince had said to him after his return from Spain was, ‘Despues de mostrarle el sentimiento que tenia de que le huviesen dejado volver sin la Infanta y quejándose de otras muchas cosas, fueron estas palabras ; que avia de conquistar á España si lo permitia ; y que esto se le avia confirmado el Principe muchas veces por cosa muy posible, aunque el le havia respondido haciendo burla d'ello.’

better satisfaction about the Palatinate. “I like not,” he said, “to marry my son with a portion of my daughter’s tears.”¹

Yet, if Buckingham’s vehement denunciations of Spanish perfidy had shaken James from the calm and self-satisfied repose in which he had long been slumbering, they were not of a nature to open his eyes to the true position of affairs. Still, as before, the restitution of the Palatinate was a mere trifle, which the King of Spain could not courteously refuse to a friendly sovereign. For James, all the physical and moral difficulties which stood in the way had no existence whatever. If Philip did not comply with his wishes at once, it was simply because he had made up his mind to insult him.

The doubts of Spanish sincerity, to which James was now compelled to listen, must have been the more distressing to him, as he had just given his sanction to a plan for the settlement of Germany, which was, as he fondly hoped, to free Europe from war, and himself from all further trouble. On

^{Oct. 2.} October 2, three days before the Prince’s return to
 Spanish plan for pacifying Germany. England, the Spanish Ambassadors had a long interview with Calvert in London. The scheme which they proposed was couched very much in the form which had been suggested by Bristol in Spain. It would be well, they said, if the King would write to his son-in-law to recommend the marriage of the young Prince with the Emperor’s daughter. If, as was probable, the Emperor wished to have the education of the boy, he might be gratified on condition that his governor was appointed by his father, and that neither he nor any of his household were to be ‘forced in point of their conscience.’ To an inquiry from Calvert whether the King of Spain would, under these circumstances, give assurance of the ‘full restitution of the inheritances and dignities,’ the Ambassadors replied evasively that ‘it was a needless thing to take it into thought.’ If the marriage took place, there could be no doubt that the Emperor ‘would restore all.’²

It is difficult to regard this concession of a guarantee for the religion of the Electoral Prince as seriously made. It is just

¹ Hacket. 165.

² Calvert to the King, Oct. 2, *S. P. Spain.*

possible that Olivares may have been frightened by the feelings
^{It is probable} which Charles had manifested at his departure from
intention. Madrid ; but it is more likely that he calculated
upon Frederick's resistance, and that he hoped, by moderating
his own terms, once more to draw James over to his side.

The next day Conway replied, in his master's name, to
Calvert's report of the conversation. James seems to have
Oct. 3.
It is ac-
cepted by
James.
taken it for granted that the Spaniards intended, if
their terms were accepted, to procure the restitution
of the Palatinate to Frederick himself, and not merely
to the Electoral Prince. "His Majesty's judgment," wrote the
Secretary, "is that it is an honourable and fair way to the ends
of restoration ; and that his Majesty will have clear and full
assurance of an honourable, total, and punctual restitution in all
points before he deliver his grandchild into their hands ; and
also take as punctual provision for the demands and limitations
in point of freedom of conscience which shall be agreed on for
his grandchild, as is here done for those that are accorded for
the Infanta."¹

Thus it was that Buckingham found his master still busy, as
of old, in the vain attempt to strike out a middle path between
irreconcilably opposite pretensions. The day after his return
was spent in anxious deliberation. If he had had his way, no
doubt all further negotiation would have been broken off at
once ; but James's mind was not yet ripe for this step, and
he was obliged to wait a little longer till events forced on the
inevitable decision. On one point at least there was
Oct. 7.
Liberation of
the priests.
no hesitation. Williams was ordered to open the
prison doors, and to set the priests at liberty, that
they might join in the general rejoicing.²

On the following day couriers were despatched in every
Oct. 8.
Proposal
made by
James to
Frederick.
direction. A letter to Frederick, laying before him
plainly and distinctly the Spanish proposal for his
son's marriage, was easy enough to write.³ It was
far more difficult to know in what terms the Court of
Spain was to be addressed.

¹ Conway to Calvert, Oct. 3, *S. P. Spain*.

² Conway to Coloma, Oct. 7, *S. P. Germany*.

³ The King to Frederick, Oct., *ibid.*

In considering this all-important question, James had before him a bundle of despatches, written on September 24,
 Sept. 24. which had recently arrived from Bristol. A difference
 The Infanta's portion. had arisen about the Infanta's portion, which Bristol
 had proposed to receive, at stated terms, in ready
 money, whilst Olivares, who knew well how empty his master's treasury was, would only agree to pay a small part of the sum in money, whilst the rest was to be commuted partly for its worth in jewels, partly for a yearly rent, calculated at five per cent. upon the capital, and secured upon landed property in Spain.¹ In writing both to the King and to the Prince, Bristol reverted to the question which had been raised about the possibility of the Infanta's betaking herself to a nunnery. On this point, he said, the King would give any security that might be desired. "I must now crave leave," he continued in his letter to the Prince, "to speak unto your Highness like a faithful, plain servant, which is, if your Highness's pleasure be to have use made of the powers you have left in my hands, I no way doubt but, in this particular, such satisfaction will be given as will appear reasonable to all the world. But, if your Highness desire that these powers should not be used, they may be detained upon other just reasons which will arise in the treaty of the temporal articles; and I doubt not but the marriage may be deferred for some few days upon other fair pretexts. But these inconveniences I conceive will follow:—First, it will be of great discomfort to the Infanta, who, until the marriage is past, is not her own woman, but must be governed by the pleasure of the junta, which, I think, she is very weary of; neither till then may she declare herself to be yours, nor comply with your Highness in answering of your letters and messages, and giving you those respects and comforts which I know she would be glad to do; but if she would any way judge that the delay of the marriage should arise from your Highness's part, I conceive she would take it most heavily. Secondly, it will certainly raise great jealousies in this King and his ministers, and retard the resolutions that are fit to be

¹ Bristol to the Prince, Sept. 24, *Cabala*, 94. Bristol to Calvert, Sept. 24, *S. P. Spain*.

taken with speed, for the putting in execution that which is capitulated. I therefore offer it unto your Highness's wisdom whether, upon the satisfaction which they will give in this particular, which will be whatsoever you can desire, and upon the agreement of the temporal articles your Highness would, upon the coming of the Pope's approbation, make any further scruple in the delivering of your Highness's powers.”¹

To the King, Bristol spoke of his own difficult position even more explicitly. “I must further,” he wrote, “let your Majesty understand that the first of the temporal articles is that the marriage shall be within ten days after the arrival of the Pope’s approbation, which is hourly expected; so that I must deal like a faithful servant with your Majesty. If, upon the coming of the Pope’s approbation, I should withhold the powers, and they understand that it is by a secret order of the Prince’s, there being a clause in the said powers that the Prince shall no ways, either in part or whole, revoke the said powers, or detract from them, but that they shall be in force till Christmas, I fear your Majesty will find your business much disturbed and retarded by it.”²

To Bristol’s assurances about the Infanta there was nothing more to be said. “We have resolved,” wrote James, “with

Oct. 8.
The mar-
riage to be
postponed
till assur-
ance is given
about the
Palatinate.

the great liking of our son, to rest upon that security in point of doubt of the Infanta’s taking a religious house, which you, in your judgment, shall think meet.” The ambassador’s statement that any postponement of the marriage would be attended with

grave difficulties was thrown away upon James. He went on to say that it was his special pleasure that it should take place shortly after Christmas, ‘that holy and joyful time best fitting so notable and blessed an action.’

“But first,” he continued, “we will that you repair presently to that King and give him knowledge of the safe arrival of our dear son to our Court, so satisfied and taken with the great entertainments, personal kindness, favour, and respect he hath received from that King and Court, as he seems not able to

¹ Bristol to the Prince, Sept. 24, *Clarendon State Papers*, i. App. xx.

² Bristol to the King, Sept. 24, *Hardwicke State Papers*, i. 481.

magnify it sufficiently, which makes us not know how sufficiently to give thanks ; but we will that by all means you endeavour to express our thankfulness to that King, and the rest to whom it belongs, in the most ample manner you can. And hereupon you may take occasion to let that King know that, according to our constant affection to make a firm and indissoluble amity between our families, nations, and crowns, and not seem to abandon our honour, nor, at the same time we give joy to our only son, to give our only daughter a portion in tears, by the advice of that King's ambassadors, we have entered a treaty concerning the restitution of the Palatinate and Electoral dignity to our son-in-law to be really procured by that King, according to the obligation of our honour, as you have well expressed in your reasons why the person of our son-in-law should not be left out of the treaty ; but that the Emperor should find out a great title, or by increasing the number of Electoral States wherewith to satisfy the Duke of Bavaria. We now, therefore, require you that presently on your first audience you procure from that King a punctual answer what course that King will take for the restitution of the Palatinate and Electorate to our son-in-law ; and in case that either the Emperor or the Duke of Bavaria oppose any part of the expected restitution, what course that King will take to give us assurance for our content on that point, whereof we require your present answer ; and that you so press expedition herein that we may all together receive the full joy of both in Christmas, resting ourself upon that faithful diligence of yours we have approved in all your service ; though almost with the latest we must remember to you as a good ground for you to work on, that our son did write us out of Spain that that King would give us a blank, in which we might form our own conditions concerning the Palatinate, and the same our son confirms to us now. What observation and performance that King will make we require you to express, and give us a speedy account.”¹

In this letter, James, passing by, as unworthy of notice, Bristol's statement that a postponement of the marriage would

¹ The King to Bristol, Oct. 8, *Cabala*, 241.

be regarded in Spain as a personal insult, quietly fixed, as if it were a mere matter of course, upon a day subsequent to the date at which, as he must have known if he had read his ambassador's despatch with the slightest attention, his son's proxy would expire. The remainder of the letter was no less characteristic of the man. He evidently believed that the King of Spain would be able and willing to effect what was now equivalent to a revolution in Germany as a personal favour to himself. For himself to take part in the German war on behalf of his kindred and religion was a task which was, in his eyes, surrounded by ever-increasing difficulties ; for the King of Spain to join in the strife on the side opposite to his own family interests and his own warmest convictions, was a mere trifle, from which it would be ridiculous to expect him to shrink.

James's letter was accompanied by one from the Prince. "The King," wrote Charles, "has thought good in this interim of expectation for my mistress, to give you a command to try what the King of Spain will do concerning the business of the Palatinate before I be contracted, and his reason is—which I could not reply to—that, having but two children, he would be loth that one of them should have cause to weep when the other has reason to laugh ; and I was the rather induced to yield unto it, because the King may very well have a positive answer of this before Christmas, so that it will lose no time in that business I desire so much. Although this be a needless office, because I am sure you will understand this more amply by the King's own letters, yet I have written this that ye may know from me, as well as from the King my father, the intent of this direction, which I assure you is in no way to break the marriage, but, in this dull interim of looking for my mistress, to put an end to the miseries of my sister and her children, which I should have done if I had stayed this winter."¹

Another letter, written to Aston on the same day, is far more indicative of Charles's real feelings. "Honest Watt," he wrote,

¹ The Prince to Bristol, Oct. 8, *Sherborne MSS.*

"the King, my father, has sent a command to Bristol not to deliver my proxy until we may know certainly what the
 and to Aston. King of Spain will do concerning the Palatinate. If you find that this do make them startle, give them all the assurance that you can think of, that I do really intend to desire this match ; and the chief end of this is that we may be as well hearty friends as near allies ; and, to deal freely with you, so that we may have satisfaction concerning the Palatinate, I will be content to forget all ill-usage and be hearty friends ; but, if not, I can never match where I have had so dry entertainment, although I shall be infinitely sorry for the loss of the Infanta."¹

It is not probable that, if Charles had been allowed to bring the Infanta with him in September, he would have expressed himself so strongly about the Palatinate. But all his self-love was in arms to avenge the slight which had been put upon him. Now that the remembrance of the wounds which had been inflicted upon his vanity in Spain was rankling in his breast his sense of his sister's wrongs became more vivid than before.

To the summons peremptorily addressed to Madrid and to the Hague, Frederick was the first to reply. After thank-

^{Oct. 20.} Oct. 20. ing his father-in-law profusely for his good-will, Frederick's and especially for his declaration that he would reply.

obtain for him an entire restitution, he touched upon the important demand which had now been made. "As to the overture," he wrote, "of a marriage between my eldest son and the Emperor's daughter, when I have obtained that full and entire restitution of which I have spoken, if your Majesty judges it expedient to insist upon the point, I shall always be very willing, through my duty and filial respect, to yield to whatever may tend to the advancement of the glory of God, and which is in conformity with your Majesty's good advice, and is necessary for the public good, and the particular interests of my House."²

However courteous may have been the forms in which it was expressed, the letter contained what was virtually a decided refusal to listen to James's proposal. No candid person,

¹ The Prince to Aston, Oct. 8, *S. P. Spain.*

² Frederick to the King, Oct. $\frac{20}{30}$, *S. P. Germany.*

indeed, would think of blaming Frederick for his objection to marry his son to a Roman Catholic wife. Every day it was becoming more plain that the Protestant religion was in real danger in Germany. What the fugitive Prince could not see was, that, as long as he persisted in claiming total restitution as a right, so long would those moderate men who looked upon the Imperial institutions as the only bulwark against anarchy, be lukewarm in his cause, if they were not absolutely hostile. The best service that he could render to Germany was to leave the championship of his religion to men whose names would not sound in the ears of their countrymen as a challenge to sedition. Unhappily such patriotism as this is hardly to be expected from the majority of men, and least of all from such as Frederick.

However much opinions may differ as to Frederick's duty, there can be no doubt whatever that his letter was a deathblow

His impracticable demands. Mediation now impossible. to any vitality which may have been left in James's mediation. It rendered all further negotiation hopeless. If Philip had been the most conscientious man in Europe, he would not have considered himself bound by promises made under other circumstances, either to persuade or to compel the Emperor to replace Frederick in his old authority, without any guarantees for his future conduct, on the mere chance that the restored Prince would abstain from sending out fresh hordes of plunderers to devastate the territories of his neighbours. If Frederick was to some extent in the right, so far as the quarrel concerned religion, Ferdinand and Philip were altogether in the right so far as it concerned the political security of Germany.

On the 21st, the day after Frederick's letter was written, the King of Spain's intentions with respect to the Palatinate were

Oct. 21.
Philip's declaration about the Palatinate. made known to Bristol. With respect to the proposed marriage, he declared himself ready to do all good offices with the Emperor, if it were understood that the young Prince was to be educated at Vienna. It would then be for his father to make due submission, and to give guarantees that he would from that time become the firm ally of the House of Austria. Then everything possible would

be done to meet James's wishes, and in proportion as the Palatine gave satisfaction, his States would be restored either to himself or to his children. After the death of the Duke of Bavaria, the Electorate would revert to Frederick's eldest son. But, to quote the words of the document itself :—" As the aforesaid Count Palatine has up to this time shown so little sign of submission or repentance, and as he has made such notorious attempts upon his lord the Emperor, it seems that it would be of very ill example that he should not retain in his individual person some mark of punishment."¹

As far as Frederick's own position was concerned, nothing more could fairly be expected. Ignorant as the Spanish ministers necessarily were of the letter which had been written the day before at the Hague, they were not ignorant that it was only after Christian's defeat at Stadtloo that Frederick had been brought to consent to any negotiation at all. The really serious point in the King of Spain's declaration was the total omission of any reference to the Protestant governor who was to have superintended young Frederick Henry's education at Vienna. The omission was evidently intentional ; and, in fact, Olivares, sanguine as usual, was already communicating to Khevenhüller a plan by which Frederick might be induced to travel to Vienna in order to throw himself at the Emperor's feet, and to leave, not only his eldest, but also his second son, to be educated in the Catholic religion.²

Such were the secret plans of Olivares and his master, when, on October 21, the despatches written in England on the 8th were placed in Bristol's hands. Ignorant, alike of Frederick's last impracticable demands, and of the no less impracticable designs of the Spanish Government, the ambassador still cherished the belief that, when once the Prince of Wales was married, Philip could not fail to exert himself on behalf of the interests of his brother-in-law on the Continent. As he was himself without any religious enthusiasm whatever, and was accustomed to regard passing events from the point of view of a secular politician, he

¹ Ciriza to Bristol, Oct. ²¹₃₁, *S. P. Spain*. Olivares to Cottington (?), Oct. ²¹₃₁, *Hacket*, 483.

² *Khevenhüller*, x. 99.

was always too apt to leave out of consideration the action either of genuine religious feeling, or of that theological partisanship which follows like a ground-swell the storm which has been already hushed. But, mistaken as he was in his interpretation of the purposes of the Spanish Court, he knew far better than to imagine that the war which had now been raging for five disastrous years could be allayed in a few weeks by Philip's mere word.

Under the influence of these impressions Bristol received directions to put off the marriage till after Christmas. Such a

Oct. 24. step he told his master plainly, would throw back into uncertainty all that had been covenanted in respect Bristol
complains of
the postpone-
ment of the
marriage. of the marriage. The proxy with which he was entrusted would then have expired. Nor was this the worst. This question of the Palatinate had often been under debate, but it had never been insisted upon as a ground for postponing the marriage. If it were now brought forward, it could not be but that the Spaniards would suspect that it was a mere pretext, and nothing more ; for there could be no doubt that to make the match conditional upon the restoration of the Palatinate was a totally new demand. His own instructions had been ‘to insist upon the restoring of the Prince Palatine, but not so as to annex it to the treaty of the match, as that thereby the match should be hazarded ;’ his Majesty having ‘seemed confident they here would never grow to a perfect conclusion of the match, without a settled resolution’ to give him ‘satisfaction in the business of the Palatinate.’ Both the Prince and Buckingham had treated the business in a similar spirit, and they might remember that ‘Olivares often protested the necessity of having this business compounded and settled before the marriage, saying, otherwise they might give a daughter and have a war within three months after, if this ground and subject of quarrel should be still left on foot.’

Bristol then proceeded to point out, in the most guarded terms, the absurdity of the course which he was asked to take. The restoration of the Palatinate, he showed, was not an affair to be hustled over in a day ; it was a question in which many great Princes were interested, and it certainly could not be

{ obtained excepting after long and formal negotiations. If the Prince were to wait for his wife till these were brought to an end, he might wait long. He had no doubt that the King of Spain would really assist in obtaining that which had been asked ; but to demand a peremptory answer, under the penalty of retaining the proxy, was to fling an insult in his face and in the face of his sister, which was sure to be bitterly resented. He therefore hoped that orders would at once be sent him to make use of the proxy when called for, and at the same time to use every means in his power to obtain a better answer about the Palatinate.¹

However respectfully Bristol's letter had been worded, he had contrived to tell his sovereign that he had done a foolish thing, and that he had better undo it as soon as possible.

It is not necessary to share Bristol's confidence in the reality of Spanish promises—to agree with him in his estimate of James's letter. It might be wise to break off his son's marriage at any cost. It might be wise to obtain a distinct engagement from Philip about the Palatinate. But to expect to wring such an engagement from Philip by the studied insult of postponing the betrothal, and at the same time to talk about the most perfect amity and friendship, was mere infatuation.

Yet, infatuation as it was, it was a dream to which James clung with his usual tenacity. Every day, indeed, Buckingham, ^{Anxiety of} and the Prince under Buckingham's guidance, were James. urging him to make the restitution of the Palatinate the indispensable condition of the marriage. But neither Buckingham nor Charles cared for anything larger than the immediate interests of the hour ; whereas James, in his uncertain and helpless way, had been labouring for years to promote the peace and well-being of Europe. Whilst he was waiting for the replies from the Hague and from Madrid to the despatches which he had sent forth as the messengers of peace, his anxiety brought on a fit of the gout, which rendered him more than ever incapable of coming to a decision.

In the meanwhile, though the Spanish ambassadors were

¹ Bristol to the King, Oct. 24, *Hardwicke State Papers*, i. 483.

treated with all outward show of respect, nothing beyond the liberation of the priests was done to satisfy their demands. The pardon and dispensation remained unused in the Lord Keeper's hands.¹ The promised letters to the judges were not written.² Encouraged by the support of Buckingham, men now allowed themselves to talk more freely than they had dared before. Strange tales were told by those who had returned with the Prince of the ignorance and superstition of the Spanish people, and of the beggarly fare and discourteous treatment to which they had been exposed in Spain.³ The air was thick with rumours. The words and actions of the men who seemed to have the destiny of England in their hands were noted as if they had been the oracles of fate. Charles, reserved and silent as usual, gave few tokens of his real feelings. Yet even he was unable altogether to conceal the change which had come over him. "It is certain," said a keen observer, "that he does not love the Spaniards ; and if he loves the Infanta, his affection is very moderate."⁴

In the midst of these uncertainties, an accident occurred, which, if it threw no new light upon the intentions of the Court,

^{Oct. 26.} ^{The accident at Black-} might at least have served to open the eyes of the Spanish Ambassadors to the opposition which their friars. scheme for securing a Catholic domination would be certain to meet with in England. It happened that a large number of persons were assembled, one Sunday afternoon, to hear a Jesuit preach in a garret attached to the French Embassy at Blackfriars. In the midst of the sermon the beam on which the flooring rested gave way, and about a hundred and fifty persons were hurled, in a confused, shrieking mass, below. The next storey was carried away by the falling ruin, and when the living had been separated from the dead, ninety-one

¹ Salvetti's *News-Letter*, ^{Oct. 24.}
^{Nov. 3.}

² Williams to Conway, Oct. 10 ; Conway to Williams, Oct. 11, *S. P. Dom.* cliii. 38, 39.

³ Chamberlain to Carleton, Oct. 25, *S. P. Dom.* cliv. 98.

⁴ "Il Principe è al solito cupo et usa gran silentio. Certo non ama Spagnuoli ; et se ama l'Infanta, l'amor è temperato." Valaresso to the Doge, ^{Oct. 24.}
^{Nov. 3.} *Venice Transcripts.*

crushed and blood-stained corpses were drawn out from amongst the mass.

In the presence of such a scene of misery, even religious bigotry might well have been silent for a time ; but the age was not one in which there was much charity to spare for Jesuits, and the dread of Papal encroachment was, thanks to James, rooting itself more firmly than ever in the English mind. As soon as the news was known, a noisy mob gathered round the doors, and threatened to break into the ambassador's house. The Bishop of London refused to allow the dead to be buried in the churchyards. In order to escape insult and ill-usage, it was found necessary to dispose of the greater number of the bodies in pits dug in the court-yard of the French Embassy. Men who should have known better pointed out with triumph that October 26, the day on which the accident happened, was November 5 in the Roman calendar, and stated, in utter disregard of the fact, that the broken beam was a perfectly sound one. The inference from these two propositions was, of course, that the occurrence was a direct judgment of God.¹

The time was rapidly approaching when it was to be decided whether the privilege of openly receiving Catholic preachers, which had been grudgingly connived at in the case of foreign ambassadors, was to be extended to every Catholic gentleman in England. On October 31 the Prince suddenly arrived in London, and on November 1 twelve members of the Privy Council, who were specially entrusted with Spanish business, were summoned to meet him. After swearing, by the special command of the Prince, not to

Nov. 1.
receives
Buckin-
ham's de-
claration. repeat a word of anything that they might hear, they were called upon to listen to a long narrative from Buckingham about his proceedings in Spain, which was no doubt as highly coloured by his personal resentment as his subsequent report to the Houses of Parliament. As soon as the statement had been made, he returned to New-

¹ A relation of the fall of the room at Blackfriars, *Court and Times of James I.*, ii. 428. Salvetti's *News-Letter*, Oct. 31, Nov. 10. — to Meade, Oct. 29, *Harl. MSS.* 389, fol. 374. D. Carleton to Carleton, Nov. 1, *S. P. Dom.* cliv. 2.

market to visit the King, by whom he was probably taken to task for his want of courtesy in refusing to receive a visit from the Spanish Ambassadors. At all events, he suddenly reappeared in London on the 9th, and lost no time in paying a formal visit to the Spaniards.¹

The King's gout had passed away, and he was able to come up to London. He had by this time received the replies of

Nov. 12.
The King
in London.

Bristol and Frederick to his letters, and even if it could be supposed that neither party in the dispute would ever put forward further claims than they

now asserted, the discrepancy between the views of Philip and of Frederick was sufficiently wide to startle the most lethargic politician. What Philip asked was that Frederick and his children should be put upon their good behaviour, and readmitted to their former possessions as a matter of grace, in proportion as they appeared to deserve it. What Frederick asked was, that he should be at once reinstated as a matter of right, and that he should then be allowed to consider what was the nature of that ill-defined submission which he owed to the Emperor. It is evident that, even leaving the religious question out of sight for the moment, the two views of the respective rights of the head and of the members of the Empire were wide asunder as the poles.

To a man with any capabilities for thought, it would have been of infinite service to have had these two ideas of the constitution of the Empire thus boldly presented before him. He would have seen that he must make up his mind either to adopt one of the two views, or to strike out some new theory for himself. In coming to his decision, he would not forget to investigate the consequences of the victory of one side or the other, and, above all, he would ask himself whether he was prepared to take any part at all in the conflict. James, however, had always insisted that his son-in-law must make submission to the Emperor, and that, in some way or another, his son-in-law's restitution was to be the consequence of the Prince's marriage. The only result, therefore, of his present cogitations was

¹ Salvetti's *News-Letters*, Oct. 31, Nov. 7, 1714.

another long rambling letter to Bristol, in which he once more called upon the King of Spain to get him out of his difficulties.

He would never have written to defer the marriage till after Christmas, he said, if he had known that the proxy would have

<sup>Nov. 13.
His letter to
Bristol order-
ing the post-
ponement of
the mar-
riage.</sup> expired. He now sent a fresh proxy, which would continue in force till March. There would, therefore, be plenty of time to obtain entire satisfaction. Yet he could not but have doubts as to the intentions of the King of Spain.

News had just arrived that the rich lands about the Bergstrasse, which had been given up by the Elector of Mentz more than a century and a half before, had now been reclaimed from the Palatinate, and had been surrendered into the Elector's hands with the connivance of the Spanish garrisons. Bristol, therefore, before he delivered the proxy, was to procure a written declaration from Philip of his determination to obtain a complete restitution of the Palatinate and the Electorate by mediation, and to give assistance to obtain that object by other means, if mediation failed. He was also to be required to state 'within what time the mediation shall determine, and the assistance of arms begin.'

In order, however, to show that he was not exorbitant in his demands, James expressed his readiness to propound a plan for satisfying the Elector of Bavaria. He was also prepared to go on with the negotiation for his grandson's marriage, although, in deference to his son-in-law's objections, the offer of sending the boy to Vienna must be withdrawn. James now proposed that the Electoral Prince should be educated in England, under the eye of the Prince of Wales and the Infanta.

Having thus disposed of the interests of Europe, James returned with unusual vigour to his own. He would have nothing to do, he said, with the proposal for sending any part of the Infanta's portion in jewels, or with the substitution of a yearly rent for the payment of the capital. He must have the whole sum in ready money.¹

This letter was accompanied by another from Conway.

¹ The King to Bristol, Nov. 13, *Clarendon State Papers*, i. 13.

ordering Bristol to come away from Spain if he did not receive a satisfactory answer within twenty days.¹

Such was the despatch which, no doubt, much to James's astonishment, proved to be an ultimatum, the rejection of which brought down in ruin the whole edifice of the Spanish alliance. It has, perhaps, been usual to lay too great stress upon the influence of Charles and Buckingham in bringing about the change in the King's method of proceeding. In point of fact, there was very little change at all, and what there was was the result far more of circumstances than of any alteration in James's opinions. Always inclined to look upon the great religious and political questions of the age very much as a lawyer looks upon an action for the possession of an acre of ground, and leaving out of consideration the interests, the feelings, and the passions of men and of nations, he had for years been under the impression that if only a suspension of arms could be effected, everything else would be easy. At last he had got his wish. A suspension of arms had been agreed on, to be followed by a great diplomatic meeting at Cologne, at which all difficulties were to be surmounted if the conflicting parties could come to an understanding on the preliminaries of an arrangement.² A very few weeks had been sufficient to show that James was unable to discover a compromise which would be satisfactory to the disputants, and he could but call upon the King of Spain to come to his help or to forfeit his friendship for ever.

The King's despatch was followed by one much shorter and sharper from his son. "Bristol," wrote Charles, "the false

*Nov. 14.
Letter from
Charles.* interpretation of the King's and my directions concerning the not delivering of my proxy has made me in such haste to send away this bearer, that by this I can only give you a command, without giving any reasons at this time, which is not to deliver my proxy until you hear further from the King and myself. Make what shifts or fair excuses you will, but I command you, as you answer it upon your peril, not to deliver my proxy till you hear further from hence. So, hoping you will obey this command punctually, I rest your friend, CHARLES, P."³

¹ Conway to Bristol, Nov. 13, *Sherborne MSS.*

² See p. 78.

³ The Prince to Bristol, Nov. 14, *Sherborne MSS.*

The next day another letter from the Prince followed in the same tone. "Whatsoever answer ye get," he wrote, "ye must
 Nov. 15. A second letter. not deliver the proxy till ye make my father and me judge of it. As for the whole business, ye must deal freely with them in as civil terms as ye will, that except that King will promise under his¹ hand to help my father with his arms, in case mediation fail, to restore my brother-in-law to his honours and inheritances, there can be neither marriage nor friendship; and, as to² the breeding up of my nephew in the Emperor's Court, avoid it handsomely as ye can, but I assure you it shall never be. And if they will do all that my father desires, they may not only be sure of an alliance, but of a hearty sincere friendship. Make no replies. Suffer no delays."³

The day on which this letter was written, Inojosa and Coloma were received by the King in the presence of the Audience of the Spanish ambassa-
 dors. Prince and Buckingham. For four long hours the discussion lasted. James was forced to admit that he had never asked that the restitution of the Palatinate should be made a condition of the marriage, and even that it was unreasonable to expect the King of Spain to take up arms against the Emperor;⁴ but, he added, in his usual inconsecutive way, that his daughter and his grandchildren were dear to him,—he could not bear to abandon them,—he had promised that by fair means or by foul he would recover all that they had lost,—his reputation was engaged, and he could not break his word.

Whilst James was making these ineffectual representations in London, the question of the marriage was being decided at Oct. 30. Madrid. On October 30, Bristol received a fresh Fresh answer about the Palatinate. reply on the subject of the Palatinate: Philip now affirmed that he would try to get the Electorate restored after the death of Maximilian to Frederick himself

¹ The word "his" is not in the original.

² The word "to" is also omitted.

³ The Prince to Bristol, Nov. 15, *Sherborne MSS.*

⁴ This particular admission is referred to in the King of Spain's reply to the ambassadors on December 9. For the rest of the conversation see Salvetti's *News-Letter*, ^{Nov. 21} _{Dec. 1}.

instead of to his son, but he gave no hope of taking arms against the Emperor. He would continue, he said, to interpose his good offices. To ask him for more was to ask for impossibilities.¹

Whilst Bristol was waiting for a reply to a fresh application for a better answer,² tidings reached Madrid that the new Pope had given his approval to the dispensation granted by his predecessor, and that the documents necessary for the accomplishment of the marriage ceremony would soon be on their way from Rome. Bristol, having at this time received only the despatch of October 8, in which he was commanded to postpone the marriage till after Christmas, at once communicated his difficulties to James. "There is an

Nov. 1. intention," he wrote, "to call presently upon me for Bristol demands instructions. the Prince's powers for the marriage left in my hands, the which I know not upon what ground or reason to detain, the Prince having engaged in the said powers the faith and word of a prince no way to revoke and retract from them, but that they should remain in full force till Christmas; and delivered unto me a politic declaration of his pleasure, that, upon the coming of the dispensation, I should deliver them unto this King that they might be put in execution, and hereof, likewise was there by Secretary Ciriza, as a public notary, an instrument drawn and attested by all the witnesses present. If I shall allege your Majesty's pleasure of having the marriage deferred till one of the holidays, although they should descend thereunto, that is impossible, for the powers will be then expired. If I shall insist upon the restitution of the Palatinate, this King hath therein declared his answer; and it would be much wondered why that should be now added for a condition of the marriage, having hitherto been treated of as a business apart, and was in being at the granting of the said powers, and hath been often under debate, but never specified, nor the powers delivered upon any condition of having any such point first cleared; and I must confess unto your Majesty I understand not how with honour, and that exact dealing which hath ever been observed in all your Majesty's actions,

¹ Ciriza to Bristol, Oct. 30, Nov. 9, *S. P. Spain.*

² Bristol to Calvert, Oct. 31, *ibid.*

the powers can be detained, unless there should appear some new and emergent cause since the granting of them, whereof as yet I hear none specified. Therefore, being loth to be the instrument by whose hands anything should pass that might have the least reflection upon your Majesty's or the Prince's honour, which I shall ever value more than my life or safety, and judging it likewise to conduce more to your service, and assuring myself that your Majesty's late direction to have the marriage upon one of the holidays in Christmas, was for want of due information that the powers will be then expired, I have thought it fit, with the advice of Sir Walter Aston, to raise no scruple in the delivery of the said powers ; but do intend, when they shall be required, to pass on to the nominating of a pre-fixed day for the marriage ; but I shall endeavour to defer the time until I may be advertised of your Majesty's pleasure, if it may be within the space of twenty-four days, and will labour to find some handsome and fair occasion for the deferring of them, without alleging any directions in that kind from your Majesty or the Prince."¹

This was plain speaking. The King, and the Prince through him, were told that the course which they had adopted was utterly dishonourable. With full knowledge that Spain would not give armed assistance for the recovery of the Palatinate, Charles had chosen to swear that he would fulfil the marriage contract in every particular, and it was monstrous that he should now repudiate his obligations on account of an obstacle which he had foreseen when he undertook them. If indeed he had chosen to plead that he had subsequently been enlightened, and that since his return to England he had learned that the engagements which he had formed were ruinous to his country, he might fairly have asked to be relieved from a promise given through ignorance or inadvertence. But nothing of the kind was the case. With him there was no admission of error, no confession of heedlessness. He was in the right when he had sworn ; he was equally in the right when, without a word of explanation, he broke his oath.

¹ Bristol to the King, Nov. 1, *Cabala*, 95. Compare Aston to Buckingham, Nov. 1 (?), *ibid.* 11.

On the question of personal honour, few will probably be found to hesitate in deciding between Charles and Bristol.

Bristol's
policy right
in the main. Opinions are likely to be more divided on the larger question of the general policy of the ambassador ; for it is plain that Bristol considered the offers of the Spanish Court on the whole satisfactory, and that he was prepared to enter upon the negotiations in Germany, with confidence in the diplomatic support of Spain. That he was wrong in supposing that Spain had renounced all exorbitant pretensions is, to us at least, undeniable ; for we know that it would have been difficult to content either Spain or the Emperor without imposing a Catholic Prince upon the Palatinate. But in the main point, Bristol was undoubtedly in the right. Standing almost alone among his countrymen, he never ceased to maintain that there were faults on both sides, and he saw in the promised negotiations at Cologne a golden opportunity for putting his master's son-in-law in the right. If Frederick could have understood the times in which he lived ; if he could have cast away those pretensions to independence which had been so ruinous to himself and to his country ; if, in short, he could have separated the cause of his religion from the cause of anarchy, he would either have forced both Spain and Austria to relinquish their schemes of armed proselytism, or would have united all Protestant States in a resistance to which his enemies would be compelled to bow. If Bristol failed signally, it was because he was so entirely unsupported. Frederick regarded the part which he was called upon to play with the utmost loathing, and signs were not wanting that, before many weeks, James, long-suffering as he had been, would throw up the game in despair.

At last, on November 12, the Pope's approbation arrived at Madrid,¹ and the 19th, the Prince's birthday, was talked of

Nov. 12.
Arrival of
the Pope's
approbation as the day for the ceremony of the marriage. Bristol, however, discovered means to interpose a short delay. Fresh conditions had been sent, together with the approbation, and till it was ascertained whether they would be accepted, the Nuncio refrained from placing the papal brief in

¹ Bristol to Calvert. Nov. 13, *S. P. Spain.*

the King's hands. His orders were, however, not to insist upon them if he found that they were likely to be refused, and after a week had passed away, he retired from the contest.¹ On the 19th he surrendered the document to Philip, who at once took the required oath to the observance of the articles by the King of England.

Bristol did his best to put off the ceremony as long as possible. It would be well, he said, to give time for the news

^{Nov. 23.} ^{The day fixed for the marriage.} to reach England before the day appointed, in order that it might be celebrated there as a day of triumph and festivity; but to all such suggestions the

Spaniards turned a deaf ear. The King, he was told, intended punctually to perform his own engagements, and he expected the same accuracy on the other side. It had been expressly agreed that the marriage should take place within ten days after the arrival of the dispensation, and though he had consented to reckon the time from the day on which it was given into his hands, no further concession would be made. He would not force his sister upon the Prince, but if the marriage had not taken place on the 29th it must be understood that the promises made were no longer binding. Thus pressed, Bristol consented to fix the ceremony for the 29th, and waited anxiously for the courier, who, unless some unusual accident occurred, would be certain before that day to bring him more precise orders than had yet been sent.²

That those orders would be otherwise than favourable to the marriage he could not bring himself to believe. At the same

^{Answer promised about the Palatinate.} time he hoped much from the professions of good-will which were addressed to him by the Spaniards. The Council of State, he was informed, had lately taken into consideration his renewed application about the Palatinate, and the King's answer would be in his hands before the day appointed for the ceremony. That answer, he was solemnly assured, should be everything that he could desire.³ It was

¹ Bristol's Answer to the Interrogatories, *Hardwicke State Papers*, i. 520.

² Bristol to the King, Nov. 23, *S. P. Spain* Aston to Buckingham, Nov. 23, *Harl. MSS. 1580*, fol. 1*c.*

³ Bristol to Conway, Jan. 23, 1624, *S. P. Spain*.

indeed not likely that Philip would again engage to take up arms against the Emperor, but it is not improbable that an effort would have been made to obtain some further concessions in Frederick's favour.

Whether, under existing circumstances, the attempt to obtain the conversion of the young Prince would have been abandoned, it is impossible to say ; but it is certain that Olivares was beginning to open his eyes to much to which, six months before, he had been wilfully blind. In the summer he had imagined that the conversion of England and the Palatinate were such mere trifles as hardly to be worth any extraordinary effort. Since the Prince had left Madrid he had begun to suspect that the prize might even now elude his grasp. He had begun to conceive the possibility that Charles might have ceased to set his heart upon the Infanta, and not a word was now uttered on the subject of those Parliamentary guarantees for religious liberty for the sake of which he had done so much to alienate the Prince. Upon the failure of the marriage, indeed, both he and Philip would probably have looked with considerable equanimity. What they really dreaded was a war with England, and as the tales reached them of Buckingham's frenzied denunciations, and of Charles's moody silence, they could not but regard such a war as likely to break out at no distant time. To avert this catastrophe they were ready to make any reasonable concession. There were some things, indeed, that they could not do. They could not readmit Mansfeld into the heart of Germany ; and they could not, whatever they might have said in a moment of heedlessness, take arms against the Emperor. But whatever gave promise of a firm and stable peace, they were prepared to advocate. Let Frederick show that he could again be trusted in the Palatinate, and the Court of Madrid would not have been the last to relinquish those airy dreams of ecclesiastical supremacy which had seemed so lifelike a few short months before.

It is seldom possible for one who has woven such a web of falsehood as that at which Olivares had been labouring ever since his uncle's death, to regain the solid ground of truth.

Even now, when Bristol was nodding approbation at his golden promises, the blow reached him which levelled his toilfully-constructed edifice to the dust. His empty professions, which had been intended to serve the purpose of the moment,

*Nov. 26.
The order
for the post-
ponement of
the marriage
reaches
Madrid.*

had been taken as equivalent to the most solemn covenant. On November 26, three days before the ceremony of the marriage was to have taken place, the despatches containing peremptory commands for its postponement were placed in Bristol's hands.

The ambassador was deeply chagrined at an order so fatal to his policy and his hopes. He at least did not, like his

*Postpone-
ment of the
marriage.*

master or Olivares, flatter himself with the idea that it was possible to insult a friendly sovereign, and at the same time to retain his friendship. Not doubting for an instant that the letter which he held in his hands was ominous of evil for his own country and for the whole of Europe, his first act was to write back to James an announcement that his directions would be punctually carried into effect. His next act was to inform Olivares that the marriage must be postponed, on the ground that his master wished the ceremony not to be separated from the foundation of a thorough amity between the Crowns.

Such an insult, thus publicly administered in the sight of the world, was not likely to lay the foundation of a thorough amity. The temporary gallery, along which the Infanta was to have walked to the church in which the ceremony was to be performed, was dismantled and removed. She herself ceased to be addressed by the style of Princess of England. The Prince's letters were no longer allowed to reach her. Her English grammars and dictionaries were restored to the shelf. The marriage was considered as indefinitely postponed, if not as broken off altogether.¹

It was with little hope, therefore, that Bristol and Aston delivered the summons for the restitution of the Palatinate, which they had been instructed to present. They first asked

¹ Bristol to James, Nov. 26, *Hardwicke State Papers*, i. 488. Bristol and Aston to Calvert, Nov. 30, *S. P. Spain*.

for an explicit answer to their last request, in which they had begged for information as to what the King would do if the Emperor refused to grant entire restitution to Frederick upon due submission?¹ They then proceeded to complain generally of Philip's conduct, of his allowing the reduction of Heidelberg and Mannheim, of his permitting the surrender of the Bergstrasse, and of his recognising the Electoral title of the Duke of Bavaria. They now wished to ask for his Majesty's good offices and mediation, and begged him to fix a time after which, if no satisfactory result followed, he would assist the King of Great Britain with his arms.²

Three days after this decisive summons was delivered, the ambassadors received an evasive answer to their former proposition, to the effect that it was unbefitting for a mediator to take part in a quarrel. Bristol was plainly told that this was not the reply which had been prepared for him a week before. How was it possible, it was added, for the King to give a more pleasing answer, when he was summoned to do so on pain of his sister's rejection?³

The tone of the reply to the last memorial was far more defiant. If Heidelberg and Mannheim had been taken, said Philip, it was the fault of the Count Palatine himself, who had continued to call himself King of Bohemia, had had two armies fighting on his side, and had tried to rouse the Princes of Germany, with Bethlen Gabor and the Turks, against the Emperor. As to his own recognition of the Elector of Bavaria, it was a courtesy due to him on account of the many services done by him to the House of Austria, though it could never be said that his private interests had ever been considered at Madrid to the injury of the public good and the peace of Germany.

"As to the proposition of giving armed assistance against the Emperor," the King proceeded to say, "it is an unnecessary

¹ Proposition of the Ambassadors, Nov. 13, *S. P. Spain.*

² Proposition of the Ambassadors, Nov. 29, *ibid.*

³ Reply to the Ambassadors' Proposition, Dec. 2. Dated Nov. 26
Dec. 6 Bristol to the King, Dec. 6, *ibid.*

Nov. 29.
The summons to
restore the
Palatinate.

Dec. 2.
Philip's first
answer.

Dec. 9.
Second
reply.

Philip re-fuses to arm against the Emperor.

demand, and one which is impracticable, on account of the great obligations under which his Catholic Majesty lies towards him. This was said to the Prince of Wales when the matter was discussed here ; and lately the same declaration was repeated by the Marquis of Inojosa to the King of Great Britain, when, at his last audience, they were conversing on the subject, and his Majesty declared himself satisfied.

“ As to the alliance and amity required, and the novelty of introducing the settlement of this question as a condition of the marriage, it is answered that this business of the settlement of the Palatine’s affairs has altogether changed both in form and substance by this new and unexpected course which the ambassadors have attempted to introduce, it being now asked as a condition of the marriage. On this point, therefore, his Majesty has nothing more to say than that he will on all occasions wish well to the prosperity of the King of Great Britain ; and that that which would be most conducive to his security, and to the better success of this business, might easily be done. His Majesty, therefore, replies forthwith formally to the proposition made to him, that there is need of forethought ; and his Majesty is still considering of giving a good direction, not only to this business of the Palatine, but to all those matters from which any inconvenience may spring to the perpetuity of this friendship and alliance. As his Majesty looks upon this amity with so great affection and desire for its perfect attainment, it would be an error not to forestall and to arrange everything that was conducive to this end, as his Majesty the King of Great Britain and the Prince his son did in the present business ; a resolution which his Catholic Majesty approves and praises much.”¹

Such was the answer by which James’s hopes were finally extinguished on the side of Spain. That the insult which he received had sunk deeply into Philip’s mind is most certain, but though the form of his reply would undoubtedly have been more courteous if the marriage had taken place, there is no

¹ Reply of the King of Spain, Dec. $\frac{9}{19}$, *S. P. Spain.*

reason to suppose that the substance would have been very different. To ask the King of Spain to take arms against the Emperor was to ask a moral impossibility.

Nor was this the only rebuff to which James exposed himself by his inconsiderate persistence in a policy which was, in

Nov. 20.
James lays
the Spanish
terms before
Frederick. reality, no policy at all. On November 20, he wrote once more to his son-in-law, laying before him, in greater detail than in his former letters, the terms which the Court of Madrid had at that time agreed to support. "We present to you," he wrote, "these propositions—to wit, in the first place, a due submission to the Emperor, under convenient limitations, which first shall be granted and agreed in conformity to that which is noble, with a safe-conduct and assurance requisite and sufficient for the free and safe going and return of your person and train. This being done, we make you offer of a present and full restitution of all the Palatinate unto the person of your son, and that you shall be his administrator during your life; and that after the death of the Duke of Bavaria, your son be re-established in the Electoral dignity, and for the better confirming the sound amity and assuring your possession and enjoying of all according to the contract which is presently to be made; and also to serve for a preparation for the bettering of the said conditions to your person, which will be in all likelihood when the marriage will be resolved and concluded to be made betwixt your eldest son, our grandchild, and one of the Emperor's daughters. In contemplation whereof they have approached a degree nearer, to wit, that the Electoral dignity shall come again to your person after the Duke of Bavaria's death. In which treaty of marriage, to clear the principal difficulty, which consisted in the education of your son with the Emperor, we have taken from them all hope herein, wherein we assure ourselves you will be content, and are purposed that he shall have his education with our son, and with and in the presence of the Infanta, when she shall be at our Court."¹

It is evident from these last words that James had no clear

¹ The King to Frederick, Nov. 20, *Cabala*, 245.

idea before his mind of the state of feeling at Madrid. The James's marriage, he seems to have fancied, could be in hesitation. definitely deferred, with the sole result of bringing Philip upon his knees. Yet in one respect the uncertainty of his position was beginning to tell upon him. Six months before, he would have accompanied the scheme which his letter contained, with a threat of withdrawing his support if it were not accepted at once. Now everything was changed. His old self-confidence was gone. His favourite and his son had taken part against him, and the King of Spain, in whom he had trusted, had turned his back upon him. He, therefore, contented himself with recommending his son-in-law to weigh the arguments on both sides thoroughly, and to let him know the result.

Whilst he was waiting for the answer, James underwent all the daily torments of uncertainty. At one time he talked of lighting up the flames of war, and of calling Bethlen Gabor and the Turks to his aid. But it was seldom that he used such language as this. One day his son adjured him to open his eyes to the trickery of the Spaniards. "What!" replied James, reproachfully, with tears in his eyes, "would you engage me in December. a war in my old days, and make me quarrel with Spain?"¹ To the urgent entreaties of Buckingham Talk about summoning Parliament. and Charles that he should summon a Parliament, he turned a deaf ear as long as he could. At last he consented to name a day on which the question might be debated in the Council; but when the day arrived, it only brought a message from James, declaring that nothing could be done till an answer to his last propositions had been returned from Spain.²

It was not long after James heard that his demand for an armed intervention had been utterly rejected by Philip, that he received a letter from Frederick. That letter contained, as might have been expected, a complete refusal of the terms proposed. Nor did the exiled Prince content him-

¹ Rusdorf to Frederick, Nov. 26. Rusdorf, *Mémoires*, i. 145.

² Rusdorf to Frederick, Dec. 16, *ibid.* i. 156. Conway to Buckingham, Dec. 20, *S. P. Dom.* clv. 65.

self, as he might well have done, with raising objections to the marriage of his son with a Roman Catholic princess.
 Dec. 20. Frederick's reply to his father-in-law. He took higher ground. His own restitution, he said, was a reality ; the submission to the Emperor was but a ceremony. The restitution must, therefore, precede the submission, and might well enough be performed by deputy, as he dared not trust the Emperor by placing his own person in his power. Frederick soon showed that what he really wanted was war. Now, as ever, his easily excited imagination was filled with the wildest hopes. It was nothing to him that Christian had been driven headlong out of Germany in the autumn, and that Mansfeld, after committing unheard-of cruelties, was preparing to abandon the devastated meadows of East Friesland. It was not, according to Frederick, his alliance with these marauders that had left him without a friend in the Empire. It was by his too great readiness to seek for peace that his natural allies had been alienated. If James would but declare in his favour, the Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg would come to his aid. The King of Denmark would be certain not to hang back. And if this were not enough, it was notorious to all the world, that the majority of the troops which marched under the banners of the Catholic League were Protestants, and were more inclined to its ruin than to its preservation.¹

If James had merely been called upon to answer his son-in-law's arguments, he would have made short work with The crisis such absurdities ; but, unhappily for him, he had come at last. to deal with them not in the region of logic, but in the region of facts. It was a fact that neither Ferdinand nor Philip would agree to any peace which did not give sufficient guarantees for the predominance of the Imperial authority and the supremacy of law in the Empire. It was also a fact, that Frederick would not agree to any peace which did not place himself and the other Princes of the Empire in a position of virtual independence, which would enable them to retain in their hands the right of peace and war. The radical difference which

¹ Frederick to the King, Dec. $\frac{20}{30}$, *Cabila*, 246.

had long ago existed had now come to an open and avowed expression. There was a great gulf between the two, which no diplomatic arts, no well-intended commonplaces, could fill up.

What Bristol would have said, if he had been consulted at this crisis, can hardly be doubted. He would have told James that it was no fit part for England to become the champion either of the religious encroachment of the Emperor, or of the political anarchy of Frederick, and that it was his duty as a statesman and as an honest man to remain neutral, at least for the present, in the coming strife. James was not the man to say anything of the kind. Never having taken the trouble to master the simplest elements of the political question, he had boasted again and again, with his accustomed garrulity, that he would accomplish everything upon which he had set his heart. Frederick and Ferdinand should be once more fast friends ; his son-in-law, without any effort of his own, should again enjoy his lands and his honours ; the marriage tie, which bound the Prince of Wales to the Infanta, was to be the bond of amity within which pacified Europe would be encircled. Now that all this bright vision had faded away, and in its stead there stood the furies of war and faction hounding on the suffering millions to their ruin, how could he stand forth and acknowledge his blindness ? How could he even comprehend, with his poor confused brain, in what his blindness really consisted ? There was nothing left for him but to give way at once, to allow his son and his favourite, with the nation at their backs, to work their will, whatever it might be.

Accordingly, on December 28, James signed the warrant commanding the Lord Keeper to issue writs for a new Parliament.¹ On the 30th, he despatched a courier to Bristol, reproving him for his conduct in agreeing to the betrothal, and ordering him to return immediately to England to give an account of his behaviour.²

The same courier conveyed a long letter to Aston, written

¹ The King to Williams, Dec. 28, *Hacket*, 173.

² The King to Bristol, Dec. 30, *S. P. Spain*,

in a greater state of bewilderment than usual. James was, beyond all measure, astonished at the interpretation put by the Spaniards on his order for postponing the betrothal. Both he and his son were more than ever anxious for the marriage. He had never meant to make the assurance for which he asked a condition of the marriage with the Infanta. He only intended it to be ‘as a fruit and blessing of the alliance with her, and an eternal pawn to this people of the constancy and faithful execution of that King’s promises, and our expectation grounded upon those promises.’

James might write in this style as much as he pleased ; but it was none the less certain that the Spanish match was at an end. Nor was that the only thing which had passed away from the world of reality in those last days of December. For fifteen months more James was to sit upon the throne, and men would continue to style him King of England ; but in the eyes of those who think more of the actual possession of power than of its semblance, he ceased to rule when he issued orders for the convocation of a Parliament. On that day the reign of Buckingham began.

So miserable had been the failure, so rapid the downfall of that self-sufficient monarch, that it is difficult to give him credit for those good intentions which were marred by the cloudiness of his intellect and the infirmity of his will. Yet even to him belongs a place amongst those who heralded the dawn of the new era, when difference of religion should no longer be regarded as a motive for war. Intolerant of opposition to his personal claims, he had now and again appeared on the stage as a persecutor. He had struck at Puritans on the one hand, and at Roman Catholics on the other ; but his tendency was towards peace and quiet, and not towards violence ; and, stained as his foreign policy was throughout with selfish aims, no candid mind will fail to recognise in it an effort—ignorant and ineffectual it may be, but still an effort—towards that better day when the spiritual and eternal hopes and consolations of mankind would cease to form a rallying cry for blood-stained armies. It was by the consciousness that in this at least they stood upon a common ground,

and not by any mere cringing adulation of the crowned monarch, that he succeeded in attaching to his throne the two most prescient statesmen of his age ; and that he counted Bacon and Bristol amongst his ministers.

Of the two men, it is to Bristol rather than to Bacon that we turn as the representative of the higher tendencies of his Bacon and Bristol. age. The sweep of Bacon's thoughts was too wide, whilst he was too often oblivious of that which was actually passing before his eyes not to render him a figure apart, whose position must be laid down in the chart of time on the Character of scale of centuries rather than of years. The mind Bristol. of Bristol, on the other hand, was intensely practical : no visions of future glory thronged before his eyes ; no general conceptions of law or policy ever exercised his intellect. From the hundreds of his letters which have been preserved, it would be difficult to reconstruct the theory upon which he acted ; but he had that strong power of intuition which is accorded to some men, by which they are enabled to single out from all others the one predominant evil which is weighing down upon their time, and to discern instinctively the remedies which alone are applicable. Gradually as we read the long series of his despatches, the grand form of the noble-hearted man stands revealed before us, and we see him ever varying his means, as events drifted before him with their changing forms, but never losing sight of the object at which he aimed.

If his own unalloyed wishes could have been carried into execution, Bristol would gladly have seen a gradual modification His early negotiations. of the harsh treatment to which the English Catholics were exposed, and he would have based his foreign policy upon a friendly understanding with Spain, which would have made a Continental war impossible. It was not his fault that this friendly understanding was exchanged for a marriage treaty, and for some time he seems to have exercised whatever influence he might possess in restricting within the narrowest limits the concessions which it would be requisite to make. For many years both he and his master concurred in refusing to make any express stipulation for those beyond the pale of the Infanta's household, though they were willing to

promise that, as a matter of favour, the lot of the English Catholics should be alleviated. It was on this rock that the negotiations had almost split when the war in Germany broke out. A Protestant Prince, in the hope of protecting the followers of his own creed, engaged in a rash attempt to overturn the whole political fabric of the Empire, without even proposing to substitute anything stable in its room. Borne back by the almost universal indignation which his rashness had excited, he was wandering about a fugitive, whilst the victorious Emperor ^{His mission} was converting his recovered power into an engine of ^{to Germany.} religious persecution. It was at this moment that the English statesman stepped upon the scene. Seizing at a glance the difficulties of the work of pacification, he proposed a compromise, which, whether it were logically defensible or not, would have been in the highest degree satisfactory to the vast majority of the German nation. Let the Emperor, he said in effect, blot the past out of his memory, and replace his rival in the position which he occupied before the war ; let Frederick not only renounce the title of King of Bohemia which he had assumed, but let him, by making due submission to the Emperor, abandon the right of private war within the limits of the Empire.

That such a compromise would have conducted alike to the peace of Europe and the independence of Protestantism it is impossible to doubt. Relieved from the dread of anarchy, Lutherans and Calvinists would have presented a united front to Catholic aggression, and the provocation which in the end roused the opposition by which the Imperial power was crushed, would never have been given. Unhappily the English Ambassador stood alone. His master had sent him to speak words of wisdom, but had taken no care to support his representations by the argument of the sword ; and he therefore hastened back to England to hurry on those preparations which had been too long delayed. The flames of war were already blazing behind him. Ferdinand could see no law but the written one, and no basis of authority excepting the Church of Rome. Frederick had thrown himself into the arms of a needy adventurer, who was prepared, in order to advance his own ends, to

spread fire and slaughter over the fair fields of his native land.

The day when Parliament was dissolved without granting a penny to the public service, must have been the saddest in the life of the patient, much-enduring man. Every apparent difficulty had been surmounted, and all opposition had been silenced, when he saw his dearest hopes wrecked on his sovereign's infirmity of temper.

It would have been well for him if his public career had ended there. After his return to Spain he was rather hoping against hope than pursuing any rational scheme. ^{His return to Spain.} He learned to look with trust upon Spanish promises, though he had no longer the hope which he had once cherished, that his master would stand forward to enforce their performance. Yet, after all, his error was the error of a noble mind. He could not bear to think that others were less honest or less clear-sighted than himself. Against Frederick he maintained that no peace was to be had unless he would restore the reign of order in the Empire. Against Ferdinand and Philip he maintained that no peace was to be had without guarantees for religious independence. For the sake of the benefits which would be accorded to the English Catholics, Spain would, he trusted, support him in imposing his compromise upon Germany, and it was only too late that he learned how unconquerable was the perversity of Frederick's nature, whilst he never learned at all that the Spanish ministers had been aiming, not merely at the alleviation of the sufferings of the few Catholics who were left in England, but at the reduction, by fraud or by force, of England herself to the creed of the Roman Catholic Church.

Thus it came to pass that Bristol saw the barque which bore his political fortunes go down before his eyes; wrecked, not as he ^{Failure of his hopes.} himself imagined, upon the petulance of Buckingham and the imbecility of Charles, but upon the inherent difficulties of the task which he had undertaken. The terms which he proposed may easily be criticised, and might probably have been amended with advantage ; but his chief fault was that he attempted to impose terms at all upon those who were unwilling to assent to any reasonable compromise whatever.

Bristol was now to take leave of the scene in which he had played so distinguished and so honourable a part. To the last

^{1624.}
^{Jan. 14.}
Bristol's
letter to
Bucking-
ham.

he preserved the full dignity of his character. Buckingham he had never flattered ; but he had never ceased to treat him with respect. The letter which he wrote to him soon after the postponement of the marriage would surely have touched the heart of any man who was not lost to all sense of public duty. "The present estate of the King's affairs," he said, "requireth the concurrence of all his servants, and the co-operation of all his ministers, which maketh me desirous to make your Grace this tender of my service ; that if there have happened any errors or misunderstandings, your Grace would for that regard pass them over ; and for anything that may personally concern my particular, I shall labour to give you that satisfaction as may deserve your friendship. And if that shall not serve the turn, I shall not be found unarmed with patience against anything that can happen unto me."¹

Language such as this was absolutely thrown away upon Buckingham. The favourite was not to be propitiated by any-

^{Offers made}
to him by
Olivares.

thing short of the most cringing subservience, and it was not long before it was known all over Europe

that when Bristol returned to London it would be, if Buckingham could have his way, to find ruin and disgrace before him. With the best intentions, but with very questionable taste, Olivares stepped forward to save him. In the presence of Gondomar and Aston he assured him that he was ordered to express his master's gratitude for the services which he had rendered to both Crowns, and that he was directed to place in his hands a sheet of white paper, which he was at liberty to fill up as he pleased in his own favour. He might ask either for lands or for honours, with the full assurance that nothing would be denied him. If he could further suggest any means by which he might be defended against his enemies at home, it should be put into execution at once.

To this strange proposal Bristol replied with dignity. The

¹ Bristol to Buckingham, Dec. 6, *Cabala*, 96.

offer, he said, he could not but esteem as it deserved, but it
 Bristol's reply. troubled him more than the malice of his enemies
 had ever done ; for against that he could appeal to the security of a good conscience and of his sovereign's justice; whereas what had now been said to him forced him to consider whether he had not been serving Spain rather than his own country. Spain, he proceeded to say, was not indebted to him the value of a leaf of paper. Whatever he had done, he had done because he thought it to be the best for England. He went home perfectly contented, and fully satisfied that he would meet with justice and protection from his sovereign. He was not, therefore, under the necessity of seeking the favour of another Prince. To speak plainly, he ended by saying, he would rather offer himself to the slaughter in England than be Duke of Infantado in Spain.¹

A few days later, on January 28, Bristol took formal leave of Philip. When his audience was at an end, the King drew

^{Jan. 28.} ^{He takes leave of Philip.} from his own finger a valuable ring to present to the ambassador, an honour before unheard of at the Spanish Court. The next day Philip left Madrid for Seville on a journey of inspection into the state of the navy. It was the public signal that, though no formal notice had been given, the marriage treaty was practically at an end.

Whatever Bristol may have thought of the causes of his failure, he had at least a clear presentiment of its results. "I will heartily pray to God," he had written, in one of his last letters from Madrid, "to prevent that miserable storm which is like suddenly to be raised in Christendom, if it be not speedily prevented by His especial goodness."² The war now about to blaze up once more from its smouldering ashes was indeed of such a nature that no one, acquainted with the real merits of the parties, could look upon without horror. On one side the cause of German nationality and of legal order was bound in an inextricable bond with an ecclesiastical despotism which was sapping the

¹ Account of the offers made by Olivares, Jan. ¹⁴₂₄, 1624, *Sherborne MSS.*

² Bristol to Calvert, Jan. 22, 1624, *S. P. Spain.*

root of all moral and intellectual vigour. On the other side was a Protestantism which had lost all respect for law, and which had allied itself with the selfish greed of princes, and with the marauding instincts of the plunderers by whom the honourable name of soldiers was disgraced. The coming

The future
of the Thirty
Years' War.

miseries of that war were beyond even Bristol's vision. The help which Charles was eager to render to his brother-in-law proved to be vain. No cause could support the accumulated burden of Frederick's incapacity, of Charles's weakness, and of the selfishness of Mansfeld and Christian ; but when the victory had been won by the sword of Tilly, and the whole of Northern Germany lay at the Emperor's feet, then was revealed in turn the incapacity of Ferdinand to become the second founder of the Empire. He might have been the head of a united Germany ; he might have given renewed life to the old national institutions, and have made the cold and calculating aggressions of Richelieu and of Louis XIV. impossible. Lorraine and Alsace would still have remained German soil, and, what was of far greater consequence, two centuries of moral and political anarchy would have been spared to the noble German nation. Unhappily Ferdinand was still the Ferdinand of old. By the Edict of Restitution he replaced the two religions upon that legal basis which, in his eyes, was all in all. In the composition of his mind there was no room for the political element which weights the feelings, the hopes, the passions of men before proceeding to action. He cared little that his extremity of law was held by half the nation to be the extremity of injustice. Therefore it was that, instead of standing, as he might have stood, at the head of a united people, he found himself coercing a divided nation by the sword of an army which represented nothing but a faction. And what an army it was ! Mansfeld and Christian were no longer alive, and their misdeeds had ceased to be a terror to German citizens and peasants. Frederick was living in hopeless exile, unregretted and forgotten. It was round Wallenstein, the general who represented the majesty of the Imperial name, and the cause of order against anarchy, that every element of disturbance gathered. During the first years

of strife, men of every creed had cast yearning eyes towards him who wore the crown of the Ottos and the Fredericks, to seek for that help which might reduce the chaos into order. They would never look with hope to Vienna again. The Empire had survived external contempt and internal dissolution ; but the iniquities of Wallenstein laid it in the dust.

For a moment, the avenging arm of the great Swede was raised to redress the balance of the war, and to re-establish the Empire upon a Protestant basis. With the genius to construct as well as to destroy, it is probable that if he had been born a German prince, he might have stood at the head of a new and happier era. As it was, his career, even if his days had been prolonged, was predestined to failure. It was the last effort, almost till our own day, to establish any national order in Germany. After him came that waste and howling wilderness, resounding with shrieks and bitter cries, and filled with the struggles of brutal and degraded beings who seemed in form alone to resemble human kind. The hideous misery of that war, if war it can be called, no writer would willingly descend to recount ; no reader would care to hear recited.

Yet, if Bristol was in the right in holding that the sword of England could not be drawn in such a war to the advantage of herself or of the Continent, he was scarcely con-

Feeling in England. scious of the wide basis upon which rested that uneasy dissatisfaction with the existing state of things which had spread amongst all classes of the population at home ; for he was hardly aware how completely the conditions of European politics had changed since he first arrived at Madrid

Change in the condition of progress. in 1611. Then the evil, before which the rising intellect of the time shrank with horror, was the prolongation of the religious strife. Everywhere the tendency of the age was towards an obliteration of the line drawn with such marked distinctness between the two creeds. In the field of speculation, the historian of the progress of tolerance can point to the spread of the Arminian theory. In the field of practical politics, he can trace the growing preponderance of political over theological arguments for persecution.

Differing in everything else, Pym and Ferdinand II. would have agreed in repudiating the notion that a heretic ought to be imprisoned or put to death simply because he was a heretic.

Before 1623 a great change had passed over the scene. Divide the blame as we may, the fact was undoubted that the old religion was encroaching upon Protestant soil. The evil most to be dreaded was no longer the continuance of war, but the imminence of defeat. In Germany the rashness of Frederick had betrayed the key of the Protestant position into Catholic hands. In England the weakness of James had granted to Spain a basis of operations against his own faith. For the interests of the human race, a barrier must be raised against the great enemy of its progress.

It was this alteration of circumstances, far more than his personal quarrel with Buckingham, which threw Bristol into discordance with the spirit of the age. Partly from the habitual deference to the home government which is the inevitable law of an ambassador's life, partly from his own mental constitution, his eyes were fixed too exclusively upon the horrors of a religious war. He saw all that was evil in those who had aroused it. He did not see that resistance to Catholic supremacy was rapidly becoming a necessity. He adopted, without a thorough examination of their ultimate tendencies, schemes for pacification which had not originated with himself, but which, faulty as they were, might perhaps lead to the consummation which he so ardently desired.

In truth, the balance of the two religions was only to be redressed by means which did not lie within the sphere of

Moral position of Protestantism. Bristol's intellect. No candid person can survey the world at the beginning of the seventeenth century without acknowledging that as far as the leaders were concerned, moral superiority was not on the Protestant side. It would be an insult to Ferdinand, to Maximilian, and to Tilly, to compare them for an instant with Frederick or with Mansfeld. Even Philip IV. and Olivares were superior to their English visitors. Liars as they were, they hoped to achieve by their falsehoods something more than the gratification of their immediate interests, or of their personal

vanity. The great question which the Protestants of that age were called upon to solve was the eternal question which presents itself to all who have embraced freedom in any form. Would they regard their liberty as a means by which to grasp the conception of a higher order than they had known before? Would they learn discipline and obedience? Would they reverence law, and count truth as a most precious jewel? If they could do this, then the victories of Wimpfen and Höchst and Stadtloo would have been won in vain. If not, the world would turn in disgust to the stillness of Papal absolutism, that it might escape from the miseries which the abuse of liberty had set before it.

Such was the question which Germany had failed to comprehend, but to which England was ready to respond. The men of that generation were prepared to build upon the foundations of that reverence at once for justice and for freedom which the events of centuries had laid deep in the English character. The world was to learn that there were men who were ready to suffer and to die, if need be, on behalf of principles more true, and of an order more fruitful of good and noble life than anything which Ferdinand and Maximilian had found it possible to conceive. From the study of Bacon, from the parsonage of George Herbert, from the pulpit of Baxter, from the prison of Eliot, a light was to break forth, splendid in its multiplicity of colour and of brilliancy, which would teach the world to shrink from anarchy and despotism alike, and to entrust the treasure of its moral and intellectual progress to ordered liberty.

How long the conflict in which England was about to engage would last, and to what issues it might finally be conducted, it was impossible to foretell. But to anyone who, like Bristol, had a full knowledge of the events which had recently been passing in Spain, it must have been evident that the league which appeared to be springing up between the Prince of Wales and the English nation could not by any possibility be longlived. It was to no purpose that Charles had listened to the explosion of loyalty which had greeted his return; it was to no purpose that he found himself acci-

dentially thrown into a fortuitous accordance with the deeper feelings of the nation. In all this there was no abiding security. Once before in English history had a giddy youth won a fleeting popularity by stepping forward to declare himself the leader of the multitudes whose sufferings had never touched his heart ; and those who could look most deeply into the character of Charles might well dread lest the tragical story of the second Richard should be repeated in the face of an earnest and long-suffering nation.

If we pause for a moment to allow our thoughts to dwell once more on the years which had passed by as Charles was growing up to manhood, it is impossible to resist the feeling of discouragement. Not a hope had been formed which had not been baffled ; not a man had stepped forward to guide the English nation who had not been thrown back into obscurity. Bacon was banished for ever from public life ; Bristol's career had been cut short, and he was looking forward to the future with more anxiety than he was willing to express ; Pym was solacing himself in the seclusion of a country life, and was waiting for better times. The wish to send forth an English army to the help of the Continental Protestants, and the wish to put an end by mediation to the miserable war by which Germany was devastated, had alike been uttered in vain. Seven years had gone by since the negotiation for the Spanish match had been formally opened, and it seemed as if, since that day, nothing had been done.

Yet it was not really so. The worth of an individual or of a nation lies not so much in what they achieve, as in what they

are. Ignorance enough there had been, and sloth ; and pros-
pects for the future. but the will to do right was there. Bacon and

Bristol, Pym and Phelips, and even (whenever his better nature was in the ascendant) James himself, were filled with a desire to make their country and the world better and happier than they were. There was no petty desire of national aggrandisement in the English demand for war ; there was no mere shrinking from laborious toil in the English demand for peace. It was thus that the seeds sown in these wintry days would bear precious fruit ; that the silenced speakers of the

Parliament which had been dissolved by the irritable King would gather to their side comrades as noble as themselves to bear in common the burden of the new struggle, into which they were to enter with clearer perceptions and with higher aims ; and that the frustrated advocates of peace, when they had passed away from earth, would leave behind them men who would take up their work when the time came for it to be accomplished.

CHAPTER XLVII.

THE DISSOLUTION OF THE SPANISH TREATIES.

THE young man's dream which had lighted Charles and Buckingham on their way to Madrid, had been pleasant enough while it lasted. All difficulties, personal and political, were to vanish away before the magic of their presence. ^{1623.} The King of Spain would, for the sake of his future son-in-law, compel the Emperor to surrender the Palatinate, and the strife which had desolated Germany for five years would be composed as easily as a lovers' quarrel. The King's sister, brought up in the most bigoted attachment to the faith of her childhood, would give her heart as well as her hand to the heretic prince whose person she loathed, and whose religion she detested. Of the two, Buckingham, not being himself in love, had been the first to discover the mistake. Quick to take offence at the slightest courtesy offered to him, he was not long in perceiving that the Spaniards meant to make the most of their opportunity, and to deliver over the Infanta, if they delivered her over at all, only upon conditions which would be insupportable to the English people. Whilst Charles had been hanging about Philip's court, and promising anything short of his own apostasy, Buckingham had been quarrelling with the Spanish ministers, and urging the Prince to return to England as soon as possible.

When at last Charles had convinced himself that his concessions had been made in vain, and that, whatever he might do, he would not be allowed to carry the Infanta with him to England, his faith in Buckingham was more strongly confirmed

than ever Buckingham's life was so completely bound up with his life, and Buckingham's objects were for the most part so fully served by promoting his young master's wishes, that differences of opinion were seldom likely to arise between them. Now that a difference had arisen, Charles had proved to be in the wrong, whilst Buckingham had proved to be in the right, and that too on a point on which Charles might well think that his friend had been more jealous for his honour than he had been himself.

Both Charles and Buckingham had come back with the full persuasion that they had been duped by the Spaniards, and with a full determination to take their revenge. To the heated imagination of the youthful politicians, the re-conquest of the Palatinate seemed very easy. In fact, the enterprise was one of exceeding difficulty. Not only was the position of Spain and the Imperialists exceedingly strong, but there were elements of disunion at work amongst the opponents of the House of Austria which would go far to make the task of organising a successful resistance impossible.

The first task, however, which offered itself to Buckingham was harder in appearance than in reality. It might seem easier to drag Theseus from his seat of pain than to move James to a declaration of war. A lover of peace by temperament and by force of reason, he knew too well what faults had been committed on both sides to be eager to join in the doubtful fray. Great, too, as was the influence exercised over him by his favourite and his son, it is hardly likely that this alone would have sufficed to overcome his reluctance to embark on so arduous an undertaking. In 1620, in spite of his unwillingness to displease those with whom he was in continual intercourse, Charles and Buckingham, backed by the almost unanimous voice of his Council and his Court, had in vain urged him to take part in the strife. At the close of 1623 he was no longer in a position to offer resistance. His plan for settling the affairs of Germany with the help of Spain had broken down completely. Even he was driven to acknowledge that that path was no

James determined to regain the Palatinat.

longer open to him, and that if the Palatinate was to be recovered at all, it must be recovered by force of arms. The only question for him to ask himself, therefore, was whether he was willing to abandon all hope of its recovery, and this he was decidedly not prepared to do. The abandonment of his daughter and her children, from considerations of state policy, was so grievous to him, that, though Buckingham would doubtless have much moral and physical inertness to combat, he could always make use of the King's real desire to recover the Palatinate as a lever to move him in the direction of decisive action.

In January 1624, James to a great extent yielded himself into the hands of Buckingham. The marriage ceremony at

^{1624.} Madrid had been postponed under circumstances ^{January.} which made it almost a matter of certainty that it ^{Diplomatic} preparations. would never be heard of again. Bristol, the chief supporter of the alliance, was recalled from his embassy in Spain, and the Earl of Oxford, who had been confined in the Tower for nearly two years on account of a violent attack upon Gondomar's influence, was set at liberty. Writs were issued for a new Parliament. Once more, as in 1620, ambassadors were ordered to make ready to start in every direction. This time they were to be the messengers, not of peace, but of war. Sir Isaac Wake was to stir up the Duke of Savoy and the Republic of Venice. Sir Robert Anstruther was to wait upon the Princes of Northern Germany and the King of Denmark. Sir James Spens would do the like office with the King of Sweden. The States-General were invited to send commissioners to negotiate a close alliance, and the invitation was made more attractive by a letter in which Conway was allowed impudently to represent the plot which had been hatched between Buckingham and Gondomar for the partition of the territory of the Republic as a mere unauthorised suggestion of Spanish iniquity.¹

These steps, important as they were, formed only part of the

¹ Conway to the Prince of Orange, Conway to Carleton, Jan. ^{9,}
S. P. Holland. ¹⁹

great plan which Buckingham had conceived. Ever since the war had broken out in Germany, France had given a passive, but not the less a real, assistance to the Emperor. Now, however, hints had reached Buck-

Hopes of a French alliance.
ingham that all this might be changed. While Charles was still at Madrid, an English friar named Grey had formed the wild project of converting him ; and, when he found that he had no chance of success, had talked with Buckingham of his own influence with Mary de Medicis, and of the probability that she might be induced to offer her youngest daughter, the Princess Henrietta Maria, as a substitute for the Infanta. How far Buckingham gave heed to the friar's prattle it is hard to say. At all events Grey made his way to Paris, saw the Queen Mother, and was sent on by her to London, after the Prince's return, to explain to Buckingham her readiness to assist in forwarding the suggested marriage. It is true that when the affair came to the ears of Tillières, the French ambassador in London, both Mary and Buckingham thought it expedient to disavow all knowledge of the intrigue ;¹ but the seed was already sown. James agreed to take up the project as soon as the treaty with Spain was definitely disposed of. In the meanwhile it was arranged that Lord Kensington should be sent over to Paris to feel the ground, and to lay the foundations of a complete friendship between the two courts.

Although James had thus given his consent to the opening of a negotiation which would leave little room for any further

Jan. 13. Offer of the Spanish am- understanding with Spain, his resolution was not so fixed as to be entirely beyond the influence of a specious offer from the other side. On January 13, the Spanish ambassadors, Inojosa and Coloma, assured him of their master's anxiety to do all that was possible to regain his friendship. Before the end of August, they asserted, all that part of the Palatinate which was occupied by Spanish troops should be placed in his hands. Negotiations should be opened, at a time to be fixed by James himself, for the settlement of all

¹ Tillières to Puisieux, Dec. 30, Jan. 9, 18, 27, *Harl. MSS.* 4593, fol. 3, 16, 25 b.

other points at issue. Some middle course was indicated as likely to obviate the difficulty about the education of Frederick's sons; and Philip, though he still refused to promise, as he had once promised in a moment of forgetfulness, to draw his sword against the Emperor, was ready to engage to do anything else in his power to bring about a favourable result.¹

Much to Buckingham's disgust, James thought the offer worth listening to, at least so far that he agreed to consult the Commissioners for Spanish affairs before taking a final decision. The body thus appealed to consisted of twelve of the leading Privy Councillors, and may perhaps be regarded as the germ of our modern cabinets. It had been called into existence in 1617, to discuss the marriage treaty with Spain, as soon as the negotiation was openly taken in hand. Its numbers had been constantly filled up as vacancies occurred. As it had recently, by a majority of seven to five, approved of the issue of writs for a new Parliament, Buckingham had good reason to expect its support in his present difficulties.²

When the Commissioners met, two questions were laid before them. In the first place:—Had the King of Spain seriously intended to give his sister to the Prince? In the second place:—Did his conduct about the Palatinate deserve a declaration of war?³ When the votes were taken, three only were given in favour of war:—

¹ Inojosa to Philip IV., Jan. $\frac{13}{23}$, $\frac{14}{24}$, *Madrid Palace Library*. Compare Valaresso to the Doge, Jan. $\frac{16}{26}$, Jan. $\frac{23}{2}$, *Venice Transcripts*, with Siri, *Memorie Recondite*, v. 568; and Chamberlain to Carleton, Jan. 17; *Court and Times*. ii. 446.

² Salvetti's *News-Letter*, Dec. 26, Jan. 5.

³ The two questions are abbreviated from the form given by Hacket (i. 167.) He says they were put immediately after the King's arrival at Whitehall, i.e. after Dec. 24. As I find no trace of such consultations elsewhere, I suspect he confused them with a discussion whether writs should be issued for a Parliament. After the King left Whitehall, i.e. on Jan. 13, we know that consultations took place. There is a curious draft of a letter (*S. P. Spain*), perhaps drawn up by Buckingham, as what he wished the King to say, and not accepted by James.

The Commissioners for Spanish affairs to be consulted.

those of Buckingham himself, of Carlisle, who hated Spain as much as his placable disposition would allow him to hate anything, and of Conway, who would doubtless have voted the other way if his patron had desired him to do so, but who was only in this case following his own instincts in opposing They ask for Spain. The other nine members of the Commission information. stated that they had not sufficient information before them, and asked permission to make a thorough examination of all the despatches bearing upon the subject. One of them turned to the Prince, who was present amongst them, and pointedly asked him whether, when he swore to the marriage treaty in Spain, it had been agreed upon that the restitution of the Palatinate was to precede the marriage. Charles kept silence for a while, and then replied that in such matters he had no will but his father's.¹

Buckingham was very angry. He sprang from his seat, pouring out on the nine Commissioners the most unmeasured Bucking. abuse as he strode out of the room, 'as a hen that ham's anger. hath lost her brood, and clucks up and down when she hath none to follow her.'² Taking the Prince with him, he hurried down to Newmarket, to complain to the King. "What!" he said to Chichester, who was passing near him as he left Whitehall, "are you turned too?"³ It was Buckingham's greatest misfortune in life that he never could understand that it was possible for men to differ from him without some sinister motive. Divergence of opinion was ever with him a thing not to be met with argument, but to be overcome by violence.

Buckingham met with better success at Royston. From whatever motive, James had no desire to see the whole secret Jan. 20. of the past negotiation unfolded before the Commis- The King supports him. sioners. He wrote to inform them that their request could not be granted, but that they must nevertheless tell him what they thought of the Spanish offer. On the 20th,

¹ Inojosa to Philip IV., Jan. ¹⁴₂₄, *Madrid Palace Library*. Tillières to Puisieux, Jan. ¹⁷₂₇, *Harl. MSS. 4593*, fol. 26 b.

² Hacket, i. 169.

³ Chichester to Buckingham, Jan. 25, *Cabala*, 197.

Charles, leaving Buckingham to keep guard over his father, returned to London. He assured the Commissioners that he would never think again of a marriage with the Infanta. All through the remainder of the week the discussion continued with unabated vigour. The Commissioners were unanimous in wishing to see the marriage treaty at an end, though many of them still shrank from giving an opinion in favour of war upon the slight information vouchsafed to them.¹

Of the nine who had originally voted against Buckingham, five—Calvert, Weston, Arundel, Williams, and Middlesex—had already declared against the summoning of a Parliament, and were all, for various reasons, the advocates of peace. Pembroke, Chichester, Hamilton, and Lennox had always been counted as opponents of the Spanish alliance; but they agreed with the other five in thinking that if Frederick's son could be removed from his father's influence, and educated, not indeed at Vienna, but at the English Court, his claims to the succession of the Palatinate might perhaps be acknowledged by Spain and the Emperor.² In Pembroke's case, especially, the hesitation to support Buckingham was so unexpected that it was accounted for at the time as proceeding from jealousy of the favourite's exclusive influence with the Prince. There may have been some truth in this, but motives of public policy may have had still more to do with his behaviour. Himself a man without ambition, the richest peer in England, and universally regarded as the model of a chivalrous English gentleman, he had watched Buckingham's career with deep distrust. Only a few months before, he had been required, as a Privy Councillor, to swear to the observance of the Spanish treaty, and to take part in the negotiations which followed for a peaceful settlement of the Continental dispute. He was now expected, without being told the reason why, to swing round with his eyes shut in the other direc-

¹ Tillières to Puisieux, ^{Jan. 31}_{Feb. 10}, *Harl. MSS. 4593*, fol. 35. Valaresso to the Doge, ^{Jan. 30}_{Feb. 9}, *Ven. Transcripts.* Hacket's list of the Commissioners is incorrect.

² Inojosa to Philip IV., Jan. ²¹₃₂, *Madrid Palace Library.*

tion. Was he without inquiry to give his vote for a war which might possibly be justifiable, but which, to all appearance, was being urged on by Buckingham's temper rather than by his reason? No wonder that he was heard to say that 'if the Spaniards performed the conditions agreed on, he saw not how the King, in honour, could fall from the conclusion, nor himself in conscience; being sworn to see all observed in his power.' He confided to Inojosa his hope that Buckingham might, with the help of the King and of the coming Parliament, be stripped of that power which he had so grievously misused.¹ To the Venetian ambassador, who exhorted him to make up his differences with Buckingham for the sake of the common cause of all European states, he replied that internal enemies must be dealt with before external ones. The cause which they had both at heart would be better served without Buckingham than with him.²

Pembroke, however, was not a man to persist long in opposition. His character was wanting in that robustness which is needed for such a task. Again and again in the course of his career we find him clashing with Buckingham; but a few words from the King or the Prince were always enough to soothe his easy temper, and he would be again on the old footing, giving the support of his respected name to a policy which he distrusted.

This time at least, it seemed as if Pembroke had made up his mind to resist to the end. Yet in a few days, he and the rest of the Commissioners agreed in a temporising answer, to the effect that they did not see that the King ought to be contented with the Spanish answer about the Palatinate, or to amuse himself any longer about the marriage. The original question concerning the propriety of going to war was left unanswered.³ It was not long before the Prince used

*Answer of
the Commiss-
ioners.*

¹ Inojosa to Philip IV., *Jan. 29, Feb. 8, Madrid Palace Library.*

² Chamberlain to Carleton, Jan. 31, *S. P. Dom. clviii. 72.* Valaresso to the Doge, *Jan. 30, Feb. 6, Ven. Transcripts.*

³ Tillières to Puisieux, *Jan. 31, Feb. 10, Harl. MSS. 4593, fol. 35.*

his authority to reconcile Pembroke and Buckingham ; and before the session opened the malcontent earl had changed into an unwavering supporter of the Government.

Between James and his son, the difference was one as well of principle as of temperament. Charles, entirely devoid

Charles eager for war. as he was of any general conception of the course of European politics, had no eyes for anything except the insults to which he had been subjected in Spain,

and the miserable condition of his sister. The only remedy, he bade Lennox assure his father, was war. James could at least regard the question from a higher point of view, if he could not succeed in discovering a fitting solution. "God be my witness," he said to Lennox, who had brought this message from the Prince, "that I never did, nor ever can desire anything, except my salvation, so much as the peace of Christendom and the good of my kingdom ; and these can only be secured by the Spanish marriage." When the reply was conveyed to Charles, the Prince told one of his confidants, that he could never forget the dishonour which he had received in Spain. It was his father's fault that he had not yet taken complete vengeance. He hoped this would soon be rectified : if not, he should be king one day, and he would then give himself no rest till he had completely ruined Spain.¹ On the whole, however, Charles had good reason to be satisfied with his father's conduct. There were from time to time, indeed, fits of hesitation and reluctance ; and rumours reached the ears of those interested in such tidings, that James had declared himself to be tired of Buckingham.² But such rumours, if there was any truth in them at all, did not reveal the whole truth. The moment that James gave a serious thought to the matter, he knew that if he was to recover the Palatinate, Buckingham's way was the only way open to him, and that the Spanish proposals had but to be fully stated to be rejected. Just at this time the same proposals which had been made by Spain in the preceding autumn were

¹ Inojosa to Philip IV., Feb. $\frac{10}{20}$, *Madrid Palace Library*.

² Valaresso to the Doge, Jan. $\frac{30}{9}$, *Ven. Transcripts*.

brought before him from another quarter. A Capuchin friar, X
 Negotiation of Della Rota. travelling under the assumed name of Francesco della Rota, appeared in England, with offers from the new Elector of Bavaria. The Elector, like the Emperor, was ready to yield much for the sake of peace. The only difference in their terms was, that whilst Ferdinand required that Frederick's son and heir should be educated at Vienna, Maximilian required that he should be educated at Munich, or, if James preferred it, under some Catholic prince elsewhere. Of course there was much said about offering all possible safeguards for the boy's religion; but what was the value of such safeguards to a youth brought at the most impressionable age within the circle of the ideas of the Catholic priesthood?¹

To this plan James gave a distinct refusal; but it was easier for him to see what was not to be done than to decide, X
 The breach with Spain referred to Parliament. for himself and others, what he wished to do. As the Commissioners would not settle his difficulties for him, the whole question was referred to the coming Parliament.

By the time the consultations of the Commissioners were brought to a close the elections were almost completed. In ordinary times the House of Commons was brought into existence under very composite influences. In the counties the choice of the great landowners weighed heavily upon the freeholders. In the smaller boroughs the owner of some neighbouring manor, to whom the citizens were bound by the obligations of ancestral courtesy, or immediate interest, could often dispose of the seat at his pleasure. The Government, too, was not without influence. The boroughs of Lancashire and the sea-coast towns of Kent, for instance, were in the habit of returning nominees of the Chancellor of the Duchy, or of the Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports. In this way the House came to represent not merely the mass of electors, but also the effective strength of the nation. The men who took part in its debates were men who were accustomed as

¹ Rusdorf, *Mémoires*, i. 156-239. Inojosa to Philip IV., Feb. ¹²₂₂
Madrid Palace Library.

magistrates, or in other ways, to take their share in the business of government. They were in the habit of acting under responsibility—in the habit, too, of attempting to render their actions subservient to the national good. Their election was very far from being a mere form. When measures are proposed in the course of this and the following years, the leaders of the assembly, again and again, in spite of the lack of reporters, make use of the argument, “What will our constituents say?” as the best rejoinder possible. For some years, as political excitement had increased, there had been a tendency in the electors to shake off the control to which they had hitherto to some extent submitted, and to require independence as the one thing needful. In the present instance the name of courtier was the surest passport to rejection, and in many places candidates supported by Buckingham, or even by the Prince, were left unchosen.¹

In two cases James was desirous of overruling indirectly the choice of the constituencies. He had a lively recollection of Coke and Sandys. Coke's attitude in the last Parliament, and he seriously designed to get rid of the old lawyer by sending him to Ireland, as member of a commission appointed to investigate the state of that country. He destined for the same employment Sir Edwin Sandys, whose opposition to the Court was of earlier date than Coke's. The step, however, was too palpably unwise to be insisted on, and both Coke and Sandys were allowed to take their seats.²

Parliament had been summoned for February 12, but was put off till the 16th, because, as men amused themselves by saying, the King had not yet made up his mind what to reply to the Spanish ambassadors.³ On the 16th it was again postponed, on account of the death of James's old friend and kinsman, the Duke of Lennox.⁴

¹ Valaresso to the Doge, Feb. ⁶₁₆, *Ven. Transcripts.*

² These are the only Parliament names in the commission (*Rymer*, xvii. 531), or in Chamberlain's contemporary letters.

³ Salvetti's *News-Letter*, Feb. ¹³₂₃.

⁴ Hacket is quite mistaken in supposing (i. 174) that there is an error in the date of the curious letter in which Williams advised Buckingham to

The speech with which James opened his last Parliament was couched in a tone of unusual hesitation. The old self-

Feb. 19.
Opening of
Parliament. confidence with which, in his happier days, he had sought to school his hearers into submission, had entirely left him. Convinced at last that peace could no longer be maintained unless he abandoned as unattainable the object for which he had striven so long, and yet shrinking with his whole soul from opening the floodgates of war, he was equally unwilling to turn his back upon his old policy, or to enter heartily upon a new one. Casting himself upon the compassion of his hearers, he pleaded before them the anxiety with which he had striven to deserve his people's love ; and told the Houses how, as a pledge of his confidence in them, he was come to ask their advice in the greatest matter that ever could concern any king. He had hoped to settle peace abroad and at home. But he now knew what the pretensions of Spain really were. The whole story would be told them by his Secretaries, who would be assisted by the Prince and Buckingham. "When you have heard it all," he added, "I shall entreat your good and sound advice, for the glory of God, the peace of the kingdom, and weal of my children. Never king gave more trust to his subjects than to desire their advice in matters of this weight ; for I assure you ye may freely advise me, seeing of my princely fidelity you are invited thereto."

Explains
what he has
done about
the Catho-
lics. Having thus removed the prohibition which had brought about the dissolution of the last Parliament, James turned to a subject on which his hearers were peculiarly sensitive. "I pray you," he said, "judge me charitably as you will have me judge you ; for I never made public nor private treaties but I always made a direct reservation for the weal public and cause of religion, for the glory of God and the good of my subjects. I only thought good sometimes to wink and connive at the execution of some penal statutes, and not to go on so rigorously as at other times ; but

accept the office of Lord Steward. It was written after Hamilton's death in 1625, and will be noticed in its proper place.

to dispense with any, to forbid or alter any that concern religion, I neither promised nor yielded. I never did think it with my heart, nor speak it with my mouth. It is true a skilful horseman doth not always use the spur, but must sometimes use the bridle, and sometimes the spur. So a king that governs evenly is not bound to carry a rigorous hand over his subjects upon all occasions, but may sometimes slacken the bridle, yet so as his hands be not off the reins."

Such words were very far from being a full and fair representation of the past negotiations. But they were at least in accordance with what James had wished to do, and were not very far from that which, by some stretch of imagination, he may have fancied himself to have done. They give an accurate account of his first offers to Spain in 1620 ; and when, in 1623, he went much farther, he had at least reserved to himself, by a protest, the right of cancelling his obligations, if reason of state should so require.¹ It is hardly likely, however, that the Commons, if they had known the whole story, would have told it in the same way.

After a few more words, James retired from the scene. He had thrown down the reins of government, and there was one standing by who was eager to take them from his failing hands. James, it is true, had told the Houses that the information for which they were looking would be communicated to them by his Secretaries, with the assistance of Buckingham and the Prince. But so subordinate a part would hardly have suited Buckingham. Before the appointed day arrived it was understood that the communication would be made by the Duke, and that the Secretaries, and even the Prince himself, would be content to give him what assistance he might need. The Houses were to assemble, not as usual in the Painted Chamber, but in the great hall of the palace, where they were accustomed to wait upon the King. If Buckingham had said, "I am the King," he could not have expressed himself more plainly.

¹ Conway to Buckingham, July 23, 1623, *Hardwicke S. P.* i. 430.
See p. 70.

How far was
this state-
ment true?

Arrange-
ments for
Buck-
ingham's ap-
pearance.

King, Prince, and State were all merged in that imposing personality. We can well imagine how he looked as he stood

Feb. 24. *Buckingham's narrative.* there, with head erect and flashing eye, to disclose those secrets of which so much was suspected, and

so little was really known. The tale which he told is easy to criticise, and it has been judged again and again with unmeasured reprobation ; but, after all, as far as it is possible to test it, its fault lay rather in its omissions than in its assertions. Over much of which the historian is bound to take account—over the folly of the journey itself—over Charles's reticence, as long as reticence was possible, with respect to his personal religion—over his solemn promises to make impracticable concessions, Buckingham threw the discreet veil of total silence. On the other hand the evidence which he produced to show that the Spanish ministers had never seriously intended giving effect to their master's rash promise to aid with his arms in the recovery of the Palatinate was entirely conclusive. Taking it all in all, the narrative bears the aspect not so much of a deliberate falsehood, as of the outpourings of a heart upon which fancy and passion had impressed their glowing pictures. When Buckingham ended by asking whether Spanish diplomacy should still be listened to, or whether, these treaties being 'set aside, his Majesty were best to trust to his own strength, and to stand upon his own feet,' he was sure to carry his hearers with him, and to sit down the most popular man in England.¹

One effect at least of the Spanish treaties was indelibly imprinted on the English mind. Bringing into prominent relief

Feb. 26. *Bill against the recusants.* the connection between the English Catholics and the great Spanish monarchy, they had served to whet

the spirit of intolerance. Almost the first work to which the Commons addressed themselves was a Bill for increasing the penalties on recusancy.²

On the 27th Weston, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, was to deliver the formal report of Buckingham's narrative to the Lower House. Before he had time to rise, he was interrupted by Sir John Eliot, a member whose parliamentary experience

¹ *Lords' Journals*, iii. 220.

² *Commons' Journals*, i. 718.

had been confined to the few weeks of the abortive session of 1614. When he sat down at the end of his maiden speech,

Feb. 27.
Sir John
Eliot. Eliot must have made himself a name as the foremost political orator of the time. Early in life he had accompanied Buckingham, then an unknown youth, on

a Continental tour, and had received from him, when he rose to be Lord High Admiral of England, the appointment of Vice Admiral of Devon. During his patron's absence in Spain, he had been imprisoned on an unjust charge springing out of his unwearied performance of the duties of his office ; and his liberation, which was almost coincident with the Duke's return, was doubtless owing to his powerful interposition. But, warm and affectionate as Eliot's nature was, he was not the man to allow any tie to an individual to fetter him in the performance of a public duty ; and though there was, for some time to come, no actual estrangement between him and Buckingham, it is probable that the retirement of the King to give place to the minister left a disagreeable impression on his mind. He was to the bottom of his heart an idealist. To him the Parliament was scarcely a collection of fallible men, just as the King was hardly a being who could by any possibility go deliberately astray. If he who wore the crown had wandered from the right path, he had but to listen to those who formed, in more than a rhetorical sense, the collective wisdom of the nation. Whoever stepped between the King and people, whoever tendered other counsel than the House of Commons had to offer, was a divider and a traitor.

The time had not yet come when Eliot was to breathe his own lofty and resolute spirit into the consultations of those around him ; but from the beginning, great as his intellectual powers were, it was not by mere force of intellect that he won his way to distinction. It was the moral nature of the man, his utter self-forgetfulness, which made him what he was, which compelled him to risk his whole life and fortunes for the chance of flinging his protest into the air against securely placed iniquity in high places, and which made him as gentle and placable as the saintly men of old in the presence of opposition the motives of which he believed to be pure.

This time Eliot rose to beg the House not to forget, in the

midst of their fresher interests, to vindicate that freedom of speech which had been refused them at the close of His speech on freedom of debate. the last Parliament. The privileges of the Commons, he argued, could not be derogatory to the King's honour. "The business," he said, "is the King's. The kingdom hath its representative in the King. In him our resolutions rest. We are only called hither upon either the general affairs of the kingdom, or the special propositions of his Majesty, and thereon to deliberate and consult, not to conclude." The Parliament, he went on to say, was the body ; the King the spirit by which it was moved. "He is, in the metaphor, the breath of our nostrils, and the bond by which we are tied one to another. Then can it not be we should attempt against, or in anything neglect, the honour of him who is so much our own."¹

Such language might have been Bacon's language. But the spirit in which the words were uttered was not the spirit of Comparison between Bacon and Eliot. Bacon. To both Eliot and Bacon the Crown and the Parliament were not contracting parties, each of which was to follow its separate interest, but members of one common body, each fulfilling its functions for the benefit of the whole. But whilst Bacon specially idealised the Crown, Eliot specially idealised the Parliament. When the separation threatened to come at last, Bacon clung the more closely to the active ruling power, whilst Eliot trusted with unshaken confidence to the body in which popular instincts were refined under the influence of word and thought. Viewing from afar the follies and errors of the Court, he learned to believe, as no other man believed before or after him, in the representatives of the nation. For him history and philosophy concurred in bearing witness to the greatness of Parliaments, the living mirror of the perpetual wisdom of a mighty nation.

For the sake of the King, Eliot now argued, the counsel of Parliament should be offered freely and without restriction.

Eliot on liberty of speech. "More for his sake than for ours," he said, "it behoves that such liberty be allowed." Freedom of speech was the indispensable condition of trustworthy advice.²

¹ Forster, *Sir J. Eliot*, i. 70, 71.

² Forster, *Sir J. Eliot*, i. 135.

Although the question thus raised could hardly be passed over in silence, the leaders of the House were too anxious to get the question referred to a committee. to the important work before them to give it much encouragement. The whole subject was referred to a committee, and was never heard of again.¹

Weston was at last able to proceed with his report. If there had ever been any hesitation in accepting Buckingham's

Feb. 26. narrative, there was none now. Inojosa and Coloma had done their best to convert him into a national hero. Hurrying to James, they assured him that if one of their master's servants had spoken of the King of England as Buckingham had spoken of the King of Spain, he would have paid the penalty with the loss of his head. James's only thought in the presence of the fiery Spaniards was to shift the burthen of a reply to other shoulders than his own. He had not been present at Whitehall, he said, when Buckingham's narrative was delivered, and he must therefore leave it to those who heard it to justify or to condemn him. In the House

Feb. 27. of Lords, Pembroke, who had now thrown himself unreservedly on Buckingham's side, led the way in Parliament. exculpating him, and a motion in his favour was unanimously carried. In the Commons the excitement was far greater. "In the way that Buckingham holds," said Phelps, "I pray that he shall keep his head on his shoulders to see thousands of Spaniards' heads either from their shoulders or in the seas." "And shall he lose his head?" cried Coke. "Never any man deserved better of his king and country." A vote, as unanimous as that of the Lords, cleared Buckingham from blame in the words that he had used.²

¹ Mr. Forster thought (*Sir J. Eliot*, i. 143) that the speeches of Alford and Phelps leave little doubt that they had received private communications from Buckingham. It is quite possible that some understanding had been arrived at, probably through Pembroke; but there is no proof of this, and there is no necessity to resort to this explanation. According to Nicholas's notes (*S. P. Dom.* clix), of which Mr. Forster made no use, Phelps said that 'since this motion is on foot, he thinks it should not rest unresolved,' which looks as if he at least expected something to come of the committee.

² Inojosa to Philip IV., *Feb. 26*, *March 7*, *Madrid Palace Library.* Coloma to

In the afternoon of the 27th the Lords took the Spanish treaties into consideration. Not a voice was raised in their favour. After two days' debate, in which the Bishops specially distinguished themselves by their warlike zeal, it was resolved that, unless the Commons should show cause to the contrary, the King should be asked to break off all negotiation with Spain, both for the marriage and for the restoration of the Palatinate.¹

The Commons were hardly likely to show cause to the contrary. The great debate was opened on March 1 in the

March 1.
Rudyerd's declaration of policy. Lower House by Sir Benjamin Rudyerd, whose official position as Surveyor of the Court of Wards, together with his close connection with Pembroke, made him a fit exponent of the coalition which had sprung up between Buckingham and the popular lords.² At the same time, his own tried devotion to the anti-Spanish policy was likely to secure for him the respectful attention of his hearers.

Rudyerd, even at his best, was apt rather to skim over the surface of an argument than to penetrate to its depths, and those who look coolly back at the events of that momentous year may be inclined to ask whether it necessarily followed, because the Palatinate was not to be regained by negotiation, that an attempt should be made to regain it by war. That such doubts were felt by a few who sat there, by Weston and Wentworth for instance, is all but certain. But Weston had surrendered himself body and soul to Buckingham, and Wentworth, haughty and defiant as he was, had too much good sense to resist the majority of an excited assembly by argument. Those who on this occasion shared his opinions could probably be counted on the fingers. The objection did

Feb. 28.
Mar. 9. the King, *Harl. MSS. 1583*, fol. 329. Valaresso to the Doge, March 5, *Ven. Transcripts. Elsing's Notes (1624-6) 2. Lords' Journals*, iii. i. 233; *Commons' Journals*, i. 721.

¹ *Elsing's Notes (1624-1626)*, 5.

² There is no direct evidence of this; but the fact that he opened the three debates of March 1, 11, and 19, and that the greater part of his advice was adopted by the King, leaves no reasonable doubt that he spoke with authority.

not come within the domain of practical politics, and Rudyerd, of all men, was the least likely to conceive its existence. For him it needed no argument to prove that a breach of the negotiations was tantamount to a declaration of war, and he advised the House to ‘petition, that his Majesty would enter into a confederacy with his friends abroad, and endeavour to re-collect and re-unite that scattered and broken party of the religion in Germany; that he would strengthen his forts within this kingdom; that he would send out a competent number of ships to discover and resist such danger as may happen; that he would really and roundly assist the Low Countries; and whosoever he intends to make war for the Palatinate, that he would make it near hand by way of diversion to save charges, whither every younger brother that had but 20*l.* in his purse may go stocked for a profession and course of life; and where the Low Countries, no doubt, will be willing and ready to assist us for their own interest, which is the motive of all States.’¹

So much was said, at the commencement of the next reign, about an alleged breach of the understanding come to in this session between the House of Commons and the Crown, that it is worth while to pause for a moment to ask what was the nature of the demand made by Rudyerd, undoubtedly with the assent, if not at the instigation, of Buckingham and the Prince.² Nothing can be plainer than that the idea of a Continental war was placed in the background, if not negatived altogether. Diplomatic intervention there was to be in Germany, accompanied, perhaps, with some aid in money from the English exchequer, in order to raise an opposition to the Spanish and Imperialist armies. But English military operations were to be confined to the Low-Countries, and whatever more was done was to take the form of a diversion, that is to say, the form of an attack by sea upon the Spanish fleets and the Spanish Indies. A new generation of Drakes and Raleighs was to be called into existence, to continue

What did
Rudyerd ask
for?

¹ Rudyerd’s speech, *S. P. Dom.* clx. 8.

² In the next year he stated that he had not received instructions from either. Probably his intercourse was with Pembroke.

the work, half-patriotic, half-piratical, which filled so large a space in the minds of Englishmen of that day.

If any doubt of Rudyerd's meaning were possible, there could be no doubt of the feeling of the House. Of Germany and of German politics the Commons knew very little, and had no chance of knowing anything accurately.

Feeling of the Commons about Spain They knew, however, that Spain had been specially prominent in the first attack upon the Palatinate, and that she had been meddling in their own domestic affairs to an extent which had roused the disgust of all Protestant Englishmen. That they greatly overrated the strength of Spain in Germany, and as greatly underrated the strength of the Emperor and the Elector of Bavaria, is evident to all who know anything about the condition of Germany at the time ; and they were thus easily led to imagine that a blow struck at Spain would have far more important results upon the Rhine than was at all likely to be the case. Though it would be unfair to say that they disregarded the miserable condition of the Palatinate, it is certain that Germany held but a secondary place in their thoughts. It was against the intrigues of Gondomar rather than against the arms of Spinola and Tilly that their indignation was specially directed. Spain, and Spain almost alone, was ever present to their vision. War with Spain was regarded

Popularity of a war with Spain. as a good thing in itself, needing no further justification. In the debate which followed Rudyerd's speech, whilst the hint which he had thrown out

about the formation of a Protestant confederacy in Germany, fell flat upon the House, his proposal to attack Spain was received with rapturous applause. "He that shall go out of the way that Sir Benjamin Rudyerd hath set down," said Phelps, "shall work in a maze, and must return thither again." "War only," cried Eliot, "will secure and repair us." The fleet, he added, might be fitted out by the help of 'those penalties the Papists have already incurred,' a proposal which, if it had been translated into figures, would have created a tyranny too monstrous to be contemplated with equanimity.¹

¹ *Commons' Journals*, i. 674, 722; *Nicholas's Notes*.

The feeling which thus prevailed found its expression in the petition which the Commons drew up for presentation to the

The petition
of the Com-
mons. King. The Lords had been content to assign as their reason for recommending that the negotiations should be broken off, the impossibility of placing further confidence in the Spanish Government. The Commons went over the whole history of the past dangers of Protestantism in England and in Europe, and found special fault with the late alliance with Spain as leading to an increase in the number of the English Catholics.¹

The petition prepared in this spirit was adopted by the Upper House, and was ready for presentation on the 3rd; but

March 3.
The King
objects to it. the King had a bad cold, and refused to receive it. It sounded, in fact, very like a covert attack upon himself, and the attempt to convert the proposed war into a religious crusade against Spain must have been most distasteful to him. Buckingham had no such scruples. "In obedience to your commands," he wrote, with that insolence which long familiarity had taught him, "I will tell Buckingham the House of Parliament that you, having been upon expostulates, the fields this afternoon, have taken such a fierce rheum and cough as, not knowing how you will be this night, you are not yet able to appoint them a day of hearing; but I will forbear to tell them that, notwithstanding your cold, you were able to speak with the King of Spain's instruments, though not with your own subjects."²

This strange letter was, in all probability, accompanied by a paper in which Buckingham had jotted down the heads of the answer which he wished James to make to the Houses.³

¹ *Lords' Journals*, iii. 246.

² Buckingham's letter (*Hardwicke S. P.* i. 460) is undated, but the reference to the cold authorises me to place it here. On March 6, Tillières writes that the King had received the petition, "ayant retardé deux jours à les voir, s'excusant sur un rheum." (*Harl. MSS.* 4593, fol. 128 b.); and Salvetti, in his *News-Letter* of the 5th, refers to the same circumstance.

³ It is printed (*Hardwicke S. P.* i. 467) as a postscript to a letter with which it has no connection, except that it has been placed next to it by the collector or binder of the volume in which it was found (*Harl. MSS.* 6987). The suggestion of a plan for paying subsidies elsewhere than into the ex-

The King, he suggested, should say that he was grateful for the answer given him, and that he did not expect any rebukes from them till he had made up his mind whether he would accept their advice or not. If he became engaged in a war in consequence of his taking that advice, he would not make peace without first consulting them ; and, finally, he would allow them to choose a committee ‘to see the issuing out of the money they give for the recovery of the Palatinate.’

Even this last suggestion, James condescended to accept. On March 5 he received the deputation from the Houses at

^{March 5.} Theobalds, and gave his answer to their petition. ^{The King's answer.} Four proposals of Rudyerd’s—that the fortifications should be repaired, a fleet fitted out, Ireland reinforced, and the Dutch Republic succoured—he adopted as his own, if indeed they had not been originally made with his approbation. But a comparison between the debate in the Lower House and this reply of James’s reveals a radical difference between their respective plans for the future. Whilst the Commons

^{Different views of the King and the Commons.} wished to do as much as possible against Spain, and as little as possible in Germany, James wanted to do as much as possible for the Palatinate, and as little as possible against Spain. “As Moses,” he said, “saw the land of promise from a high mountain, so would it be a great comfort to me that God would but so prolong my days as, if I might not see the restitution, yet at least to be assured that it would be.” He would not own ‘one furrow of land in England, Scotland, or Ireland without restitution of the Palatinate.’ In this mind he would live and die ; but he could not declare war till he knew what means he should have to support it. He was himself miserably in debt. He would allow the money voted for the war to be placed in the hands of treasurers appointed by Parliament, but he hoped that, over and above this, they would give him something for himself. In one thing only

chequer, must have been made before the King’s speech of the 5th, in which that suggestion was adopted. If, therefore, it did not actually accompany Buckingham’s letter, it must have been sent about the same time.

did his language about the war differ from the plan expounded by Rudyerd. Rudyerd had suggested the promotion of union amongst the German Princes. James went a step further, and proposed to send them actual aid.¹

To a war with Spain, James was strongly averse. To Carondelet, the Archdeacon of Cambrai, who was the frequent

March 9.
James's con-
versation
with Caron-
delet. bearer of communications to him from the Spanish ambassadors, he complained bitterly of the rash utterances of his son. Charles, he said, continued to talk as lightly as on his first arrival of the ease with which he could conquer Spain. His young companions had put this folly into his head. As for Buckingham, he did not know what devil had entered into him. He was himself most anxious to remain at peace with Spain, but it would be impossible for him to resist his Parliament unless Philip would come to his aid, by giving full and prompt satisfaction to his demands for the restitution of the Palatinate.²

Two days after this conversation with Carondelet, the Commons took into consideration the speech which James had

March 11.
Debate in the
Commons. delivered on the 5th. Neither his demand for money for the payment of his debts, nor his demand for

money for a war in Germany, found any response in the House. In vain Weston unrolled the whole list of the past expenses of the Crown. Rudyerd, in moving for a conference with the Lords, proposed to ask their advice on the defence of Ireland, the repair of the forts, the setting out of a fleet, and the aid to be given to the Dutch—the four points, as men soon began to call them—but said nothing either of the King's debts or of the German Princes, an omission which can hardly have been accidental. In the debate which followed, no one rose to recommend a war in Germany.³ England, said Coke, never prospered so well as when she was at war with Spain. If

¹ *Lord's Journals*, iii. 253.

² Carondelet's Report, March ⁹₁₉, *Madrid Palace Library*.

³ There are two reports of this session in the Journals. According to the second, Wentworth of Oxford spoke of Germany (i. 732). But the first report (i. 692) substitutes 'The Low Countries,' and is evidently right in doing so.

Ireland were secured, the navy furnished, the Low Countries assisted, they need not 'care for Pope, Turk, Spain, nor all the devils in hell.' A resolution was finally passed that, as soon as his Majesty declared the negotiations at an end, he should be assisted in a parliamentary way.

The Commons seem to have taken for granted that James's demand for payment of his own debts would not be pressed.

The Prince's
explanations
to the Lords. In the Lords the matter was taken more seriously, and doubts were expressed whether it would be possible to raise subsidies enough for this purpose and for the war as well. The Prince of Wales, now a constant attendant upon the debates, was in his place when these words were spoken. He had long lost all patience with his father's doubts and hesitations, and he was too ardent in the cause which he had adopted to reflect that by bringing royalty into contempt he was menacing an authority of which he would one day be himself the appointed guardian. Buckingham, it is said,¹ had been taught by Conway to look with envy upon the financial resources of the Dutch Republic, and had recently assured

¹ "Una de las cosas con que Boquingan ha ganado al Principe ha sido con decile que quiere hacelle el mos poderoso Rey que aya tenido Inglaterra, y la forma que le ha propuesto para ello, ayudado del Secretario Conue, qu'es muy platico de las cosas de Olanda, es que se procure quel Parlamento aconseje la guerra como ya lo ha hecho, con que sera mayor la obligacion que le correra de dar para ella, y que se comience a levantar gente y fortificar los puertos y guarneçellos y prevenir armada y que no bastando como no bastaran los subsidios con que sirven en tales ocasiones para guardar estos Regnos y divertir a V. Mag^d. y sustentar un exercito para la recuperacion del Palatinado, sera facil cosa despues, con pretexo de acudir a todos estos, reducir al Reyno como quien persuadio la guerra, à que se introduzgan sobre los bastimientos, haciendas y mercaderias al exemplo de lo que han hecho en Olanda las mismas scissas que allí y con que podra quedalle esta renta perpetua, fortificarse y sobralle dineros para lo que quisiere intentar, y para mantener un golpe de gente estrangera en este Reyno con que tener en freno à los dèl y los Puritanos, sin subjetarse como ay esta el Rey à ellos, y ha que para qualquiera poca ayuda se aya de poner en manos del Parlamento. El Principe lo ha creido y lo tiene por muy reuscible."—Inojosa to

Charles that if he would only put himself forward as the leader of a popular war, he would, when his time came to reign, make himself a more powerful sovereign than any former king of England. It was impossible to maintain a great war by means of subsidies alone, and it would therefore be necessary to introduce new taxes, like those paid in the Dutch Republic. These taxes might easily be made permanent, especially if the ports were fortified and garrisoned, and if foreign troops were introduced into England, to take part in its defence against a Spanish invasion. Of holding such far-reaching views Charles for the present gave no sign. Without waiting to consult anyone, he boldly explained away his father's words. The King, he said, merely meant to let it be known that he was in want of money, and did not mean to ask for help himself till after the safety of the kingdom had been provided for.¹ The effect of this marvellous commentary was immediate, all the more because the Prince repeated it to the Commons on the following day.² An address, embodying the ideas expressed in debate, was at once agreed to ; and on the 14th it was presented to the King at Whitehall by the Archbishop of Canterbury, in the name of the two Houses.

The King's reply
Even if James had not taken offence at his son's unexpected interference, he may well have hesitated when called upon to sanction a plan of operations so different from his own. At all events his reply was not that which the Houses had expected to receive. He took especial offence at a phrase in the address condemning the insincerity of the Spaniards. He had not yet, he said, delivered his opinion on Buckingham's relation. He had come to no conclusion on the sincerity or insincerity of those with whom he had to deal. When Jupiter spoke, he was accustomed 'to join his thunder with it ; and a king should not speak except to maintain it by action.' Then, having got rid of his ill-humour, his speech took a more practical turn. Thanking the Houses

¹ *Elsing's Notes* (1624-1626), 25.

² Valaresso to the Doge, March ¹²₂₉, *Ven. Transcripts*. Prince's speech to the Commons, March 12, *Madrid Palace Library*.

for their promise to grant him money, he pressed for more definite information on the amount they were prepared to give. "I must not only deal," he said, "with my own people, but with my neighbours and allies, to assist me in so great a business as the recovery of the Palatinate." In other words, whilst the Houses were proposing to fight Spain at sea or on the flats of Brabant, James was proposing a great Continental alliance for a war in Germany. For this purpose, he said, he should need five subsidies and ten fifteenths, adding, in spite of his son's declaration, that he hoped they would give him another subsidy and two more fifteenths for himself. He had almost made up his mind to break off relations with Spain. He trusted they would pass as many good Bills as possible, and he intended to call them together at Michaelmas, or a few days later.¹

This hesitating utterance was understood by the Commons to imply that there would be no war after all. They left the presence without the usual cry of "God save the King." The Prince showed his annoyance at his father's disavowal of his words by remaining in sullen silence for the remainder of the day, whilst the friends of Spain went joyously about with smiling faces.²

Buckingham, unlike the Prince, did not take refuge in silence. It was probably a day or two before this that he had written to James another of those strange and insolent letters in which the position of master and servant was completely inverted. "I beseech you," he wrote, "send me your plain and resolute answer whether, if your people so resolve to give you a royal assistance, as to the number of six subsidies and fifteens, with a promise after, in case of necessity, to assist you with their lives and fortunes; whether then you will not accept it and their counsel to break the match with the other treaties; and whether or no, to bring them to this, I may not assure some of them underhand,—

¹ *Lords' Journals*, iii. 265.

² D. Carleton to Carleton, Sir R. Cotton to T. Cotton, March 17, S. P. Dom. clx. 19, 20; Valaresso to the Doge, March ¹⁹₂₉, Ven. Transcripts.

Buckingham's letter
to the King.

because it is feared that when your turns are served you will not call them together again to reform abuses, grievances, and the making of laws for the good government of the country,—that you will be so far from that, that you will rather weary them with it, desiring nothing more than their loves and happiness, in which your own is included. Sir, I beseech you think seriously of this, and resolve once constantly to run one way. For so long as you waver between the Spaniards and your subjects, to make your advantage of both, you are sure to do it with neither.”¹

Full of these thoughts, Buckingham now sought an interview with the King. Throwing himself upon his knees he besought him to give satisfaction to his subjects. Buckingham's interview with James. Yet if Buckingham was anxious to gain from the unwilling King a declaration of war, his idea of what that war should be differed alike from the views of James and from the views of the House of Commons. If the Commons were for a war at sea, and James was for a war on land, Buckingham was for a war both by land and sea. He now dwelt upon the favourable prospect of obtaining French co-operation. The Spanish marriage treaty, he said, had been ‘prejudicial to the present Government here, in pressing the abrogation of many good laws, and being contrary to the conscience of the people.’ The same conditions, replied James, would be demanded in any other Roman Catholic marriage. Against this conclusion Buckingham argued, and suggested that the Houses should draw up a petition, asking the King not to consent to the Spanish conditions with any other Popish prince.

Under these persuasions James gave way once more, and consented to allow Buckingham and his son to explain away

March 15.
The King's
answer ex-
plained. his answer. The next day, accordingly, Charles was able to assure the Houses that his father had no further doubts about the justice of the war, and that he would apply to that object the whole sum of six sub-

¹ *Hardwicke S. P. i.* 466. The letter is undated, but must have been written before the 20th, when a smaller sum than six subsidies was offered by the Commons; and I think before the 14th, when the King seems to have accepted the proposal of six subsidies from Buckingham.

sides and twelve fifteenths, if they chose to grant it to him. Buckingham then proceeded to unfold the history of his conversation of the previous night, and for the first time revealed the secret of the proposed French marriage. It was possibly upon perceiving some signs of dissatisfaction around him that Charles added in a low voice, "My father has a long sword. If it is once drawn, it will hardly be put up again."¹

Whether dissatisfaction was expressed or not, there can be no doubt that it was felt. "I confess," wrote a member of the

Prospect of a French marriage. House, about a fortnight later, "that my heart beats still as you know it hath done ever, and goeth not with this match neither, and I find so many of the same pulse here, that I am sorry my noblest Lord² is employed in the business."³

Nevertheless the hint thrown out called forth no open expression of disapprobation. In the long debate which followed

March 19. Debate on supply. on the grant of supply, only one member alluded to it, by proposing that the King should be asked to

break off all other treaties, as well as the Spanish, that might be prejudicial to religion. On the prospect opened to them of a Continental war they were more outspoken. Sir Francis Seymour touched the question to the quick. He had heard 'wars spoken on,' he said, 'and an army; but would be glad to hear where. The Palatinate was the place intended by his Majesty. This we never thought of, nor is it fit for the consideration of the House in regard of the infinite charge.' Not a word was uttered in opposition to the view thus taken by Seymour. The House was looking in another direction than the Palatinate. "Are we poor," cried Eliot, "Spain is rich. There are our Indies. Break with them; we shall break our necessities together!"⁴

In fact, the Commons were in a difficult position. The

¹ *Lords' Journals*, iii. 266. Valaresso to the Doge, March ¹⁹₂₉, *Ven. Transcripts*. Account of a conversation between the King and Buckingham, *S. P. Dom.* clx. 80.

² Carlisle, who was to go as ambassador to negotiate it.

³ Nethersole to Carleton, March 31, *S. P. Dom.* clxi. 61.

⁴ *Commons' Journals*, i. 740. *Nicholas's Notes*.

task before them was no longer to oppose their own resolution
 Difficult position of the Commons. to the inertness of the King. They were called upon to decide between two opposite schemes of political and military action. Instead of looking forward to a war limited in extent and lucrative, as they fondly hoped, in its results, they were called upon to provide for a vast Continental alliance, cemented by a marriage which, taken at its best, would go far to encourage the hopes of that Church which they most detested, and relying for its support upon an expenditure of English blood and treasure so great that they could hardly contemplate the prospect with equanimity. As Coke explained to them, six subsidies and twelve fifteenths would bring in 780,000*l.*, and the six subsidies which might be expected from the clergy would raise the grant to 900,000*l.*, an amount which, however small it may sound in the reign of Victoria, was utterly unprecedented in the reign of James. Even the officials in the House did not venture to support the demand in full. Rudyerd, who had again opened the debate, had contented himself with asking that the subsidies should be in principle voted; part of them being held back to be levied at some future time. Later in the debate, however, Edmondes, Privy Councillor as he was, professed himself to be staggered by the greatness of the demand, and recommended three subsidies as sufficient. Weston too, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, acknowledged that the sound of six subsidies was 'very fearful'; whilst Vane and Conway only ventured to urge the consideration of Rudyerd's original proposal, according to which the full levy would be contingent on the renewed approbation of the House.

March 20. In the end three subsidies and three fifteenths, or about 300,000*l.*, were voted. The money was to be paid to treasurers appointed by Parliament at such periods that the whole of it would be in the Exchequer within one year after James had declared the negotiations with Spain to be at an end.¹

¹ The comparison sometimes made between the incidence of a subsidy and that of our present income-tax, is altogether misleading. As far as land was concerned, a subsidy was a tax upon rental, which would often be little more than nominal, the chief profit being made by the fines levied as the leases fell in, which would not be touched by the subsidy. The

The address from both Houses with which this resolution was accompanied plainly declared the objects for which it was intended. They were stated to be 'the support of the war which is likely to ensue, and more particularly for those four points proposed by your Majesty; namely, the defence of this realm, the securing of Ireland, the assistance of your neighbours the States of the United Provinces and others of your Majesty's friends and allies, and the setting forth of your Royal Navy.'¹

Before this address was presented it was privately shown to James. To one passage, in which it was said that the war was to be waged 'for the conservation of the true religion of Almighty God,' he took objection, as making it difficult for him to find allies beyond the limits of Protestantism. The objection was admitted as valid, and the phrase was cancelled.

The address thus amended, unlike the last one, was graciously received. The King said that he was willing to take the advice of Parliament 'in the annulling and breaking of those two treaties, both of the match and of the Palatinate.' In all his negotiations he had only aimed at the recovery of the Palatinate. "I am old," he added, "but my only son is young, and I will promise, for myself and him both, that no means shall be unused for the recovery of it; and this I dare say, as old as I am, if it might do good to the business, I would go in my own person, and think my travail and labour well bestowed though I should end my days there." Not a penny of the money, now offered by the Houses, he declared, should be spent but upon this work, and that too by their own treasurers. In the address, the subsidies had been spoken of as 'first fruits,' and there had been a further assurance of more to come when he was actually engaged in war. He took the Houses at their word. "In the next session," he said, "you will consider how this hath been husbanded, and

gradual decrease of subsidies in value was generally attributed at the time to the collusion of the collectors. Is it possible that there was also a practice of increasing the fines at the expense of rental?

¹ *Lords' Journals*, iii. 275.

March 22.
Its wording altered.

March 23.
James declares the treaties dissolved.

according to that, think what is next to be done ; and it will spur you the more to enable me for the rest whereof I spake to you before." For advice about the conduct of the future war, however, he must be dependent not upon Parliament, but upon military men who would form a Council of War. His plans 'must not be ordered by a multitude,' for so his 'designs might be discovered beforehand.' Without the consent of their treasurers he would not touch a penny of the money now offered. "But whether," he said, "I shall send twenty thousand or ten thousand, whether by sea or land, east or west, by diversion or otherwise, by invasion upon the Bavarian or the Emperor, you must leave that to the King."

What, then, was the meaning of the engagement thus taken ? On the one hand Parliament, with the exception of the vague clause about assisting 'other your Majesty's friends and allies,' distinctly intimated that the money was to be employed solely on the four points originally proposed. Even if that clause were to receive the widest possible interpretation, it could never be seriously contended that out of 300,000*l.* there would be enough left, when the expenditure authorised in the address had been met, to provide for any extensive military outlay. James, in talking of sending twenty thousand men or ten thousand men, was clearly not referring to anything connected with the present vote, but to the use to be made of the further subsidies which he expected in the autumn. He had already promised to call Parliament together for purposes of domestic legislation. He now promised to give an account at the same time of the expenditure already agreed on, and to ask the sanction of the Houses to the further prosecution of the war. He would thus have time to ascertain the feeling of the various European courts in which he hoped to find allies. But he honestly told Parliament that when he proceeded to make war in earnest, he should be guided by military, not by political, far less by religious considerations. What he wanted, in short, was to get back the Palatinate,—not to punish Spain for her past conduct, or to join in a Protestant crusade.

Evidently, therefore, neither party was in any way bound to anything beyond the expenditure of the 300,000*l.* already

offered. When the next session began it would be open to the King to say, if he thought fit, that he had found the enterprise more arduous than he had expected ; and it would be equally open to the Commons to say that they ^{Neither party bound for the future.} declined to support any particular policy which the Crown had resolved to adopt. The blind confidence which Charles afterwards demanded was neither offered nor assumed on either side, even in the event of the autumn session taking place. Still less could it be fairly expected, if the meeting of the Houses were delayed, that the Commons would sanction without inquiry any further expenditure on which the Crown might have entered upon its own responsibility.

For the present, however, there was little thought of future complications. On the afternoon after the King's declaration, ^{Public rejoicings.} the streets were filled with happy faces. As soon as darkness fell, bonfires were blazing on every side. At last the long weary burden of years had been thrown off. Whatever else might happen, it would not be a Spanish princess who would be nearest and dearest to the future King of England, and mother to the future Prince of Wales. Neither Gondomar nor his master would again find an excuse for meddling with the administration of English law, or for thrusting aside statutes which, whatever we may now think of them, were at that time regarded as the bulwarks of religion and liberty.

Whilst the bonfires were blazing in the streets, some of the servants of the Spanish embassy in the Strand were foolish enough to crowd to the windows to see what was going on. As might have been expected, they were received with jeers by the crowd below, and stones and firebrands were flung towards them. The next day, on March 24. Buckingham's motion, the Lords resolved that an attempt should be made to discover the offenders. In March 25. the Commons other feelings prevailed. Two members of the House reported that they had been in the Strand on the evening in question and had not witnessed anything improper. On this negative evidence the Commons thought themselves justified in treating the whole story as a pure invention.¹

¹ *Lords' Journals*, iii. 280. *Commons' Journals*, i. 750.

The Spaniards insulted.

If Buckingham had still some regard for decorum, Charles shared the popular feeling to the full. Whilst James's decision

March 18. The Prince rejects a present from the Countess Olivares. was still hanging in the balance, three cartloads of fruits and sweetmeats were driven up to the gate of St James's Palace, at that time the residence of the Prince of Wales. They were a present from the Countess of Olivares, prepared in happier days. Charles would not even vouchsafe to look at them. Turning to Cottington, he bade him divide the good things as he pleased amongst his attendants.¹

A king's son, it thus appeared, could be lamentably deficient in the elements of good breeding. The day before this ex-

March 17. Lafuente robbed of his despatches. hibition of courtesy there had been a deed done in France by which still greater obloquy was brought upon the English name. The Spanish Government, in the hope of obtaining better terms from James, had despatched Gondomar's confessor, Lafuente, to England, trusting that his discreet character and his accurate knowledge of the Court might procure him a hearing where the impatient Inojosa and the blunt, soldierlike Coloma had failed.

As Lafuente was travelling near Amiens, his coach was surrounded by a number of men armed with pistols and disguised with false beards. His baggage was searched with the utmost minuteness, and even the leaves of his breviary were eagerly turned over. His assailants were evidently no common robbers, for, though they carried off every scrap of paper in his possession, they left his money and all his valuable property untouched. The affair was never subjected to any serious investigation, but Lafuente believed that the culprits were Frenchmen employed by the Marquis of Hamilton, whose intimacy with Buckingham made it unlikely that the outrage had been committed without the knowledge of the Lord Admiral.² If so, and if Lafuente's instructions were in Buck-

¹ Chamberlain to Carleton, March 20, *S. P. Dom.* clxi. 4. Salvetti's *News-Letter*, March 26.
April 5.

² Lafuente to Philip IV., March $\frac{21}{31}$, *Madrid Palace Library*. *Fran-
cisco de Jesús*, 97.

ingham's hands on the 19th or 20th ; and if again, as there can be no doubt was the case, they contained no offer that Philip would draw sword in defence of Frederick's rights in the Palatinate, we have a sufficient explanation of James's announcement on the 23rd that the treaties were to be dissolved. He had hesitated as long as he thought it possible that Lafuente, whose coming had been for some time expected, might bring the engagement which he hoped. When he knew that nothing of the kind was to be expected, it was impossible for him any longer to resist the wishes of his son and his Parliament.

On the 29th Lafuente was admitted to the King's presence together with the two ambassadors, but he had no credentials

The treaties with Spain denounced. to present, and a letter from the King of Spain which he had with him when he left Madrid was equally missing. He, therefore, contented himself with inveighing against Buckingham's insolence in Spain, without saying anything about the present intentions of his master. According to the jest of the day, he had only come to give extreme unction to the dying treaties.¹ To the ambassadors James spoke at some length. He told them that the negotiation had been broken off because the Spanish offers were vague and insufficient. If even now, at the last moment, Philip would promise to support with his arms a fair settlement in the Palatinate, such an offer would be thankfully accepted, whether the Parliament were pleased or not. The Prince, who was well aware that Philip would never give such a promise, expressed himself satisfied with this announcement, whilst Buckingham in vain challenged Lafuente to declare the substance of the instructions which he had lost.²

The inability of the Spaniards to give hopes of their master's armed intervention in the Palatinate seems to have removed the last hesitation from James's mind. As soon as they left the room their places were taken by Dutch commissioners, who

¹ Valaresso to the Doge, April $\frac{2}{12}$, *Ven. Transcripts.*

² Inojosa to Philip IV., $\frac{\text{March } 29}{\text{April } 8}$. Lafuente to Philip IV., $\frac{\text{March } 30}{\text{April } 9}$, *Madrid Palace Library.*

had come over to discuss the terms on which English military assistance should be given to the States-General.
 Reception of the Dutch commissioners. Their reception was eminently favourable. The King assured them of his strong desire both to maintain the independence of their country, and to regain the lost Palatinate.¹

The Commons had now leisure to turn their attention to the subject to which, next to the war with Spain, they attached the greatest importance. The treaties which had just been set aside had done much to repress the growth of a tolerant spirit in England. The men who, like Bacon and Bristol, rose to power in the earlier years of James's reign, were capable of embracing something of the idea of toleration. The men who were looked up to in the Parliaments of 1621 and 1624—Pym, Eliot, and Phelips—closed their hearts against the very thought. The reason of this difference is not difficult to discover. The Roman Catholic creed was no longer a mere religious error, endangering, according to the common belief, the souls of men, but accompanied by no very evident political danger. It was now once more aggressive, both on the Continent and in England. Every step which had been gained by its champions in Germany, every blow which had been struck in its favour upon the Danube or the Rhine, had found an echo in English hearts, more especially as it had gained vantage-ground in the concessions which Spain had wrung from the impolitic compliance of an English sovereign. Because James had allowed the reins of government to hang loosely in his hands, and had not repelled with scorn the pretensions of an alien ruler to interfere with the domestic affairs of England, the best and wisest spirits of the age were crying out, not merely for the exclusion of Spanish influence, but for the administration of the English law, as far as their Roman Catholic fellow-subjects were concerned, in a harsh and intolerant spirit.

In all that was happening the Spanish ambassadors, ignorant, like the rest of the world, of the deep hold which the loss of the Palatinate had taken upon James's mind, saw, in the

¹ Lafuente to Philip IV., *March 30, April 9, Madrid Palace Library.*

repulse which they had met, nothing more than the result of the overbearing self-will of Buckingham. It was not hard

^{Spanish intrigues.} for them to construct out of rumour, partly true and partly false, the idea that the King was held in actual physical durance, by the arts of his favourite and his son, and they imagined that if they could only succeed for an instant in gaining the ear of James, the whole monstrous edifice which Buckingham had constructed would topple down of itself.

Their first difficulty arose from their knowledge that they were never allowed to see James in private. When they were admitted to an audience Buckingham was always present, ready to remove any impression they might chance to make, the moment they had left the room. This hindrance to freedom

^{The King is asked to see Carondelet in private.} of speech they determined to 'break through at the earliest opportunity.' On March 29, the day on which they were summoned to hear from the King's lips the announcement that negotiations were at an end, whilst Inojosa engaged the Prince and Buckingham in conversation, Coloma offered James a paper which he requested him to put in his pocket till he found himself alone. The paper, when opened, proved to contain a request that the King would give a private audience to Carondelet, who had already served as a medium of the secret communications between the King and the ambassadors. The audience was granted on April 1, and

^{April 1.} ^{Carondelet's audience.} James explained to Carondelet, as he had explained to the ambassadors before, that he had no thought of breaking with Spain if he could have the assurances for which he had persistently asked. Nothing that Carondelet could say had any effect to draw him from this position. The restitution of his children, he said, was of all things next to his heart. He was engaged to effect it by his honour, his reputation, and his promises. If the King of Spain would not comply with his request, he must use the forces which God had put into his hands to effect his object. "In no way," James ended by saying, "will I suffer any further delay. I wish to be prepared for peace, if it is possible to have it, and also for war, if it is forced upon me. With Spain I do not at

all wish to fight, but rather to keep up a good correspondence and friendship with her." The Spanish delays, he added, were what they had always been. The King of Spain and his ministers would one day be sorry that they had let slip the opportunity of the Prince's visit to make a firm alliance with England. Carondelet was glad to turn the conversation, and contrived before he left to assure James that he was little better than a prisoner in Buckingham's hands, and was being used as a tool for the satisfaction of the private animosities of the favourite.¹

On the morning of April 3, Lafuente saw the King. He dwelt, as Carondelet had done, on Buckingham's overbearing conduct, and uttered loud warnings against the folly of embarking on a war in which England was unlikely to meet with the success which she sanguinely expected.²

There was enough of general truth in the charge to make James excessively uncomfortable. He must have known that, even if it were not true that he was being dragged against his will by Buckingham into a course of action which he disliked, he had at least entered upon a path which, but for Buckingham, he would never have chosen. He now expressed, in bitter words, the usual dissatisfaction of a man who finds out that he is being led by others. His son, he said, before his visit 'to Spain, was as well affected towards that nation as heart could desire, and as well disposed as any son in Europe; but now he was strangely carried away with rash and youthful counsels, and followed the humour of Buckingham, who had he knew not how many devils within him since that journey.'

The proceedings in Parliament added to the King's vexation. On April 3, the day on which he had received Lafuente's complaint against Buckingham, a petition was sent up by the Lords asking for the full execution of the penal laws against the recusants, and a request was added to it, 'that upon no occasion of marriage or

¹ Carondelet's Report, April ¹₁₁, *Madrid Palace Library.* Valaresse to the Doge, April ¹₁₁, *Ven. Transcripts.*

² Lafuente to Philip IV., April ⁴₁₄, *Madrid Palace Library.*

Petition
against the
recusants:
James's ob-
jections.

treaty, or other request on that behalf from any foreign Prince or State whatsoever,' his Majesty 'would take away or slacken the execution of his laws against the Popish recusants.'¹

To the last clause James had no objection to make. He had learned something from past experience, and he had resolved not to complicate the French treaty with any of those stipulations for the English Catholics which had hampered him so terribly in his negotiations with Spain ; but the demand for the full execution of the penal laws annoyed him. He had no well-defined theory on the subject of toleration, and as his practice in this, as in many other matters, was very much influenced by the special circumstances of the moment, he shrank from avowing an intention to deal harshly with the recusants at a time when he was persuaded that the Palatinate could only be recovered with the assistance of France and other Roman Catholic countries.

As often happened with James, his vexation threw him violently into a course opposite to that which he had previously taken. He ordered the courier who had already started for Madrid, with a despatch announcing the breach of the negotiations, to be overtaken and brought back. He must now, he said, consult more fully with his son. "Ye know," he wrote to Conway in a letter conveying these directions, "my firm resolution not to make this a war of religion."²

Although the decision which James appeared to have taken, to put an end to the negotiation with Spain, was thus once more exposed to uncertainty, he was not prepared to give full credence to the charges brought by Carondelet and Lafuente. He informed the Spanish ministers that, if they expected him to take any steps against the Duke, they must first proye their allegations.³

¹ *Lords' Journals*, i. 289.

² The King to Conway, April 3. Printed without a date in *Rushworth*, i. 140.

³ There are two forms of the account of these transactions, which was given afterwards by Carondelet to Williams (*Cabala*, 275, and *Hacket*, i. 195). I suspect them both to relate to the same conversation, though the notes given by Hacket are treated by him as an abstract of the paper subsequently given by Inojosa to James. Hacket's story, as usual, is in

Carondelet fancied that the secret of his interview with the King was in safe keeping ; but in spite of his clerical character

April 3. Carondelet betrayed to Williams. his morals were loose.¹ His mistress was in the pay of Williams, who, provided that he could get important information, cared little what means he employed to obtain it. To Williams the discovery afforded a splendid opportunity of strengthening his interests at Court. It was true that he had been assured by Buckingham that his conduct in opposing the war with Spain would be passed over ; but since he had given offence no opportunity had been afforded him of exhibiting his devotion.

Williams went first to the Prince. "In my studies of divinity," he said, after explaining how he had come by his

April 5. Williams informs the Prince. knowledge, "I have gleaned up this maxim, It is lawful to make use of the sin of another. Though the devil make her a sinner, I may make good use of her sin." "Yea," answered Charles with a smile, "do you deal in such ware?" "In good faith," said Williams, "I never saw her face."

After some consideration, it was resolved that Buckingham should go to Theobalds, to feel his ground with the King,² whilst Williams remained in London, to probe Carondelet's secret to the bottom. He ordered the immediate arrest of a

miserable confusion. He fancied that he knew better what happened than appears on the face of the documents he printed, and transferred to the beginning of April events which took place long afterwards, when the King was at Windsor, which will be given in their proper place.

¹ The Spanish embassy stood in no good repute since Inojosa's arrival. Tillières is not a very satisfactory authority against it. But even his outrageous statement about Inojosa that 'n'étant pas content de débaucher les filles et femmes Catholiques, il se fait servir des prêtres et confesseurs de maqueraux,' throws some light on the probability of the truth of the story about Carondelet. Tillières to Ville-aux-Clercs, Feb. ⁷₁₇, *Harl. MSS.* 4593, fol. 46 b.

² Hacket gives a wrong date, and sends Buckingham to Windsor instead of Theobalds. From the *Lords' Journals* we know that Buckingham was in his place on the morning of the 5th, and was absent on the 6th and 7th. Conway, in a letter written to Aston on the 7th (*S. P. Spain*), speaks of him as being then at Theobalds.

April 7.
Gains further information from Carondelet.

priest whom he knew to be specially intimate with the arch-deacon. As he expected, Carondelet was not long in asking leave to plead for his friend's life. Late at night, to escape observation, he came to the Deanery at Westminster. At first he found Williams obdurate. How could mercy be shown whilst Parliament, with its watchful eye, was still in session? Carondelet caught at the word Parliament. He knew that Williams had opposed Buckingham at the beginning of the year. He did not know how ready he was to desist from a fruitless opposition. "Let not," he said, "the dread of this Parliament trouble you. I can tell you, if you have not heard it, that it is upon expiration." Then, fancying from Williams's answers that he had found a confederate, he unfolded the whole tale of his secret audiences.¹

As soon as Carondelet was gone, Williams sat down and wrote off for Buckingham an account of all that had passed.² A few evenings later Carondelet returned with further information, and Williams was able to take credit to himself for having fathomed so deep a mystery. Yet, before Buckingham had time to receive the information, he had recovered his mastery over the mind of James. On April 6,

April 6.
The final breach with Spain.

the day before Carondelet's first interview with Williams, the delayed despatch announcing the final breach of the negotiations with Spain was at last sent off—a step which would hardly have been taken if the im-

¹ *Hacket*, i. 198. Mr. Tierney, in his edition of *Dodd*, argues that the story of the priest arrested is untrue, because an account (*Cabala*, 275) sent off at once to Buckingham by Williams contains a heading—"The end, as was conceived, of Don Francisco's desiring this conference." I do not see that this necessarily follows. Williams may very well have omitted the story of the priest, which was only needed to show why Carondelet came to his house. What had to be accounted for was, how Carondelet came to confer with Williams on such secret matters; what was his end in "desiring this conference." Whether he had already been brought to the Deanery by other affairs was unimportant. Hacket is most confused in dates, and often mixes up different stories, but I do not think that either he or Williams were likely to invent the story.

² *Cabala*, 275.

pression made by Carondelet and Lafuente on the King had not been already removed.¹

This despatch, written and rewritten several times, announced that the proposition made in January by the Spanish ambassadors could not be accepted. James would never consent to his grandson's education at the Emperor's court, nor would he

¹ Williams did not write his notes till two o'clock on the morning of the 8th, and that morning Buckingham was in his place again in the House of Lords.

The following account by Williams of a further conference between himself and Carondelet, is given in Birch's transcripts, *Add. MSS. 4164*, fol. 280, as taken from *Harl. MSS. 7000*, where I have not been able to find it. Dr. Birch's name is, however, a sufficient guarantee that the reference only is incorrect.

" 1. He was very inquisitive if I had already or intended to impart what he had told me in secret the night before to any man ; to the which he did add a desire of secrecy, because (1) the King had charged him and the friar to be very secret ; (2) the ambassadors did not know that he had imparted these things unto me ; (3) the paper was secret instructions which they gave the friar to urge and press the same points which himself had done, unto the King.

" 2. He confessed that the greatest part of the friar's instructions was to do all the worst offices he could against the Duke, and to lay the breach of the marriage and disturbance of the peace upon him.

" 3. He excused his bringing the copy of that paper unto me, because the Marquis (*i.e.* Inojosa) had got it in his custody ; but said he would procure it with all speed. I desired him to do it, the rather because, besides my approbation of the form and manner of writing, I might be by it instructed how to apply myself to do his Majesty service therein, as I found by that conference his Majesty's bent and inclination.

" 4. He having understood that there was, though a close, yet an indissoluble friendship between the Duke and myself, desired me to show some way how the Duke might be won unto them, and to continue the peace. I answered I would pursue any fair course that should be proposed that way ; but, for myself, that I never meddled with matters of state of this nature, but was only employed before this journey of the Prince's in matters of mine own court and in the pulpit.

" 5. He desired to know if they might rely upon the King, whom only they found peaceably addicted, otherwise they would cease all mediation and prepare for war. I answered that he was a king that never broke his word, and he knew best what he had said unto them.

" 6. He commended much the courage and resolution of the Lord Treasurer, which I told him we all did, as a probable sign of his innocence.

be satisfied with anything less than a direct engagement that Spain would assist his son-in-law by force of arms if diplomacy should fail. The two Houses of Parliament, he added, ‘have given us their faithful advice to dissolve both the treaties, as well of the marriage as of the Palatinate. To which we have given our consent, having not found any example that any king hath refused the council of the whole kingdom composed of faithful and loving subjects.’ So far the letter was all that Buckingham could have desired; but a passage followed in which James again pressed Philip to aid him, or at least not to oppose him, in his efforts to obtain the restitution of the Palatinate. And though he allowed the Prince to cancel this last clause,¹ he did not countermand the sending of a letter of Conway’s in the same packet, in which the ambassador at Madrid was directed to assure Philip that, though James had promised to listen to the advice of his Parliament, he had never promised to follow it.²

Such a reservation could have but little result. The one fact of importance was that the Spanish intrigue had failed, and the treaties were at last abandoned. In all that had passed the hesitation of James had been most manifest. He had been half-driven, half-persuaded, to place himself in hostility to Spain. It had not been without many backward glances that he had taken the required step—glances which the Spaniards interpreted as meaning much more than they really did. Yet it was surely not merely owing to the personal ascendency of Buckingham that James at last shook off the influence of the Spanish ambassadors.

<sup>Nature of
Buck-
ham's in-
fluence over
James.</sup> “7. He said the Marquis had despatched three *correos*, and expected of large propositions from Spain to be made unto his Majesty concerning the present restitution of the Palatinate, and that if these failed they were at an end of all treaty, and the ambassadors would forthwith return home.”

“Indorsed:—Bishop of Lincoln’s Relation of Speeches passed between his Lordship and Don Francisco.—11 April, 1623.” [Sic].

¹ In the draft the passage is scored out, and a note in Charles’s hand is appended to it—“These two last are thought best to be left out.” The King to Aston, April 5, *S. P. Spain*.

² Conway to Aston, April 3. Date corrected to April 8. *S. P. Spain*.

What he asserted in his despatch was nothing more than what he had said plainly to Carondelet. He broke off the treaties because the King of Spain had given him no reason to suppose that he intended to assist him in the forcible recovery of the Palatinate. James may perhaps have retained a lingering hope that Philip might still be moved to give the required promise, but to all except himself the breach thus made was final and irreparable.

Buckingham's sanguine and incisive temper had carried him safely up to this point. Would it serve him equally well when he came to proceed to positive action? It is far easier to put an end to negotiations than to conduct a war. He would no longer have the full assurance of the support of the House of Commons. If he had been on the side of Parliament against the King in wishing to make the breach with Spain complete, he was on the side of the King against Parliament in wishing to make a close alliance with France the main feature of his foreign policy. That he was in the right in shrinking from going to war without French aid cannot reasonably be doubted, but it remained to be seen at what price that aid was to be purchased.

*Difficulties
still to be
met.*

CHAPTER XLVIII.

BUCKINGHAM'S ASCENDENCY.

HENRY RICH, Viscount Kensington, had arrived in Paris on February 15, charged with a confidential mission. Without making any absolute overtures, he was to sound the disposition of the French Court towards a marriage between Charles and the Princess Henrietta Maria, the youngest sister of Louis XIII. Unlike his elder brother, the Earl of Warwick, the speculator in buccaneering adventures in the reign of James and the pious Lord Admiral of the Commonwealth, Kensington had been fitted by nature to gain in the drawing-room the success which was denied him in the senate and the field. Without force of character or intellectual ability, he had early taken his place in that train of flatterers whose ready services were so pleasing to Buckingham, and were of so little value in the hour of trial; and it was to the satisfaction which he had thus given to his patron that he owed his high position at Court, his peerage, and at last his selection as messenger of love to the French Princess.

Kensington's journey was extremely well-timed. Louis had at last taken alarm at the position which Spain and the allies of Spain occupied on his frontiers. The proud flag of Philip waved from the Netherlands in the north, over an almost uninterrupted series of fortifications, through the Palatinate, Franche Comté, the Milanese Duchy, Naples, Sicily, and Sardinia, to the spot where the Pyrenees lower their crests as they sink towards the waters of the Atlantic. Behind this martial barrier was now arising once more the shadowy form of the old Empire which had been

*La Vieille
ville's
ministry.*

quickened into life by the successes of Spinola and Tilly, and which was now in close alliance with the Spanish monarchy. Louis had felt that it was no longer a time to be guided solely by his religious instincts. Devoted Catholic as he was, he was a still more devoted Frenchman, or rather, it would perhaps be more correct to say, he was still more devoted to the maintenance of his own authority, in which, for him, the interests of France were comprehended. Yet though Louis was by no means a cypher in French politics, he was too sluggish and unfamiliar with business to trouble himself with the actual direction of affairs. A minister he must have who would be content to carry out his master's plans, except so far as he might be able to mould them in accordance with his own. He now announced the change which had come over him by dismissing his former ministers who were on friendly terms with Spain and the Emperor, and by calling to his councils the Marquis of La Vieuville, who was pledged to pursue a different course.

With the higher political questions which were likely to arise out of this change, Kensington had neither the authority nor the desire to meddle. Easy and graceful in his manners, he had little difficulty in winning his way amongst the ladies and gay gentlemen of the Queen Mother's court. Mary de Medicis, at this time under the guidance of the sagacious Richelieu, at once treated the handsome Englishman as a friend. She gladly caught at the idea of making her daughter Princess of Wales, especially as she hoped by this means to obtain a cessation of the persecution of the English Catholics, and thus to do more for her Church than Philip of Spain and his sister had succeeded in accomplishing. Her feeling was shared by her son, and Kensington was able to send home the most glowing description of his reception at Paris. Though he was told that there could be no serious negotiation till his master had openly broken with Spain, nothing was left undone to give him confidence in the eventual success of his mission. With the Queen Mother he was soon at home, chattering gaily in broken French, and whispering airy compliments in the ears of the ladies around her. The day after his arrival he was able to report that he had seen the Princess, a quick,

Kensington's
success at
Court.

bright-eyed girl in her fifteenth year. "My Lord," he wrote to Buckingham, "she is a lovely sweet young creature. Her growth is not great yet, but her shape is perfect." The Princess Henrietta Maria. She had seldom, he had been informed, 'put on a more cheerful countenance than that night.' "There were some," he added, "that told me I might guess the cause of it."

Of soft glances and merry speeches Kensington was an apt reporter. It was not long before he had to turn his attention to more serious work. Ill-advised as any marriage with a Roman Catholic could not fail to be, in the existing state of English public feeling, both James and Buckingham wished this marriage to be at least the seal of an effectual military alliance, and they expected to proceed simultaneously with the two negotiations. Kensington soon made himself the mouthpiece of the French court in advising the contrary course. "For I doubt," he wrote, "whether it may not be thought a little dishonourable for this king to give his sister conditionally that, if he will make war upon the King of Spain his brother, we will make the alliance with him. . . . But if we fall speedily upon a treaty and conclusion of a marriage, the which will find, I am persuaded, no long delays here, neither will they strain us to any unreasonableness in conditions for our Catholics, as far as I can find ; then will it be a fit time to conclude a league, the which they will then for certain do when all doubts and fears of falling off are by this conjunction taken away."¹

It was truly a golden prospect, but even to Charles it did not seem quite satisfactory after his experience in Spain. The

March 3.
Dissent of Charles. Prince wished the general league of friendship to precede the negotiation of the marriage treaty.² Kensington characteristically replied by assuring Charles that all would come right in the end, by praising the Princess,

¹ Kensington to Buckingham, Feb. 16, Feb. 26 (both letters printed without a date), *Cabala*, 290, 286. Kensington to Conway, March 4, *S. P. France*.

² We learn the Prince's opinion from Kensington's answer to Buckingham's letter of March 3. It is dated March 9, *S. P. France*.

who was 'for beauty and goodness an angel,' and by recounting how she, having borrowed a miniature of the Prince which hung about his neck, 'opened it with such haste as showed a true picture of her passion, blushing in the instant of her own guiltiness.'¹

All this was very delightful to a lover, but it would not go far to help on the political alliance between the two kingdoms.

Sir Edward Herbert, who had returned to France as April 13.
Herbert's
opinion on
the policy of
France.
ambassador after the death of Luynes, and who knew the country too well to be deceived by the gossip of the Queen Mother or the blushes of a girl of fourteen, formed an opinion very different from that of Kensington. The object of the French, as he thought, was to make themselves arbiters between England and the House of Austria ; he therefore advised his master to bring them 'to some real and infallible proofs' of their intention to assist England 'in the recovery of the Palatinate, at the same time or before' the marriage treaty was discussed. Otherwise they would 'want no excuse to keep themselves in peace of neutrality.' Herbert was the more confirmed in this view of the case by his knowledge that Louis was anxious to send a diplomatic agent named Marescot to the Elector of Bavaria. So unpalatable to the French King was the remonstrance made against this proposal by the ambassador, that means were taken to induce James to recall him ; and, in fact, the letter ordering him to return home had been already despatched before his last note of warning reached England.²

Herbert had been guilty of seeing too clearly where the real difficulty lay. Whatever interest Louis had in the matter lay in opposing Spain, and Spain alone. As a devout Catholic he would naturally wish to confine his operations in Germany within the narrowest possible limits.

Was France
likely to help
in Germany?
To send an embassy to the Elector of Bavaria was precisely the step likely to be taken by a man in his position. The victories of Tilly and the League would have been positively gratifying to him if they had merely resulted in the depression of Pro-

¹ Kensington to the Prince, March 9, *Cabala*, 288.

² Herbert to Calvert, Jan. 26, Feb. 6, March 10. Herbert to the King, April 13, *S. P. France*, Tillières to Ville-aux-Clercs, March 30, April 9, *Harl. MSS.* 4593, fol. 194 b.

testantism and could have been dissociated from the formidable growth of the Spanish power. To join James in driving out Catholic rule and Catholic worship from the Palatinate might possibly be regarded by Louis in the light of a political necessity, but it would never be considered by him as desirable in itself. The overtures which had been made to James in vain through Francesco della Rota, were certain to be acceptable to Louis, as by placing the education of Frederick's children in Maximilian's hands, they would, if adopted, almost inevitably lead to a rivalry between the Bavarian and the Austrian families.

Nor was the divergence of the views of the two kings about the Palatinate the only difficulty in the way of a cordial co-

The French anxious about the Valtelline. operation between France and England. Louis had a Palatinate of his own in the Valtelline, that long and narrow valley which, stretching from the Lake of Como to the Tyrolese mountains, offered the only way of communication by which Spanish armies could pass from Italy into Germany without encroaching upon the possessions of states more or less openly hostile. This territory was now in the grasp of Spain by a very questionable title. The Roman Catholics, who formed almost the entire population, had been treated with extreme harshness by the Protestant Grison Leagues, the masters of the whole valley. In 1620 the people of the Valtelline rose against their oppressors, massacred the few Protestants upon whom they could lay their hands, and called the Spanish governor of Milan to their help. In spite of the remonstrances of France, the Spaniards took the aggressive and carried fire and sword into the heart of the Grison mountains. At last a league of resistance was formed between France, Venice, and Savoy, and in the spring of 1623, Spain nominally relinquished its authority over the Valtelline and entrusted the valley to the Pope. Spanish garrisons, however, still occupied the principal fortified posts, and the King of Spain refused to withdraw them unless the right of passage through the Valtelline were secured to his soldiers by treaty. In 1624 matters were still unchanged, and French politicians were looking forward to a war for the recovery of the Valtelline as eagerly as English politicians were looking forward to a war for the recovery of the Palatinate.

Here at least there was no risk that success would be attended with any danger to the interests of the Roman Catholic Church.

If the Palatinate were reconquered by the German Protestants, even with French aid, it would be very difficult for Louis to secure the priests of his religion in the hold which they had taken upon the country. If the Valtelline were reconquered by the petty Grison states with the help of France, Venice, and Savoy, it would be easy enough for those who gave the assistance to take effectual steps for the cessation of persecution for the future.

Here then, as Herbert perceived, and Kensington did not perceive, lay the danger in the course which the English Government was bent on pursuing. *¶* The general direction of the policy of the two countries was the same, but the secondary objects at which they aimed were different. *¶* It was a case in which England had every reason to keep up a good understanding with her powerful neighbour, but in which an attempt to form too close an alliance would almost inevitably lead to mutual irritation, if not to an open breach.*¶*

Unhappily, great as was the difference of character of the three men at the head of affairs in England, they were all equally sanguine that others would do that which they wished them to do. The hesitating James, the reticent Charles, the hasty Buckingham, had no idea that they were in any respect unreasonable in asking the French Government to do precisely that which they wanted done, in the precise way in which they thought best. The French, on their part, nourished the deception. They too had their own ends to serve, and in the eagerness with which the English Court was seeking their friendship they saw a ready means of gaining their objects whilst giving as little as possible in return.

To France then, for the present, the German war was secondary to the project for the recovery of the Valtelline. All that was wanted in Germany was to create a disturbance which would be sufficient to prevent the armies on the Rhine from coming to the help of the Spanish forces in the Italian valley. *¶* When the Valtelline was recovered,

French view
of the war in
Germany.

then, and not before, would be the time to consider what was to be done in Germany.

To anyone with an eye to see, it was obvious, from the shape which the first project of French co-operation with England Mansfeld in took, that nothing more was meant. If there was a Holland. man in Europe who was unfit to stand at the head of any serious movement in Germany, that man was Mansfeld. That unscrupulous adventurer knew how to plunder friend and foe better than he knew how to conduct war. By the Catholics he was regarded with a well-deserved ferocity of hatred, whilst all Protestants who had anything to lose shrank from him as they would shrink from the plague. He had not even the merit of success. To send Mansfeld into Germany was to invite defeat by the provocation which his mere presence would give.

Early in the spring, Mansfeld was once more in Holland, looking out for an employer. The great German war, for a moment, had sunk down into quietude, and it seemed as if the Emperor's authority would be acknowledged from the North Sea to the Alps. At this moment Du Maurier, the French ambassador in Holland, advised Mansfeld to go to France. His visit to France. Upon his arrival Louis, for form's sake, refused to see him, but he sent to tell him that he might be employed in an attack upon Franche Comté in order to divert the Spanish troops in the Netherlands from sending reinforcements to the Valtelline.¹ As soon as Mansfeld's assent was gained he was sent over into England to persuade James to take upon himself a share of the expenses of the undertaking. As the reconquest of the Valtelline would have an appreciable effect in diminishing the power of the House of Austria, it cannot be said that the scheme was one of purely French interest, but it was certain that neither James nor the English Parliament would contemplate with satisfaction such a use of English troops or of English money.

The difficulties in the way of the French alliance were not

¹ “Se non si trovasse modo d'aggiustare negotio della Valtellina dovera essere impiegato dalla Francia all' invasione della Borgogna Contesa.” Siri, *Mem. Rec.* v. 526. Siri wrote from the despatch of the Florentine agent in Paris.

confined to these military questions. On April 5, when the Commons sent up to the Lords their petition against the recusants, Charles went out of his way to swear that, ‘whosoever it should please God to bestow upon him any lady that were Popish, she should have no further liberty but for her own family, and no advantage to the recusants at home.’ It would seem that the enforcement of the laws against the English Catholics was, in Charles’s mind, a policy likely to be entirely unobjectionable to the French king, whose alliance he was courting.

On April 14, Mansfeld arrived in London. By the Prince he was eagerly received. He talked confidently of seizing

Franche Comté and then falling upon the Austrian lands in Alsace and Swabia.¹ Apartments were assigned to him in St. James’s Palace, the very room being given him which had been prepared for the Infanta. Whenever he appeared in the streets the people followed him

with shouts of applause. On the 16th he was taken April 16. to see James at Theobalds. He touched the heart of the old King by the fluency with which he spoke of the recovery of the Palatinate as a thing not so very hard to be accomplished. If his Majesty, he said, would give him 10,000 infantry and 3,000 horse, six guns, and 20,000*l.* a month, he would need no more. With such a force he would levy contributions to make up all deficiencies. France, Venice, and Savoy would assist, if it were merely on account of the interest which they took in the Valtelline, but it was absolutely necessary that a commencement should be made in England.²

James was evidently pleased. The Palatinate, he repeated for the hundredth time, must be recovered, whatever its re-

covery might cost. But he had not abandoned his April 18 usual caution. He entered into an engagement to Engagement with him. furnish Mansfeld with the thirteen thousand men, and the 20,000*l.* a month for which he asked, but he accom-

¹ This must be meant by his offer ‘d’attaquer les pais héréditaires de la Maison d’Autriche.’ Tillières to Ville-aux-Clercs, April ²⁰₃₀, *Harl. MSS. 4523*, fol. 239.

² D. Carleton to Elizabeth, April 24, *S. P. Dom.* clxiii. 48.

panied his engagement with a declaration that his promise would only be valid if the King of France would April 25. entrust the German commander with a similar force. The joint army would then be used 'for the recovery and recuperation of the Palatinate and the Valtelline.'¹

On the 25th Mansfeld left England. The few days which he spent in London had been passed in a whirl of popularity.

^{Mansfeld leaves Eng-} Men pressed forward to have the honour of touching land. the edge of his cloak ; the Archbishop of Canterbury received him as he stepped out of his boat on the Surrey side of the Thames, and the Earl of Carlisle conducted him in state as far as Rochester.²

Mansfeld was able to take with him the news that preparations for war were being carried on in earnest in England.

^{April 15.} On the 15th, the day after his arrival, Commissioners English pre-
parations for war. had been at last appointed to treat with the Dutch about sending troops to their assistance. On the 18th orders had been given to fit out twelve ships of the Royal Navy.³

^{April 18.} On the 21st a Council of War had been appointed, and the names of its members were such as to give every assurance that its deliberations would be conducted with ability. Lord Grandison, who, as Sir

^{April 21.} The Council of War. Oliver St. John, had crowned a long military career by services as Lord Deputy of Ireland ; Lord Carew, the Master of the Ordnance, and former President of Munster ; Lord Brooke, the Fulk Greville of Sydney's days ; Lord Chichester, the soldier and statesman ; Sir Edward Conway, Sir Edward Cecil, Sir Horace Vere, Sir John Ogle, and Sir Thomas Button, formed a group which comprised all the available military knowledge of the time, whilst Sir Robert Mansell held a high place amongst those who were acquainted with maritime affairs.⁴

¹ Mansfeld's engagements, April 18, 24 ; the King's Declaration, April 25, *S. P. Germany*. Rusdorf to Frederick, April, *Mémoires de Rusdorf*, i. 283.

² Rusdorf to Frederick, ^{April 26} *May 6*, *ibid.* i. 289.

³ Commission, April 15, *S. P. Holland*. Warrant, April 18, *S. P. Dom.* clxiii. 4.

⁴ Warrant, April 21, *S. P. Dom.* clxiii. 18.

Against the policy which was indicated by these measures, the Spanish ambassadors struggled with all their might. On

April 20. Message of Lafuente to James. the 20th, Lafuente had another audience at Theobalds, at which neither the Prince nor Buckingham was present. The message which he carried was such as has seldom been presented by the ambassadors of a nominally friendly state. He had to say that the house in which Inojosa and Coloma resided was carefully watched, so that no visitor dared to enter it. It was useless for them to ask for an audience, as they were never allowed to see his Majesty except in the presence of the Duke. James's own subjects regretted to see him thus reduced to a mere shadow, and the most important affairs of state submitted to the judgment of a Parliament of which many members were mere boys, and of those who were of full age many were men of low estate. Constantly James's name was being used in support of designs of which he heartily disapproved, and in opposition to designs of which he heartily approved. Men turned from the King to the Prince, as to the rising sun.

X Then came a graver charge against Buckingham. The Electress Palatine had proposed to him that her eldest son should marry his daughter. In this way, he might hope that, if Charles remained unmarried, his own grandchild would be King of England. With this prospect before him, he intended to frustrate Charles's marriage with a French Princess, as he had already frustrated his marriage with a Spanish Infanta. The declaration which had been made by the Prince at Buckingham's instigation, that he would allow no toleration except to his wife and her household, had already made it impossible for the King of France to consent to give his sister where conditions so debasing were to be enforced.

Lafuente next proceeded to a long impeachment of Buckingham's conduct. He told how he had borne himself in Spain with insolence both to the Prince and to the King ; how he had introduced light women into his apartment in the Palace itself, and close to the rooms occupied by the Prince ; how, after his return, he had revealed to members of Parliament the secret of the treaty for the partition of the Netherlands,

and of the oath taken by the King and Prince to obtain within three years from the Parliament an Act confirming the liberty of conscience promised to the Catholics.

If James wished, continued Lafuente, to discover the truth of these charges, he had better begin by dissolving Parliament. Its members were Puritans, and as such they wished to be without a king, whilst the Catholics were always loyal subjects.

James replied that he was ready to forbid Buckingham to be present when the ambassadors next waited on him. Lafuente was quite right about the Puritans. They loved parity, not purity. He would never take money from the Commons on the condition that he was to persecute the Catholics. He would rather dissolve Parliament and send it to the devil. As for the charges against the Duke, he doubted whether they were really true.¹

Either from the vacillating weakness which had now become part of his nature, or from the natural recoil from the evident over-statement by Lafuente of his case against Buckingham, James acted in a way which must have caused grievous dis-

April 23. appointment to the ambassadors. On the 23rd, in Answer to the recu- answering the Commons' petition against the recu-
sancy pe- sants he expressed himself favourably to the request
tition. laid before him. He considered himself unfortunate. he said, to need a spur to do that which his conscience and duty bound him to do. His heart had bled when he had heard of the increase of Popery. If he had known any way better than another to hinder its growth he would have taken it. Yet he had abstained from persecution, nothing being more likely to increase a religion. He was now ready to banish the priests, and to direct the judges to put the penal laws in execution. His subjects should be forbidden to frequent the houses of foreign ambassadors, or to bring up their children in the Roman Catholic faith. As for the request that no immunity for the English Catholics should be included in any treaty for his son's marriage, he heartily assented to it. "Now," he said, "for the last part of your petition. You have therein given me the best

¹ Lafuente to Philip IV., May $\frac{10}{20}$, *Madrid Palace Library*.

advice in the world ; for it is against the rule of wisdom that a king should suffer any of his subjects to be beholder and depend upon any other prince than himself ; and what hath any king to do with the laws and subjects of another kingdom ? Therefore assure yourselves that, by the grace of God, I will be careful that no such condition be hereafter foisted in upon any other treaty whatsoever ; for it is fit that my subjects should stand or fall to their own lord.”¹

No condition for the Catholics to be in the treaty.

James most likely meant all this at the time. The increase which had lately taken place in the numbers of the Catholics, and which was doubtless in the main to be attributed to the readiness with which timid or half-hearted converts declare themselves as soon as persecution has ceased, was as formidable to him as it was to the House of Commons, and he was especially disinclined to make concessions to France after his past experience of the Spanish treaty. His answer was generally regarded as satisfactory, his adoption of his son’s promise about the French marriage treaty being especially grateful, though most of those who heard him would have been better pleased if he had announced that there would be no French marriage at all. ‘In a wondrous fine speech,’ Eliot proposed that the thanks of Parliament should be given to the King and the Prince ; and, though the motion was not adopted, the House gave a practical form to Eliot’s expression of feeling by pushing on the Subsidy Bill as fast as possible.²

Between his Parliament and his own conscience, James was ill at ease. Scarcely had he thrown himself, as it would seem,

April 22. James wishes to know more of the charges against Buckingham.

entirely into the hands of the Commons, when he sent to the Spanish ambassadors asking them to come to him at Theobalds. At this audience, which took place on the 24th, Inojosa repeated the statements made by Lafuente, and added that Buckingham had conspired with Parliament to dethrone the master to whom he owed everything, in case of his refusal to

¹ *Lords’ Journals*, iii. 317.

² Nethersole to Carleton, April 25, *S. P. Dom.* clxiii. 50.

make war upon Spain.¹ If the King wished to test the truth of the assertion, let Buckingham's friends be asked, upon their oath, whether he had not made the proposal in their hearing.

Words so confidently spoken could not fail to make an impression upon the King. As soon as Inojosa left him he

Buckingham's ill-humour. set out for Windsor, stopping at St. James's on his way, where Charles came out to meet him with

Buckingham at his side. The tears stood in James's eyes as he repeated what the Spaniard had said. The accusation, he added, was so distinct that Buckingham ought to clear himself, if he could. Charles accompanied his father, but Buckingham, though invited, remained behind. He must have justice, he said, against his slanderers. Till his innocence had been acknowledged, Windsor was no place for him. He would rather betake himself to the Tower, and deliver himself up as a prisoner.²

Inojosa next, at James's request, sent him a paper containing the substance of the charges which had been brought by

Further statement by Inojosa. Lafuente. He admitted that they were 'not such as could be made to appear by legal and judicial proofs.'

Men, he said, were too much afraid of Buckingham to tell the truth. Then followed a long tirade against the misdeeds of the favourite, which, even if it contained no exaggeration, was entirely irrelevant to the point at issue.³

¹ Inojosa, in his despatch of May $\frac{5}{15}$, refers to another one of the same date, which I have not seen, as containing a full account of his conversation with the King.

² Inojosa to Philip IV., May $\frac{5}{15}$, *Madrid Palace Library*. Valaresso to the Doge, $\frac{\text{April } 30}{\text{May } 10}$, *Ven. Transcripts*. Conway's note, April 25, *S. P. Dom.* clxiii. 51. Rusdorf to Frederick, $\frac{\text{April } 26}{\text{May } 6}$, May $\frac{2}{12}$, *Mémoires*, i. 289, 294. Tillières to Ville-aux-Clercs, $\frac{\text{April } 26}{\text{May } 6}$, *Harl. MSS.* 4593, fol. 2, 65.

³ Amongst Valaresso's despatches is a copy of this paper in Latin, the language in which, as Lafuente states, in his letter of May $\frac{10}{20}$, it was presented. Copies in different languages are to be found in almost all the archives of Europe. In the *Cabala* there is an English translation (ed. 1691, 252). In 1813, Mr. Lysons printed it again in the *Archæologia*, xviii.

Inojosa had not improved his position. On May 2 the members of the Privy Council were called upon to answer a series of interrogatories which had been prepared in order to sift the matter to the bottom. One by one the councillors swore that they had never heard any traitorous expression proceed from Buckingham's mouth. Inojosa's attempt to conjure with the wand of Gondomar had failed entirely. When he came the next day to present his letters of recall, James refused to accept them. He must see him again, he said, before he left England. Some who were present hinted that there were precedents for calling ambassadors to account before the House of Lords ; but to these rash advisers James turned a deaf ear. Such precedents, he answered, had been found to cut off his mother's head. He would not, however, let the Spaniard go till he had inquired whether his conduct was approved of by his master. Inojosa complained in vain of the treatment to which he was subjected. James told him that he must either prove his case or acknowledge his accusation to be false.¹

Inojosa's information was believed at the time to have been derived from Middlesex, who was supposed to have hazarded

Middlesex supports the Spaniards. this desperate step to save himself from ruin.² Of the five Privy Councillors who in the beginning of the year had taken the most determined stand against a breach with Spain, Lennox was dead ; Williams had made his peace with Buckingham ; Arundel, though doubtless holding the same opinion still, was maintaining a prudent silence ; Calvert was only waiting for a fit opportunity to declare himself a Roman Catholic, and to retire from public life ; whilst

280, fancying that it was probably drawn up by the Earl of Somerset, for the very insufficient reason that he found it amongst other papers connected with Somerset, and there may have been people who have been under the impression that there is, in this way, evidence in existence to show that Somerset was at this time trying to oust Buckingham from the King's favour. The paper was drawn up by Lafuente, and a copy of it in Spanish is in the *Madrid Palace Library*.

¹ Locke to Carleton, May 8 ; D. Carleton to Carleton, May 21, *S. P. Dom.* clxiv. 53, clxv. 12; Salvetti's *News-Letter*, May $\frac{7}{17}, \frac{14}{24}$.

² D. Carleton to Carleton, May 3, *S. P. Dom.* clxiv. 12.

Middlesex stood alone in attempting to stem the torrent. To an economical administrator of the finances Buckingham's lavish expenditure could never be congenial. The Lord Treasurer, whose business it was to think how money could be saved, had often winced under the pressure put upon him by the Lord Admiral, whose pleasure it was to think how money could be spent. Unless men were much mistaken, he had attempted, just as the Prince was starting for Madrid, to supersede Buckingham in the Royal favour with the help of his brother-in-law, Arthur Brett. The young man had been ordered to travel on the Continent, and a seeming reconciliation had been effected. Now Buckingham's enormities had reached their height. Before the eyes of the minister, who had built up a surplus out of a deficit by the unremitting labour of years, a war with Spain opened visions of distress which were not to be counterbalanced by any prospect of national glory. He had no faith in the popular belief that the certain expenditure might easily be recouped by the capture of Spanish treasure-ships. Whilst Buckingham and the Commons were discounting the chances of the future, the old City merchant expressed his doubt of the value of the security offered.

To the Prince, Middlesex had given special offence. When the question of the Spanish marriage was being considered after Charles's return from Spain, all the other councillors who objected to seeing it broken off, qualified their opinions by saying that, if the Prince had taken any dislike to the person of the lady, it would be a sufficient reason for putting an end to the engagement. Middlesex alone expressed himself otherwise. Whether his Highness, he argued, wished to marry the Infanta or not, it was his duty to do so 'for reason of state and the good that would thence redound to all Christendom,' for 'he supposed that the Prince ought to submit his private distaste therein to the general good and honour of the kingdom.' 'Whereupon,' said Williams, who told the story long afterwards, 'the Prince bid him judge of his merchandises, if he would, for he was no arbiter in points of honour.'¹

Middlesex, however, had the King's ear. If James listened to

¹ Dillon's Articles against Williams, 1634 (?), *S. P. Dom.* cclxxx. 77.

Lafuente or to Inojosa, if he sunk back from time to time into his old dislike of war, Buckingham attributed it all to Middlesex. Before the end of March the return of Arthur Brett to England brought matters to a crisis. Buckingham resolved that Middlesex and the King should be separated.

In a moment, charges sprang up against the Lord Treasurer, whose economy had made him many enemies, and who had doubtless committed some faults. He had been harsh and imperious in his bearing, and had neglected on some occasions to observe the due formalities of his office. In taking care of his master's fortunes he had not forgotten to think of his own ; and at a time when the practice of high officials was very loose, he had probably done enough fairly to expose himself to the charge of malversation.

Charges
against
Middlesex.

As it had been with Bacon, so it was now with Middlesex. Many things said against him were exaggerated. Some of his actions might be palliated, as being in accordance with the usual practice. Some things which formed the subject of accusation were even to his praise. But after all allowances have been made, there remains enough to show that he had done things which he ought never to have done.¹

On April 15 the charges against Middlesex were laid before the Peers by Coke and Sandys. In Bacon's case complaints made by individuals had merely been sent up for investigation. This time the Commons took a higher tone. Reviving in all its fulness the old practice of impeachment, they asked for justice as the grand jury of the

¹ Part of a letter, in the possession of Lord Buckhurst, which is thus abstracted in the fourth report of the Historical MSS. Commission, shows that there was afterwards a revulsion of feeling in his favour, grounded on the recollection of his services :—“ Two days since, the Committee of Twelve being in examination what the Duke hath gotten out of the King's revenue, Sir Robert Pye took occasion to inform them that Middlesex had gotten from the King in a short time 120,000*l.*, and therefore moved that he might be likewise examined ; to which Sir J. Eliot, being in the chair, answcred that it might be true for aught he knew to the contrary ; but that it was true that Middlesex had merited well of the King, and had done him that service that few had ever done, but they could find no such matter in the Duke.” Harman to Middlesex, May 3, 1626.

nation, 'the inquisitors-general of the grievances of the kingdom.'

Although the Treasurer showed no lack of courage during the long inquiry, it was in vain that he fought his accusérs point by point. On May 13 sentence was delivered against him. He was to lose all his offices, to be incapable for the future of holding any office in the State, to be imprisoned in the Tower during the King's pleasure, to pay a fine of 50,000*l.*, to be prohibited from taking his seat in Parliament again, or from coming within the verge of the Court.¹

Whatever may be thought of the special faults of Middlesex, the practice of bringing criminal charges against men whose chief offence lay in their political convictions might easily lead to the grossest abuses, and could scarcely fail to turn to the damage of the heedless young men who had been the main instigators of the proceedings. To the old King their conduct appeared as foolish as it was unintelligible. "You are a fool," he said bluntly to Buckingham; "you are making a rod with which you will be scourged yourself." Turning to his son, he added a special word of warning. "You will live," he said, with prophetic sagacity, "to have your bellyful of impeachments."² Before the trial was at an end Buckingham was prostrated by a severe illness, but Charles took up the cause with characteristic impetuosity. Again and again he thrust himself forward in the debate, ever painting the character of the friend of Spain in the blackest colours.³

Middlesex had been thus removed from the King's side, but a greater, more persuasive counsellor than Middlesex was at hand. When Bristol was recalled from Spain, it was only by pawning his plate that he was able to obtain the means needed for his journey. He was coming in the most dangerous of all tempers for Buckingham; full of the conviction that he had been hardly dealt with, and yet with all his irritation mastered by the most complete self-

¹ *Lords' Journals*, iii. 383. Valaresso to the Doge, April ¹⁰/₂₀, *Ven. Transcripts.*

² *Clarendon*, i. 44.

³ *Elsing's Notes*, 1624-1626, 75-77, 86, 88.

control. All he asked was the fulfilment of a promise which James had given him never to condemn him without first hearing what he had to say. He had no intention of throwing himself into opposition, open or secret. Like Bacon he held that the King's resolution, whatever it might be, was to be accepted as final.

That James should grant a hearing to Bristol was the last thing of which Buckingham would approve. If once the two Bucking- men were brought together, there would probably be ham's de- an end of the King's new anti-Spanish policy, and signs against him. Buckingham's own insolence and folly at Madrid would be revealed on more credible evidence than that of the Spanish ambassador. Buckingham's first thought, therefore, was to send Bristol to the Tower. He talked over the plan

April. with Pembroke and Hamilton, but neither Pembroke nor Hamilton, opposed as they were to Spain, would hear of so ill-advised a measure. Buckingham accordingly persuaded James to issue an order to Bristol to place himself in confinement in his own house. Yet, though James suffered himself to be persuaded to exclude Bristol from his presence,

May. he had no intention of placing his faithful servant under permanent restraint. Some little inquiry there He is con- must be, for form's sake, and then he should be taken fined to his house. into favour. Meanwhile James hopefully busied himself in bringing Buckingham to lay aside his rancour.

Bristol was a difficult man to deal with in this manner. It at any time he had chosen to acknowledge that everything done by himself had been wrong, and that everything done by Buckingham had been right, he would probably have been welcomed, like Weston and Williams, amongst the Duke's train of penitents. But to this he refused to stoop. He would hold his tongue if the King pleased, but unless he were convinced, he would never admit himself to have been in the wrong. Loyalty to his sovereign ceased to bind him when he was required to prove it by declaring that to be true which he believed to be untrue.

Bristol accordingly asked for a trial in Parliament, such as that which had been fatal to Middlesex. The session, however,

was nearly at an end, and James, who shrank from exposing him to his political opponents, resolved to refuse his request, and for a little time longer to leave him under restraint.¹

That the session must end before the great business of the day, the French negotiations, could be seriously entered upon, was tacitly admitted at Court. One result of The Mo-
nopoly Act. the alliance between Buckingham and the Commons had been the production of a large amount of legislation on matters of everyday importance. No statute had come into existence for fourteen years, and it was understood that James was willing to give his assent to the passing of many Bills which had been prepared, in 1610 and 1614, with the object of limiting the prerogative of the Crown in pecuniary matters. Above all, the question of the monopolies was by this time ripe for legislation. The Lords were ready to withdraw their objection against tying the King's hands for the future, upon which the Monopoly Bill of the last session had been wrecked, and the Commons, on the other hand, agreed to except from the operation of the Bill some of the principal monopolies already in existence.

Great as the importance of this Act has been, it cannot be said to have been founded on any principle not recognised Changes ef- before. That a monopoly for a limited time should fected by it. be granted to those by whom new processes of manufacture were introduced had long been accepted as the general rule. The great change effected was the rendering the rule more definite, and the entrusting its application to the Common Law Judges, who would be far more likely than Privy Councillors or Commissioners to apply a strictly judicial solution to any question which might arise, without being drawn aside by political or economical considerations.

On the question of impositions the Commons had maintained a discreet silence, although there had been debates on commercial matters which might fairly have suggested it to them.² Under these circumstances it might have been ex-

¹ Preface to the Earl of Bristol's defence in the *Camden Miscellany*, vi. pp. i-vii.

² Mr. Forster (*Sir J. Eliot*, 2nd edit. i. 89) has printed extracts from

pected that the King and the Lower House would have parted in kindness. But James was no longer in a kindly mood. He had parted with some of his prerogatives, and he knew that he had been little better than a cypher in the resolutions which had been taken. On May 28,

May 28.
The griev-
ances. after listening with composure to the grievances presented to him, he answered that his lawyers must consider them before he could give a reply. Then he began to scold the House for the Bills which they had laid before him, in so exasperating a tone that the Commons refused to enter the Royal Speech on their journals.

The next day Parliament was prorogued to November 2. James had fresh criticism for the Bills presented for his consent.

May 29.
Prorogation
of Parlia-
ment. He made merry over one, for ‘the better observance of the Sabbath,’ as allowing ‘no recreation to the poor men that labour hard all the week long, to ease themselves on the Sunday,’ and he entirely refused to pass the Bill for enforcing more strictly the penalties on recusancy. He then proceeded to express his annoyance at the impeachment of Middlesex, which he had not been bold enough to prevent. It was for him, he said, to re-examine the evidence, and to remit the penalties if he saw fit. No one in future was to complain in Parliament of any of his servants, without first asking his leave. He was master in his own household, and was well able to redress any grievance arising from the conduct of his Ministers.

It was not by words unaccompanied by deeds that the rising power of Parliament was to be beaten back. For the present, however, all questions about the extent of the prerogative were subordinate to the great question about the management of the war. At the

James
threatens to
amend the
Subsidy Bill. a speech of Eliot's on this subject, alleged to have been delivered in this session. From inquiries which he has kindly made for me at Port Eliot, it appears that the speech is not to be found in this place, and therefore, if spoken at all, it must have been spoken at some other time. There is no trace of it in any reports that I have seen of any of the four Parliaments with which this work is concerned. On May 20, Conway (*S. P. Dom.* clxv. 4) writes to Calvert that the House might probably fall upon ‘questions concerning impositions,’ and Calvert replies (*ibid.* 11) that all had gone well.

beginning of his speech James had protested that he had never ceased to care for the Palatinate, and had assured the Houses that if they met again with the same resolution as they had cherished in the past session, it would be the happiest Parliament known in history. Before he ended he remembered that he had attempted in vain to induce the Commons to insert into the Subsidy Bill a clause naming the recovery of the Palatinate as one of the objects of the grant.¹ Whereas, he said, they 'had made the preamble without his advice, and so as it might be prejudicial to him for some reasons of state, he must be forced to alter it, and set his marginal note upon it.'

Dissatisfaction of the Commons. At this extraordinary and unexpected declaration the usual respect for the Royal person was for an instant forgotten, and those who were present gave vent to their dissatisfaction in murmurs and gesticulations. "Thus," wrote an eye-witness of the scene, "parted we from his Majesty, with much more discontent and fear of the success of this Parliament than when we came together at the beginning with hope of a good and happy prosecution."²

The session which thus came to an end was one of no slight importance in the development of our Parliamentary constitution. Headed by the Prince of Wales, the House of Commons appeared suddenly to have become the first power in the State. What was wanting to it was the virtue of self-restraint which springs from experience, and that knowledge of the limitations of power which is seldom acquired except by those who have a practical acquaintance with the handling of affairs. Leaders who could teach them how to walk warily amongst the pitfalls around them these men had none, and it was only too probable that before long they would visit with a just retribution those who had flattered their weaknesses and abused their confidence.

Proceedings against Bristol. The dissatisfaction of the House with James's last speech was not entirely justified by his subsequent acts. His intemperance was always greater in word than in action. The Subsidy Act was left untouched ; and Middlesex, though his fine was subsequently reduced to

¹ Locke to Carleton, May 17, *S. P. Dom.* clxiv. 92.

² Report by E. Nicholas, *ibid.* cixv. 61.

20,000*l.*, never saw the King's face again. Nor did James, in presence of the opposition of his favourite and his son, venture to admit Bristol to his presence. Both Buckingham and Charles, indeed, were preparing future difficulties for themselves by their conduct towards the man whose influence with the King

July 10. Questions put to him. they most dreaded. A long series of interrogatories was sent to Bristol, bearing on the whole of his past diplomacy. Bristol answered them all with care. He was able to show that on all doubtful points he had acted by his master's orders, and that he had given such advice as he believed at the time to be the best for the King's service. Many of the Commissioners appointed to conduct the investigation expressed themselves fully satisfied, and James at last sent word to Bristol that he was now ready to see him.

An interview between Bristol and the King was the very thing to which Buckingham most strongly objected. Hinting

Buckingham suggests a compromise. that there were further questions still to be put, he made use of the delay thus obtained to convey a suggestion to Bristol that he should surrender his Vice-Chamberlainship, and retire to his country-house at Sherborne, on the condition that all further proceedings against him should be dropped. Buckingham little knew the character of the man with whom he was dealing. Bristol's reply was that,

July 24. *Bristol refuses it.* if his honesty and fidelity were declared to be unquestioned, he was quite ready to acknowledge that he might have erred from weakness or want of ability.

If not, he was ready to answer any further questions that might be sent to him. "For," he wrote, "in matter of my fidelity and loyalty towards his Majesty, the Prince, and my country, I hope I shall never see that come into compromise, but shall rather lose my life and fortunes than admit the least stain to remain upon me or mine in that kind."

Bristol's position was logically unassailable. If he was supposed to have done anything worthy of punishment, let his case be investigated. If not, why was he under restraint? *Bristol at Sherborne.* Though Buckingham could not answer an argument like this, he could continue to act in defiance of it. Bristol was left at Sherborne untried and uncondemned. If he came into

the King's presence he might say things about the Prince's visit to Madrid which would not conduce to raise Buckingham in his master's opinion. But, to do Buckingham justice, it was not mere personal enmity by which he was actuated. If Bristol was to be kept at a distance, it was that James, and England through James, might be kept from falling back into the evil Spanish alliance. Even when Buckingham was engaged in an apparently personal quarrel, he had often great public ends in view. The interests of his country were so completely bound up in his mind with his own preferences and jealousies, that he came to think of himself and England as inextricably combined.

The disregard, not only of legal forms but of common justice, which had been shown in Buckingham's treatment of

^{1620.} Bristol, marked another proceeding in which the

^{1620.} The English King had to take a far more active part, and for
and the Por- which no pretext of public good could be alleged.
tuguese in the East.

In the far East as in the far West, it was almost, if not quite, impossible to bring the relations between European merchants under the laws which regulated commerce in the settled societies of Europe. In pursuit of the dazzling prize the subjects of each nation struggled and fought with their rivals, careless of treaties made at home. An attempt made by the English East India Company in 1620 to open a trade with Persia had been met with fierce opposition from the Portuguese subjects of Spain established at Ormuz, who regarded the whole

^{1621.} commerce of that part of the world as their own. The English, beaten at first, had returned with superior forces, and had established a station at Jask. The report of the prowess of the new-comers was not thrown away upon the Shah, who had a quarrel with the Portuguese. He assured the English merchants that he would not allow them to place a

^{1622.} bale of goods on board their ships unless they would
Capture of join him in an attack upon Ormuz. With real or
Ormuz. affected reluctance, they consented, and Ormuz was soon reduced to capitulate.¹

¹ Bruce, *Annals of the East India Company*, i. 229; Purchas, ii. 1785.

To the complaints of the Spaniards, preferred whilst the Prince was still at Madrid,¹ James does not seem to have paid

1623.
April.
Spanish
complaints.

much attention : but there was another side of the question to which he was more alive. Sending for the governor of the East India Company, he told him that it would be a graceful act to make a present to Buckingham in his absence for his services in the negotiation with the Dutch of the year before. The Company, thus urged, and considering that 'this business of Ormuz may find a strong opposition,' voted 2,000*l.* for the purpose.²

When Buckingham returned, with his heart full of ill-will towards all Spanish subjects, there was of course no thought of

July.
The East
India Com-
pany's pre-
sent to Buck-
ingham.

satisfying the Portuguese ; but, much to the surprise of the Company, the Duke began to make claims upon them on his own account. The machinery of

the Court of Admiralty was put in motion to collect evidence that by the capture of Ormuz and by the seizure of Portuguese vessels in the East, they had realised, or ought to have realised, 100,000*l.*—a calculation which, as far as can be at present ascertained, appears to have been grossly exaggerated.³ As soon, however, as the preliminary inquiry was complete, Buckingham claimed 10,000*l.*, a tenth of the sum named, as due to him as Lord High Admiral, as though the captures had been made by privateers sailing under ordinary letters of marque in European waters.

The Company was at first disposed to resist the Duke's claim. They obtained a legal opinion to the effect

1624.
Feb. 28.
The Com-
pany remon-
strates.

that, as no letters of marque had been granted, no tenths were due ; but they were 'not willing to contend with my Lord.' What to do they hardly knew. A petition was drawn up, and then abandoned as likely

¹ Consultas of the Councils of Portugal and of State, April 1623, *Egerton MSS.* 1131, fol. 169. <sup>16, 17,
26, 27,</sup>

² *East India Company's Court Minutes*, July 23, 1623, vi. 24.

³ Bruce, *Annals of the East India Company*, i. 242 ; Examinations, S. P. *East Indies*.

to give offence. At last a committee was appointed to remonstrate as cautiously as possible.¹

It was dangerous to remonstrate, however cautiously, with Buckingham. The day after his interview with the committee

March 1.
Stay of the
East India
fleet.

he drew the attention of the House of Lords, on behalf of a committee of which he was the reporter, to the fact that the Company's fleet was about to sail

to the East Indies, and proposed that it should be detained for service against Spain. On the same day a similar motion was made in the Commons by Sir Edward Seymour, a member who was supposed to possess the confidence of Buckingham.

A deputation from the Company at once waited on the Duke. He received them graciously, and assured them that the stay of the ships had not originated with him. 'Having heard,' he said, 'the motion with much earnestness in the Upper House of Parliament, he could do no less than give the order.' He would only be too happy to advocate their cause with the Lords, and would, upon his own responsibility, allow the ships to drop as far as Tilbury.²

It is possible that the first suggestion that the fleet should be arrested had proceeded from some independent member of the

March 10.
The
Company
charged with
piracy.

Lords' Committee ; but the coincidence of the motions in the two Houses made it hard to persuade the Company that this was the case. A few days later

Buckingham struck another blow in the quarrel. To the argument that no tenths were due because there had been no letters of marque, the rejoinder was easy, that if there had been no letters of marque there had been an act of piracy. A suit was accordingly commenced against the Company in the joint names of Buckingham and the King. The damages were

¹ *East India Company's Court Minutes*, Feb. 18, 23, 27, 28, vi. 412, 425, 430, 435.

² *Elsing's Notes*, 1624-26, 14; *Commons' Journals*, i. 676; *East India Company's Court Minutes*, March 5, vi. 439. The motion made by Buckingham is given by Elsing as part of a report from a committee. The notice of the fleet may therefore have been taken in the committee by some other person.

laid at 15,000*l.*, and that too without prejudice to further claims.¹

In vain the Company begged for mercy. "Did I deliver you," said James, "from the complaint of the Spaniards, and do you return me nothing?" He was no tyrant, and they might have the benefit of the law if they pleased.

March 22.
He demands
20,000*l.*

But if they did not wish to try their case against him, he must have 10,000*l.* for himself, as well as 10,000*l.* for Buckingham. To justify his demand he proceeded to propound a dilemma. The goods, he said, were taken either justly or unjustly. If unjustly, the whole was forfeited. If justly, the Lord Admiral's tenth must be paid. Apparently the inference was that the Company was to pay the King on the ground that the goods had been taken unjustly, and Buckingham on the ground that they had been taken justly.

The Company was in great straits. Their ships were still under embargo in the Thames. A few more days' delay would lose them the monsoon, and ruin their prospects for a year. Necessity had no law, and 10,000*l.* was offered to the King 'to shut up all businesses.'

With this offer James was not satisfied. He said that he must have as much for Buckingham. There was nothing for it but to submit. The whole 20,000*l.* was paid, and paid. The fleet was allowed to sail. It seemed, as some one observed at the Company's meeting, as if 'ships stayed upon pretence of state might be released for money.'²

¹ *Admiralty Court Records*, No. 158; *Book of Acts*, fol. 204.

² *East India Company's Court Minutes*, vi. 466-555. The receipt drawn up for Buckingham's signature was 'for 10,000*l.* to the Lord Admiral, in full satisfaction for all pretences of right as Lord Admiral, for all actions past in the Indies, by sea or land, to the 30th of April last.' The King's receipt was—'for 10,000*l.* now to be paid to the King, much challenged by his Majesty for freeing the Company's servants out of prison, and the Company from the complaint of the Spanish ambassador, and the Company's ships outward bound released, which were secured by order of Parliament, until upon promise thereof they were afterwards released.' Buckingham afterwards stated that he had lent 9,800*l.* of the money for the equipment of the King's fleet, and this is corroborated by a letter written by him to Conway on June 14, in which he says, "I hope this morn-

Such was the mode in which Buckingham, this time with the full co-operation of the King, exercised the duties of his office. Something, no doubt, was to be said against the Company on every count. The siege of Ormuz and the capture of the goods was an act of violence. The ships sailing to the East Indies might doubtless be called upon before they went to contribute their fair proportion to the defence of the realm. That which admits of no justification is the way in which every argument was pushed just so far as suited the immediate purposes of the men in power and no farther. There was enough legality about the capture to extort one sum of money ; enough illegality to extort another. The Portuguese, who were the main sufferers, were never thought of, save that the English ambassador was directed to inform the Government at Madrid that the assailants at Ormuz had acted under compulsion from the Shah.¹

It was only by coming to some understanding with the other European powers for a territorial limitation between the trading grounds of the various nations, that such collisions as that which had taken place at Ormuz could be avoided for the future. Further to the east the experiment of a close combination with the Dutch, which had been tried under the treaty of 1619,² was already breaking down. Never had the feeling between the merchants of the two nations been more embittered than it was when they were bound to live at the same ports, and to share between them the same commerce in certain fixed proportions. As the most numerous and powerful body, the Dutch treated the English with studied unfairness, and the English gave vent to their feelings in such language as men are wont to use when they discover that they are being cheated.

Early in 1623 the slumbering hatred burst into a flame. ing will put an end to the business of the East India merchants for the moneys to be disposed to Mr. Oliver for the Navy.” *Tanner MSS.* lxxiii. 447. Besides, the exact sum appears on a warrant from the Council of War, dated July 31, and was then probably repaid to Buckingham.

¹ Conway to Aston, June 27, *S. P. Spain.*

² See Vol. III. p. 179, and Vol. IV. p. 407.

The castle of Amboyna, the main seat of the clove trade, was guarded by the Dutch with peculiar jealousy. The English factory was only permitted to establish itself outside the fortifications ; and a body of Japanese soldiers in the Dutch service

Feb. 11. The massacre of Amboyna. was equally excluded. On the night of February 11, however, one of the Japanese approached the Dutch sentinel, and asked some questions about the state of the defences. He was at once seized and put to the torture. In his agony he confessed that his countrymen designed to surprise the castle. They, too, were tortured, and declared, or were made to declare, that the English were privy to the conspiracy. A drunken English surgeon, also under torture, acknowledged the truth of the charge. Nine other Englishmen, almost the whole of the English population of the town, were next subjected to the most horrible torments, and six others, residing at more distant stations, were subsequently dealt with in the same barbarous manner. As might have been expected, some of them gave way before their tortures, and confessed anything that was required of them. In the end ten of the sufferers were set aside for execution, and were beheaded without further evidence.¹

News in those days was long in reaching England from the East. The massacre of Amboyna remained unknown till May

The news received in England. 1624. At the meetings of the East India Company the tale gave rise to the greatest indignation. The story, as it was received from the Dutch, was in the highest degree incredible. The whole English population inculpated amounted to no more than twenty men, who were hardly likely, in the face of past experience, to attempt to right themselves against the overwhelming forces of their opponents. But the case of the Company against its Dutch rival did not end here. Even if the unfortunate men had been guilty of all that they had admitted under torture, the governor of Amboyna would not have been justified in touching a hair of their heads. By the treaty of 1619, all disputes between the nations were to be referred to the mixed Council of Defence ; and, if they could not be settled in this way, were to be referred home for negotiation

¹ Brockedon and others to the Company ; *E. I. C. Orig. Corr.* 10, 11, 30 ; *Purchas*, ii. 1853.

between the two Companies, or, in the last resort, for negotiation between the two Governments.¹

There has seldom been a moment in our history when such an outrage would not have roused England from one end to the other. When, however, the news arrived, the nation was in no mood to listen to charges against the enemies of Spain. At first, indeed, there seems to have been some little excitement, but it quickly died away.² The time had not yet come when the commercial differences with the Netherlands would seem greater than the religious differences with Spain ; and by the middle of July revenge for the massacre of Amboyna appears to have been no longer thought of by the mass of men.

The King was more deeply affected by the sad story than anyone else. He was the author of the treaty which, by bringing his subjects into such close neighbourhood with the Dutch, had made the massacre possible. He now told Caron, the Dutch ambassador, that, if justice were not done by August 12, he would take his own measures to enforce it.³

Yet how was England, at such a moment, to quarrel with her neighbours in Holland ? The alliance with the Dutch had been the corner-stone of the policy of the House of Commons, and, though James was unwilling to limit the war within the narrow bounds which seemed sufficient to the Lower House, he had fully accepted its designs, so far as they went. On May 19 an order had been given to equip thirty merchant vessels in addition to the twelve ships of the Royal Navy which

¹ The treaty must be interpreted by the agreement between the Companies appended to it.

² Chamberlain to Carleton, June 5, June 19 ; D. Carleton to Carleton, June 26, *S. P. Dom.* clxvii. 16, clxviii. 8, 48 ; Dutch Commissioners to the States-General, June $\frac{6}{16}$, *Add. MSS.* 17,677 k, fol. 369. As early as the 31st of May, we have a statement that ‘it is said that the Company is much blamed by some, for that now, in a time when his Majesty had resolved to aid the Dutch, the Company had published the putting of ten Englishmen to death.’ *E. I. C. Court Minutes*, x. 541.

³ Caron to the States-General, July 16, *Add. MSS.* 17,677 k, fol. 576.

were already in an advanced stage of preparation.¹ As soon as Parliament was prorogued, the negotiation with the Dutch

^{June 5.} _{Treaty with the Dutch.} Commissioners was taken up warmly, and on June 5 a treaty was signed by which England agreed to pay, for two years, a body of six thousand volunteers to be sent over to aid the States-General in defending their independence.²

James seemed to be going on fairly in the way in which Buckingham would lead him, and there is no reason to suppose that he was in any way half-hearted in what he was doing. Yet he was less able than ever to perceive the necessary consequences of his actions; and he thought that he could send troops to the aid of the Dutch, and fit out his navy, without breaking absolutely with Spain.

The Spanish ambassadors could not see things in this light. Coloma protested warmly against the levies, as an _{Coloma's protests.} infraction of existing treaties. On the other hand Inojosa intimated that he had fresh proposals to make about the restitution of the Palatinate. He was told that James would not see him, but that he might tell his secret to any Privy Councillor he chose. Inojosa refused to address himself to anyone but the King; upon which he was informed that the sooner he and Coloma left England the better it would be. Coloma replied that he was under orders to remain till his successor arrived. Inojosa was only too glad to escape. There were fresh insults in store for him. No carriages were provided

^{June 26.} _{Inojosa leaves Eng- land.} to take him to Dover. Even his request for the protection of a Royal ship against the Dutch cruisers was refused, and it was only after a delay of some days that he was allowed to take his passage in one of the merchant vessels which had been recently taken into the King's service, and which was consequently entitled to carry the Royal colours. On the day of his departure James wrote to complain to Philip of the conduct of his ambassadors, requesting that they might be punished for their misdemeanours.³

¹ *Signet Office Docquets*, May 19.

² *Treaty*, June 5, *S. P. Holland*.

³ Coloma to the King, ^{May 23.} _{June 2.} The King to Aston, June 26, *S. P.*

Coloma had indeed a thankless task in remaining in England. Every day some new cause of offence was brought before his notice. At sea, so at least it was believed in England, Spaniards were already engaged in plundering English vessels. In Spain an embargo had been laid upon the goods of English merchants, and their ships were being confiscated, on the charge of having Dutch goods on board. Nearer home the Dunkirk privateers were making prize of English vessels engaged in trade with Holland ; and, pushing up towards the mouth of the Thames in search of their enemies, had committed hostilities as high as Queenborough. Nor was it only from private and unauthorised attacks that danger was apprehended. A large fleet was fitting out in Spain, the destination of which was carefully concealed.¹

Part of this fleet, however, was placed by accident in the hands of the English Government. A squadron setting out from Dunkirk, to join the rendezvous in Spain, was chased by the Dutch, and four of its galleons took refuge in the Downs. Although James refused to treat them as enemies, he refused to accede to Coloma's request that he would grant them the usual privileges of neutrality, and allow

them to sail with the advantage of two tides.² For three months the weary crews waited for deliverance till the equinoctial gales at last set them free. Putting to sea in the height of the tempest, three of the ships succeeded in regaining Dunkirk. The fourth was attacked by a Dutch vessel, and blew up, together with its assailant.³

Short, therefore, of an actual declaration of war with Spain, Buckingham had succeeded in carrying James with him in the fulfilment of the programme laid down in the Subsidy Act. The

Spain. Conway to Carleton, June 12, *S. P. Holland.* Salvetti's *News-Letters*, June $\frac{11}{21}, \frac{18}{28}$.

¹ Conway to Aston, June 27 ; Aston to Conway, July 1, *S. P. Spain.*

² Many of Coloma's letters on the subject are in the State Papers (*Spain*), and there are frequent notices of it in the Domestic series, and amongst Salvetti's *News-Letters*.

³ Salvetti's *News-Letters*, Oct. $\frac{8, 15}{18, 25}$.

levy of troops for to the Dutch and the equipment of the fleet had received prompt attention. The repair of the forts and

June.
The pro-
gramme of
the House
of Commons
carried out.

the sending of reinforcements to Ireland waited only till money came in. Even the King's hesitation to declare war against Spain was at this time ascribed by one who had good opportunities of knowing the truth, not so much to any hankering after his old alliance with Philip, as to his high estimate of the risks of such a war if it were entered upon without allies. "The King," wrote Nethersole a fortnight after the prorogation, "is resolved not to break with Spain, nor to give them any occasion to break with him, until he be secure that France will join very close with him, and other Catholic Princes and States which have the same interest against the greatness of Spain ; as being of opinion that all the Protestants in Europe would be too weak a party to oppose it, and that if they should join against Spain without the drawing of other Catholic princes into the action, it would be understood to be a war of religion, which would leave no Catholic prince neuter, but cause them all to join with Spain."¹

No one who has seriously studied the course which history took during the next quarter of a century will be inclined to doubt the wisdom of James's hesitation. The power to which he was opposed was too firmly rooted in the ideas of men to be overthrown by such means as seemed sufficient to the House of Commons. Protestantism could only defend itself by ceasing to be aggressive, and by appealing to the political sympathies of Catholic States. The policy of James was in the main the policy which, in after years, crowned Richelieu with glory. Yet to the one man it brought nothing but defeat and shame, to the other it was to bring success and honour. Where James knew but how to dream, Richelieu knew how to act.

Of the various parts of the enterprise upon which James had embarked, the negotiation with the Protestant powers presented the least inherent difficulty. In the beginning of June, Sir

¹ Nethersole to Carleton, *S. P. Dom.* clxvii. 28.

James Spens was despatched to the King of Sweden, and Sir Robert Anstruther to the King of Denmark and the North German Princes.¹ If, when Parliament met in the winter, assurances could be given that a strong Protestant force was ready to take the field, the House of Commons might perhaps be induced to reconsider its determination against sharing in the German war ; and, should this prove not to be the case, James would be clearly absolved from any engagement to carry on further a war which, with insufficient means, could end in nothing but disaster.

Far more difficult was the task of treating with the Catholic opponents of Spain. In nothing is diplomatic skill so necessary as in a negotiation between Governments whose general interests coincide, whilst each has particular objects in view. James was anxious to recover the Palatinate. France was anxious to recover the Valtelline. The danger was great lest the French Government should use England for its purposes, and then kick away the ladder by which it had risen. Yet the offer of French aid was too tempting to be rejected. The wisest policy was doubtless that which was laid down not many months afterwards by Gustavus Adolphus. The great Swedish King held that the attack upon the House of Austria should be made by a Protestant alliance. Those who had a common cause would be able without difficulty to stand shoulder to shoulder in the fight. There was no reason, however, that advantage should not be taken of the divisions amongst the Catholic States. Let France, Venice, and Savoy be invited to join, if they would, against Spain and the Emperor. But let not the union be too close. Rather let France and her Catholic allies be invited to fight in Italy or the south of Germany, whilst England and her Protestant allies were fighting in the north of Germany.²

If such a plan as this had been adopted, it is possible that the French alliance might have ended less disastrously than it

¹ Instructions to Spens, June 6, *S. P. Sweden*. Instructions to Anstruther, undated, *S. P. Denmark*.

² Oxenstjerna to Camerarius, Aug. 24, Moser, *Patriotisches Archiv*, v. 42.

did. The military situation would have corresponded with the political situation. Account would have been taken of the prominent fact that the King of France and the Protestant sovereigns were only half agreed. The friction certain to ensue upon such co operation would have been diminished to a minimum. Unhappily the three men who directed the course of affairs in England were notoriously inclined to close their eyes to unpleasant facts. Already Mansfeld had been despatched to France with proposals for a joint military undertaking. Then followed Sir Isaac Wake, on his

May 17.
Carlisle sent
to France.

way to Italy to stir up Venice and Savoy. On May 17 Carlisle set out for Paris to tie the knot between the two kingdoms by the flowery bonds of a matrimonial alliance. James, Charles, and Buckingham agreed in looking for the closest possible unity of action between France and England.

CHAPTER XLIX.

THE FRENCH MARRIAGE TREATY.

JAMES HAY, Earl of Carlisle, has been chiefly known in modern times as a spendthrift and a lover of the pleasures of the table;

^{May.} yet he was in many respects well qualified to conduct
Carlisle as a negotiator. the delicate negotiation with which he was entrusted.

Compared with the courtly and volatile Kensington, with whom he was ordered to act, he may well rank as a statesman. His tried courtesy, and his special friendliness towards France, made him an acceptable person in the Court to which he was accredited, whilst he had a strong regard for his master's dignity, and a sympathy for the Protestant feeling in England, which would prevent him from becoming, as his colleague had become, a mere echo of the sentiments to which it might please the Queen Mother and her ladies to give utterance. When he arrived he was received with open demonstrations of satisfaction from all, with happy glances from the bright eyes of the Princess, and with friendly words from the King.¹

Herbert, however, who was still in Paris, doubted whether all this meant much. "They do not spare," he wrote to James,

^{June.} ^{Herbert's doubts.} "to profess openly that they have no disposition to come to a manifest rupture with Spain. Notwithstanding which, they have promised thus much already, that, in all that can be done by other means than coming to an entire breach they will not fail to give your Sacred Majesty contentment."²

¹ Carlisle and Kensington to Conway, May 27, *S. P. France*.

² Herbert to the King, June 2, *S. P. France*.

The first difficulty of the negotiation, however, turned upon the marriage treaty. Both James and Charles had assured

The marriage treaty and the English Catholics. Parliament that there would be no article in favour of the English Catholics, and for the present they both intended to keep the promise which they had given.

"The constitution of our estate," wrote James in the instructions which he gave to Carlisle, "cannot bear any general change or alteration in our ecclesiastical or temporal laws touching religion for so much as concerns our own subjects." Even for the Catholics themselves it would be better that they should rely on his own clemency than on a treaty with any foreign power. "For when," he added, "they shall have the reins loosed to them, they may, by abuse of favour and liberty, constrain us, contrary to our natural affections, to deal with them with more rigour than we are inclined to; so as we may not article for dispensation and liberty to our Roman Catholic subjects, but hold the reins of those laws in our own gracious hands. And you may assure that King and his ministers that, in contemplation of that marriage, we shall be the rather inclined to use our subjects Roman Catholics with all favour, so long as they shall behave themselves moderately; and, keeping their consciences to themselves, shall use their conversation without scandal."¹

May 31.
Refusal of
the French
to treat with-
out men-
tioning the
English
Catholics. The first meeting between the ambassadors and the commissioners named by Louis took place on May 31. As was often the case in those days the progress of business was stopped by a question of precedence. Richelieu was one of the commissioners, and claimed honours as a cardinal, which the representatives of Protestant England were unwilling to concede. At last the difficulty was got rid of by Richelieu's taking to his bed under pretence of illness. He would thus cease to enter into competition with those who were seated in a sick man's chamber.

The next dispute was more serious. The English ambassadors offered to take up the treaty which had been sketched

¹ Instructions to Carlisle and Kensington, *Harl. MSS.* 1584, fol. 10.

out in 1613, when a marriage had been contemplated between Charles and the Princess's elder sister Christina, and in which there was no mention of toleration except for the bride and her household. The French commissioners at once refused to accept this proposal as sufficient. On their side they had drawn up articles framed upon the model of the Spanish treaty, one of which contained an express engagement on the part of the King of England that no Catholic in his dominions should be molested on account of his religion.

Further discussion did not tend to remove the difficulty. "No man," said the ambassadors, "shall be persecuted for being a Catholic. But if he goes to mass he will be punished for disobeying the law." After this it is not strange that an assurance that James would give a verbal promise of his intention to show favour to the Catholics made but little impression on Louis. Nothing less than a written engagement, he informed Carlisle, would be satisfactory. James might keep this engagement secret if he pleased ; but it was indispensable that it should be in writing.¹

//Whatever might be the value of the French alliance, it ought to have been evident that it was not worth purchasing

June.
Charles
draws back.

on these terms. It was better to go to war without the help of France than to go to war without the help of the English Parliament.//There could be no doubt that if the promises solemnly given by King and Prince were heedlessly flung aside, it would be hopeless to expect the support of the House of Commons. Not indeed, that, at first, it seemed likely that these promises would be broken. Tillières, as soon as he was apprised of the difficulties raised in Paris, reported that, though James's scruples might perhaps be overcome, nothing was to be expected from Charles. The Prince was 'very hard,' having 'little inclination to satisfy France in these essential points.' He was surrounded by Puritans, and would soon be a Puritan himself.²

¹ Ville-aux-Clercs to Tillières, June $\frac{1}{11}$. Louis XIII. to Tillières, June $\frac{9}{19}$, *Harl. MSS. 4594*, fol. 41, 64 b.

² Tillières to Ville-aux-Clercs, June $\frac{5}{16}$, *ibid. fol. 59.*

If Louis's demand had been pressed in the harsh terms in which it was originally couched, the negotiation would probably have been strangled at its commencement. La Vieuville, however, with wisdom beyond that of his master, was little solicitous for an engagement which it was as impolitic for Louis to exact as it would be for James to give, and he was very anxious to secure the practical co-operation of England in his resistance to Spain. La Vieuville's wisdom unfortunately was for others rather than for himself, and in pursuance of his own objects he allowed himself to use words which Louis was certain to disavow as soon as they came to his ears. "Give us," he said to the English ambassador, "some stuff with which we may satisfy the Pope, and we will throw ourselves heart and soul into your interests." "They do here," wrote Carlisle, "let fall unto us

that though they are bound to make these high de-

June 14. mands for their own honour, the satisfaction of those of the Catholic party, and particularly for the facilitating of the dispensation at Rome, yet it will be always in your Majesty's power to put the same in execution according to your own pleasure; and they do also with strong protestations labour to persuade us that when the articles of marriage shall be signed, they will enter into treaty for the making of a strict conjunction with your Majesty for the redress of the general affairs of Christendom, and will declare themselves to espouse your Majesty's interests, so as both the treaties shall be ratified together."¹

¹ Carlisle to the King, June 14, *S. P. France*. The person from whom the idea about the Pope came is not mentioned in this letter. But in a later despatch (Carlisle and Holland to Conway, Oct. 9, *S. P. France*), the words given above are quoted as La Vieuville's—"Donnez nous de faste pour contenter le Pape, et nous nous jetterons dans vos intérêts à corps perdu." At a time when Charles had the greatest interest in showing that Louis or Richelieu had encouraged the idea that the engagement was only offered to satisfy the Pope, with the express understanding that it might be disregarded in England, no one ever ventured to state that they personally had done so. The charge was always made impersonally, and had its foundation, I believe, upon these overtures of La Vieuville. Richelieu, indeed, when pushed hard, may have said, that without the engagement the Pope would not consent, and may have made civil

La Vieuville hints that the demand was only made to please the Pope.

To give weight to these words the French preparations for war were hurried on. Already on May 31 a treaty had been drawn up by which France engaged to assist the Dutch with large sums of money, and immediately afterwards Venice and Savoy were asked to join in the support of Mansfeld. On June 19 three French armies were ordered to prepare themselves for active service. Two of these were posted respectively in Picardy and at Metz, whilst the third, being stationed on the frontier towards Franche Comté and Savoy, would be equally available for an attack upon the Palatinate or for an attack upon the Valtelline.¹

As far as it is now possible to ascertain the truth, these measures made little impression on James. He ordered the judges to see to the execution of the penal laws.² The French alliance suddenly ceased to form the staple of conversation at Court, and those who were behind the scenes began to make inquiries about the good looks of marriageable princesses in Germany.³

La Vieuville saw that something more must be done if the negotiation was to be saved. He begged Kensington to return to England to propound a middle course. If James La Vieuville's middle course. objected to sign an engagement, he would perhaps not object to write a letter containing the promise required.

To give greater effect to this proposal, Tillières, who had never given more than a half-hearted support to the marriage, was recalled. His successor was the Marquis of Effiat, a man endowed with much of the tact and ability of Gondomar. He had not been in England many days before he found his way to the heart of James by eagerly speeches about his readiness to oblige the King of England if it were not for the Pope; or even said that the King would not be bound in case of actual danger to the State from the Catholics. But I do not believe that he ever used words to imply that the whole engagement was a sham one, got up for the purpose of deceiving the Pope.

¹ Siri, *Mem. Rec.* v. 603; Kensington to Conway, June 15, *S. P. France.*

² Salvetti's *News-Letter*, June $\frac{18}{28}$.

³ Nethersole to Carleton, June 25, *S. P. Dom.* clxviii. 40.

listening to his long stories about his triumphs in the hunting field; but he was too clear-sighted not to perceive that his chief effort must be made in another direction. Buckingham, now recovered from his illness, was again at Court, and whoever could gain the ear of Buckingham had gone far to secure the approbation of his master.

The French demands which had startled James and his son, had not startled Buckingham. To embark with all his

^{July.} heart upon some darling scheme, and to treat all
Buckingham obstacles as not existing, was the course dictated to
gained by Effiat. Buckingham by his sanguine and energetic nature.

He was now bent on chastising Spain and reconquering the Palatinate. These objects he believed could only be attained with French aid ; if so, we may imagine him arguing, the terms laid down by France must be complied with. When Europe was at his feet, who would think of reminding him of the Royal promise that those terms should not be granted ? He assured Effiat that he would stake his personal reputation on the success of the marriage negotiations. He was ready to row in the same boat with him. If the marriage did not take place it would be his ruin.¹

It was a momentous resolution—how momentous for himself and for England, Buckingham little knew. Before Effiat's

^{La Vieu-}
^{ville's pro-}
^{posal ac-}
^{cepted by}
^{James.} courteous flattery all difficulties faded away, and though the ambassador had not himself been entrusted with the secret of La Vieuville's suggestion,

his presence was none the less favourable to its reception. After all, it might be argued, to write a letter could hardly be a breach of the Royal promise. When Kensington returned to Paris he carried with him the news that James was ready to embody in a letter his already declared resolution to show favour to his Catholic subjects.

James had taken but a little step in advance ; he doubtless intended that the letter should not contain any binding engagement, but he had left the firm ground on which he had hitherto stood, and if he once began to discuss with a foreign sovereign the administration of the

^{Aug. 2.}
Disgrace of
La Vieuville.

¹ Effiat to Louis XIII., July $\frac{8}{18}$, *Harl. MSS.* 4594, fol. 115.

English law, it would be hard for him to know where to stop. Before long, he had to face the alternative of going farther or of drawing back altogether. When Kensington reached Paris he found that he had toiled in vain. La Vieuville's proposal about the letter had been made without his master's knowledge, in the belief that the thing when once done would be accepted with gratitude. As soon as the truth came to the ears of Louis, he dismissed his too independent minister and placed the direction of the government of France in the hands of Richelieu.

Whether Richelieu concurred in the stringent demands which he was now instructed to put forward, it is impossible to say. In the memoirs which he left behind, it was his studied object to falsify history, in order to show that everything actually done proceeded from his own deliberate judgment. The real facts can often be shown, and still oftener suspected, to have been very different from the representation which he has given of them. Instead of being the author of all that was done in his name, he was in these early years of his ministry the servant of a jealous master, who was careless indeed of details, and ready to leave high authority in the hands of one capable of exercising it, but who took good care to exact submission to his general views. For the present Louis had made up his mind to demand from England, as the price of his sister's hand, concessions to the English Catholics which could only result in making that alliance thoroughly unstable. This was the mistaken policy of which Richelieu, willingly or unwillingly, made himself the mouthpiece. It is possible that, unversed as he was in English Parliamentary politics, he may have believed that the relaxation of the penal laws would be more easily attainable than it really was. At all events he had hardly any choice. If he refused his concurrence

Aug. 4.
Richelieu
demands an
article for
the English
Catholics.

in the designs of Louis he would fall as La Vieuville had fallen before him, especially as the clergy, backed by a powerful party at Court and in the country, would stand up as one man to advocate the resumption of the old friendly relations with Spain. Richelieu, therefore, if he was to hold his ground, must speak plainly to the English

ambassadors. He would preserve all forms of courtesy, but they must understand that the concession demanded was a serious matter.

Richelieu, in fact, was not likely to fall into La Vieuville's mistake of fancying his power greater than it was. He understood that the need of satisfying the Pope might still be pleaded for the unwelcome requirements of Louis; but he would take care that the Pope should be really satisfied. The King assured the ambassadors with studied politeness that the word of his dear brother would content him as well as either article or oath, but it would not content the Pope. The ambassadors betook themselves to the Cardinal. Was this the reply, they asked, which they were to deliver to their master. "Assuredly," answered Richelieu, "if the King said there must be an article, an article there must be." "Is this then," they asked again, "the answer we are to give?" "Yes," he replied, "for you will find no other."

The next day he spoke with the
 Aug. 5. same resolution. "On my salvation," he said, "we must have either an article or a writing—baptize it by what name you will—signed and sworn to, so to oblige the good faith of your King."

Carlisle and Kensington betook themselves to the Queen Mother. "We let her know," to use the words of their own narrative, "the impossibility of it, both in regard of the engagement of his Majesty's royal word to his Parliament to the contrary, and that upon the motion and prayer of the Prince his son; and of the necessity of keeping himself free in that point to entertain good intelligence betwixt him and his subjects for the better enabling him to the common good." The ambassadors further reported that the Queen answered not a word, though she contrived, with all the grace of her southern breeding, to look as if she would gladly have satisfied them if she could.¹

Both James and Charles, who were together at Rufford when the despatches announcing the new proposal reached them, agreed in rejecting the demand of an article. A letter,

¹ Carlisle and Kensington to Conway, Aug. 7, *S. P. France.*

they probably argued, would simply announce their intention of showing favour to the Catholics; an article constituted an

^{Aug. 12.} Refusal of James and his son to agree to the change. obligation. Conway was therefore directed to inform Effiat that if the arrangement made with La Vieuville was disavowed, the negotiation must be considered as broken off.¹ Charles was as decided as his father. "If," he wrote to Carlisle, "you perceive they persist in this new way that they have begun, in making an article

^{Aug. 13.} for our Roman Catholic subjects, dally no more with them, but break off the treaty of marriage, keeping the friendship on as fair terms as you can. And, believe it, ye shall have as great honour with breaking upon these terms as with making the alliance. Yet use what industry you can to reduce them to reason, for I respect the person of the lady as being a worthy creature, fit to be my wife ; but, as ye love me, put it to a quick issue one way or other."²

Effiat felt that his diplomacy would be tested to the uttermost. His only hope lay in Buckingham, who was drinking the waters at Wellingborough, the curative properties of which had recently come into repute. Buckingham's aid was easily obtained, and he offered at once to accompany the Frenchman to the Court, which had by this time removed to Derby. On their way they met a courier with

^{Aug. 14.} despatches for the ambassadors in France. At Effiat's suggestion, Buckingham asked for the packet, broke the seal, and, having ascertained its contents, carried it back with him to James to demand its alteration. When he reached Derby, the whole Court was astir. The news that the marriage had been broken off was in every mouth.

All that evening Buckingham was closeted with the King and the Prince. What passed between them we have no means of knowing, but the result was that Buckingham was able to show Effiat the despatch with about two-thirds marked for omission. Yet the Frenchman was far from having everything his own way. James still positively refused to concede the article which Richelieu demanded. He

^{James gives way to some extent.}

¹ Conway to Carlisle and Kensington, Aug. 12, *Hardwicke S. P.* i. 573.

² Charles to Carlisle, Aug. 13, *S. P. France.*

told Effiat that, in the face of Parliament, he could never accept such an article, but he offered so to word the letter which he had promised to write as to guarantee the Catholics against persecution.¹

Would a mere alteration in the wording of the proposed letter be sufficient to satisfy the French Government? Buckingham

Aug. 16. at least hoped so, and wrote to Louis, assuring him *Buckingham's letter to Louis.* that his master could yield no further, and adding that, in his poor opinion, more could not reasonably be asked of him.²

To fancy, however, that such a concession would content the French Government was to mistake the meaning of the late Richelieu change of ministry. La Vieuville's policy had been not content. the policy of Protestant alliances in Germany, and he had fallen because neither the Queen Mother nor Louis himself was ready for so startling an innovation. Mary de Medicis, by favouring her daughter's marriage with the Prince of Wales, aimed at the acquisition of influence which would ameliorate the lot of the English Catholics. Louis, on his part, aimed also at the creation of a diversion against Spain which would enable him to secure his own interests in the Valtelline. It was Richelieu's business to carry both these wishes into effect.

As soon, therefore, as the conferences in Paris recommenced after La Vieuville's fall, Richelieu proposed an engagement drawn up in the strongest possible terms. In the

Aug. 10. He draws up an article. form which had been agreed upon with La Vieuville,

James was to write to Louis that, in contemplation of the marriage, he would permit his Roman Catholic subjects 'to enjoy all suitable favour, and would preserve them from all persecution, as long as they continue to live without scandal, and keep themselves within the limits of the obedience of good subjects; and he will also permit them to enjoy, in trust upon his word and promise, as much favour and liberty as they would have had in virtue of any articles granted to Spain.' The word-

¹ Effiat to Louis XIII., Aug. $\frac{18}{28}$, *Harl. MSS.* 4595, fol. 134; Nether-
sole to Carleton, Aug. 19, *S. P. Dom.* clxxi. 60.

² Buckingham to Louis XIII., Aug. $\frac{16}{26}$, *Harl. MSS.* 4595, fol. 160.

ing, as Richelieu proposed it, ran as follows :—“ The King of Great Britain will give the King a private engagement signed by himself, by the Prince his son, and by a Secretary of State, by which he will declare that, in contemplation of his dearest son and of the Princess, the sister of the Most Christian King, he will promise to all his Roman Catholic subjects, on the faith and word of a king, and in virtue of his word and oath given on the holy Gospels, that they shall enjoy all the liberty and freedom which concerns the secret exercise of their religion which was granted by the treaty of marriage made with Spain, as he does not wish his Catholic subjects to be disquieted in their persons and goods on account of their secret profession of the Catholic religion, provided that they behave modestly, and render the obedience and fidelity which good and true subjects naturally owe to their king.”¹

Carlisle, when this proposal was made, was in the highest degree indignant. Whether these words were placed in the Aug. 14. actual contract or not, there was no doubt, in Car-
Anger of lisle's mind, that their acceptance would involve an
Carlisle. infraction of the promise given to Parliament. He refused even to reply to the French commissioners, and recommended James, if the proposed engagement were shown him by Effiat, ‘to express some indignation, and not to yield a whit till he heard from’ his ambassadors again.²

Carlisle's colleague was made of more yielding stuff. Dissatisfied with Carlisle's attempt ‘to carry all with a high hand,’

Aug. 18. and careless of any considerations beyond the success Kensington gained by the French. of the marriage, Kensington entered into secret communications with Richelieu, and was able, before many days were over, to paint the condescension and affability of the Cardinal in the most glowing colours. Richelieu, in fact, was loud in his professions of friendship, and threw the blame of his strictness upon the necessity of satisfying the Pope. But, though he consented to some verbal alterations, he was firm on the main point. The engagement need not form part of the contract, but it must be a binding obligation. “ The signing by

¹ *Harl. MSS. 4595, fol. 42 b, 55.*

² *Carlisle to Conway, Aug. 15, S. P. France.*

the Prince and Secretary," wrote Kensington, "was next questioned, because that made it a public act, whereas before we were made believe that a private promise of his Majesty's should serve the turn. It was answered that La Vieuville had therein transcended his commission, and that it was that brake his neck ; that the treble signing was only to make it more specious, that they could not think the King my master would press to change it."¹

Having thus secured an advocate in one of the English

^{Aug. 28.} ambassadors, Richelieu was all the more confident
The French of gaining his point. When James's draft and Buck-
demands insisted on. ington's letter arrived, they were both thrust aside as offering no basis of agreement.² Some further modifications were made in the wording of the French draft, but that was all.

To support the demands of Louis, the French Government made a great show of eagerness to give help to Mansfeld's ex-

^{Aug. 29.} ^{Louis pro-} Aug. 29. ^{mises to sup-} ^{port Mans-} ^{feld.} ^{Marescot in} ^{Germany.} ^{Count} ^{should be supported by France as long as he} ^{was supported by England.} ^{Nor is it altogether im-} ^{possible that at this moment Louis may have been} ^{inclined to do something in this direction.} ^{Though the mere} ^{fact of his sending Marescot to treat with the Elector of Bavaria} ^{had given umbrage to Spain,³ his plan of raising up a central} ^{party in Germany under French influence had broken down} ^{completely.} ^{Marescot, who had spent the summer} ^{in passing from one prince to another, had just come} ^{back to report the entire failure of his mission.} ^{Many of the} ^{princes had refused even to look at his credentials.} ^{The} ^{Elector of Saxony had treated him with the greatest rudeness,} ^{asking him 'whether there were any such king as the King of} ^{France.'} ^{The ambassador gravely replied, 'that he could} ^{not be so ignorant as he pretended of a prince so great and} ^{powerful.'} ^{"That is strange," said John George, mockingly,} ^{"that there should be a great and mighty king in France, and}

¹ Kensington to Conway, Aug. 18, *S. P. France.*

² Louis XIII. to Effiat, ^{Aug. 28} ^{Sept. 7}, *Harl. MSS. 4595*, fol. 219.

³ Philip IV. to the Infanta Isabella, March ⁸ ¹⁶²³, *Brussels MSS.* See p. 218.

we for four years together never heard of him." To Marescot's rejoinder, that 'this answer savoured too much of the Spanish faction,' the Elector's reply was prompt. "If I had been of the French," he said, "I had likewise perished, as I have seen those other princes that depended upon that crown do before me."¹

Such scorn flung openly in the face of a French ambassador was likely to provoke Louis to more decided action, and the September knowledge that this was the case may well have had weight with the English Government in their consideration of the amount of concession to be made on the subject of the English Catholics. When once James had agreed to put his promises upon paper at all, it was difficult for him to know where to stop. Each new alteration proposed seemed to involve but a little step of retreat from his original position, and it was not till the whole was yielded that the full extent of the ground lost could be measured. Yet on this occasion James was inclined to stand firm. Buckingham,

Buckingham however, threw himself at once upon the side of the supports Effiat. French. To him, the immediate object at which he aimed, the success of the marriage and the acquisition of French aid in the war, was the one thing visible. He knew that his close alliance with Effiat was regarded with suspicion at Court. Pembroke and Hamilton had raised objections to his policy, and he had good reason to believe that, when Parliament met, their objections would be urged far more strongly, and that he would be openly reproached for abandoning the position which he had taken up about the Catholics.² He now comported himself more as an agent of France than as an English minister. With Effiat he held lengthy and secret consultations, placing without scruple in the Frenchman's gained over. hands the despatches of Carlisle and Kensington, almost as soon as they were received. Soon he succeeded in gaining over the Prince, whose mind was always fertile in excuses for doing that which at the moment he wished to do.

¹ Carlisle an¹ Kensington to Conway, ^{Aug. 29} _{Sept. 8}, *S. P. France.*

² "Où" *i.e.* in Parliament, "il se trouve à présent en ombrages, pour n'avoir pas tenu ses paroles contre les dits Catholiques."

The old king was therefore isolated. For two whole days he resisted the united pleadings of his favourite and his son. On

^{Sept. 7.}
Decision of James.
the third day he gave way so far as to accept the formula offered by the French, though he saved his conscience by insisting that it should take the shape of a letter and not of an engagement, either in the contract or out of it.¹

^{Sept. 9.}
Satisfaction of the Prince.
“The business,” wrote Charles to Carlisle, forgetful of his decision taken less than a month before, “is all brought to so good an issue that, if it is not spoiled at Rome, I hope that the treaties will be shortly brought to a happy conclusion, wherefore I pray you warn your Monsieur that the least stretching more breaks the string, and then Spain will laugh at both.”²

One formality remained to be observed. It was the custom in England, as Buckingham explained to Effiat, to submit treaties either to the Privy Council or to a select committee of its members. It was the more necessary to take this course now, as he had little doubt that in the approaching session of Parliament an attack would be made upon him for advising the King to stop the execution of the Recusancy laws. If the Privy Councillors could be made partakers in the offence, they would be unable to open their mouths against him³ as members of either House.

What passed in the Council we do not know. A consultation, invited only after the King's mind had been made up, can scarcely have had any real value except for the purpose indicated by Buckingham. The resolution taken was conveyed to the ambassadors in Paris. “His Majesty,” wrote Conway to them, “cannot be won to any more in largeness of promise or any other form, it being apparent to all this kingdom what promise the Prince hath made and the King approved, not to enter into articles or conditions with any other Prince for the immunities of his subjects

¹ Effiat to Ville-aux-Clercs, Sept. $\frac{11}{21}$, *Harl. MSS. 4595*, fol. 317; Conway to Carlisle and Kensington, Sept. $\frac{14}{24}$, *S. P. France*.

² The Prince to Carlisle, Sept. 9, *ibid.*

³ Effiat to Ville-aux-Clercs, Sept. $\frac{11}{21}$, *Harl. MSS. 4595*, fol. 317.

Roman Catholics, that being indeed to part his sovereignty, and give a portion to another king.”¹ It was a poor shred of comfort for James to wrap himself in. A letter engaging that the English Catholics should have as much freedom in the secret exercise of their religion as they would have had by the treaty with Spain might not form part of the contract; but the difference was not great, excepting that a promise given in a letter might be broken with a little less reluctance than a promise given in a contract.

James began to act on the assumption that everything was settled. Kensington, whose facile compliance with the French demands had endeared him more than ever to Buckingham, was raised to the Earldom of Holland in approbation of his conduct.

The Privy Council had consented, not merely to the form of the treaty, but also to that which was its necessary consequence, the suspension of the laws against the recusants.² The immediate result was most disastrous to a good understanding between the King and his people. Whether the promise given by James and his son about the Catholics had been broken or not, it was certain that the promise about summoning Parliament in the autumn could not be kept.³ How would it be possible to face the Commons? When, indeed, the bride was once in England, it would be too late to remonstrate on the conditions on which she had come; but if Parliament met before the step had been irreversibly taken, who could answer for the consequences? The

¹ Conway to Carlisle and Kensington, *Harl. MSS.* 1593, fol. 266. The letter is undated, but was probably written on Sept. 5.

² Effiat to Louis XIII., ^{Sept. 26} _{Oct. 6}, *Harl. MSS.* 1596, fol. 17 b. Effiat speaks of a *supersedeas* under the Great Seal, of which no trace is to be found on the Patent Rolls. Probably there is some mistake, arising from a foreigner's ignorance of legal forms.

³ On March 14 (p. 197) James had promised to summon Parliament at Michaelmas or shortly after. On March 23 (p. 201) he had declared that the business of considering the course of the war should be taken in hand in the next session, and the actual prorogation had fixed the opening of the next session at November 2.

Houses were therefore prorogued to February 26, on the trans-
 parent pretext that London had become too un-
 Oct. 1.
 Parliament prorogued. healthy to be a safe place of meeting. Care was taken
 to insert in the proclamation a statement that this
 course had been adopted in pursuance of the advice of the
 Council.¹

The chances of winning over the hard heads of the House of Commons to an unpopular domestic policy with the aid of the charms of the young Queen were not very great. Unless Buckingham could escape the consequences of his actions in a blaze of military glory, he was plainly doomed to be taunted with apostasy from the cause which he had voluntarily adopted. To some extent the news which reached him from the Continent sounded hopefully in his ears. The Kings of Sweden and Denmark were bidding against one another for English support, and the Duke of Savoy was eager to make use of the English navy for designs of his own against Genoa. It was true that Buckingham had no money with which to pay the fleets and armies which he was busily organising in his imagination. The supplies voted in the last session had been devoted to special objects, and he had just cut off for five months all possibility of obtaining more from a legitimate source. Financial considerations, however, seldom obtruded themselves on Buckingham. If the war were only once begun on a scale large enough to dazzle the world, he might safely, he fancied, throw himself upon the patriotism of the English nation.

Buckingham was embarking on a hazardous policy. Armies set on foot upon the chance of future supplies are apt to be less

¹ Proclamation, Oct. 1, *Rymer*, xvii. 625. The prorogation was really ordered 'for many weighty considerations, but principally this, that the respect of the Princess of France, and the reverence which will be given to her person when she shall be here, for those graces and virtues that shine in her, as likewise for the love and duty borne to the Prince, being all joined in her, will not only stay the exorbitant or ungentele motions that might otherwise be made in the House of Parliament, but will facilitate in his Majesty's proceedings those passages of favour, grace, and goodness which his Majesty hath promised for the ease of the Roman Catholicks.' Buckingham to N., Oct. (?), *Ellis*, ser. 1, iii. 179.

dangerous to the enemy than to their own commanders. Yet

July.
Refusal of
the Council
of War to
supply
Mansfeld.

what else was to be done? An attempt had been made in vain to divert some of the subsidy money to the support of Mansfeld. The Council of War had replied by asking whether the King would give them a written declaration that he needed the money 'for one of those four ends mentioned in the statute.' Weston, who had been sent to ask for the money, could not say that the King intended to give any such declaration, but he knew 'that it was both his Majesty's and the Prince's pleasure' that they should enable Mansfeld to pay his troops. He was told distinctly that without 'some particular warrant in writing nothing could be done.'¹

Even if Buckingham had been able to raise the money which he needed, it was unlikely that Mansfeld's armament would Questions gain for him the good-will of the House of Commons? If the force which it had been proposed to Mansfeld's employment. levy had been directed towards the Palatinate, such an employment would have been entirely outside the circle of ideas within which the Lower House had been moving, and Buckingham had already reason to question whether France was disposed to give even this amount of satisfaction to the

Aug. 26. wishes of the King of England. A little later Louis's The League intentions were made still clearer. On August 26 a for the re- league had been signed between France, Venice, and Valtelline.

Savoy for the recovery of the Valtelline; and, in order to prevent the Spanish Government from bringing up fresh troops to resist the attack, it had been arranged that the Duke of Savoy, with the aid of a French force, should make an attack upon Genoa, and that Mansfeld should throw himself upon Alsace and the Austrian possessions in Swabia.²

Whilst James and Buckingham, therefore, were fondly hoping to make use of Richelieu for the reconquest of the Palatinate, Richelieu was planning how to make use of James and Buckingham for the reconquest of the Valtelline. The result of Marescot's embassy to

¹ Weston to Conway, July 31, *S. P.* lxx. 82.

² Siri, *Mem. Rec.* v. 639, 680.

Richelieu
and Ger-
many.

Germany had been discouraging. Richelieu had consequently assured the Elector of Bavaria that he need have no fear of an attack from France for at least a year, and had instructed Effiat to lay before James a plan for the pacification of Germany which bore a very close resemblance to those unsatisfactory overtures which had been made by Francesco della Rota in the preceding winter.¹

Richelieu was probably right in judging that this was as much as he could persuade his master to do for some time to come ; perhaps also in judging that it would be unwise for France to embark in open war till it was clear that she could find allies who could be trusted; but when Buckingham passed his neck under the yoke of the imperious Cardinal, he had certainly expected more than this.

Towards the end of September Mansfeld was once more in England, pressing for men and money. He announced

September. that his English troops, if he could persuade James Mansfeld again in England. to entrust him with any, would be allowed to land between Calais and Gravelines, close to the Flemish frontier,² and that Louis was ready to allow him to levy 13,000 men, and would, in conjunction with his allies, supply money for their pay.³ Yet the French ministers, who had so pertinaciously demanded the strictest acknowledgment of the rights of the English Catholics, refused to bind themselves to any definite course in their military operations by a single line in writing. In the meanwhile, Louis wrote to Effiat informing him that what was given to Mansfeld was given 'for the affairs of our league,' that is to say, for the support of his operations in the Valtelline. If the men could also be useful to the King of England and his son-in-law, he should be glad. After the marriage had been agreed upon, he would be able to deliberate further.⁴

¹ Richelieu, *Mém.* ii. 405 ; Louis XIII. to Effiat, Sept. ⁷/₁₇, *Harl. MSS.* 4595, fol. 307. See p. 181.

² Louis XIII. to Effiat, ^{Sept. 24}/_{Oct. 4}, *ibid.* fol. 369.

³ Effiat to Louis XIII., ^{Sept. 26}/_{Oct. 6}, *ibid.* fol. 17 b.

⁴ Louis XIII. to Effiat, ^{Sept. 30}/_{Oct. 10}, *ibid.* fol. 33.

Such was the position of affairs when the English Parliament was a second time prorogued. Buckingham, it would seem, had sold his master's honour for nought. To his October. A written engagement demanded from France. thinking, indeed, the only course left to him was to push blindly on. If he had had his way, 20,000*l.* would have been placed at once in Mansfeld's hands. The adventurer had an interview with James, who listened, well pleased, to his talk, and amused him by a recommendation to ask leave of the Infanta to pass through the Spanish Netherlands on his way to the Palatinate.¹ There was, however, still some prudence left in the English Court. The Council recommended a short delay till Louis had given a written promise to allow Mansfeld's troops to enter France, and to permit their employment for the recovery of the Palatinate. In the meanwhile Mansfeld was to go to Holland, to muster some Germans who were to take part in the expedition.²

In a few days James learned that he had reckoned without the French in respect both of the marriage and of Mansfeld's army. Carlisle and Holland were plainly told that their master's letter, even if countersigned by the Prince and a Secretary of State, would not suffice, and were informed at the same time that there could be no offensive league for the present. "To capitulate in writing," said the French ministers, "would but cast rubs in the way of their dispensation, and make it altogether impossible; since it must needs highly offend the Pope to hear they should enter into an offensive league with heretics against Catholics, and was like so far to scandalize the Catholic princes of Germany, as this king should lose all credit with them, whom yet he hoped to win to their better party." In vain the ambassadors remonstrated. Not a line in writing could be drawn from the French ministers. 'They could not,' they said, 'condescend to anything in writing; but if the King's faith and promise would serve the turn, that should be renewed to us here, and

¹ Rusdorf to Frederick, Oct. $\frac{2}{12}$, *Mém.* i. 377.

² Rusdorf to Frederick Oct. $\frac{5}{15}, \frac{6}{16}$, *Mém.* i. 379, 381; Conway to Carlisle and Holland, *Hardwicke S. P.* i. 532.

to his Majesty likewise by their ambassador in England, in as full and ample manner as we could desire it.' A long altercation followed, and the English ambassadors broke off the interview in high dudgeon, saying that 'they knew not whether, when the King their master should hear of this their proceeding, he might not open his ear to new counsels, and embrace such offers as might come to him from other parts, and leave them perhaps to seek place for repentance when it would be too late.'¹

In a private letter to the Prince, Carlisle expressed his opinion strongly. "It may therefore please your Highness," he

^{Aug. 13.} ^{Carlisle's} wrote, "to give your humble servant leave, out of his zeal and devotion to your Highness' service, to re-opinion.

present unto your Highness that our endeavours here will be fruitless unless you speak unto the French ambassador in a higher strain, and that my Lord of Buckingham also hold the same language unto him. It is true that they do offer the King's word for their assistance, and that their ambassador shall give his Majesty the like assurance ; but what assurance can be given to the verbal promise of this people, who are so apt to retract or give new interpretations to their former words, . . . your Highness, out of your excellent wisdom, will easily discern."²

With respect to the marriage treaty, so much had been yielded already that a point or two further hardly mattered

<sup>The French plan sup-
ported by Bucking-
ham.</sup> much. Buckingham had before him the vision of an angry Parliament, incensed with him, as he told Effiat, because he 'had so far departed from the promises that had been made.'³

Startling news, too, reached him from Spain. Inojosa, as might have been expected, had, after a mock investigation, been fully acquitted of the charge of conspiring against Buckingham ; but the party

¹ Carlisle and Holland to Conway, [Oct. 9], *Hardwicke S. P.* i. 536 ; date from copy in *S. P. France*.

² Carlisle to Charles, Oct. 7, *ibid.* i. 535.

³ "À cause qu'ils disent que le Duc s'est fort éloigné des promesses qui leur avoient été faites."—Effiat to Ville-aux-Clercs, ^{Sept. 26} _{Oct. 6}, *Harl. MSS.* 4596, fol. 25.

opposed to Olivares had sufficient weight in the Council to make one more effort to avoid a breach, and a resolution was taken to send Gondomar once more to England in Coloma's room. The prospect of seeing the clever Spaniard again whispering his words of command in James's ear was very terrible to Buckingham; and who could foresee the result if Gondomar should find new and unexpected allies in the House of Commons?

If it was to be a question whether the King should give way to Spain or to France, Charles was sure to place himself

Oct. 19. on Buckingham's side, and he joined in urging his father to make the required concession. "Your Charles supports Buckingham. despatch," he wrote to Carlisle, "gave us enough ado to keep all things from an unrecoverable breach. For my father at first startled very much at it, and would scarce hear reason, which made us fear that his averseness was built upon some hope of good overtures from Gondomar, who, they say, is to be shortly here, though I believe it not; which made me deal plainly with the King, telling him I would never match with Spain, and so entreated him to find a fit match for me. Though he was a little angry at first, yet afterwards he allowed our opinions to be reason, which before he rejected."¹

It was like Charles to suppose that his father could not be really influenced by the motives he professed, and to fancy that it was impossible for anyone to differ from himself with any semblance of reason. Yet if the concession which he was now recommending had been laid before him six months before, he would doubtless have started back with amazement and horror. He had directly engaged that his marriage should bring 'no advantage to the recusants.'² As for James, a loophole was still left to him. He had promised that 'no such condition' should be 'foisted in upon any other treaty whatsoever.'³ He was not asked to do precisely this. He was to keep his word in the letter, whilst breaking it in the spirit. The article, separate from the treaty, was to be called a private engagement. As, however, it was to be made as binding as possible by

¹ The Prince to Carlisle, Oct. 19, *S. P. France.*

² Page 222.

³ Page 226.

his own and his son's signature, attested by that of a Secretary of State, this was surely enough to startle James, without its being necessary to seek for an explanation of his reluctance to give his assent in some imaginary overtures from Gondomar.

To his own disgrace Charles had his way. James had not strength of mind enough to break up the alliance on which he James gives had counted for the restoration of the Palatinate. way.

Orders were sent to the ambassadors to accept the French proposals. What was James to gain in return? The The French Government and Mansfeld verbal promise of support to Mansfeld, which was all that Louis offered, was plainly not worth having.

"We think it not fit," wrote Carlisle and Holland, "to express by writing the sense we have of the proceedings of the French."¹ Louis, in fact, had agreed to declare his intention of continuing his contribution to Mansfeld for six months, and of allowing the money to be used for the recovery of the Palatinate. If, however, 'the affairs of the Palatinate were not settled within this time, his Majesty would continue, in every way which he might consider most fitting, to testify to his brother the King of Great Britain his desire that he might receive contentment in the matter of the Palatinate.'² Against this wording the ambassadors protested. Instead of declaring that he would aid 'in every way which he might consider most fitting,' Louis might at least say that he would aid in every way that was most fitting. They were told that this could not be. In that case, they replied, they would rather not listen at all to so illusory a promise. Acting, no doubt, in pursuance of orders from England, they said that they would be content with a simple promise to pay Mansfeld for six months. To this Louis cheerfully consented, and, in giving the promise, added a few words still vaguer than those to which objection had been taken. "As to the continuance of my assistance for the Palatinate," he said, "let my good brother the King of Great Britain confide in my affection, which I will show by my deeds and acting rather than by my words and promises."³

¹ Carlisle and Holland to Conway, Oct. 28, *S. P. France*.

² Ville-aux-Clercs to Effiat, ^{Oct. 25}_{Nov. 4}, *Harl. MSS. 4596*, fol. 45.

³ Carlisle and Holland to Conway, Oct. 28, Nov. 12; *Hardwicke S. P.* i. 523, *S. P. France*.

On these terms the marriage treaty was signed by the
 Nov. 10.
 The mar-
 riage treaty
 signed.
 ambassadors on November 10. It needed only the ratification of the King of England and the grant of the Papal dispensation to be carried into effect.

What was now to be done for Mansfeld? Was he, without any real understanding with France, to be launched into the heart Something to be done for Mans- feld. of Germany? If a scheme so rash was to be persisted in, where was James to find the 20,000*l.* which he would be called upon to pay month by month.

The Exchequer had not in it a farthing applicable to the purpose. The Council of War had shown by its former answer that its members did not believe that the subsidies were intended to be expended in such a way, and without an order from the Council of War the Parliamentary Treasurers could give nothing. But for the turn which the marriage arrangements had taken, Parliament would by this time have been in full session, able either to grant the sum required or to give the King plainly to understand that no further subsidies would be forthcoming for the purpose.

In default of Parliament, application was again made to the Council of War. Payments for such an expedition as Mansfeld's were perhaps covered by the letter of the Where was money to be found? Subsidy Act, as being intended to assist 'other his Majesty's friends and allies,' but they were certainly in contravention of its spirit. Besides, even if this had not been the case, there was no money really applicable to the purpose. It would tax all the powers of the Treasurers to meet the demands made upon them for the four points expressly named in the Act, and it was only by neglecting one or other of them that it would be possible to divert something for Mansfeld.

By what arguments the Council of War was swayed we do not know. But on October 4 a warrant, followed up by another Nov. 24. on November 24, was issued by that body to empower the Treasurers to advance 15,000*l.* for the expenses of levying troops for Mansfeld, and 40,000*l.* to pay his men for two months.¹

¹ Abstract of the warrants of the Council of War, June 1625; *S. P. Dom. Charles I.*, Addenda.

On October 29 orders had been given to levy 12,000
 Oct. 29. pressed men for this service.¹ On November 4
 Mansfeld landed at Margate on his return from
 Holland. On the 7th he received a commission empowering
 Nov. 4. him to take command of the troops. He was to
 Mansfeld in use them for the recovery of the Palatinate, doing
 England. nothing against the King's friends and allies, es-
 pecially doing nothing 'against the lands and dominions of
 He is not to which the King of Spain, our very dear brother,
 touch Spanish and the Infanta, have a just and legitimate pos-
 territory. session.'²

The troops, in short, were to be used for the purposes for which they were intended, and for nothing else. If a war with Spain must come, let it come after due deliberation, and not as the result of one of those raids which Mansfeld knew so well how to plan and to execute.

Assuredly reasons were not wanting to justify James in the policy of carrying the war into Germany rather than attacking Spain. On the other hand there is nothing to be said for the means which he adopted to secure his end.

^{Little prospect of success.} Mansfeld himself was a man upon whom no dependence could be placed. Even in the little Court which gathered round the exiles at the Hague, he was no longer regarded with favour. Camerarius, one of the ablest of Frederick's counsellors, predicted that no good would come of his employment. "From this," he wrote, "the restoration of the Palatinate is not to be expected. Indeed I see many other objections; and if Mansfeld has with him foreign soldiers, instead of an army for the most part composed of Germans, the whole Empire will be leagued against him. I fear, too, that Duke Christian may combine with him, and he is alike hateful to God and man. The time requires not such defenders."

Broken and divided as Germany was, there was still some national feeling left. To fling a couple of adventurers with an army of foreigners into the heart of the country was not the

¹ *Signet Office Docquets*, Oct. 29.

Rusdorf to Frederick, Nov. 5; the King to Mansfeld, Nov. 7; Rusdorf's Mem. i. 390, 392.

way to conciliate this feeling. As yet no arrangement had been come to with the German Princes. It was not upon any understanding with them that Mansfeld's projects were based. Nor, even if the chances of an invasion of Germany had been greater than they were, was this invasion one which could be regarded hopefully. For, of the two Governments by which it was to be supported, one was anxious to employ the troops against Spain in Italy, whilst the other was anxious to employ them against the Emperor in Germany.

There were, in fact, two policies, each of which was not without its merits. A close alliance with France to attack Spain would probably not have been without its fruits in lightening the weight which pressed upon the German Protestants. On the other hand a close alliance with Sweden, Denmark, the Dutch Republic, and the Princes of North Germany would probably have been more directly effectual for the recovery of the Palatinate. In the first case, the co-operation of the Northern Protestants ; in the second case, the co-operation of France, would have to be regarded as of secondary importance.

The course which was actually taken was the result of the several faults of James and Buckingham. It satisfied the King's caution by the appearance of strength which he saw in an alliance reaching from Stockholm to Paris. It accorded with Buckingham's impetuosity, that England should stand alone, and should prepare to throw her only army into the midst of Europe without any trustworthy or ascertained alliance on any side.

James's notion that it was possible to treat the question of the Palatinate apart, without given offence to Spain, was one which could hardly bear the test of conversion into practical action.¹ He had thought to mingle in a strife in which the passions of men were deeply engaged, without taking account of anything but their reason, and he had fancied that he could

* The impossibility of Spain remaining neutral if the Palatinate were attacked, is clearly put in a letter from the Infanta Isabella to Philip IV.,

April 2nd, Brussels MSS.

measure their reason by his own. He had expected his son-in-law to forget his injuries, and to consent to take his place again at Heidelberg as a peaceable subject of the Empire. He had expected the King of Spain, in spite of the deep distrust which he entertained of Frederick, to help him back into his old Frankenthal position. He now expected the Infanta Isabella demanded from the Infanta to surrender Frankenthal to an English garrison according to the treaty made in the spring of the preceding year.¹ The Infanta replied that she was quite ready to give up the town to an English garrison if James would send one to the gates ; but she declined to assure that garrison against the probable danger of an attack from the Imperialist forces in the neighbourhood. Clearly the Spaniards were not about to assist in the recovery of the Palatinate.

Would France be more likely to help than Spain had been ? For a moment James and Buckingham were able to flatter themselves that it would be so. On November 18 France gives hopes of aid. it was known in London² that, when the marriage treaty was signed, Louis had promised with his own royal mouth that Mansfeld should have liberty to land at Boulogne or Calais ; that the letters of exchange for the French share of the expenses had actually been seen by the ambassadors; and that Richelieu had assured Carlisle and Holland that ‘ they had not so much linked together two persons as two crowns, and that the interest of the Palatinate was as dear to them as to the English.’³

At the news that the treaty had been signed the bells of the London churches rung out their merriest peals, and healths were drunk to the future Queen of England around bonfires in the streets.⁴ Yet at the very time the French Court had already made up its mind to draw back from the engagement into which Louis had entered a few days before to allow Mansfeld to pass through France. The preparations for the attack upon the Valtelline were now complete;

¹ See p. 74. ² Rusdorf to Frederick, Nov. 20, *Mem.* i. 394.

³ Carlisle and Holland to Conway, Nov. 12, *S. P. France*.

⁴ Salvetti's *News-Letter* ^{Nov. 26}
^{Dec. 5}.

and, though it could not be known in Paris that the French force which had started from Coire on November 15 would sweep all opposition before it, there could be no doubt that the result would be determined long before Spanish troops could reach the scene of action from Flanders. So far as the Valtelline was concerned, therefore, there was no further need of Mansfeld's assistance.

What steps Louis and Richelieu intended to take with respect to Germany in the next summer's campaign it is impossible to say. Most probably they did not know themselves. We may, however, be quite sure that they never seriously entertained the idea of allowing Mansfeld to pass through France to attack the Imperial garrisons in the Palatinate, whilst England remained at peace with Spain.

Louis was soon provided with an excuse for abandoning his engagements. The Spanish Government at this time combined a full appreciation of the benefits of peace with a firm determination not to make those concessions which would alone make peace possible. In the past winter and spring Philip and Olivares had been quite in earnest in desiring to make peace in Germany, upon terms which would have secured the triumph of their own religion; and a few months later they were equally in earnest in desiring to make a final peace with the revolted Netherlands, if only they could secure the opening of the Scheldt to the commerce of Antwerp, by which means, as the Infanta Isabella assured her nephew, the trade of Amsterdam would be entirely ruined. On July 3,

^{The siege of} the day after her letter was written, news arrived in Breda. Brussels that her overtures had been rejected at the Hague, and that the Dutch had entered into a league with France. Upon this Spinola, who had remained inactive since his failure at Bergen-op-Zoom in 1622, marched to lay siege to Breda.¹

To the Prince of Orange, Breda was no common town. In it was the house in which his ancestors had dwelt whilst as yet the seventeen Provinces reposed peacefully under Spanish rule.

¹ The Infanta Isabella to Philip IV., July ^{2, 3, 19}, _{12, 13, 29}, *Brussels MSS.*

Its recovery from the enemy had been his own earliest military exploit. Upon the ramparts and sluices by which Breda was guarded, he had lavished all the resources of his own consummate skill as a military engineer. "Have you seen Breda?" he used to say to travellers who spoke boastfully of this or that fortress which they had visited. He now learned that, at a time when he was himself wasting away with enfeebled health and forced inaction, this town, so dear to him as a man and as a soldier, was in danger. The forces of the Republic were not sufficient to justify him in running the risk of an attempt to save it.

During his last visit to Holland, Mansfeld had suggested to Maurice that the English troops entrusted to himself might be

The French
wish to em-
ploy Mans-
feld at
Breda.

employed in relieving Breda.¹ Louis, too, who was sending over his secretary Ville-aux-Clercs to receive James's oath to the engagement he was to take about

the Catholics, instructed him to argue that Mansfeld would be far better employed in succouring Breda than he would be in Alsace or Franche-Comté, especially as it would be impossible for him to march into the Palatinate in the winter.² In fact, if Mansfeld was not to be used at Breda, it was difficult to say how he could be used at all.³ Even if the French had been more than half-hearted in the matter, it would have been premature to send him into Germany without any previous arrangement with the German princes. And why, the French ministers might well argue, should James object? Six thousand soldiers were already serving in his pay under Maurice against Spain, and why should not twelve thousand under Mansfeld do the same? It was perhaps hard to meet the

Unwilling-
ness of
James.

logical difficulty; but James drew a line between assisting the Dutch against Spain, and sending an independent force with the same object. He had fallen back upon the belief that he could escape a war with

¹ Villermont, *E. de Mansfeldt*, ii. 240.

² Instructions to Ville-aux-Clercs, Nov. $\frac{17}{27}$, *Harl. MSS.* 4596, fol. 106.

³ The Infanta Isabella, writing to Philip IV., Nov. $\frac{16}{26}$, argued that the troops must be intended for Breda, for it was not the season of the year to begin war in Germany. The greater part of the troops would perish before they could reach that country. *Brussels MSS.*

Spain after all. The fleet, which in the beginning of the summer had been gathering in the Spanish harbours, had been called off across the Atlantic by the news that San Salvador, in Brazil, had been captured by a Dutch force, and there had, in consequence, been the less necessity for proceeding hastily with the equipment of the English navy. Lest Spain should take umbrage at what little had been done, James explained to the Infanta's agent that the ships which he was preparing were intended to convoy the French Princess to England, and to make reprisals on the Dutch East India Company for the massacre of Amboyna. At the same time he repeated his assurance that Mansfeld should not attack Spanish territory.¹

When Ville-aux-Clercs arrived, his first task was to obtain the ratification of the marriage treaty. The King was at Cambridge, suffering from a severe attack of the gout. His hands were so crippled that, like Henry VIII. in his old age, he had

Dec. 12. been obliged to make use of a stamp, from inability ^{The mar-} to sign his name. On December 12, however, though ^{riage treaty} ratified. still suffering, he was sufficiently recovered to be able to join his son in ratifying the articles of marriage. Much to the discontent of the Privy Councillors, not one of the number, excepting Buckingham and Conway, were allowed to be present at the ceremony.

There remained the private engagement to be signed: "I the undersigned Charles, Prince of Wales," so ran the words ^{The private} finally agreed upon, "after having seen the promise engagement. of the Most Serene King of Great Britain, my very honoured Lord and father, and in conformity with it, promise on the faith and word of a Prince, both for the present and the future, in everything that is and shall be in my power, that, in contemplation of the Most Serene Princess Madame Henrietta Maria, sister of the most Christian King of France, I will promise to all the Roman Catholic subjects of the Crown of Great Britain the utmost of liberty and franchise in everything

¹ This was probably said about Nov. 19. The declaration is printed without a date by Villermont, *E. de Mansfeldt*, ii. 242. The order for reprisals on the Dutch had really been given. Conway to Carleton, Nov. 4, *S. P. Holland*.

regarding their religion, which they would have had in virtue of any articles which were agreed upon by the treaty of marriage with Spain, not being willing that the aforesaid Roman Catholic subjects should be disquieted in their persons and goods for making profession of their aforesaid religion, and for living as Catholics, provided, however, that they use the permission modestly, and render the obedience which, as good and true subjects, they owe to their King. I also promise, through kindness to them, not to constrain them to any oath contrary to their religion, and I wish that my engagement, which I now sign, should be attested by a Secretary of State."¹

Then followed the signatures of Charles and Conway. It was not a transaction of which they had any reason to be proud. The edifice of toleration, founded upon a breach of one promise, might easily be overthrown by the breach of another. In truth, neither Charles nor Buckingham cared about toleration at all. What they wanted was to make the French marriage and the French alliance possible, and we may well believe that they swallowed the necessary conditions without inquiring too closely into their chance of being able to fulfil them. The explanation which Charles afterwards gave, that he had signed the engagement without intending to keep it, because he was aware that the King of France wished him to do so in order to deceive the Pope, finds no countenance from any source of information now open to us.

Whatever Charles's motives may have been, the French ministers required him to act at once upon the engagement he

Dec. 24. Suspension of the Recusancy Laws. had taken. On December 24 the Courts were forbidden to admit any further prosecution of the recusants under the penal laws.² On the 26th an order was issued to the Lord Keeper to set at liberty all Roman Catholics in prison for offences connected with their religion. At the same time the two Archbishops were directed to stop all proceedings against them in the Ecclesiastical Courts, and the Lord Treasurer was commanded to repay all fines which had

¹ Secret engagement, *Harl. MSS.* 4596, fol. 144.

² Conway to Williams, Dec. 30, *S. P. Dom.* clxxvii. 39.

been levied from them since the last Trinity Term. For the future the fines, instead of passing into the Exchequer in the ordinary course, were to be paid over to two persons especially appointed for the purpose, who were to repay the money at once to those from whom they received it. In this way it would look as if the fines were still being paid, whilst nothing of the kind was really being done. Nor was this the only deception practised upon the nation. These special orders were only made known to those specially interested in them. Another order, directing the banishment of the priests then in prison—which, as there was now nothing to prevent their returning in security as soon as they had crossed the sea, can only have been intended to throw dust in the eyes of the world—was passed under the Great Seal, and enrolled on the Patent Rolls, to be seen by all who chose to examine those public documents.¹

If Charles had not strengthened his position by the step which he had taken, Richelieu had still less cause to congratulate himself. He had indeed gained a great diplomatic success; but the very concession made to him was fraught with future evil to France as well as to England. Although both he and Louis had aimed at less than had been aimed at by Olivares and Philip; although France had been content with the protection of the English Roman Catholics, while Spain had aimed at the restoration of the Papal authority in England, even this interference with the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign was likely to produce an element of discord between the two nations which would more than counterbalance the family connection which was about to join the two kings. The marriage treaty was the first link in the chain of events which in two short years was to lead to war between France and England.

¹ The King to the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dec. 26; the King to the Lord Keeper, Dec. 26; the King to the Lord Treasurer and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Dec. 29, *S. P. Dom.* clxxvii. 25, 29, 37; Banishment of Priests, Dec. 24, *Rymer*, xvii. 644.

Value of
Richelieu's
success.

CHAPTER L.

THE LAST DAYS OF JAMES I.

To obtain from James the ratification of the marriage treaty was only part of Ville-aux-Clercs' mission. He had also to obtain permission for Mansfeld to attempt to succour

Dec. 1.
Ville-aux-
Clercs to ask
that Mans-
feld might
pass through
Flanders. Breda, and to contrive if possible to embroil James in open war with Spain.¹ James, indeed, almost immediately after the ratification of the treaty, took one step in the direction in which the Frenchman wished

Dec. 14.
James con-
sents. to guide him. On December 14 he issued an explanation of his former prohibition to Mansfeld. That commander was to ask leave from the Infanta to enter Flanders; but in the event of a refusal he was to force his way through the Spanish territory.²

As yet the name of Breda had not been mentioned either by Ville-aux-Clercs or James, though the relief of the town was

Further de-
mands of
France. plainly intended by the French. James's difficulties were only beginning. He had been given to understand that Mansfeld would land on French territory,

and would march at once to the Spanish frontier in order to demand a passage of the Infanta. Now, however, Richelieu took alarm, or pretended to take alarm, at James's former declaration that Mansfeld should not enter the Spanish Netherlands. Before James explained away his meaning on the 14th, orders had already been issued in the name of Louis to Ville-

¹ Ville-aux-Clercs and Effiat to Louis XIII., Dec. $\frac{1}{11}$, *Harl. MSS.* 1596, fol. 144.

² Explanation by the King, Dec. $\frac{14}{24}$ (?), *ibid* fol. 187.

aux-Clercs and Effiat to inform James that Mansfeld could not be permitted to land in France unless the English Government distinctly authorised his passage through the Spanish Netherlands. The alternative offered was that Mansfeld should go by way of Holland. He would certainly not be permitted to march a hundred miles on French territory.¹

As usual, the French ambassadors applied to Buckingham for support. The exact nature of the conversation between them cannot now be discovered. The Frenchmen were under the impression when they left him, that Mansfeld, if the passage through Flanders seemed undesirable, might take any other route he pleased, on the sole condition that the French cavalry, which was to take part in the expedition, should accompany the English infantry. They therefore wrote at once to Mansfeld, strongly urging him to convey his men through Holland,² instead of through France and Flanders.

Such, however, was not the understanding of Buckingham. Perhaps, as Ville-aux-Clercs thought afterwards, he was so confident of his influence over Mansfeld that he assented to the proposal that the commander might take any route he pleased, without duly considering all that might be implied in those words.³ Perhaps, when he came to speak to the King, and found how reluctant James was to give his consent to the course proposed, he may have thought it expedient to disavow the promise which he had heedlessly given, and it is certain that he afterwards assured Ville-aux-Clercs that he had never mentioned the possibility of Mansfeld's passing through Holland to the King. In fact, something very different from a mere military question was at issue. James wished to obtain the

¹ Louis XIII. to Ville-aux-Clercs and Effiat, *Harl. MSS.* 4596, fol. 200 b.

² They told Mansfeld that the English would give him entire liberty 'de prendre tel parti que vous estimerez le plus avantageux sans demander de nous autre condition que la cavallerie Français prendra même route, et sera embarquée pour passer avec leur infanterie.'—Ville-aux-Clercs and Effiat to Mansfeld, Dec. ¹⁸₂₈, *Harl. MSS.* 4596, fol. 212 b.

³ *Mémoires de Brienne*, i. 394.

open complicity of France in the coming war. Louis wished to involve James in hostilities with Spain whilst himself remaining at peace. If English troops landed at Calais, and then, accompanied by French cavalry, crossed the frontier into Flanders or Artois, it would be very difficult for Louis to wash his hands of the whole matter ; whereas if a small body of cavalry joined Mansfeld's army in Holland, whatever Mansfeld chose to do might be set down to his own wrongheadedness, or to the orders of his English superiors.

In the meanwhile, the unlucky men whose destination was the object of such contention, were gathering to their rendezvous

^{The rendez-}
at Dover. The aid of English troops was not to be despised. The Prince of Orange, who knew them

well, used to say that when Englishmen had got over their first sufferings, they were the bravest men in his motley army. The ten thousand who had gone out in the summer had been received by the Dutch with open arms ; but they had advantages which Mansfeld's troops would never have. They were volunteers, not pressed men. They had been incorporated into the Dutch army, and had gradually learned their work in the strictest school of discipline then existing in the world. They would be well clothed and well fed. There may have been an exaggeration in the popular saying that an Englishman could not fight without his three B's—his bed, his beef, and his beer—but it was exaggeration which contained a certain amount of truth.¹

All that went to the making of an army was wanting to Mansfeld's compulsory levies. His men, pressed against their wretched condition of will, had little heart for the service. The county officials, whose duty it had been to select them, had

too often laid their hands upon those who were most easily within reach, rather than upon those who were fittest for the work. "Our soldiers," wrote one who saw a number of them pass on their way, "are marching on all sides to Dover God send them good shipping and success ; but such a rabble of raw and poor rascals have not lightly been seen, and go so

¹ Relazioni Venete, Inghilterra, 75, 233.

unwillingly that they must rather be driven than led." "It is lamentable," wrote another in the same strain, "to see the heavy countenances of our pressed men, and to hear the sad farewells they take of their friends, showing nothing but deadly unwillingness to the service ; and they move pity almost in all men in regard of the incommodity of the season, the uncertainty of the employment, and the ill terms upon which they are like to serve, whereof I know not how discreetly I should do to tell you all that I hear spoken ; but it may suffice that I say the whole business is generally disliked, and few or none promise either honour to our nation by this journey, or anything but wretchedness to the poor soldiers."¹

Whether a real army could ever have been constituted out of such unpromising materials may admit of doubt. As it was, *They are irregularly paid.* the men had not fair play. Mansfeld, accustomed as he was to live at free quarters, was not in the

habit of paying much attention to his commissariat. Money difficulties, too, were not long in presenting themselves to him. He had received 15,000*l.* for the expenses of levying and arming the men, and 40,000*l.* for their payment during the months of October and November. He now, though the men were only just gathering at Dover, asked for another 20,000*l.* for the current month of December. But the resources of the Parliamentary Treasurers were exhausted, and it was only after some delay that the Prince was able to borrow the money on his own personal security.² What chance was there that the further sum, which would soon become due for January, would ever be forthcoming ?

Whilst Mansfeld was disputing with the Government over the accounts, the men were left to shift for themselves. When

Dec. 25. Insubordination of the soldiers. they reached Dover they found that but few vessels had been collected to carry them over, and that the state of the tides was such that even those few were unable to enter the harbour. Neither food nor money awaited

¹ Chamberlain to Carleton ; D. Carleton to Carleton, Dec. 18, *S. P. Dom.* clxxvi. 65, 66.

² Burlamachi's accounts, 1625, *S. P. Germany.* Chamberlain to Carleton, Jan. 8, *S. P. Dom.* clxxxii. 29.

them. As a natural consequence they roamed about the country, stealing cattle and breaking into houses. Their ranks were thinned by frequent desertions, whilst those who remained at Dover threatened to hang the mayor and burn the town.¹

To send down a commission for putting martial law in force was the first thought of the Council. To those who were on

^{1625. •} the spot it seemed a very insufficient remedy. "If Jan. 1. there be not order to pay the soldiers," wrote Hip-
Martial law. pesley, the Lieutenant of Dover Castle, "all the martial law in the world will not serve the turn." When the commission was read, one of the mutineers shouted out, 'If you hang one you must hang us all.' The man was seized and condemned to death; but the officers, who knew how much the men were to be pitied, were not anxious to carry out the sentence, and contrived to find an excuse for setting the prisoner free.²

In order to obtain vessels in greater numbers, an embargo was laid on several Hamburg ships which were lying in the Downs;³ but the removal of the physical difficulty in the way of the passage only served to bring the political difficulty into greater prominence. James and

^{Jan. 3.} Ships for transport put under embargo. Buckingham, whatever may have been the real nature of their communications with the ambassadors, still flattered themselves that whether the troops passed through the Spanish Netherlands or not, they would at least be allowed to make a French port the starting-point of their enterprise, so as to establish the complicity of Louis in the undertaking.

This was, however, precisely the thing which the French had determined should not be. Ville-aux-Clercs and Effiat had gained over Mansfeld, and Espesses, the French ambassador at the Hague, was busily employed in urging the States-General to consent to the landing of Mansfeld somewhere near

¹ Hippesley to the Privy Council, Dec. 25; the Mayor of Dover and Hippesley to the Privy Council, Dec. 26; Wilsford to Nicholas, Dec. 27; *S. P. Dom.* clxxvii. 17, 18, 33.

² Hippesley to Nicholas, Jan. 2; Hippesley to Buckingham, Jan. 3; *S. P. Dom.* clxxxii. 10, 11.

³ Embargo by the Council, Jan. 3, *S. P. Germany*.

Bergen-op-Zoom. In spite of the advocacy of the Prince of French negotiations with the Dutch. Orange, who was ready to risk anything to save his beloved Breda, Espesses found it hard work to gain the consent of the States General, by whom Mansfeld was better known than liked. Their towns, they said, which contained neither forage nor victuals, could not receive his troops, and to quarter them on the peasants could not be suffered. If, indeed, the soldiers were regularly paid by the King of England, and commissioned by him to serve against Spain, and if the promised French cavalry were allowed to accompany them, it would be another matter.¹

Before this hesitating acceptance of the plan reached England, Mansfeld had taken for granted that it would be adopted

Jan. 2. Mansfeld speaks of his change of plan. by the Dutch. He sent orders to the German troops which were waiting for him in Holland to remain where they were, and began to drop mysterious hints of his intentions. He informed Conway that when his shipping was ready, he would take the course which the winds allowed him, and which was most proper and suitable to his designs, mentioning also certain vessels which would be required for the embarkation of the French cavalry. Conway replied that he did not understand his meaning. He thought it had been arranged that the army should land in France, and march by land.² Upon this Mansfeld spoke out plainly, and declared his intention of carrying his army to Flushing.³

Buckingham, perhaps, with some uneasy remembrance of a consent half-given in his conversation with the ambassadors,

Jan. 6. Buckingham's dissatisfaction. attempted to argue with Mansfeld. The winds would be contrary, the rivers would be frozen, the States-General would be quarrelsome; there were no ships to bring over the French cavalry, so that his Majesty would be obliged to make war alone, and to this he would never consent. The sooner Mansfeld sailed for Calais the

¹ Carleton to Conway, Jan. 6, *S. P. Holland*. Villermont, *E. de Mansfeldt*, ii. 26. Rusdorf to Frederick, Dec. $\frac{18}{28}$, *Mem. i.* 399.

² Mansfeld to Conway, Jan. 2; Conway to Mansfeld, Jan. 4, *S. P. Germany*.

³ This is implied in Buckingham's letter of the 7th.

better. A few days later Buckingham spoke more impatiently.

Jan. 10.
The Prince
angry.

The Prince chimed in with him. "What he wishes," he said, "is impossible. The best thing he can do is to land at Calais, or France will not be engaged. From Calais he can go by any way he likes. What has he to do at Flushing?"¹

"France will not be engaged." There was the root of the matter now. Two thousand French horse, and such shadow of a French alliance as might rest upon the expedition by its being permitted to land at Calais, was all that remained of the grand scheme for the co-operation of the two nations for the recovery of the Palatinate. James's displeasure was still more outspoken. He sent Sir John Ogle and Sir William St. Leger to Dover to inquire into the condition of the troops. If they found Mansfeld bent on taking ways of his own, they were to dismiss the transports which had been collected with so much difficulty, and to send the men back to their homes.

The men had no such good fortune before them. Mansfeld, well aware that any attempt to land in France would be

Jan. 19.
Mansfeld
forbidden to
land in
France.

fruitless, replied that he would do his best to place his troops on French soil, and that he would allow himself to be stopped by nothing short of a direct prohibition from Louis. Such a prohibition was of course forthcoming, and on January 19 was placed in Mansfeld's hands, in the presence of Ogle and St. Leger. By this time his men were on board, and he still talked of crossing over to Calais, though it was St. Leger's opinion that 'a very small matter would send him back.'²

The experiment was not made. Buckingham was anxious to get the army off on any terms. He told Effiat that, if the Buckingham gives way. prohibition to land were persisted in, James would allow Mansfeld no choice but to disband his troops. Would it not be possible, he asked, to allow the force to go on

¹ Buckingham to Mansfeld, Jan. ⁶₁₆; Rusdorf to Mansfeld, Jan. ¹⁰₂₀, *Harl. MSS. 4596*, fol. 230, 231.

² Ogle and St. Leger to Conway; St. Leger to Conway, Jan. 19; *S. P. Dom.* clxxxii. 15, 16; Mansfeld to Buckingham, Jan. 19; *S. P. Germany.*

shore at Calais only for a few hours? If this could not be, still, if only he could be assured that the French cavalry would really join the expedition, he would do his best to satisfy the King.¹

To the Prince Buckingham gave his reasons for consenting to the passage through Holland. The opposition to the land-

^{Jan. 23.} ing, he said, doubtless proceeded from the Jesuit party in France. Was it, however, worth while to strive against it? Would it not be better, as matters stood, to send Mansfeld through Holland to the ecclesiastical territories on the Rhine? If the French cavalry were with him, Louis would be as much engaged in the quarrel as if Mansfeld had landed in France. Such an arrangement would do more to advance the main ends of recovering the Palatinate—as the States would be at Mansfeld's back, and the Princes of Germany would move if they were only encouraged by the arrival of his troops—than if Mansfeld were forced to land in France against the will of Louis.²

The march to the Palatinate, not the relief of Breda, was uppermost in Buckingham's mind. On the 26th he wrote to

^{Jan. 26.} Mansfeld that, against his own judgment, he accepted his opinion in favour of the march through Holland, whilst on the same day Conway issued

directions from the King to the colonels of the army forbidding them to obey their general if he attempted to employ them at Breda.³

At last, on January 31, the sorely tried army was able to leave Dover. As had been foreseen, the port of Calais was

^{Jan. 31.} He sails at last. closed against them. The French cavalry, which had been placed under the command of Christian of Brunswick, was not ready to start. Mansfeld passed

^{Feb. 1.} Anchors at Flushing. on his way without any accession of strength, and on February 1 the vessels which bore the English army cast anchor off Flushing.⁴

¹ Effiat to Louis XIII., ^{Jan. 23.} *Harl. MSS. 4596*, fol. 2956.

² Buckingham to the Prince, Jan. 23, *S. P. Dom.* clxxxii. 96.

³ Conway to the Colonels, Jan. 26; Minute in Conway's letter-book, p. 688, *S. P. Dom.*

⁴ Carleton to Conway, Feb. 3, *S. P. Holland.* Villermont, *E. de Mansfeldt*, ii. 283.

What good could come of an armament of which the commander was bent upon one line of action whilst the officers were under strict orders to pursue another? Hardships of the men from want of food. Before this difficulty could be faced there were many hardships to be endured. The provisions brought from England would only last for four or five days, and who could say how soon the scanty stock would be replenished? Mansfeld knew full well that not a single penny would be forthcoming from the English Exchequer for some time to come. Even if, by some strange good fortune, the men succeeded in reaching Germany without being starved on the way, what possibility was there that these raw levies, without food or money, could stand against Tilly's veterans for a day?

Mansfeld, however, had plainly no intention of leading his men against Tilly. If he had wished to do so, a plan which would have left Breda unrelieved was not likely Want of transport. to find favour with the States-General, and without the good-will of the States-General there was no obtaining the means of transport which he needed. In Holland, at least, it was firmly believed that the relief of Breda was the first step needful to success in Germany. It was 'the common opinion that if the Palatinate be only sought in the Palatinate, it would never be recovered.'

The troops could ill support delay. The men were 'poor and naked.' At Flushing they had remained for some days Sickness breaks out. closely packed on board the vessels which brought them over. Then they were transferred to boats which were to carry them to Gertruidenberg, a town not far from Breda. Three regiments reached the place of their destination. The other three had gone but a few miles when the frost came down upon them and made further passage impossible. Exposed to the cold blasts and the driving snow, sickness broke out amongst them. The exhaustion from which they had already suffered unfitted them to bear up against fresh hardships. When they left Flushing they had not tasted food for eight-and-forty hours. But for the aid of the Dutch Government they would all have perished from starvation.

At Gertruidenberg matters were no better. No preparation had been made to provide food for such a multitude. "All day long," wrote Lord Cromwell, who had come out in command of a regiment, "we go about for victuals and bury our dead."¹ Forty or fifty deaths were recorded every night. At last Count Frederick Henry, the brother and heir of the Prince of Orange, came to the relief of the suffering Englishmen. He sent them meat and bread, and provided them with straw to cover their freezing limbs as they lay in the boats. The account which Carleton gave of their sufferings ended in a cry for money. Mansfeld had brought with him merely 2,000*l.* He was not a man, the English ambassador thought, to care much for the welfare of his troops. He would prefer filling up the vacancies with new levies to taking reasonable care of the old ones.²

What possible use could be made of these ill-starred troops? The way to the Palatinate was barred against them by the Imperialist armies which had been hurried up to oppose them, and James persisted in his refusal to allow of their employment at Breda. Had they, indeed, been able to march up the Rhine, the diversion might have been useful to the Dutch. James, however, had no money to send, and he argued that the French, who had caused all the mischief, ought to supply the deficiency. If this could not be done, the States might perhaps advance the 20,000*l.* a month which he had bound himself to pay to Mansfeld.³

The Dutch were not quite inexorable. They allowed their credit to be used to raise a loan of 20,000*l.*⁴ They perhaps hoped that James would get over the difficulty by accepting a proposal which had been made for placing Mansfeld under Frederick's orders, who would not be bound by the King of England's engagement. "His Majesty," they were told, "cannot yet be moved to think

¹ Cromwell to —— (?), *S. P. Holland.*

² Carleton to Conway, Feb. 14, 18, March 1, *ibid.*

³ Conway to Carleton, March 4, *ibid.*

⁴ Memorial of Money raised for Mansfeld, Aug. (?), *ibid.*

it fit to break it by equivocations, or by changing of forms and names.”¹

James's last words in this matter—for they were his last—were entirely in consonance with his earlier ones. The Palatinate, and the Palatinate alone, was the object at which he aimed. War with Spain was to be avoided as long as possible. Impartial posterity will perhaps be inclined to think that he was wise in looking to the recovery of the Palatinate, rather than to vengeance upon Spain, as the true object of the war; but his mind, indolent in itself, and becoming more indolent as years rolled by and health failed, shrank from the fatigue of planning a large scheme of foreign policy as a whole, and he did not see that the enmity of Spain was the inevitable result of any serious attempt to recover the Palatinate. Even if he had been right in thinking it possible to interfere in Germany without provoking Spain, it would have been a grave mistake to pursue this object in close connection with France and Holland. For the first interest both of France and Holland was to diminish the power of Spain, and not to recover the Palatinate.

Whilst the Governments were disputing, the soldiers were dying. In little more than a week after James's last refusal was given, out of a force of 12,000 men, barely 3,000 The army wastes away. were capable of carrying arms. The French cavalry was equally thinned by sickness and desertion. When at last Christian of Brunswick brought his troops from Calais only a few hundreds out of the two thousand men originally under his orders were disembarked on the Dutch coast.²

Whilst Mansfeld's prospects of finding his way into Germany were becoming more hopeless every day, where were those allies upon whom James ought to have been Negotiations in Germany. able to reckon before he allowed a single Englishman to take part in an enterprise for the recovery of the Palatinate? What had been done to engage the assistance of

¹ Rusdorf, *Mem.* i. 498–510. Conway to Carleton, March 21, *S. P. Holland.*

² Villermont, *E. de Mansfeldt*, ii. 285.

the North German States, or of the Kings of Denmark and Sweden?

When Anstruther unfolded his master's plans in August to Christian IV. of Denmark, the King answered that he was quite ready to take arms, but that he must first be assured of the support of England and of the Protestant States of North Germany. It was therefore arranged that Anstruther should visit the princes who had most to fear from the progress of the Imperialists, and that Christian should give him a final answer on his return.¹

The position of the King of Denmark was a typical one. Like the other princes of North Germany he had looked with disfavour upon Frederick's Bohemian enterprise; but he looked with equal disfavour upon the establishment of a strong Imperial authority, and his zeal for Protestantism was quickened by the knowledge that, whether the secularised ecclesiastical possessions held by his house in Germany were held legally or not, no doubt existed in the Emperor's mind that they were still rightfully the property of the Church. His personal interest in the great question of the ecclesiastical lands was by no means slight. His younger son Frederick had the dioceses of Bremen, Verden, and Halberstadt either in possession or reversion.

As usual, personal and political objects were closely intertwined with objects which were neither personal nor political.

These North German sees were occupied by Protestants, who, though they called themselves bishops, or sometimes, more modestly, administrators, were simply lay princes, like the dukes and counts around them, the only difference being that, instead of holding their rank by hereditary right, they were elected for life by the chapters of

¹ Anstruther, in his account of his negotiations, March (?) 1625, *S. P. Denmark*, says 'that the King did ingenuously advise me, and did not forbear to second me by invitation of the Electors of Saxe and Brandenburg and others, by his own particular letters by me sent, and since again by letters of the King of Great Britain.' Droysen (*Gustaf Adolf*, i. 207-224), not being aware of this evidence, fancied that Christian assented to take part in the war at a later period through jealousy of Gustavus.

the dioceses, which often consisted, at least in part, of aristocratic sinecurists like themselves. It was quite natural that Catholics should regard such an arrangement as wholly indefensible, and, if no more had been at stake than the loss by the neighbouring princes of so rich a provision for their younger sons, the sooner a change came the better for Germany.

The results of the forcible dispossession of the Protestant administrators would, however, have been widely felt. Their lands were inhabited by a Protestant population, which would at once have been doomed to compulsory reconversion. Their fortresses would have been occupied by troops hostile to the order of things established in the neighbouring territories, and their revenues would have served as a bait to those Protestants who were anxious to make provision for their families, and who might perhaps not be slow to learn that canonries and bishoprics would fall into the laps of ardent converts to the doctrines of the Emperor and the Pope.

Were the North German princes so steadfast in their faith that they could be trusted to withstand the temptation? It is hardly too much to say that the fate of German Protestantism was at stake. With the fortunes of German Protestantism would come at last to be involved the fortunes of German nationality. The intellectual giants who since the days of Lessing and Göthe have overshadowed Europe, have all sprung up on Protestant soil; and the generation which has only just passed away could tell of the peaceful conquest over the ignorance of Catholic Germany achieved at the beginning of this century by men of the Protestant North,¹ and which paved the way for that political unity which is at last healing the wounds inflicted by the great war of the 17th century.

Though the Emperor had accepted the agreement made at Mühlhausen in 1620, by which the Protestant administrators were declared safe from attack as long as they remained obedient subjects, doubts were freely expressed whether he would keep, in the days of his prosperity, the promise which he had made in adversity. Even

Was the
Emperor
likely to
reclaim the
bishoprics?

¹ See specially the life of Friedrich Thiersch, by his son, Dr. H. Thiersch.

if scant justice were done to Ferdinand in this surmise, he might fairly be expected to urge that the diocese of Halberstadt was no longer under the protection of the agreement of Mühlhausen. Its Administrator, Christian of Brunswick, had certainly not been an obedient subject to the Emperor. Though he had now abdicated, in the hope that the chapter would choose a Protestant successor, in the eyes of the Emperor such an election would have no legal basis. Christian's treason, he would argue, had replaced the see in the position in which it was before the agreement of Mühlhausen, and the chapter was therefore bound to elect a really Catholic bishop, instead of a cavalry officer who called himself a bishop in order that he might enjoy the revenues of the see. There were, moreover, other ways, besides that of force, by which Protestantism could be undermined in the bishoprics. If a majority of a chapter could be gained over, a Catholic bishop would be chosen at the next election. Many of the canons were Catholics still, and, with the help of an armed force, it was easy to find legal grounds for turning the minority into a majority. In this way Osnabrück had lately been won from Protestantism ; and other sees might be expected, unless something were done, to follow soon.¹

At such a time Anstruther had not much difficulty in gaining the ear of most of the princes to whom he addressed himself. The Elector of Saxony, indeed, continued to stand aloof ; but in other quarters there was no lack of readiness to stand up against the Emperor, if only the English ambassador could engage to bring into the field a force large enough to give promise of success.

Whilst Anstruther was passing from one German state to another, Spens was engaged in making similar advances to the King of Sweden. Gustavus Adolphus was bound by every conceivable tie to the Protestant cause. He had to fear a Catholic pretender to the Swedish crown in the person of his cousin Sigismund. If the Emperor extended his authority to the shores of the Baltic, the throne of Gustavus

¹ On the position of these bishoprics, and of Halberstadt especially, see Dr. Opel's *Niedersächsische Dänische Krieg*.

and the national independence of Sweden would be exposed to serious danger. The dominion over the Baltic was for him a question of life or death. Yet it would be in the highest degree unjust to speak of him as taking a merely selfish or even a merely national view of the work of his life. Politics and religion were closely intertwined in the minds of the men of his generation. To him, the consummate warrior and statesman, the defence of Protestantism was no empty phrase. It filled him with the consciousness that he was sent forth upon a high and holy mission. It taught him to believe that in prosecuting the aims of his own policy he was a chosen instrument in the hands of God.

For Sweden he had already done much. Succeeding to his father in an hour of desperate trial, when the armies of Christian of Denmark were sweeping over the desolate land, the ^{His position} youthful hero had stemmed the tide of invasion at ^{in 1624.} its highest, and had wrung from the invader a peace which had preserved the independence of the country. He had since driven back the Russians from the coast of the Baltic, and was able to boast that the subjects of the Czar could not launch a boat on its waters without the permission of the King of Sweden. He had struggled, not unsuccessfully, against his Polish rival. But his eye had never been removed from the strife in Germany. To drive back the Imperial armies from the North, if not to overthrow the House of Austria altogether, was the object of his ambition. Yet no man was less likely than Gustavus to interpret the conditions of success by his wishes ; and it was certain that he would never throw himself, as Frederick of the Palatinate had done, into the labyrinth of a desperate enterprise, on the complacent assurance that what he was desirous of doing was certain to obtain the approval and the support of Heaven.

Already, the year before, Gustavus had made proposals to the exiled Frederick for a general Protestant league. Those proposals had been, with the consent of the States-General, communicated to the Prince of Wales; and when Spens arrived ^{Mission of} Spens at Stockholm in August 1624, he brought with him, in addition to his public instructions from James, verbal directions from Charles and Frederick to come to an under-

standing with Gustavus respecting the proposed alliance. Gustavus was not long in sketching out his programme. Plan of Gustavus. The time for half-measures he held to be passed. There must be a common understanding between all Protestant states. He, if properly supported, would make his way, through Poland and Silesia, into Bohemia. England and Holland could do much to help. Spain would have to be kept in check as well as the Emperor to be beaten back. The assistance of Catholic powers—France, Venice, and Savoy—was not to be despised. But let them find their own field of operation for themselves. They might attack Bavaria, or might make war in Italy at their pleasure.¹

The view taken of the war by the Swedish king was certainly very different from that taken by James. Moderation, fairness, and conciliation, admirable as they are whilst

Its merits. friendly settlement is still possible, or when it once more becomes possible after victory has been won, must be flung aside when hostilities have been once commenced. The spirit must be aroused which alone gives endurance to the warrior. The watchword must be spoken for which men's hearts will beat. To place poor, vacillating Frederick once more in his Electoral seat was not an object for which nations would care to fight, least of all if it were to be accomplished with the aid of a marauder like Mansfeld. But if it once came to be believed that Protestantism was in danger, it would be a very different thing. Then, indeed, an irresistible force could be gathered to make head against Imperial aggression ; and with strength would come again the possibility of moderation. The leader of an army such as Gustavus would have gathered under his standards would enforce discipline and spare the towns and fields of Germany from indiscriminate plundering. More than this, if he could give assurance that he was fighting in defence of his own religion without any intention of proscribing that of his opponents, he might gain help from those who from political motives alone were hostile to the House of Austria.

All this Gustavus was one day to accomplish. It was

¹ Oxenstjerna to Camerarius, Aug. 24, Moser's *Patriotisches Archiv*,

perhaps premature to entertain such a design in 1624. Until men have actually felt the weight of evil, they are hard to rouse to a course so revolutionary as that which Gustavus proposed. The Lower Saxon Circle was, indeed, threatened by Tilly, ^{Was it not} but it had not yet been invaded. The fertile plains ^{premature?} of Northern Germany had not yet been wasted by the armies of the South. The clouds were gathering, but the bolt had not yet fallen. The iron had not yet entered into the souls of the peasants of Pomerania or of the burghers of Magdeburg.

There was another risk, too, not unforeseen by Gustavus himself. Though he was not at war with Denmark, the fires of the old rivalry still smouldered on. What if Christian ^{Risk from Denmark.} should fall upon Sweden when its king was in the heart of Silesia or Bohemia? Denmark was not then the petty realm which modern events have made it. Its king reigned in Norway, ruled in Schleswig, and in part of Holstein, and held lands beyond the Sound which are now counted as the southern provinces of Sweden. So certain was Gustavus that no good could come from Denmark,¹ that he demanded that his allies should join him in forming a fleet to guard the Baltic against a Danish attack in his absence.

Before long Gustavus was compelled to modify his plan in a way which was certain to give offence to Christian. The

^{September.} ^{Bellin at Stockholm.} Elector of Brandenburg sent an ambassador, Bellin, to Stockholm, to offer to the King of Sweden his aid in placing him at the head of a league of North German princes. The Elector, however, coupled his offer with the condition that the war should be carried on as far as possible from Brandenburg. Instead of directing his course through Silesia into Bohemia, Gustavus was to ascend the valley of the Weser, and to cut his way to the Palatinate.²

¹ Writing to Spens on Nov. 18 Dec. 8, Oxenstjerna says that everything is as it was when he left, ‘nisi quod his ipsis diebus pro certo cognoverimus tractari inter Danum et Regem Poloniæ de confederatione mutua adversum nos.’ *Stockholm Transcripts, R. O.*

² Oxenstjerna to Camerarius, Sept. 10, Moser's *Patriotisches Archiv*, v. 56, 58.

Before these representations Gustavus consented to abandon his original plan ; but though he was ready to act in any way which might, at the time, seem advisable, he was not ready to act at all excepting under conditions which would give him a fair prospect of success. When, therefore, Spens, accompanied by Bellin, presented himself in England to declare the intentions

^{1625.} _{January.} _{Demands of Gustavus.} of the King of Sweden, those who heard him were fairly astonished at the magnitude of his demands. Gustavus, the ambassador said, was ready to lead an army of 50,000 men to the Palatinate. Of these he would furnish 16,000 himself, leaving the remaining 34,000 to be provided by his allies. He was ready to meet one-third of the expenses of the war, but another third must be borne by England, and the remainder by the German princes. There must be something more than mere talk of finding money. Gustavus had no intention of throwing himself upon a friendly country, like Mansfeld or Christian of Brunswick, on the mere chance of being able to pay his way. Sufficient to support his army for four months must be supplied in hard cash before he would stir. When he did stir, he would not encounter the dangers of a divided command. The whole direction of the war must be placed in his own hands. That he might be secured against a possible attack in the rear from Poland or Denmark, a fleet of twenty-five ships must be stationed in the Baltic, and the German ports of Wismar and Bremen must be temporarily surrendered to him, to give him a firm basis of operations. In order to discuss these propositions, a congress of the powers friendly to the operation should be held as soon as possible.¹

If there was to be war at all, the best policy for the English Government would probably have been to place itself unre-

_{Jan. 2.} _{James shrinks from the expense.} servedly in the hands of Gustavus ; but Gustavus was as yet but little known in England ; and as matters stood, with Mansfeld's expedition swallowing up all the little money which remained in the Exchequer, and with no

_{Jan. 5.} Parliamentary grant possible for many a month to come, the magnitude of the Swedish demands only inspired alarm. "I am not so great and rich a prince," said

¹ Rusdorf, *Mémoires*, i. 438, 439.

James, "as to be able to do so much. I am only the king of two poor little islands." The yearly expense, in fact, which he was asked to meet, would have exceeded 400,000*l.*, and he had already engaged to pay nearly 100,000*l.* a year for the troops which he had sent to the help of the Dutch, and 240,000*l.* a year for Mansfeld's army.

As the discussion went on, a natural anxiety was expressed by the English Government to see Sweden and Denmark acting in concert. Why, said Conway, should not Christian Denmark to be asked to join. be asked to bear part of the burthen? If neither of the kings would serve under the other, might not the supreme command be given to the Elector of Brandenburg?¹

Day by day the financial difficulties appeared in a stronger light. At last Buckingham assured Bellin that, though he Jan. 17. would spare neither life nor honour in the cause, France to be consulted. he must first hear what the Kings of Denmark and France would do. Bellin had better go on to Paris to consult Louis. As he had done in the case of Mansfeld, James was at last brought to promise that he would do as much as the King of France would do. Christian might be asked to leave the direction of the war to Gustavus, and a congress could meet at the Hague on April 20.

On his arrival at the French Court, Bellin found no difficulty in obtaining a promise of assistance. A French emissary, La Bellin in France. Haye, had visited the courts of Copenhagen and Stockholm, and, though he does not seem to have had any definite overtures to make,² it is probable that Richelieu was now hoping to obtain his sovereign's consent to a more active intervention in Germany. Bellin, however, was told that help would be given only on the understanding that the conditions of peace to be demanded after the war were to be settled by the Kings of France and England. Whether Gustavus would have consented to take money on such terms may reasonably be doubted.³

¹ Rusdorf to Frederick, Jan. $\frac{3}{12}, \frac{8}{18}$, (probably misprinted $\frac{18}{28}$), *Mémoires de Rusdorf*, i. 420, 430.

² Notes of a letter from Anstruther to Carlisle, Jan., *ibid.* i. 478 Oxenstierna to Camerarius, Jan. 23, *Moser*, v. 94.

³ Rusdorf to Frederick, Feb. $\frac{12}{22}$, *ibid.* i. 480.

Before Bellin returned to England, important despatches were received from Anstruther.¹ Christian, encouraged by the Offers of reports which the English ambassador had brought Christian IV. from the North German Courts, and possibly urged to exertion in the hope of outbidding the King of Sweden, now professed himself ready to embark on the war with less extensive preparations than those which seemed indispensable to Gustavus. Instead of asking for 50,000 men, he thought that 30,000 would be sufficient. If England would support 6,000 foot and 1,000 horse, at the expense of 170,000*l.* or 180,000*l.* a year, he would be perfectly satisfied. As his own dominions lay on the south side of the Baltic, he could secure a basis of operations without asking for the surrender of German ports. Finally, he made no request for the provision of payment in advance.²

To a Government without money in hand these considerations were decisive. In England, however, it was not understood

Feb. 20.
James promises to ally himself with Denmark. that the acceptance of Christian's offers involved the rejection of the Swedish plan. The rivalry between the two kings; it was thought, would be put an end to by the decision of the Congress when it met at the Hague.³ In the meanwhile Spens was to go back to

March 15.
Gustavus invited to co-operate. persuade Gustavus to enter upon the stage in conjunction with Christian. The offer of Denmark, he was directed to say, 'stood upon shorter ways and less demands, and if not so powerful, yet feasible, and held sufficient for the present.'⁴

The task of reconciling the two kings was not so easy as it seemed to the English Government. Not only was there jealousy of long standing between Sweden and Denmark, but the enterprise to which Christian and Gustavus were invited, was not one to be lightly undertaken. Though the North German princes were alarmed for the future, they were not

¹ They arrived between the 9th and 20th of Feb., as I judge from two letters written by Conway on those dates; *S. P. Denmark*.

² Substance of Anstruther's despatch, Jan. 13, *Mémoires de Rusdorf*, i. 472.

³ Rusdorf to Frederick, March 19, *ibid.* i. 510.

⁴ Instructions to Spens, March 19, *S. P. Sweden*.

yet reduced to desperation. Gustavus stood alone in perceiving the conditions indispensable to success. In the first place, a military force strong enough to defy opposition must be brought together. In the second place, within the larger league of the political opponents of the House of Austria, there must be a narrower league of those who specially aimed at a Protestant restoration in Germany, which would be able to speak with the authority of conscious strength if any attempt were made by France to snatch from it in the hour of victory the object at which it had aimed.

In England, for different reasons, neither James nor Buckingham were capable of taking so broad a view of passing events. James, wishing to recover the Palatinate of James, with as little cost as possible to his impoverished exchequer, was drawn on, half against his will, from one step to another, always selecting that policy which would involve him as little as possible in the war, and which would spare him something at least of those terrible demands upon his purse and of Buck-
ingham. which even the most economical mode of conducting military operations was certain to make. Buckingham, on the other hand, with Charles following in his wake, desired a vigorous and all-embracing war. Yet for the very reason that he had no idea of the strength gained by the concentration of effort in one direction, he shrank almost as much as James had shrunk from the large demands of Gustavus. If war was to be carried on here, there, and everywhere, it must of necessity be starved in each separate locality. If Gustavus stood alone in perceiving the way to victory, he also stood alone in resolutely refusing to take part in a war in which the probabilities of victory appeared to him to be small. As soon as the English resolution was reported to him, he informed

Gustavus turns against Poland. Spens that he would take no part in the German war on such conditions. Those who thought it so easy a task to overpower the resistance of the House of Austria might do their best.¹ The negotiation was thus brought

¹ Gustavus Adolphus to Spens, March 13, *S. P. Sweden*. This characteristic letter will be published in the next volume of the Camden Society's Miscellany.

to a close. When the spring came to an end, Gustavus embarked to carry on his hereditary feud with the King of Poland, hoping at least to prevent the Poles from coming to the assistance of the Emperor.

Even if Buckingham's policy had been far surer of a favourable reception in Parliament than it was, the demands for money for Mansfeld, for the Netherlands, and for Germany, would have strained his late popularity to the utmost. Yet these projects, involving as they did an annual expenditure of more than 500,000*l.*, formed only a part of the magnificent schemes upon which Buckingham was launching the English nation. After all, if he was not a great military commander even in his own eyes, he was Lord High Admiral of England, and the war would be sadly incomplete if the navy were to take no part in it. Though the armament of the fleet had been postponed from want of money, and on account of the cessation of any fear of an attack from Spain, orders had been given which pointed to the employment of the ships in the following spring.¹

What was the exact use to which these ships were to be put was still undecided. When Wake had set out in May 1624 for

^{1624.} ^{May.} ^{Proposed} Turin, he had carried with him instructions to sound the Duke of Savoy on the subject of the co-operation of an English fleet with a French and Savoyard army in an attack upon Genoa similar to that which had been suggested by Raleigh before he started on his expedition

^{August.} to Guiana. When Wake arrived at his destination,

he found Charles Emmanuel already prepared with a design of his own. Let the King of England, he said, lend him twenty ships of war, and pay twenty thousand soldiers for three months. The whole expense would be about 126,000*l.* In return for this, James should have a third part of the booty ; or, if he preferred certainties to uncertainties, the Duke would engage to pay him 900,000*l.* after the surrender of the city.

Genoa had so notoriously merged her interests in those of

¹ Survey of the Fleet, Aug. 31, 1624, *S. P. Dom.* clxxi. 36.

Spain, that she could hardly claim the privilege of neutrality. In England, as soon as the Duke's proposition was known, doubts were expressed, from a financial point of view, of the soundness of the proposed investment. Wake was told to ask the Duke what were his grounds for thinking the enterprise an easy one, but at the same time to assure him that it would be seriously taken into consideration if he could succeed in showing it to be feasible.¹

By this time, however, a French army under the command of old Marshal Lesdiguières was preparing to take part in the attack upon Genoa, as a diversion in favour of the troops invading the Valtelline, and Lesdiguières, sorely in need of a naval force, had despatched agents to England and Holland to recommend the plan in another shape. He proposed that the fleet should sail in the name of the King of France, though it was to be composed of English and Dutch vessels. They were simply to be hired by Louis as he might hire them from a merchant ; and if neither James nor the States-General would be able to lay claim to any share of the splendid profits of which the Duke of Savoy had held out hopes to the English Government, neither would they be called upon to take any part in the expense.

To this plan the Dutch at once gave their consent, and agreed to lend twenty ships for the purpose.² In England Buckingham warmly supported the agent of Lesdiguières, and persuaded James to follow the example set by the States-General. It was therefore understood that the French commander would have twenty English ships at his disposal.

Merely to lend a few vessels, however, was a trifle hardly worth mentioning in the midst of Buckingham's far-reaching schemes. In the course of a conversation with Ville-Spain.³ aux-Clercs and Effiat on the subject of this arrangement, he flashed before their eyes the grand project which, in the following summer, was to occupy so large a space in the thoughts of men. Another fleet, he said, there must be. It

¹ Wake to Conway, Aug. 9 ; Conway to Wake, Oct. 20, *S. P. Savoy*.

² Treaty with M. de Bellujon, Dec. 14, *S. P. Holland*.

should be sent to sea in the name of the King of Bohemia, and should carry a land army strong enough to seize some December. fortified post on the Spanish coast. Afterwards it could look out for the treasure ships which annually returned to Spain with their precious freight from the mines of America. When that was taken—and there could be no real difficulty in the way—the power of Spain would be crushed. Mansfeld and the Prince of Orange—at the time when Buckingham was speaking, Mansfeld was still in England—would have an easy task ; and France and England would be the joint arbiters of Europe.¹

Truly it was a bright and glorious vision. When Genoa had been taken, when Mansfeld had won his victorious way into Bucking. ham's self. confidence. the heart of Germany, when city after city of the Spanish Netherlands was surrendering to the armies of the Dutch Republic, then, even if the wealth of the Indies were not there to pay for all, Buckingham would have small need to fear the persistent opposition of the House of Commons. It was true that he had made no allowance for difficulties, or even for accidents. But how could difficulties or accidents be thought of when he was there to guide the State ?

Buckingham's vainglorious forecast was uttered in the middle of December. A month later he learned that even his Difficulties path was beset by obstacles. By that time he knew arise. that Gustavus at least did not think victory easy of attainment. He knew also that the French had ideas of their own about Mansfeld's employment. Finally he knew, too, that if they liked to control the march of English troops according to their own convenience, they were also quite ready to appeal to England for the aid which they needed in their own domestic difficulties.

For a long time the condition of the Huguenots had been The French Huguenots. such as to forebode a catastrophe. Too weak to trust themselves to the protection of the common laws of the realm, they had yet been strong enough to wrest from their

¹ Ville-aux-Clercs and Effiat to Louis XIII., Dec. $\frac{16}{26}$, *Harl. MSS.* 4596, fol. 208 b.

sovereign the right of maintaining garrisons in certain fortified places, so as to secure at least a local independence. Such a situation was full of danger. To surrender their privileges was to place their religion at the mercy of a jealous, perhaps of a bigoted, master. To keep them was to exist as a state within a state, and to flaunt the banners of a group of urban republics in the face of the growing popularity of a monarchy which had undertaken the task of founding the unity of France upon the ruins of a self-seeking aristocracy.

Whatever may have been the right solution of the problem, the French Government, before Richelieu's accession to power, Encroach- made no attempt to discover it. The Peace of Mont-
ments of the pellier, by which the last civil war had been brought
French Go- government. to a conclusion, had been violated again and again. Amongst other promises the King had engaged to pull down Fort Louis, a fortress erected during the war to command the entrance to the port of Rochelle ; but the Rochellese knew only too well that the walls and bastions thus solemnly devoted to destruction in word, were being strengthened under their eyes. Marshal Lesdiguières is reported to have said that either the Rochellese must destroy the fort, or the fort would destroy Rochelle. Richelieu, there is little doubt, would have counselled the fulfilment of the terms of the treaty, in order that France might have her arms free to operate against Spain ; but he had to consult his master's mood, and would find it hard to wring from Louis a consent to an act which looked like the abandonment of all control over a French city.

At last, whilst the more prudent among the Huguenots were still counselling submission, two brothers, the Dukes of Rohan and Soubise, both of them alike ambitious and incompetent, resolved upon once more fighting out the old quarrel in arms. On December 26 Soubise sailed into the harbour of Blavet in Brittany, and capturing six vessels of war, carried his prizes safely to Rochelle. The seafaring population of the great city welcomed him as their deliverer, and the civil war once more began.

Great was the indignation at the French Court when the

Dec. 26.

Soubise
seizes the
French fleet

news was told. Yet Louis was unable to take vengeance on the rebels without a larger navy than that which, after Soubise's captures, he had at his disposal. Richelieu as usual came to the rescue in the hour of difficulty. Richelieu asks aid from England and the Netherlands. Whether he wished to see the demands of the Huguenots conceded or not, he was not the man to deal lightly with rebellion. If England and the States-General, he argued, had been ready to lend ships to Lesdiguières for an attack upon Genoa, why should they not lend ships to Louis to be used against that perfidious city which was holding him back from the fulfilment of his obligations to favour their interests against Spain.

The Dutch Government had scarcely a choice. They could not afford to offend the sovereign with the help of whose subsidies they were making head against their oppressor. Richelieu's request, therefore, was at once granted at the Hague.

In England the preparations for the great naval expedition against Spain were in full swing. Twelve ships of war and a hundred transports were being prepared for sea,¹ and Buckingham was only waiting to hear once more from Lesdiguières in order to get ready the vessels intended for Genoa. To him, therefore, news which made it likely that there would be any obstacle in the way of the French co-operation on which he counted was most unwelcome. He at once informed Effiat that the demand made by his master should be complied with, and, without going through the form of consulting James, gave orders that the ships required should be fitted out immediately.² Not that James was likely to throw any obstacle in the way. When he first heard what had taken place, before Effiat had had time to ask for the use of his ships, he expressed himself strongly on the subject. "If Soubise," he said, "or anyone else takes upon himself to commit such follies in your master's dominions, I will give every

¹ The King to the Council of War, Dec. 1624, *S. P. Dom.* clxxvi. 58, i.

² Effiat to Louis XIII., Jan. ^{11, 17, 18,} _{21, 27, 28,} *Harl. MSS.* 4596, fol. 258 b, 277 b, 290 b.

kind of assistance against him, in men, in ships, and in any other way in my power." When he heard what Effiat wanted, he had no objections to make. "If those rascally Huguenots," he said, "mean to make a rebellion, I will go in person to extinguish them."¹

The French alliance was still regarded at the English Court as worth making sacrifices for, in spite of the misunderstanding which had by this time arisen about Mansfeld's destination. It was known in December that the dispensation for the marriage had been granted at Rome ; and, as it was believed that the Princess would be in England before the end of January, Buckingham, who was to hold the Prince's proxy at the ceremony, began his preparations for the journey. Charles indeed had been eager to go in person to Paris, as he had gone to Madrid ; but, upon a note from Louis intimating that his presence in France was not desired, he had been forced to abandon the idea.²

January, however, passed away without the arrival of the dispensation ; and with the delay came the necessity for a

^{Jan. 19.} further prorogation of Parliament,³ which, in its Prorogation turn, deferred for a yet longer time the possibility of Parlia-
ment. of obtaining money with which to meet the wants of Mansfeld's starving soldiers.

Richelieu had taken every means in his power to induce the Pope to grant the dispensation. Immediately upon the fall

^{1624.} ^{August.} ^{Richelieus} ^{and the dis-} of La Vieuville, he had despatched Father Berulle to Rome to expound to the Pope the advantages which would accrue to the Catholic Church from the English marriage. He had also taken care to reinforce the pleadings of the gentle enthusiast by plain speaking at Paris.

¹ Effiat to Ville-aux-Clercs, Jan. 23; Effiat to Louis XIII., Feb. 2; ²³ ^{Feb. 2}, *Harl. MSS.* 4596, fol. 295 b, 298 b, 327.

² Chamberlain to Carleton, Dec. 4, *S. P. Dom.* clxxvi. 15; Ville-aux-Clercs and Effiat to Louis XIII., Dec. 12; Louis XIII. to Effiat,

Jan. 10, *Harl. MSS.* 4596, fol. 157, 262.

³ Proclamation, Jan. 19, *Rymer*, xvii. 648.

He declared openly that if the dispensation did not come quickly, Louis would proceed to the marriage without it.¹

Richelieu's attitude had the desired effect. The dispensation was granted on November 21. When, however, it arrived November. in Paris it appeared that the Pope had only given way Alterations in the contract are demanded by the Pope. conditionally upon certain changes being made in the wording of the agreement between the two kings. Amongst other demands, he asked that, instead of the private engagement taken by James and his son, there should be a public instrument assuring freedom of worship to the Catholics, of which all the world might take cognisance.²

Some of the French ministers, forgetting that publicity had never been required before, fancied that even this concession

^{1625.} might be wrung from James. Effiat, however, soon February. convinced himself that the Pope's wishes had no chance of being complied with. In England a show They are rejected by James. was made of a readiness to throw up the marriage

treaty with France, and to fall back once more on the Spanish alliance. On March 11 a courier started with a safe-conduct for Gondomar, and with letters from the Prince as well as from the King, addressed to the old diplomatist.³ Richelieu, however, was not likely to risk a quarrel to satisfy the exigencies of the Pope,

^{March 21.} and on March 21 a promise was signed on behalf of The marriage finally agreed upon. the King of France to the effect that if the Pope's demands were not withdrawn within thirty days, the marriage should take place without any dispensation at all.⁴

Whether the French alliance would be able to stand the strain which the divergent views and interests of the two nations were certain to put upon it might perhaps be doubted;

¹ Richelieu, wrote Langerac, the Dutch Ambassador at Paris, on Aug. ⁶₁₆, 'verclaert dat indien deselve dispensatie niet haest en compt, dat men daerom niet laeten en sal met het huwelick voorts te procederen.' I owe this quotation, taken from the despatch at the Hague, to the kindness of Dr. Goll, of Prague.

² Carlisle to Buckingham, Feb. 16, *Hardwicke S. P.* i. 551.

³ Spanish *News-Letter*, March ¹¹₂₁, *Roman Transcripts, R. O.*

⁴ Carlisle and Holland to Buckingham, Feb. 24, *S. P. France*. Effiat to Louis XIII., March ¹₂₁, *Harl. MSS.* 4596, fol. 359 b.

but there could be no doubt that, as far as position at Court went, both Buckingham and Richelieu were the stronger for the successful termination of the controversies which had sprung out of the marriage treaty.
Strong position of Buckingham at Court.

Of Buckingham it might truly be said that he held the government of England in his hands. Whatever wild scheme crossed his brain was accepted with docility by the Prince, as if it had been the highest effort of political and military wisdom; and, when Charles and Buckingham were agreed, James was seldom capable of offering any serious opposition to their impetuous demands.

Until Parliament met, therefore, Buckingham had nothing to fear. It is true that there had been murmurs in high places at his tergiversation with respect to the English Catholics, and there can be little doubt that the greater part of the old nobility regarded him with aversion as an upstart. Such opposition he could afford to disregard. The Privy Council and the Government offices were filled with his creatures, or with men who found it expedient to bear themselves as though they were his creatures.

His opponents at his feet. No man except Middlesex and Bristol had ventured to stand up against him. Middlesex, though upon January. Middlesex and Bristol. his humble submission he had been liberated from the Tower, and had been excused the payment of a large part of his fine, was hopelessly excluded from public life. Bristol was less yielding than Middlesex. To a fresh demand that he

Feb. 2. should acknowledge that he had been guilty of errors in judgment during his embassy at Madrid, he replied by a re-statement of his own view of the matter, accompanied by a letter which, though humble enough, did not contain any acknowledgment that he had been in the wrong.¹ An ac-

¹ "Hoping that your nobleness and equity will be such as a true and clear answer will be more acceptable to your Grace than an unjust acknowledgment, I have entreated Sir Kenelm Digby to deliver unto your Grace my answers unto the propositions which he brought unto me from you, and humbly beseech your Grace to cast your eyes over them, and if there shall be anything wherein your Grace shall rest unsatisfied, I entreat your Grace to give me leave to attend you, where I shall endeavour

knowledgment that he had been in the wrong was, however, the one thing upon which Buckingham insisted, and, unless Bristol was much mistaken, he was debarred from appearing at Court by an order issued by the favourite in the King's name, without the consent of James. The Duke, said Bristol, in the account which he subsequently gave of the matter, 'moved his Majesty that I might first make an acknowledgment of my fault, which his Majesty refused to compel me unto ; saying he might then be thought a tyrant to force a man to acknowledge that which he was not guilty of ; and his Majesty sent me word that I should make no acknowledgment unless I would freely confess myself guilty. Yet the Duke caused a message to be sent me that his Majesty expected that I should make the said acknowledgment, and confess myself guilty.'¹

Others were more supple than Bristol. Williams and Weston had convinced their patron that they would be ready

Williams, Weston, and Calvert. to carry out his wishes ; whilst Calvert, who was secretly a convert to the Church of Rome, and had

long been anxious to escape from the entanglements of office, had laid his secretaryship at the Duke's feet, telling him plainly that he intended to live and die in the religion which he professed. Buckingham, who had spoken hard things of Calvert a few months before, was always inclined to deal gently with opposition of this submissive kind, and assured the secretary that he should come to no harm by his avowal. He was therefore allowed, according to the custom of the time, to bargain with his successor for 6,000*l.* to be paid to him as the

not only to satisfy you in these particulars, but that I truly and unfeignedly seek your Grace's favour, to which, if I may upon fair and noble terms be admitted, your Grace shall find me for the future a faithful and real servant to you, to the utmost of my power. But if I must be so unhappy as these my humble seekings of your Grace may not find acceptance—although I conceive my ruin an easy work for your greatness—I shall with patience and humility endeavour to bear whatsoever God shall be pleased to lay upon me as punishment for other sins committed against Him, but not against my master, whom I take God to record I have served both with exact fidelity and affection."—Bristol to Buckingham. *Earl of Bristol's Defence*, Pref. xxiii, *Camden Miscellany*, vi.

¹ *Ibid.* xxiv.

price of his withdrawal from office, and he was soon afterwards created Lord Baltimore in the Irish peerage.¹

Calvert's successor was Wotton's nephew, Sir Albertus Morton. He had formerly been secretary to Elizabeth, when she was still at Heidelberg. For the first time since the office had been divided, both the secretaries were thoroughgoing opponents of Spain ; and though neither of them was likely to be more than an exponent of Buckingham's policy, this indication of the views now prevailing at Court is not to be neglected. A few weeks later,

Feb. 9.
Morton
secretary in
Calvert's
place.

March 23.
Conway
made a peer.

the other secretary, Sir Edward Conway, received the reward of his obsequious devotion to Buckingham, 'his most gracious patron,' as he always called him, and was raised to the peerage as Lord Conway. The treasurersh

ship, which had been in commission since the fall of Middlesex, had recently been placed in the hands of Chief Justice Ley, who acquired a peerage with the title of Lord Ley. If he knew nothing of finance, he has at least Milton's high testimony to his personal integrity. After all, if Buckingham was to spend money at anything like the rate he was inclined to do, it hardly mattered much whether Ley knew anything of finance or not. A Colbert or a Peel would under the circumstances have failed in guarding the Exchequer against an enormous deficit.

1624.
Dec. 20.
Ley Treas-
urer.

In the course of the past year, Buckingham had added another office to those which he already held. Having received the reversion of the Wardenship of the Cinque Ports, Warden of the Cinque Ports. he persuaded the Warden, Lord Zouch, to surrender the post to him at once, by an offer of 1,000*l.*, and a pension of 500*l.* a year.² Such arrangements were too common at the time to call forth much remark, and but for subsequent events it is probable that we should have heard no more of it than we have heard of the very similar transaction between

¹ Salvetti's *News-Letter*, Jan. 27, Feb. 6; Chamberlain to Carleton, Feb. 12, *S. P. Dom.* clxxxiii. 43.

² Agreement between Buckingham and Zouch, July 17, 1624. Statement relating to the Cinque Ports, Nov. 11, *S. P. Dom.* clxx. 16, clxxiv. 71. Grant of Office, Patent Rolls, 22 Jac. I.

Calvert and Morton, or than we heard, till within the last few years, of the sums of money which passed from hand to hand whenever an officer in the army thought fit to sell his commission.

Buckingham afterwards declared that in accepting this office he was solely actuated by consideration for the public welfare.

His defence of his conduct. In the approaching war, it would be highly inconvenient if one part of the coast were to be under the

jurisdiction of the Lord High Admiral, and another part under the jurisdiction of the Warden of the Cinque Ports ; and future generations, by reducing the Warden's office to a dignified sinecure, were to afford testimony to the Duke's foresight in this particular. However this may have been, there is no reason to doubt Buckingham's sincerity : for, about the same time, he refused to accept an office of still greater dignity which James pressed upon him. It was proposed that he should be

He declines the Lord-Lieutenancy of Ireland. named Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, and should execute the functions of government by deputy. It is said that his refusal to decorate himself with the title caused great annoyance to his enemies, who hoped to profit by the disrepute into which his acceptance of the offer would have brought him.¹

In truth, it was not so much from the number of offices which he held that Buckingham was likely to lose the popularity which he had gained in the preceding spring,

1625. March 2. Advice of Williams. as by the superiority which he assumed over the holders of all offices. Williams, whose cautious prudence always led him to avoid extreme follies, but whose want of tact was continually leading him to forget that good advice is not always palatable, contrived to give dire offence to his patron by recommending him to retire from his dangerous prominence. The Marquis of Hamilton, the Lord Steward of the Household, had just died, and Williams at once wrote to Buckingham advising him to give up the Admiralty and to become Steward of the Household. In time of war, it was a necessity for the Admiral 'either to be employed abroad per-

¹ Pesaro to the Doge, Nov. $\frac{19}{29}$, Dec. $\frac{13}{23}$, 1624, *Ven. Transcripts.*

sonally, or to live at home in that ignominy and shame as ' his Grace ' would never endure to do.'¹

Williams's advice was good, but it was hardly likely to commend itself to a man who fancied himself equally capable of commanding a fleet and of governing a state. Williams had only succeeded in injuring himself.

Hamilton was but one of the many men of note who had fallen victims to that sickly winter. In the Low Countries, Deaths of Southampton, the patron of Shakspere in early life, men of note. succumbed to the fatigue of his duties as colonel of one of the regiments which had gone out in the summer to maintain the cause of Dutch independence. At home Caron, for thirty years the representative of the States in England ; Chichester, the soldier statesman, who had ruled Ireland so wisely ; and Nottingham, the Admiral whose flag had floated over the fleet which drove the Armada to its destruction, sunk one after another into the grave.

Rife as disease had been, no apprehension had been entertained of any danger to the King's life. At the beginning of Illness of the King. the year he had recovered from the severe attack of gout from which he had suffered at the time of Ville-aux-Clercs' visit in December, and he was again able to take his usual interest in current affairs.² On the 1st of March he was at Theobalds, in his favourite deer-park. On the 5th he was attacked by a tertian ague, and, although those around him did not think that anything serious was the matter, he was himself prepared for the worst. Hamilton's death affected him greatly, the more so as there were wild rumours abroad that he had been poisoned, and that he had been converted on his death-bed to the Roman Church, rumours which, however destitute of truth, made some impression at the time on the popular mind. To James the loss of Hamilton was the loss of a personal friend. "I shall never see London more," he said, as he gave directions for the funeral ; and he gravely reproved his

¹ Williams to Buckingham, March 2, 1625, *Cabala*, 280. This is the true date. Hacket, fancying the letter related to the death of Lennox, supposed it to have been written the year before.

² Chamberlain to Carleton, Feb. 26, *S. P. Dom.* clxxxiv. 47.

attendants who sough: to cheer him with the popular saying, "An ague in the spring is physic for a king." The large quantities of fruit which James consumed had probably impaired his constitution, and the constant habit of drinking small quantities of wine at short intervals, though it did not affect his head, was likely to weaken his health. He had never been a good patient, and he now refused to submit to the prescriptions of his physicians, who would consequently be all the more likely to take offence if irregular treatment were applied.¹

On the 12th James was believed to be convalescent, and was preparing to move to Hampton Court for change of air.

^{March 12.} Anxious to improve his condition still further, he re-His apparent membered, or was reminded, that when Buckingham recovery. had been ill in the spring, he had been benefited by some remedies recommended by a country doctor living at Dunmow. Under the directions, it would seem, of Buckingham's mother, a messenger was despatched to Dunmow, and the result was a posset drink given by the Duke himself, and some plaster applied to the King's stomach and wrists by the Countess, with all the zeal which elderly ladies are apt to throw into the administration of remedies suggested by themselves. The remedies may have been, and probably were, harmless; but they were given just as the

^{March 14.} hour came round for the returning fit, and this time The King worse. the fit was worse than ever. The regular physicians found out what was going on, and were highly indignant. They refused to do anything for the patient until the plaisters were removed. After this fit the King's condition again improved, but on the 21st he again asked for Lady Buckingham's remedies, and, though Buckingham appears to have remonstrated, the wilful patient insisted on having his way. The next fit was a very bad one, and again the physicians remonstrated. One of the number, Dr. Craig, used exceedingly strong language, and was ordered to leave the Court. But Craig's tongue was not tied, and it soon became an article of

¹ Chamberlain to Carleton, March 12, *ibid.* clxxxv. 48. Chambermayd to Elizabeth, March 27, *S. P. Dom.*, *Charles I.*, i. 2.

belief with thousands of not usually credulous persons that the King had been poisoned by Buckingham and his mother.¹

The next day, when the fit was over, Pembroke was about to leave Theobalds. James, however, could not bear to part with him. "No, my lord," he said, remembering the March 22. rumours that had been spread of Hamilton's change of religion ; "you shall stay till my next fit be passed ; and if I die, be a witness against those scandals that may be raised of my religion, as they have been of others."

The King called for Bishop Andrewes ; but Andrewes was too ill to come, and Williams had been sent for to administer spiritual consolation to the sick man. On the road March 23. Williams sent for. he met Harvey, the discoverer of the circulation of the blood, who expressed his fears that the patient would not recover. Williams found the King's spirits low ; and the next morning he obtained the Prince's leave to tell his father that his end was near. James bore the tidings well. "I am satisfied," he said, "and I pray you assist me to make ready to go away hence to Christ, whose mercies I call for, and I hope to find them." Till the end came, Williams was by the sick man's side whenever he was awake, 'in praying, in reading, most of all in discoursing about repentance,

March 24. James receives the Communion. faith, remission of sins, and eternal life.' On the 24th, James, after making at some length a confession of his faith in the presence of his son and the principal attendants on his person, received the Communion from

March 27. His death. the hands of Williams. After this his strength gradually sunk, and on the 27th he died.²

James was in his fifty-seventh year when, already an old man

¹ *State Trials*, ii. 1319 ; Fuller, *Church History*, v. 568. The evidence is worthless in itself, and the only ground for supposing it to have any value is cut away when once it is understood that Buckingham had no object in poisoning the King. Except in the single matter of the relief of Breda, he had had his way in everything. In a pamphlet published in 1862, entitled *Did James the First of England die from the effects of poison, or from natural causes?* Dr. Norman Chevers has shown that there is no medical evidence in favour of the theory of poison.

² Hacket, i. 222. Conway to Carleton, March 31, *Court and Times of Charles I.*, i. 1.

in constitution, he was taken away from a world which he had almost ceased even to attempt to guide. The last years of his life had not been happy ; nor was the promise of the future brighter. He had raised expectations which it would be impossible to satisfy, and it was certain that any credit which might accrue to him would be attributed by the popular voice to others than himself. It is but just to ascribe to him a desire to act rightly, to see justice done to all, to direct his subjects in the ways of peace and concord, and to prevent religion from being used as a cloak for polemical bitterness and hatred. But he had too little tact, and too unbounded confidence in his own not inconsiderable powers, to make a successful ruler, whilst his constitutional incapacity for taking trouble in thought or action gave him up as an easy prey to the passing feelings of the hour, or to the persuasion of others who were less enlightened or less disinterested than himself. His own ideas were usually shrewd ; and it is something to say of him that if they had been realised both England and Europe would have been in far better condition than they were. The Pacification of Ireland and the effort which he made to effect a more perfect union with Scotland were the acts which did him most credit. If in late years his attempts at putting an end to the war in Germany had covered him with ridicule, and if his efforts to form a great Continental alliance as the basis of war seemed likely to end in failure, it was not because his views were either unwise or unjust, but because either the obstacles in his way were too great, or he was himself deficient in the vigour and resolution which alone would have enabled him to overcome them. Keenness of insight into the fluctuating conditions of success, and firmness of will to contend against difficulties in his path, were not amongst the qualities of James.

The irony of flattery which in his lifetime had named him the British Solomon, was continued after his death. Williams, to whom the best points of the late King appeared so admirable, in contrast with the rash, headstrong violence of his successor, proclaimed in his funeral sermon the comparison between James and the wisest of the Hebrew kings. .

Either by the wish of Charles or by James's own desire, the body of the first of the Scottish line in England was not to lie apart, as Elizabeth lay in her own glory. The vault in which reposed the remains of Henry VII. and Elizabeth of York was opened, and the occupants of the tomb were thrust aside, to make room for the coffin in which was the body of him who was proud of being their descendant. To unite England and Scotland in peace justly seemed to James to be as great an achievement as to unite the rights of York and Lancaster, and to close the long epoch of civil war. The comparison which was thus invited could not but bear hardly upon the memory of the late sovereign. Henry, by his mingled vigour and prudence, laid the foundation of the strong monarchy of the Tudors ; James sowed the seeds of revolution and disaster.¹

¹ There is an account of the opening of the tomb in Dean Stanley's *Memorials of Westminster Abbey*. Curiously enough, James was defied even in the tomb. Close by the coffin of the author of the *Counterblast to Tobacco* was found a pipe, probably dropped by a workman

CHAPTER LI.

MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC PROJECTS OF THE NEW REIGN.

THE news that Charles had taken his father's place was received with general satisfaction. "The joy of the people," as a con-

March 27. temporary expressed it, "devoured their mourning."¹
 General satisfaction with the new reign. Of the character of the new King, silent and reserved as he was, little was known, and still less had reached the public ear of his questionable proceedings in the negotiation of the marriage treaty. It was enough that, ever since his return from Madrid, he had been the consistent advocate of war with Spain.

When Ville-aux-Clercs went back to France with the marriage treaty, Richelieu asked him what he thought of Charles.

Ville-aux-Clercs' opinion of Charles. "He is either an extraordinary man," was the shrewd reply, "or his talents are very mean. If his reticence is affected in order not to give jealousy to his father, it is a sign of consummate prudence. If it is natural and unassumed, the contrary inference may be drawn."²

The extreme reserve of the young King was doubtless closely connected with that want of imaginative power which His reticence. lay at the root of his faults. With all his confidence in his own thoughts, he failed to give to his ideas an expression which was satisfactory to others or even to himself. He did not like to be contradicted, and his father's rapid utterance had swept away his slow conceptions as with a torrent before he could find out what he really meant to say.

¹ Tilman to D'Ewes, April 8, *Ellis*, ser. 2, iii. 243.

² *Mémoires de Brienne*, i. 399.

The man who is too vain to bear contradiction and not sufficiently brilliant or wise to overpower it, must of necessity take refuge in silence.

Unfortunately the defect which hindered Charles from being a good talker hindered him also from being a good ruler. His defects as a ruler firm convictions of his mind were alike proof against arguments which he was unable to understand, and unalterable by the impression of passing events, which slipped by him unnoticed. The wisest of men, the most decisive of facts, were no more to him than the whistling of the storm is to the man who is seated by a warm fireside. They passed him by ; or, if he heeded them at all, it was only to wonder that they did not conform to his own beneficent intentions. "I cannot," he said on one occasion, "defend a bad, nor yield in a good cause."¹ Conscious of the purity of his own motives, he never ceased to divide mankind into two simple classes—into those who agreed with him, and those who did not ; into sheep to be cherished, and goats to be rejected. Such narrowness of view was no guarantee for fixity of purpose. When the moment came at last for the realities of life to break through the artificial atmosphere in which he had been living, when forms unknown and unimagined before crowded on his bewildered vision, it was too late to gain knowledge the acquisition of which had been so long deferred, or to exercise that strength of will which is only to be found where there is intelligent perception of the danger to be faced.

The same explanation will probably in a great measure account for the special fault which has, more than any other, cost Charles the respect of posterity. The truthful man must be able to image forth in his own mind the impression his engagements leave upon those with whom they were made ; and must either keep them in the sense in which they are understood by others, or must openly and candidly show cause why it is wrong or impossible so to keep them. The way in which Charles gave and broke his promises was the very reverse of this. He looked too much

How far he
was untruth-
ful.

¹ Laud's Diary, Feb. 1, 1623.

into his own mind, too little into the minds of those with whom he was bargaining. When he entered into an engagement he either formed no clear conception of the circumstances under which he would be called upon to fulfil it, or he remembered too clearly this or that consideration which would render his promise illusory, or would at least, if it had been spoken out, have prevented those with whom he was dealing from accepting his word. When the time came for him to fulfil an engagement he could think of nothing but the limitations with which he had surrounded it, or with which he fancied that he had surrounded it, when his word had been given. Sometimes he went still farther, apparently thinking that it was lawful to use deception as a weapon against those who had no right to know the truth.

Of the defects in Charles's character, the nation was as yet profoundly ignorant. All that was known of him was to his

^{Beginning of} advantage. James died a little before noon. After some hours spent in private, the young King—he was but in his twenty-fifth year—came up from Theobalds to St. James's. The next morning he gave orders that

^{March 28.} ^{The Privy Council.} all his father's officers of state should retain their places. With the exception of the Catholic lords,

Wotton and Baltimore, who were excluded, the new Privy Council was therefore identical with that which had existed at the close of the last reign. For though the names of Suffolk, Wallingford, Middlesex, Bristol, and Bacon were also removed, those who bore them had long ceased to appear at the board. The only addition to the number was Sir Humphrey May, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, a man of some ability and of a very conciliatory disposition.¹

The remainder of the week was passed by Charles in seclusion at St. James's. Buckingham, who was alone admitted to share his privacy, 'lay' on the 'first night of the reign in the King's bedchamber, and three nights after in the next lodgings.'² There is nothing to show that

¹ Proceedings of the Privy Council, March 28; Chamberlain to Carleton, April 9, *S. P. Dom.* i. 5, 46. *Council Register*, March 29.

² Neve to Hollende, April 5, *Court and Times*, i. 3.

Buckingham's familiarity with the King was in any way unpopular at this time, when the transactions relating to the French treaty were still involved in mystery. Of all men living Eliot was least open to the charge of undue subserviency. Yet Eliot wrote to Buckingham that he hoped to become 'wholly devoted to the contemplation of' his 'excellence.'¹

If the outer world was satisfied for the time, there were those at Court who knew too much to be at ease. Williams had instinctively shrunk from the unpopularity which was sure to result as soon as the concessions made to the Catholics were known, and he had too much common sense to look with favour on Buckingham's military projects, which he knew to be far too extensive for the means at his disposal. When the Lord Keeper was first admitted to the royal presence, he found Charles bent upon summoning Parliament immediately, to enable him to go on with his preparations by sea and land. The King even asked why the old Parliament of the preceding year might not be called, without the delay of fresh elections. Williams told him that this would be distinctly illegal, and hinted that it would be well to afford time to canvass the constituencies in favour of candidates of the right sort. But Charles was in no mood to hear of difficulties. Let the writs, he said, be despatched forthwith. Let not a day be lost. The fleet must go forth in the summer. War with Spain must be carried on vigorously. Williams did not venture to argue with his new master, but the few words which he spoke not being

¹ Eliot to Buckingham, April 1; Forster's *Eliot*, i. 111. Eliot had been coming to London to attend Buckingham on his visit to France, and Mr. Forster regarded the order, which met him, to remain in the West, as evidence of some intrigue countenanced by the Duke. But the order (*Council Register*, March 28) was plainly a *bona fide* one, giving him special duties to fulfil. In fact, Eliot was not wanted to accompany Buckingham, simply because Buckingham's journey was indefinitely postponed. When the Duke went it was under other circumstances, and the suite which he proposed to take was left behind. There was no slight whatever put upon Eliot. As I shall hereafter show, the breach between Eliot and Buckingham cannot be proved to have taken place till much later than Mr. Forster supposed.

sufficiently enthusiastic, the King turned his back upon him and dismissed him.¹

In the Council, too, voices were raised against proceeding March 29. Objections to the marriage with the marriage treaty as it stood. Matters had, however, gone too far to admit of hesitation now, and all opposition was put down by Buckingham with a high hand.²

A week after his father's death, Charles removed to Whitehall, walking without state across St. James's Park. His demeanour gained general approbation. His face was April 3. Charles at Whitehall. serious and pale. His attention to the services of religion was the object of almost universal remark.

Men told one another with satisfaction that the new King was 'very attentive and devout at prayer and sermons,' and were especially pleased to hear that he had refused to make the customary present of mourning to a single recusant. A few weeks later the newsmongers reported that, as an Irish earl was talking in a loud voice in a room next to that in which the King was at prayers, Charles sent to him to leave off prating and come to prayers. "His Majesty," said the Irishman, "knows well enough that I do not come to his prayers." "If he will not come to my prayers," replied Charles, "let him get out of my house."³

Such anecdotes were sure to be favourably received. Nor was the restoration of the state which had been observed at Order at Court in the days of Elizabeth likely to injure the King in the popular opinion. Almost anyone with a courtier's introduction could gain access to James; Charles directed that no one should be admitted to his presence without special directions from himself.⁴ Amongst those who were thus excluded was one who might have hoped for better treatment. Sir Francis Cottington had been Charles's secretary when

¹ *Hacket*, ii. 4.

² Effiat to Louis XIII., April ¹⁸₂₈, *Harl. MSS.* 4597, fol. 36.

³ Neve to Hollonde, April 5; Chamberlain to Carleton, April 9; Meade to Stuteville, May 6, *Court and Times*, i. 3, 6, 20.

⁴ Salvetti's *News-Letter*, April ¹⁵₂₅.

he was Prince of Wales, and had served him faithfully in that capacity. It was, however, well known that, having fallen sick at Madrid, he had declared himself to be a Roman Catholic, at least till his recovery, and that he had since protested, like Bristol, his belief that, with the aid of the Spanish ministers, the restoration of the Palatinate need not be despaired of. He was now not only stripped of his official position and emoluments, but forbidden to appear at Court. Cottington, like a man of the world as he was, went straight to the Duke, asking him ‘whether it could not be in his power, by all dutiful application and all possible service, to be restored to the good opinion his Grace had once vouchsafed to have of him, and to be admitted to serve him?’ Buckingham had at least the merit of speaking out his thoughts. He told Cottington ‘that he would deal very clearly with him ; that it was utterly impossible to bring that to pass which he had proposed ; that he was not only firmly resolved never to trust him, or to have to do with him, but that he was and would be always his declared enemy ; and that he would do always whatsoever should be in his power to ruin and destroy him, and of this he might be most assured.’

Cottington, seeing that all chance of advancement was at an end, replied that ‘he hoped, from his justice and generosity, that he would not suffer himself to gain by his loss,’ adding that he had not only by the Duke’s command laid out money in jewels and pictures, but had once, ‘in hope of his future favour,’ made him a present of a suit of hangings worth 800*l.* Buckingham told him that he should be at no loss. If he would send in his account, every penny should be repaid.¹

Such an anecdote as this points to the special danger of the new reign so far as it was to be influenced by Buckingham. There would be no personal meanness ; but whether anyone was to be treated as a friend or as an enemy would depend entirely on the accordance of his political views with those prevalent for the time at Court. There would be no largeness of mind, no readiness to hear all sides of disputed questions.

Charles’s heart was set upon greater things than on the

¹ *Clarendon, i. 13*

restoration of etiquette. On the 9th he directed the formation, April 9.
Committee on foreign affairs. of a Committee of the Privy Council to advise him on foreign affairs. Buckingham, of course, was one of the selected number. Of the other four members—Pembroke, Brooke, Ley, and Conway—Pembroke was the only one who had ventured to differ from Buckingham, and even he had never differed from him for any length of time.¹

The first result of the consultations of this body was the removal of the bar to the employment of Mansfeld at Breda.

Mansfeld allowed to assist the Dutch. The States-General were again applied to for money, and they consented to give their security for a loan of 40,000*l.* raised at Amsterdam. The English Government hoped that this sum would be sufficient to enable Mansfeld to take his way towards the Palatinate as soon as the fate of the besieged town was decided.² The demands of the Northern Powers were next taken into consideration. It appeared that the Congress at the Hague could not be brought

May 26. together as soon as was expected, and Charles Money sent to the King of Denmark. therefore entered into a separate agreement with the King of Denmark. He offered to furnish him with 30,000*l.*³ a month, and before May was at an end he paid over 46,000*l.* on account. He did not, however, abandon the hope that the co-operation of Gustavus might still be secured.⁴

If Charles was anxious for the success of Mansfeld and Christian, he was still more anxious for the success of his own

April. fleet, which, thanks to a timely loan of 30,000*l.* from The fleet got ready. Buckingham, was being rapidly prepared for sea.

The new King's first recorded appearance in public after his father's death was on the occasion of a visit to the shipping at Blackwall.⁵ It had been finally settled that twelve ships of the Royal Navy, twenty armed merchantmen, and

¹ The King to Ley and others, April 9, *S. P. Dom.* i. 43.

² Conway to Carleton, April 19; Carleton to Conway, April 19, *S. P. Holland.*

³ *Enrolments of Privy Seals*, May 26; Anstruther to Carleton, May 28, *S. P. Holland.* Ley to Conway, June 11, *S. P. Dom.* iii. 52.

⁴ Declared Accounts, Treasurer of the Navy. *R. O.*

⁵ Meddus to Meade, April 22, *Court and Times*, i. 11.

fifty colliers to act as transports, should rendezvous at Plymouth in June. Something more than ordinary sea service was intended,

May 1. intended, and on May 1, the Privy Council ordered that 10,000 landsmen should be pressed to accompany the fleet as soldiers. Of these, 8,000 were to be at Plymouth on May 25. The remaining 2,000 were to be sent over to the Netherlands, there to be exchanged, if the consent of the States-General could be obtained, for the same number of disciplined men from the English regiments in the Dutch service. By this means some steadiness might be imparted to the raw levies, who were but too likely to be the mere offscouring of the streets, sent by justices of the peace to serve his Majesty because they were troublesome to their neighbours at home.¹

The application made at the Hague for disciplined soldiers had been accompanied by a proposal that the Dutch should take an active part in the expedition itself. When **The Dutch asked to take part.** the demand reached the Netherlands, the soldier who had guided the Republic since the death of Barneveld had died, after a lingering illness. In his brother, Frederick

April 13. Henry, who succeeded him as Prince of Orange, and **Death of the Prince of Orange.** as Stadholder of five out of the seven Provinces, the States were eventually to find a soldier of a quality equal to that of Maurice; but he was as yet untried in his high post, and, with the fate of Breda trembling in the balance, the States-General naturally demurred to Charles's request to be allowed to select two thousand picked men from all the

April 17. English regiments in their service. Whatever men he **Reply of the Dutch.** took, they said, he must take by whole companies, the good and the bad together. They had, however, no objection to his invitation to share in a maritime attack upon Spain, and they agreed to furnish twenty ships to the proposed expedition. At the same time they expressed their desire to bring to trial the perpetrators of the massacre of Amboyna, and, for the time at least, this cause of dissension was removed.²

¹ *Enrolments of Privy Seal's, Dec. 23, Feb. 2; Reply to Carleton's Memorial, April 17, S. P. Holland. Council Register, May 1, 16.*

² *Reply to Carleton's Memorial, April 17, S. P. Holland.*

The discussion then turned on the further arrangements to be made for the expedition. For some reason or other, per-

^{May.} ^{Buckingham to command the expe-} aps to avoid subjecting England to reprisals from Spain,¹ Charles was unwilling actually to declare war, and it was arranged that Buckingham should take the command in person, but that he should receive his commission from Frederick the titular King of Bohemia.²

Where was the thunderbolt to fall? The intention had originally been to direct the fleet towards the coast of Spain, to occupy some fortified town there, and to watch for the treasure-ships returning from Mexico; but an idea dropped in conversation by some one in authority at the Hague was now taken up by Buckingham with characteristic warmth. The fleet and army

^{Plan of a campaign in Flanders.} might, he thought, be more usefully employed in an attack upon the ports of Flanders in combination with the Dutch forces. If those nests of privateers were taken and destroyed, both England and the Netherlands would be the better for the operation.³

Before such a scheme could be finally adopted it was necessary to obtain the approbation, if not the co-operation, of the French Government. Up to this time Charles had scrupulously carried out his engagements with Louis. By mutual consent the term within which the marriage was to be celebrated had been prolonged for a month as soon as James's illness was known to be serious,

^{May 1.} ^{Celebration of the King's marriage by proxy.} and before the month came to an end, the Pope, discovering that no attention would be paid to his remonstrances, ordered his Nuncio at Paris to deliver up the dispensation without waiting for further concessions from the English. The marriage was accordingly celebrated by proxy on May 1, in front of the great west door of

¹ That there was any wish to avoid attacking Spain is a theory impossible to maintain in the face of the evidence of the French ambassadors and others, who were watching Charles from day to day.

² Buckingham to Carleton, May 4, *S. P. Holland*.

³ Compare Richelieu, *Mémoires*, ii. 461-4, with Morton's instructions, June 14, *S. P. Holland*.

Notre Dame, after the precedent set at the marriage of Margaret of Valois with the Huguenot Henry of Navarre.¹

On the same day Charles gave directions to the Lord Keeper to carry out the engagement which he had taken as

Favours to the Catholics. Prince to remove the burdens weighing upon the Catholics in England. "We will and require you,"

he wrote, "to give order to all such our officers to whom it may appertain, that all manner of prosecution against the said Roman Catholics, as well on their persons as goods, for the exercise of the said religion, be stayed and forborne, provided always that they behave themselves modestly therein, and yield us that obedience which good and true subjects owe unto their King."²

Charles was represented at the marriage ceremony by the Duke of Chevreuse, a distant kinsman of his own,³ who had Buckingham attached himself warmly to the English alliance. As appointed to fetch home the Queen. of greater political activity in England, Buckingham abandoned the idea of visiting Paris as proxy for his sovereign, and, setting himself down to the work before him, looked forward, at the most, to sailing across the Straits in command of the fleet which was to fetch home the young Queen.⁴

Doubts about the French alliance. It is not likely that either Charles or Buckingham, in their sanguine optimism, foresaw the storm which they were raising in England by their concessions to the Catholics ; but they were beginning to doubt whether they would have anything except the person of the bride to show in return for what they had done. The league offensive and defensive between England and France, once promised as the crowning ornament of the marriage, had vanished amidst a cloud of compliments ; and now, before the end of April, had

¹ Siri, *Memorie Recondite*, v. 835, 847.

² The King to Williams, May 1, *S. P. Dom.* ii. 1.

³ Through his great-grandmother, Mary of Guise.

⁴ Salvetti's *News-Letters*, April 1, 29, May 6. That his final resolution to go to Paris was a sudden one, is plainly stated in a letter from Conway to Carleton, May 24, *S. P. Holland*. This explains why Eliot was not and could not be asked to attend. See p. 320, note 1.

come a letter from Carlisle, arguing that, for Charles's own sake, the less he said about such a league the better. No one

*April 21.
Carlisle's
warnings.* could tell on which side the weight of the French monarchy would ultimately be thrown. On the one hand French troops were co-operating with the Duke of Savoy against Genoa. On the other hand, no peace had yet been made with Soubise and the Huguenots of Rochelle. The Pope had despatched his nephew, Cardinal Barberini, to Paris, to mediate an agreement between France and Spain. Under these circumstances Carlisle doubted the wisdom of urging a stricter alliance upon the French. "I am infinitely apprehensive," he wrote, "of adventuring my gracious young master's virgin reputation to a refusal." The French, he argued, would break a treaty as easily as they would break their word. If they continued adverse to Spain they would of their own accord seek aid from England. If they made peace with Spain they would expect England to aid them against the Huguenots, a thing to which it would be impossible for the King of England to consent.¹

This was excellent advice, such as Carlisle, mere courtier and spendthrift as he is generally represented, was usually accustomed to give. Yet how was it possible for *Buckingham cannot abandon hope.* Buckingham to follow it? The policy of waiting till France made up her mind what part she would play, he had long ago impetuously dashed aside. For the sake of the closest union with France he had sacrificed his own consistency; and with it, though as yet he knew it not, his popularity with the English nation.

Buckingham could not bear that doubt should be thrown upon the hopes on which he had buoyed himself up so long.

*He deter-
mines to go
to France.* One chance yet seemed to remain to him. Forgetting how little his personal presence in Spain had availed him, he would try whether his personal presence in France would not clear all difficulties away. He could offer the co-operation of that great English fleet which was in a forward state of preparation, the aid of which, as he

¹ Carlisle to Buckingham, April 21, *S. P. France.*

imagined, the French Government was hardly likely to despise. If he proposed to attack the Spanish Netherlands by sea and land from the north, in conjunction with the Dutch, whilst Louis, taking up in earnest his father's last enterprise, directed his armies upon them from the south ; if he promised that the Spanish province of Artois should be surrendered to France as her share of the spoils, what French heart could turn away from so much glory, combined with so much solid advantage to the monarchy ? For the sake of such an alliance as this, Louis could hardly object to grant acceptable conditions to the Huguenots.¹

Influenced by these hopes and fears Buckingham had ceased to wish to give English aid to France against Rochelle. He

The English vessels for Rochelle. would rather, as far as we can judge from his acts, urge Louis to pardon the Huguenots, in order that he might

make war, than help him to subdue the Huguenots with the same object. A few days before James died, contracts had been signed which temporarily made over to the King of France the 'Vanguard,' a ship of the Royal Navy, together with seven merchant vessels hired for the purpose from their owners. They were to be placed under the command of Pennington, the companion of Ra'leigh in his last voyage to Guiana, and were to be at the service of Louis for a time varying at his discretion from six to eighteen months. It was expressly stated that the vessels might be used 'against whomsoever except the King of Great Britain.'² On May 8 the ships were ordered to cross the Channel, but on the 18th, a few days after Bucking-

¹ There are no despatches from Buckingham giving an account of his mission. But its main objects are to be found in Richelieu's *Mémoires* (ii. 459), and his statement is confirmed, so far as relates to the proposed league, by Rusdorf (Rusdorf to Frederick, ^{May 23}
_{June 2}, *Mémoires*, i. 578) ; and so far as relates to the attack upon Flanders, we know, from Morton's instructions referred to at p. 325, that such a project was in contemplation. The proposal about the Huguenots is noticed in Langerac's despatch of May ²⁰
₃₀, an extract from which has been communicated to me by Dr. Goll.

² Contracts, March 25, *S. P. France*. When Glanville afterwards stated that the vessels had been pressed, he probably meant, not that they had been pressed for the King of France, but that they had been first pressed for the service of the King of England, and then transferred to France.

ham had left England, Sir John Coke, who was the leading spirit amongst the Commissioners of the Navy, and who was deep in Buckingham's confidence, wrote to Pennington directing him in no way to meddle with the civil war of France, or to take part in any attack upon Protestants there or elsewhere. The true intention of his employment was to serve against 'the foreign enemies of France and England.' These orders, in flagrant contradiction with the letter and spirit of the contract, were said to be for its 'better understanding.'¹

This change of front in the matter of the ships was accompanied by another in the matter of the recusancy laws. On May 11, the English Catholics were full of hope. The order sent to Williams on the 1st² was, as they believed, to be obeyed. Three thousand letters to the judges, the bishops, and other official personages, commanding them to desist from any further execution of the penal laws, were ready to be sent out. Before the 23rd the Catholics were told that they must wait a little longer, as it would be unwise to fly openly in the face of the coming Parliament. When the session was at an end their demands might be attended to.³

It was hardly wise of Buckingham to offer to the French Government in so public a manner the alternative between a complete alliance with England and an open rupture. To Richelieu, who was anxious to lead his sovereign in the path in which Buckingham desired him to tread, the advent of the impetuous young man must have been a sore trial. He knew that Louis, hesitating as he was between two opinions, almost equally loathing the domination of Spain and the independence of his own Protestant subjects, would be thrown off his balance by the slightest semblance of a threat on

¹ Warrant from Buckingham, May 8; Coke to Pennington, May 18; *S. P. Dom.* ii. 37, 74. I must ask those who think that Coke's letter was written to throw dust in the eyes of Pennington, to suspend their judgment till I have told the whole story.

² See p. 326.

³ The English Catholics to Ville-aux-Clercs, May 11, 23, *Harl. MSS* 4597, 140 b, 170 b.

They are not
to serve
against the
Huguenots.

Change in
the treat-
ment of the
Catholics.

Danger of
Buck-
ingham's visit to
France.

either side ; and that it was scarcely to be expected that the headstrong Englishman, whose whole political position was endangered, should abstain from threats.¹

On May 14, Buckingham arrived in Paris. To the world in general he appeared to have set his whole soul on displaying his handsome person and his jewelled attire at the Court festivities ;² but those who knew that he was accompanied by the new secretary, Sir Albertus Morton, might suspect that he had more serious work in hand.³

Of Buckingham's negotiations at Paris we merely learn that, with Richelieu's warm support, the King sent a nobleman to Rochelle to invite the Huguenots to send deputies to Paris to treat for peace.⁴ After some delay caused by the state of the King's health, the Court set out for Compiègne, where Louis was to take leave of his sister. Bucking-

Richelieu's position is clearly defined in Langerac's despatch of June 23. He was always urging the King to war abroad and peace at home. The same ambassador, writing on June 27, says that Buckingham told the Queen Mother that the Huguenots must seek peace on their knees, with rapiers in their hands. As far as I can gather Buckingham's intentions, he seems to have come over in the spirit of this conversation, though probably he thought less of the rapier at the beginning, and more at the end, of his mission.

² The list of his clothes and attendants, printed in *Ellis*, ser. 1, iii. 189, of which so much use has been made by Buckingham's biographers, is not a list of what he really had with him, but of what he intended to take if he had gone as proxy at the marriage. Instead of the long train there set down, only Montgomery, Morton, and Goring accompanied him (*Salvetti's News-Letter*, May 23). He left England in such haste that he had to send back a gentleman "pour lui apporter ses nouveaux riches habits, afin qu'il se puisse montrer en ses vanités" (*Rusdorf*, i. 579). Under these circumstances Eliot, of course, did not accompany him. The story told by Wotton, how he dropped a diamond in Paris which he subsequently recovered, is, I suspect, the origin of the incredible tale that he purposely left his diamonds so loosely fastened on to his dress as to fall off, and that he then refused to take them back from those who picked them up.

³ Salvetti's *News-Letter*, May 23.

⁴ Langerac's despatch, May 20.

ham employed the two days which he spent there in urging the French Government to join England in a declared war against Spain. Either Louis took umbrage at the Duke's manner of negotiating, or he shrank from taking so decided a part.¹ He would neither bind himself to reject any pacific overtures which

Buckingham demands a strict alliance. might come from Spain, nor would he engage to take open part in a war for the recovery of the Palatinate.² Even the proffered bribe of the annexation of Artois to France did not move him. He would give 100,000*l.* towards the expenses of the King of Denmark, and he would continue his share of Mansfeld's pay for seven months longer, and would reinforce the Count's shattered army with two thousand additional French horse.¹ More than this he refused to do.²

By a statesman accustomed to take hard facts as they were, the result of Buckingham's mission would not have been re

Buckingham's failure. garded as so very pitiful. It was something that the French Court should show a disposition to treat with the Huguenots and to oppose Spain in its own time and its own way. Unfortunately Buckingham had staked his reputation on far more than this. Nothing but the most brilliant success would save his conduct with respect to the Catholics and Mansfeld's expedition from the gravest animadversion in the coming Parliament. He had gone to France with inflated hopes of unbounded success ; he returned bitterly disappointed. It is hardly too much to say that his visit to Paris in 1625 cut the ground from under his feet as completely as his visit to Madrid in 1623 had cut the ground from under the feet of

¹ The destination of the French horse is not mentioned in the despatch of Chevreuse and Ville-aux-Clercs which refers to the offer (*June 27, July 7, Harl. MSS. 4597, fol. 193*). But Lorkin tells Conway, in a letter of June 22 (*S. P. France*), that Richelieu had informed him that 'he had offered further a new succour of 2,000 horse for Count Mansfeld.' In his letter of Aug. 18, Lorkin further says that Richelieu, in conversation, told him 'that at Compiègne they had offered a million towards the King of Denmark's entertainment, 2,000 horse towards the setting up of Mansfeld's army again, and to continue their wonted pay for seven months longer, but could never, in all this time, get answer from England.' *S. P. France.*

² Richelieu, *Mémoires*, ii. 461.

James. He had yielded much, and had nothing to show for it in return.

Is it wholly impossible that Buckingham's vexation at his political failure may have vented itself in the extravagance of which he was guilty a few days later? Though Louis went no farther than Compiègne, his mother and his wife accompanied the young Queen of England some stages farther. At Amiens Buckingham spoke bitterly to Mary de Medicis. The Huguenots, he said, might come to Paris to ask for peace upon their knees, but they must bring their rapiers in their hands.¹ On the

Buckingham and the Queen of France. other hand, he addressed Queen Anne in terms of such passionate devotion, as they were walking together in the shades of evening, that she was forced to call her attendants to her help.²

That the handsome Englishman had made an impression upon the poor young wife, who had been treated with complete neglect by her husband, there can be no doubt whatever; and Buckingham, especially in his present temper, was not the man to restrain himself from taking ad-

vantage of her weakness. After his departure, he met

June 7. a courier at Abbeville bringing him instructions to impart certain information to the French Government. Hurrying back to Amiens, he informed Mary de Medicis of the State secret confided to him, and then asked for an audience of the young Queen.³ Being introduced, as was the fashion of those days, into the chamber in which Anne was in bed with her attendant ladies around her, he threw himself on his knees, and kissing the coverlet over her, poured forth a torrent of impassioned words such as would have beseemed a lover restored after long separation to the sight of his plighted mistress. Vanity and licentiousness were deeply rooted in Buckingham's nature.⁴ Yet were vanity and licentiousness sufficient to account for conduct so strange? May there not have mingled with unchastened desire some feeling of pleasure in paying his addresses thus publicly to the wife of the man who had thwarted his policy?²

¹ Langerac's despatch, June ¹⁷₂₇.

² The scene is described substantially in the same way in the Memoirs of Madame de Motteville, and in the Memoirs of Brienne. There is no very

Whilst Buckingham was making love or weaving political schemes at Amiens, the innocent pledge of the tottering alliance

^{June 12.} ^{Henrietta Maria lands at Dover.} was continuing her journey. On June 12 she landed at Dover. Charles, at the urgent entreaty of his mother-in-law, had retired to Canterbury, in order that he might not set eyes on his bride till she had recovered

^{June 13.} ^{Her first sight of Charles.} from the effects of sea-sickness. The next morning he rode over to Dover and took her by surprise.

Running down stairs, as soon as she heard that he had come, she offered to kiss his hand. He caught her in his arms and kissed her. "Sire," she said, as soon as she was able to speak, "I am come to this country to be used and commanded by Your Majesty." By-and-by, seeing that she reached to his shoulder, Charles, who had heard much of her shortness of stature, glanced downwards to see if her feet were raised by artificial means. "Sire," she said with the ready wit of her nation, "I stand upon my own feet; I have no helps by art. Thus high I am, and am neither higher nor lower."¹

Such passages between a sharp, bright-eyed girl of fifteen and a husband of twenty-four could not do more than gloss over the inherent difficulties of the situation. The young wife had been taught to regard herself as entrusted with the mission of comforting and protecting the persecuted members of her own Church. She had not crossed the sea forgetting her own people and her father's house. Nor was Charles likely to fill a large space in her imagination. Affectionate himself towards her, he was eager for her affection in return; but he expected to be obeyed without showing that superiority which secures voluntary obedience. He was punctilious, harsh when contradicted, and without resource in moments of emergency.

clear account of the despatch which reached Buckingham at Amiens. It seems to have been connected with the Duke of Savoy (Ville-aux-Clercs to Louis XIII., ^{June 27} ^{July 7}, and the subsequent correspondence : *Harl MSS. 4597, fol. 192, 213 b.*) Buckingham appears to have added a request that the 2,000 horse, instead of being placed under Mansfeld, should be lent to Charles to do what he pleased with them, probably to use them for the attack upon Flanders.

¹ Meade to Stuteville, June 17, *Ellis*, ser. I, iii. 196, 197.

Petty difficulties soon arose. Henrietta Maria had grown up under the care of Madame de St. Georges, and she begged not to be separated from her as she drove with her husband from Dover to Canterbury. She was told that the lady's rank was not high enough to give her a claim to a place so near the Queen. While, therefore, Madame de St. Georges was excluded, Buckingham's mother and sister, together with the Countess of Arundel, were allowed to seat themselves in the royal carriage. The first matrimonial conflict, rising at times almost to the dignity of a diplomatic dispute, sprang out of this question of precedence. The French ladies of the Queen's suite took good care to keep the quarrel open, and to teach her to regard everything English with contemptuous dislike.¹

On the 16th the King and Queen entered London by the highway of the river. Though the rain was falling fast, they

June 16.
Entry of the
King and
Queen into
London.

kept the windows of their barge open, so as to be seen by the multitude which awaited them. They were received with the utmost enthusiasm. The tops of the houses, the decks of vessels and lighters, were covered with a shouting crowd. Deeply laden wherries gave life to the surface of the river. The ordnance of the fleet at Blackwall, and after that the Tower gans, discharged a thundering welcome. The Queen, as she landed at Denmark House—the Somerset House of an earlier and a later generation—seemed to be well pleased with her reception. The London crowd knew no ill of her, and those who gathered to see her as she passed had it not in their hearts to be uncivil to one so young and fair. It was rumoured too that there were hopes of her conversion. Perhaps she had herself unwittingly given rise to the report. Some one had impertinently asked her whether she could abide a Huguenot. "Why not?" she quickly replied; "was not my father one?"²

Charles might well look merrily around him as he led his wife to his home. But for those terrible religious and political questions behind, he had no need to be alarmed at the little

¹ Chevreuse and Ville-aux Clercs to Louis XIII., undated, *Harl. MSS.* 4597, fol. 181.

² — to —, June 17, *Court and Times*, i. 30.

disagreement about Madame de St. Georges' precedence, or the important discovery of the French ladies in waiting that their mistress had to sleep in an old-fashioned bed which had done service in the days of Queen Elizabeth. Unhappily, two days before the royal entry into London, the first stroke had been aimed at the French alliance of which Henrietta Maria was the living symbol. On June 14 Morton was despatched to the Netherlands to urge the Dutch to co-operate with England in the attack upon Flanders, in which Louis had refused to share.¹ If this project should be adopted, the war would assume a more exclusively Protestant character, and poor Henrietta Maria's marriage would, politically at least, have lost its meaning.

For the moment, however, this risk was averted. It was by no means a propitious time for inviting the States-General to take part in a hazardous enterprise. On May 26

^{May 26.} ^{Surrender of Breda.} Breda had surrendered, and there was nothing so stable in the military or financial strength of England as to induce the cautious Dutch Government to abandon its defensive policy for an attack upon the enemy in the very centre of his power, especially as there was every reason to suppose that the project was not regarded with favour at Paris. If indeed a warning were needed to keep the Dutch from placing too great confidence in the overtures of England, it was not far

^{June.} ^{Deplorable condition of Mansfeld's troops.} to seek. The condition of Mansfeld's troops was more deplorable than ever. As soon as Breda was lost, the States, anxious to be rid of him without delay, had done their best to forward him on his way towards the Palatinate. The attempt was no sooner made than its impracticability appeared. Beyond the frontier 19,000 of the enemy's troops were waiting to swoop down upon him the moment that he abandoned the protection of the Dutch fortresses. In spite of the money which Carleton had succeeded in raising upon the security of the States-General, the men had, as usual, been infamously neglected. Four days passed after their arrival at the frontier before even a piece of bread was served out to the famished soldiers. The peasants, fearing the

¹ Instructions to Morton, June 14, *S. P. Holland.*

consequences of the irruption of a starving mob, had fled at their approach. Of the whole force—English, French, and Germans together—but 6,000 marching men were left. "Our General," wrote Lord Cromwell on June 7, "studies his profit and how to ruin us, I think ; else he would give us that which might make us live like poor Christians, and as the King's subjects. . . . I desire nought in this world but an honest life, and so doth my Lieutenant-Colonel, your servant. Let us but command men that may not die as if we had killed them by giving them neither meat nor money, and we will go anywhere where our noble conductor dare send us ; but to command a regiment starved, now not 220 men, I scorn it."¹

Such was the position of England on the Continent when, on June 18, Parliament met at last. The only diplomatic effort

^{June 18.} ^{Military and diplomatic failure.} and the only military effort which had been seriously taken up had ended in failure. The French alliance had produced no visible results. The men who had followed Mansfeld in January were either lying under the green sod in the fields of Holland and Brabant, or were cowering for shelter under the guns of the Dutch forts. The projects for ^{Necessities of the future.} the future were uncertain, hazardous, and enormously expensive. In the course of the next year 360,000*l.* would be required for the King of Denmark, 240,000*l.* for Mansfeld, 100,000*l.* for the regiments in the Low Countries, and some 300,000*l.* for the fleet, making in all a sum of 1,000,000*l.*, or more than three times the amount of the subsidies which had been granted in 1624 as an unprecedented contribution.

^{Probable state of feeling in the House of Commons.} Yet it is probable that the mere extent of the demand would not have stood in the King's way if the hearts of the Commons had been with him. Unless the new Parliament abandoned the position taken up by the old one, this was more than unlikely. At all events, in 1624 neither a close alliance with France, nor the embarkation of England upon a Continental war on a large scale, had been approved of by the Lower House. It remained to be seen whether the Commons of 1625 would be of a different opinion.

¹ Cromwell to Carleton, June 7, *S. P. Holland.*

CHAPTER LII.

THE FIRST PARLIAMENT OF CHARLES I. AT WESTMINSTER.

NEVER within living memory had there been such competition for seats in the House of Commons. Never had the members

June 18. chosen attended so numerously on the first day of Numerous attendance at the opening of Parliament. the session. Something there was doubtless of a desire to welcome the young King, of whom nothing but good was as yet known ; something too, it may be, of curiosity to learn the secret of the destination of the ships which were gathering, and of the diplomatic messages which had been speeding backwards and forwards over Europe. Nor is it at all unlikely that many at least were anxious to hear from the King's lips some explanation of the way in which his promise had been kept to the former Parliament, some assurance, if assurance were possible, that the English Catholics had not benefited by the King's marriage.

The presence of the members in London was not without risk to themselves. The plague, that scourge of crowded and unclean cities, had once more settled down upon the capital. In the first week of April twelve deaths from this cause had been recorded. By the middle of June, just as Parliament was meeting, the weekly mortality was one hundred and sixty-five.¹

Seldom has any sovereign had a harder task before him than that which was before Charles when he stood up to persuade

¹ Salvetti weekly records the numbers. The number last given is from a letter from Meade to Stuteville, June 18, *Court and Times*, i. 32.

the Commons to vote him unheard-of sums of money in order that he might carry out a policy on which their opinion had never been asked, and of which they were almost certain to disapprove. Yet it is extremely unlikely that he felt at all embarrassed, or that the idea that any reasonable man in that great assembly could possibly disagree with him even entered into his mind.¹

Charles opens Parliament. The business to be treated of, said the King, needed no eloquence to set it forth. He had nothing new to say. The advice which the Houses had given to his father had been taken, and he had but to ask for means to carry it still further into execution.

His speech. "My Lords and Gentlemen," he then went on to say, "I hope that you do remember that you were pleased to employ me to advise my father to break both those treaties that were then on foot, so that I cannot say that I come hither a free, unengaged man. It is true that I came into this business willingly, freely, like a young man, and consequently rashly; but it was by your entreaties, your engagements. . . I pray you remember that this being my first action, and begun by your advice and entreaty, what a great dishonour it were both to you and me if this action so begun should fail for that assistance you are able to give me." After a few more words, urging his hearers to haste on account of the plague, and protesting his desire to maintain true religion intact, he left it to the Lord Keeper to signify his further pleasure.²

¹ No doubt some will take the view that the speech was deliberately drawn up so as to avoid mention of the difficulties of the case. What I have said above, however, seems to me far more in consonance with Charles's character.

² In addition to the scanty notices in the Journals, we have for this Parliament Eliot's *Negotium Posterorum*, which has been edited by Dr. Grosart, and the Fawsley MS. belonging to Sir R. Knightley, which I have edited for the Camden Society. I shall refer to the latter as *Fawsley Debates*. Unless there is any special necessity for referring to one particular source, it will be understood that what I say in the text is founded on these authorities. The further volume of notes taken by Eliot I shall give as *Eliot Notes*.

Williams had not much to say,¹ and his hearers were doubtless thinking more of the young King's first appearance than of the Lord Keeper's rhetoric. If we can trust to the subsequent recollection of Eliot, the impression made by the speech.

made by Charles was pleasing. It was natural that he should not himself go into details, and the House might reasonably expect to hear more, in due course of time, from the Lord Treasurer or from a Secretary of State. Men were tired of the long speeches of the late King, and there was a general disposition to trust to the good intentions of his successor.

There was one point, however, on which the Commons had made up their minds. Whatever Charles or his ministers had yet to tell them about the war, they meant to hold him to his promise about the Catholics. Any concession to them they regarded as dangerous to the security of the realm.

Feeling about the Catholics
expressed by the Speaker.

When the Speaker, Sir Thomas Crew, was presented to the King, he took the opportunity of expressing the general opinion of the House on this subject. The King, he trusted, would be able to recover the Palatinate, and also 'really to execute the laws against the wicked generation of Jesuits, seminary priests, and incendiaries, ever lying wait to blow the coals of contention.' To this exhortation Williams, by the King's command, replied vaguely that speedy supplies were urgently needed, and that the House might trust his Majesty to choose the proper means of defending his religion.

On the 21st the Commons proceeded to business. There could be no doubt that precedent as well as ordinary courtesy demanded an explicit statement on the King's behalf of the amount of the proposed expenditure and of the reasons upon

¹ I am unable to discover the enormity of Williams's suggestion, that, if subsidies were too slow in coming in, Parliament might find some other way of hastening their grant, as that could not 'be unparliamentary which is resolved by Parliament.' Eliot's account of this session is so interesting that one is apt to forget that it was written some years after the event, and coloured by the recollection of all that had passed since. I may say at once that I do not believe that there was no feeling against the King till after the second application for supply.

which the demand was founded. With the last Parliament June 21. James had entered into a direct engagement to No definite demand of supply made. take the Commons into his confidence when they next met.¹ Whether, if Charles had told the truth, he would have satisfied the Houses, may well be questioned. He preferred to tell them nothing at all. Not a minister rose in his place in the Lords or Commons to say how much was wanted, or to explain in what way the supply, if it were voted, would be spent. Charles threw the reins about the neck of Parliament, and expected it to follow his call.

Silence under such circumstances, whether the result of a deliberate purpose, or, as is more likely, of mere youthful inexperience and ignorance of human nature, was in itself the worst of policies. Above all things assemblies of men ask to be led ; and to this assembly no guidance was offered. Whilst the House was still hesitating what to do, an unexpected motion was brought

Adjourn-
ment pro-
posed by
Mallory and
Wentworth. forward. Mallory, the member for Ripon, proposed that the King should be asked to adjourn the session to Michaelmas, on account of the prevailing sickness.

The motion was warmly supported by Sir Thomas Wentworth. It is easy to understand why it should have found favour in his eyes. To him the war with Spain was policy. sheer folly. King and Parliament, he thought, had gone mad together the year before. The duty of England, he considered, was to attend to its own business, to amend its laws and improve the administration of justice, leaving the Continent to settle its troubles in its own way. When he had heard of the prorogation of Parliament in October, he had been beyond measure delighted. "For my part," he had written to a friend, "I take it well, and conceive the bargain wholesome on our side, that we save three other subsidies and fifteenths."² An adjournment to Michaelmas now, which would save more subsidies still, would, we may readily conjecture, be equally agreeable in his eyes.³

¹ See p. 201.

² *Strafford Letters*, i. 24.

³ Eliot ascribes Wentworth's support of the motion to his desire to postpone an impending inquiry into the validity of his election. But Eliot could know nothing of Wentworth's motives ; and, even if it were worth

That Yorkshire members, coming from a part of England where antagonism with Spain was less pronounced than that in the counties, and above all, in the port towns, of the south, should wish to dispose for three months of the King's demand for subsidies, is easily intelligible. It is far more significant that Phelips, to whom Spain was as hateful as the principle of evil itself, should have risen in support of the proposal. There was matter of fear, he said, in every part of the State. Before they thought of giving, they ought to take an account of the supplies which were given in the last Parliament, and as, by reason of the plague, there could not possibly be found time enough then for such an inquiry, they should ask his Majesty that it might be deferred to a more convenient opportunity.¹

How far these words of the impetuous orator expressed the floating opinion of the House, must be left to conjecture ; but, whatever members might think, they were not prepared to drive the King to extremities, and Mallory's motion was without difficulty rejected.

Something, however, must be done, if it were only to occupy the time of the House. If the Commons had voted ten or twelve subsidies without asking questions, they would have given great pleasure to Charles and Buckingham, but they would have pleased no one else. At the next sitting, therefore, after a proposal for the appointment of the usual committee for grievances, came a motion from Alford² for a committee 'to consider of Wentworth's while to put off an investigation which must have taken place whenever the House met again, his was the character to court rather than to shun inquiry.

^{June 22.} ^{Committee for grievances not appointed.} *Fawsley Debates*, 7. The omission of all reference in Eliot's narrative to the part taken by Phelips, is enough to put us on our guard against trusting it too implicitly as a complete authority. Phelips's speech is mentioned in the Journals, though not in a satisfactory manner, and the *Eliot Notes* have the following, after Mallory's motion : ' Seconded by Sir Ro. Phelips, in consideration of the dangers, either for adjournment to another time or place.' We have therefore Eliot's own handwriting in favour of the correctness of the *Fawsley Debates* on this point.

² Doubtless the old member, who again sat for Colchester in this Parliament, though his name is omitted by Willis.

what course we shall take in all business this Parliament.' To these motions Rudyerd rose. After a studied panegyric on the King, he adjured the House not to be led away into inquiries which might lead to contention so early in the reign. Sir Edward Coke professed himself content that there should be no committee for grievances, on the understanding that an answer should be given to those which had been presented the year before ; and Coke's suggestion was ultimately adopted.

A new turn to the debate was given by Sir Francis Seymour.¹ Their duty to God, he said, must not be forgotten. Let them ask the King to put in execution the laws against priests and Jesuits. After an animated discussion, in which member after member expressed himself in accordance with Seymour's proposal, the question was referred to a committee of the whole House.

The most remarkable feature of this debate was the complete silence of the Privy Councillors in the House. It was only at its close that Heath, the Solicitor-General, promised that an answer should be given to the grievances of 1624. On the general policy of the Government, it would seem, no man was commissioned to say a word.

The next day the House went into committee on religion and supply, 'wherein religion was to have the first place.' The key-note of the debate was struck by Eliot. "Religion it is,"

^{June 23.} ^{Eliot's speech on religion.} he said, "that keeps the subjects in obedience, as being taught by God to honour his vicegerents. A *religando* it is called, as the common obligation among men ; the tie of all friendship and society ; the bond of all office and relation ; writing every duty in the conscience, which is the strictest of all laws. Both the excellency and necessity hereof the heathens knew, that knew not true religion ; and therefore in their politics they had it always for a maxim. A shame it were for us to be less intelligent than they ! And if we truly know it, we cannot but be affectionate in this case. Two things are considerable therein—the purity and the

¹ Mr. Forster ascribes this to Pym ; but Eliot does not give his name, and the Journals and the *Fawsley Debates* agree on Seymour.

unity thereof ; the first respecting only God, the other both God and man. For where there is division in religion, as it does wrong divinity, so it makes distractions among men. It dissolves all ties and obligations, civil and natural, the observation of heaven being more powerful than either policy or blood. For the purity of religion in this place I need not speak, seeing how beautiful the memories of our fathers are therein made by their endeavours. For the unity, I wish posterity might say we had preserved for them that which was left to us."

To this lack of unity Eliot now addressed himself. Arguing that those who had fallen away from it were a constant danger to the State, he urged that, if necessary, the recusancy laws should be amended, or, if that could not be, that the existing laws should be put in execution.

Eliot's speech is the more noteworthy as it announced the complete adhesion of a man who was no Puritan to the Puritan Meaning of opposition against Rome. In Eliot's composition the speech. there was nothing of the dogmatic orthodoxy of Calvinism, nothing of the painful introspection of the later Puritans. His creed, as it shines clearly out from the work of his prison hours, as death was stealing upon him—*The Monarchy of Man*—was the old heathen philosophic creed, mellowed and spiritualised by Christianity. Between such a creed and Rome there was a great gulf fixed. Individual culture and the nearest approach to individual perfection for the sake of the State and the Church, formed a common ground on which Eliot could stand with the narrowest Puritan. All superstitious exaltation of the external ordinances of the Church, of human institutions which gave themselves out to be divine, was hateful to both alike. The Calvinist creed Eliot could ennable to his own uses ; the Roman creed he would have nothing to do with. For the sake of the English nation it was to be proscribed and trodden under foot. There must be unity and purity of faith, and that faith must be one which brought man face to face with his Maker.

The result of this debate was a petition drawn up by Pym⁴

⁴ Mr. P. in the *Fawsley Debates* is surely Pym.

and Sandys, and altered to some extent in committee. The King was asked to execute the penal laws in all their strictness,

Recusancy petition drawn up. and to take other measures to prevent the spread of the doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church.

Nor did the Commons trust only in coercive measures. They desired that so many of the silenced ministers as would engage not to attack the government of the Church, should again be allowed to preach ; that a restraint might be put upon non-residence, pluralities, and other abuses ; and that some scheme might be drawn up for increasing the income of the poorer clergy.

If it is easy for us to condemn the readiness with which Eliot and Pym called in the authority of the State to repress a religion of which they disapproved, it is impossible to use their shortcomings as a foil for Charles's virtues. He, at least, had no more idea than they had of opposing religious error by moral force. But for the disturbing influence of his marriage, he would have been quite as ready as they were to put in execution the laws against the recusants. His difficulty was not that of a man who is asked to do what he thinks wrong, but merely that of a man who is entangled by two contradictory promises, and who sees the time approaching when one, if not both of them, must be broken.

When on June 30 the petition was sent up to the Lords for their approval, it had been still further modified. The request

June 30. The petition sent up. that the silenced ministers should be readmitted to their pulpits without exacting any fresh pledges from them had given place to a request that a fresh effort should be made to reduce them to conformity.

It would still be some time before the petition on religion reached the throne. What Charles expected the Commons to

Seymour's motion for a small supply. do as soon as they had relegated their religious grievances to the House of Lords it is impossible to say. Supply stood next in order to be treated of ;

but though twelve days of the session had passed away, giving him time to reflect on the attitude of the Commons, he had taken no steps to explain to them the real meaning of the vague demands which he had made in his opening speech.

If Charles expected that, when once the petition on religion had been cleared out of the way, the Commons would lay at his feet the vast treasures which he needed, but the amount of which he had not ventured to specify, he was soon bitterly undeceived. Scarcely had the petition left the House when Sir Francis Seymour rose and proposed the grant of one subsidy and one fifteenth, or about 100,000*l.* Seldom has a motion more simple in appearance been more momentous in its consequences. ^{Importance of the motion.} The vote proposed was as nearly as possible one tenth of the sum which Charles required to fulfil his engagements. It therefore implied, under the most courteous form possible, a distinct resolution of the House to give no adequate support to the war in which the King was engaged.

Seymour gave no reasons for his abrupt intervention. As far as he was personally concerned, it is not difficult to find an explanation of his conduct. ^{Consistency of Seymour.} He had been one of the most eager in the last Parliament to engage England in a war with Spain, one of the most decided in protesting against any attempt to involve Parliament in extensive military operations on the Continent.¹ He was therefore only consistent with himself in refusing the supply necessary to carry out a policy of which he disapproved.

The Court party was taken by surprise. Many of its members were absent from the House ; all of them had been left without instructions how such an emergency was to be met. Rudyerd alone, facile speaker as he was, was prepared to say something, and he dwelt at some length upon the recent expenses of the Crown, the sums of money which would be required for the payment of debts incurred in burying King James, for the entertainment of foreign ambassadors, for the approaching coronation, and for the war. The navy was to be got ready ; the Dutch, the King of Denmark, Mansfeld, to be assisted. But whatever Rudyerd might say, he had not been empowered to ask for any definite sum

^{The Court party taken by surprise.}

¹ On March 19, 1624, he had said that he had heard ‘wars spoken on and an army ; but would be glad to hear where. The Palatinate was the place intended by his Majesty. This we never thought of, nor is it fit for the consideration of the House, in regard of the infinite charge.’

of money, and the combined vagueness and magnitude of his demands were not likely to conciliate men who felt themselves drifting into a war the duration and extent of which were beyond calculation. The most dangerous temper in which an assembly can be found is that which arises when it believes that it has not been treated with confidence ; and though we have no means of knowing whether the House was in such a temper when Seymour rose, it certainly was not for want of a cause, if no such feeling existed.¹

The existing dissatisfaction, whatever may have been the extent to which it had spread, found full expression in Phelips

Speech by Phelips. Now, it would seem, he was less isolated than when at the beginning of the session he had risen to support the motion for an immediate adjournment. After a few words which, to Charles at least, must have sounded like bitter irony, in which he described the proposed grant as an expression of the affections of the subject, he went on to complain, in somewhat exaggerated terms, of the state of the kingdom as it had been left by James. Then, coming to the point at issue, he aimed straight at the argument upon which Charles had relied in his opening speech. It was not true, he said, that Parliament was bound by any engagement to the King. "The promises made," he explained, "were in respect of a war. We know yet of no war, nor of any enemy." Then, touching on still more delicate ground, he referred to the late disasters. No account had been given of the expenditure of the last subsidies. But even if that were in readiness, "What account is to be given of twenty thousand men, and of many thousand pounds of treasure, which have been expended without any success of honour or profit?"² Such failures, he

¹ I am sorry to say that I am forced to treat the situation as though the *Negotium Posterorum* had never been written. Eliot was so little able to place himself back in past days, that he reasons as if the vote passed had been an adequate supply.

² The 20,000 men are either a slight oratorical exaggeration, or include the French and Germans who were with Mansfeld. Eliot makes Phelips speak of millions of treasure, which is too absurd, one would think, even for an orator. I have followed the *Fawsley Debates*.

added, had not been usual in the days of Elizabeth. Let them press upon the King the necessity of taking these things to heart, and beg him ‘to proceed in his government by a grave and wise counsel.’ He would vote, however, for rather more than Seymour had proposed. He thought they might give two subsidies without any fifteenths, that is to say, about 140,000*l.* He hoped no man would press for more. If any man put forward the King’s merit as a reason for a higher grant, he missed the right way. “For other argument,” he ended, “we know what can be said, and hope that at the return of the navy ^{Grant of two subsidies.} there will be better inducements.” In the end Phelps’s amendment was carried, and two subsidies were voted.

Charles’s want of confidence in the House was thus met by a vote which was practically a vote of want of confidence in his advisers. ^{How far were the Commons in the right?} Phelps’s main position was unassailable. It was not true that, even if the existing Parliament were bound by the vote of the last one, it was under any engagement to the King, except to take into consideration his proposals relating to the war. When he came before the Houses without any definite demands, they could but judge him by the result of his actions, and those actions had been so thoroughly unsuccessful that they furnished no inducement to trust him blindly in the future.

Yet, though the step taken by the House under the guidance of Seymour and Phelps was certainly justifiable, it is impossible not to regret the manner in which the thing was done. An event of such historical importance as a breach between the Crown and the House of Commons should not have been allowed to take place upon a sudden and unexpected motion, followed by a hasty vote. The House, in all probability, would have failed in any case to establish satisfactory relations with Charles ; but it would have spared itself much obloquy in the future, and would have conciliated much popular feeling at the time, if it had condescended to put its views and intentions into an address in vindication of its thoroughly legitimate position. That there was no ill intention is probable enough. Men who disliked voting money for questionable objects would be glad

enough to escape from the necessity of entering into controversy with their sovereign, and would doubtless flatter themselves that, in voting two subsidies, they had done the King considerable service.¹

The vote of so inadequate a supply was a bitter pill for Charles to swallow. His first impulse was to remonstrate against the measure which had been dealt out to him. Instructions were given to one of the ministers to press the House to increase its vote.² But the intention was soon abandoned. By the King's order the Solicitor-General laid before the Commons the answer to the grievances of the last Parliament, and the Lord Keeper at the same time informed them that the King was sorry 'for the great danger they were in by reason of the sickness, and that' he was prepared to end the session as soon as they were ready.³ In these words the Commons naturally dis-

¹ This view of the case is that which finds a reflection in Eliot's narrative. As a key to the situation that narrative is quite worthless, but I do not doubt that the view taken in it was not without foundation in the feeling which existed at the time.

² I am always loth to challenge any assertion of the late Mr. Bruce; but it is clear to me that the provisional instructions calendared under July 8 (*S. P. Dom.* iv. 26) must have been written before July 4, as they contain a direction that the person to whom they are addressed should, if the main object failed, urge the House to turn their resolution into a Subsidy Bill, which was what they did on July 4, without pressing.

³ Eliot says that the message was 'that his Majesty received great satisfaction and contentment in their gift, both for the form and matter, it coming as an earnest of their love.' On this Eliot founds an argument, that the King having accepted the gift was precluded from asking for more. We have, however, three separate reports of the message: that of the *Lords' Journals*, that in Coke's statement in the *Commons' Journals*, and that in the *Fawsley Debates*. In none of these do any such words occur. Something of the sort may be implied from the fact that the King did propose to close the session, and Eliot may have taken that which was implied as actually said. The Lord Keeper may, on the other hand, have said something which, as not forming part of his message, may not have been formally reported. At all events, Eliot cannot be relied on for details. He says that the Subsidy Bill 'being passed the House of Commons, and that intimated to the King, it produced a message.' As a matter of fact the Bill had not even been read a first time when the message was delivered. Since

covered an intimation that they were to hear no more of the demand for money. The plague was raging terribly in London. Men were counting up the growing death-rate with perplexed faces. The members, believing that all serious business was at an end, slipped away in crowds to their homes, leaving less than a fourth part of their number to bring the session to a close.

Already, in spite of the preoccupation of the House with other matters, a question had been decided of some interest in itself, and of still greater interest as bringing into

June. Wentworth's collision two men who more than any others were to election.

personify the opposing views of the parties in the approaching quarrel, and who were both to die as martyrs for the causes which they respectively espoused. At the beginning of the session Sir Thomas Wentworth took his seat as member for Yorkshire. His rival, Sir John Savile, accused the sheriff of the county of having conducted the election so irregularly that a fresh appeal to the electors was a matter of necessity. According to Savile, the sheriff, being a friend of Wentworth, interrupted the polling when he saw that it was likely to go against the candidate whom he favoured. The sheriff, having been summoned to give an account of his proceedings, explained that when the poll was demanded it was past eleven in the morning, and that he had doubted whether it could legally be commenced at so late an hour. He had, however, given way on this point, but he believed that no one who had not been present when the writ was read had a right to vote, and consequently when some of Savile's men broke open the doors in order to force their way to the poll, he had put a stop to the voting and had declared Wentworth to be duly elected.

In the discussions which followed in the House, not only were the facts of the case disputed, but there was considerable difference of opinion as to the proper procedure at elections.

this note was written, I am able to bring Eliot's own testimony against the *Negotium*. The report in the *Eliot Notes*, in the possession of the Earl of St. Germans, like that in the *Fawsley Debates*, is silent on any word in the message about accepting the subsidies.

Wentworth bore himself as haughtily as usual. Not only did he state his case proudly and defiantly, but, in opposition to the rules of the House, he omitted to withdraw when it was under investigation, and rose again to answer ^{Wentworth's} advocacy of the arguments which had been urged against him. ^{his own case.}

Eliot at once rose to denounce the offender, comparing him to a Catiline who had come into the senate in order to ruin it. Before this invective Wentworth was compelled to leave the House, though he was afterwards permitted to return and to state his case once more.¹

It was no mere personal rivalry, no casual difference, which divided Wentworth and Eliot. With Wentworth good government was the sole object in view. Everything else was mere machinery. Conscious of his own powers, he was longing for an opportunity of exercising them for the good of his fellow-countrymen ; but, excepting so far as they could serve his ends, he cared nothing for those constitutional forms which counted for so much in the eyes of other men. The law of election existed, one may suppose him to think if not to say, for the purpose of sending Sir Thomas Wentworth to Parliament. He was himself arrogant and overbearing to all who disputed his will. In private he expressed the utmost contempt for his fellow-members,² and it is not likely that he had any higher respect for his constituents. He was an outspoken representative of that large class of

July 4. politicians who hold that ability is the chief requisite for government, and who look with ill-concealed contempt upon the view which bases government upon the popular will.

Eliot stood at the opposite pole of political thought. To

¹ Mr. Forster (*Sir J. Eliot*, i. 160), after giving Eliot's speech from the *Negotium*, proceeds as follows : “ ‘ Yet hear me first,’ cried Wentworth, as with a general feeling unmistakeably against him, he rose to leave. He spoke briefly and without interruption.” This implies that Wentworth succeeded in setting the rules of the House at defiance. The *Eliot Notes* do not agree with this view of the case. After referring to Eliot's appeal to the privileges of the House, they say “ W. sent out again. After, the motion being renewed upon question, W. admitted to be heard.” Wentworth therefore was specially authorised to speak.

² *Strafford Letters*, i. 24.

him the attempt to convert Parliamentary elections into a sham Eliot's re- was utterly abhorrent. In them he saw the voice of proof. the nation speaking its mind clearly, as he saw in the representatives of the nation once chosen the embodiment of the majesty of England. Out of the fulness of his heart he reproved the man who held both the House and its constituents in contempt.

The majority sided with Eliot. Glanville, whose authority was great on all questions of this nature, produced precedents

^{July 5.} to show that a poll when demanded must be granted, ^{The election declared void.} whether it was after eleven or before, and that electors had a right to vote even if they had not heard the writ read. Wentworth's election was declared void, and the doors of the constitution were opened more widely than they had been before.¹

Few as were the members remaining at Westminster during the last days of the session, they had still matters of unusual importance to discuss. Some three years before, ^{1622.} Richard Montague, the rector of Stanford Rivers, ^{Montague at Stanford Rivers.} in Essex, found in the hands of some of his parishioners a paper drawn up by a Roman Catholic missionary, containing the usual arguments against those Calvinistic tenets which, at the close of the preceding century, had been the accepted doctrines of the great majority of the clergy, and attacking the popular theology as if it was the accepted doctrine of the English Church. Montague, who belonged to a different school, and who found support for his opinions in those formularies of his Church which reflected the belief of an earlier generation, determined to frame a reply which should base its repudiation of the Roman doctrine upon grounds very different from those which were popular amongst the clergy and laity. He was not unversed in controversy, having already entered the lists against Selden himself, whose *History of Tithes* he had unsparingly condemned.

The result of Montague's meditations was that *The Gag for the new Gospel*—such was the quaint name of the paper

¹ Forster, *Sir J. Eliot*, i. 153; *Favrsley Debates*, 13, 36, 44.

which had aroused his indignation—received a reply under the
^{1624.} equally quaint name of *A New Gag for an Old Goose*. It is unnecessary to say that it was deformed
A New Gag for an Old Goose. with that scurrility from which few controversies in
that age were free. But, as far as the matter of the volume is concerned, an impartial judgment will probably consider it as a temperate exposition of the reasons which were leading an increasing body of scholars to reject the doctrines of Rome and of Geneva alike. To the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination Montague entertained an insuperable objection. He refused to speak of the Roman Church as indubitably Antichrist, or of the Pope as the man of sin.¹ Those who remained under the Pope's authority formed a part of the Church of Christ, corrupt and unsound in the highest degree, but not utterly apostate. Of the more peculiar doctrines sanctioned by Papal authority he spoke in a way very different from that in which the majority of Protestant Englishmen were accustomed to express themselves. He denied the right of the clergy to enforce upon the people the practice of compulsory auricular confession ;² but he held that in cases where the mind was perplexed or the conscience burthened with sin, the person so troubled might be invited, or even exhorted, to come voluntarily to the Christian minister, and to seek for advice and consolation, and for the declaration of divine pardon to the repentant offender. He denied that the bread and wine in the Lord's Supper underwent any substantial change ; but he asserted that Christ was therein present to the faithful receiver in some mysterious way which he did not venture to define.³ Pictures and images, he

¹ The passage about the Roman Church is a quotation from Cassander: “Et quamvis præsens hæc ecclesia Romana non parum in morum et disciplinæ sinceritate, ab antiquâ illâ unde orta et derivata est, discesserit, tamen eodem fundamento doctrinæ, adde etiam in doctrinæ sinceritate et sacramentorum a deo institutorum firma semper constituit, et communionem cum antiquâ illâ et indubitâ Christi Ecclesiâ agnoscit et colit. Quare alia et diversa ab illâ non potest, tametsi multis in rebus dissimilis sit. Manet enim Christi Ecclesia et sponsa, quamvis multis erroribus et vitiis sponsum suum irritaverit, quamdin a Christo suo sponso non repudietur, tametsi multis flagellis ab eo castigetur.” *New Gag*, 53.

² *Ibid.* 83.

³ *Ibid.* 258.

said, might not be made the object of worship or even of veneration; but there was no reason why they should not be used, even in churches, to bring the persons and actions of holy men of old before the minds of the ignorant, and thus to excite devotion in those upon whose ears the most eloquent sermon would fall flat. Montague, in short, proposed that they should be used much in the same way as the pictures in illustrated Bibles, or in painted church windows, are used in our own time.¹ He finally argued that prayers to the saints were to be rejected, not because he doubted that the holy dead retained a loving sympathy with those who were yet living, but because he was unconvinced that there was any way of reaching their ears so as to excite their pity, and further, because 'we may well be blamed of folly for going about, when we may go direct; unto them, when we may go to God.'²

Such opinions were not likely to pass long unchallenged. Two clergymen, Yates and Ward, complained to a committee of the Commons in the last Parliament of James, and, as the session was drawing to a close, the Abbot. Commons referred their complaint to the Archbishop of Canterbury.

The Com-
mons refer
the book to
Abbot. Although Abbot warmly sympathised with the objections taken to the *New Gag*, he did not much like the responsibility thrust upon him by the House of Commons. If the proceedings. idea, prevalent with modern writers, that he was still under disgrace in consequence of the accidental homicide committed by him in Lord Zouch's park, finds little countenance from contemporary evidence, it is certain that James far preferred the chatty, secular-minded Williams to the Calvinistic, clerical Archbishop. Abbot therefore thought it best, as soon as he had read the book, to ask James what he had better do, and was recommended to send for the author.

¹ "Images have three uses assigned by your schools. Stay there, go no further, and we charge you not with idolatry! *Institutionem rudium, commonefactionem historiæ, et excitationem devotionis.* . . . Not the making of images is disliked, not the having of images is condemned, but the profaning of them to unlawful uses in worshipping and adoring them." *New Gag*, 300, 303.

² *Ibid.* 229.

Abbot took the hint. "Mr. Montague," he said, "you profess you hate Popery, and no way incline to Arminianism.

He remonstrates with Montague. You see what disturbance is grown in the Church and the Parliament House by the book by you lately put forth. Be occasion of no scandal or offence ; and therefore this is my advice unto you. Go home, review over your book. It may be divers things have slipped you, which, upon better advice, you will reform. If anything be said too much, take it away ; if anything be too little, add unto it ; if anything be obscure, explain it ; but do not wed yourself to your own opinion, and remember we must give an account of our ministry unto Christ."

Such advice, which might perhaps have been of some avail with a young man whose opinions were as yet unformed, was of course thrown away upon a practised writer who was simply asked to cast the whole treasure of his intellect in a new mould. Montague too went to the King, and found in James a sympathising auditor. "If that is to be a Papist," said James, "so am I a Papist." By the King's permission he prepared a second book, entitled *Appello Cæsarem*, in which he vindicated more fiercely than before his claim to be the true exponent of the doctrine of the Church ; and this book, having been referred by James to Dr. White, Dean of Carlisle, was by him declared to contain nothing but what was agreeable to the public faith, doctrine, and discipline of the Church of England, and was accordingly licensed for the press. Before it was ready for publication, James died, and it was issued with a dedication to his successor.

Montague's opinions were not likely to be popular. On July 1, as soon as the question of supply had been settled, the

1625.
July 1.
The Com-
mons apply
to Abbot. Commons sent a deputation to Abbot, to know what steps he had taken. The deputation found him much vexed. After telling them all that had happened, he complained that he had not even been informed of the intended publication of the second book till it was actually in the press. As, however, he had no legal jurisdiction over Montague on the mere complaint of the House of Commons, all that he could say was that he would gladly give his judg-

ment upon the *Appello Cæsarem* whenever he should be ‘orderly directed to it.

The attempt of the Commons to obtain the unofficial support of the Archbishop having thus fairly broken down, they referred the whole subject to the committee by which the Petition on Recusancy had been prepared.

That the report of the committee would be adverse to Montague was clearly to be foreseen. His opinions had made but little way amongst the lawyers and country gentlemen—the two most conservative classes in the nation—of whom the House was mainly composed. Nor indeed was it to be expected that the prevailing Calvinism would surrender its ground without a struggle. It had done great things for Europe. At a time when the individual tendencies of Protestantism threatened to run riot, it had given to men a consistent creed and an unbending moral discipline, which was yet Protestant to the core, as being built upon the idea of the Divine choice resting upon the individual soul, without the intervention of any priest or ecclesiastical society. Wherever the struggle with Rome was the deadliest, it was under the banner of Calvinism that the battle had been waged. Wherever in quiet villages, or in the lanes of great cities, anyone woke up to the consciousness that a harder battle with sin was to be waged in his heart, it was in the strength of the Calvinistic creed that he had equipped himself for the contest. Alone with his God, the repentant struggling sinner entered the valley of the shadow of death. Alone with his God he stepped forth triumphantly to hold out a hand to those who had passed through the like experience with himself.

The strength of the English Calvinists lay mainly in the humble peaceable men who found in their creed a safeguard against a life of sin. Such a one was the father of Richard Baxter. Around his Shropshire home, in the last ten years of James’s reign, there was but little preaching at all. In one village there were ‘four readers successively in six years’ time,’ ignorant men, and two of them immoral in their lives ! In another ‘there was a reader of about eighty years of

The books referred to a committee.

age that never preached.' He said the Common Prayer by heart, and got a day-labourer or a stage-player to read the psalms and lessons. These were succeeded by others, one of whom obtained a living in Staffordshire, and, after preaching for twelve or sixteen years, was turned out on the discovery that his orders were forged. Then came an attorney's clerk who was a drunkard, and who took orders, or pretended to have done so, because he could not make his living in any other way. On Sundays and holidays these men read prayers, 'and taught school and tippled on the week days,' often getting drunk and whipping the boys. The villagers did not prosper under such shepherds. As soon as the hasty service was over on Sunday morning, they gathered round the maypole on the green and spent the rest of the day in dancing and jollity. To take no share in these riotous amusements was to incur the mockery of the little community, and to earn the nickname of Puritan, a word which then carried the deadliest reproach. Not that the elder Baxter had any wish to separate himself from the Church. He 'never scrupled Common Prayers or ceremonies, nor spoke against Bishops, nor ever so much as prayed but by a book or form, being not ever acquainted then with any that did otherwise; but only for reading Scripture when the rest were dancing on the Lord's Day, and for praying—by a form out of the end of the Common Prayer Book—in his house, and for reproving drunkards and swearers, and for talking sometimes a few words of Scripture and the life to come, he was reviled commonly by the name of Puritan, Precisian, and hypocrite.'¹

For most of those who took part in the conflict with Rome and the conflict within themselves, there was no disposition to shake off the Calvinistic doctrine. They felt it as a support rather than an incumbrance. They had no wish to probe it to its depths or to search out its weak points. Its moral strength was enough for them.

This could not last for ever. There was sure to come a time in every land when this feeling that religion was a conflict would die away, at least with some ; when those who grew up strengthened by the surrounding influences of habitual piety

¹ *Baxter's Life*, I.

would look to their religion rather as an intellectual framework to the quiet morality of their lives than as a struggle or an effort. In England it came when men like Laud and Montague set themselves free from the bonds of Calvinistic dogmatism. They claimed to think for themselves in cases in which no decision had been pronounced, and to search for goodness and truth on every side. They were offended not merely by this or that doctrine of Calvinism, but with its presumption in repelling half the Christian Church of the present, and almost all the Christian Church of the past, from participation in the Divine favour. They were offended with its dogmatism, with its pretensions to classify and arrange men's notions of mysteries which eye hath not seen nor ear heard, and they claimed the right to say that there were things on which the popular religion had pronounced clearly, which were nevertheless beyond the domain of human knowledge.

Even if, like the Arminians of the Netherlands, the rebellion against Calvinistic dogmatism had taken a merely doctrinal form, the supporters of that rebellion would have had but little chance of taking hold of the popular mind. The objections which they felt were only likely to occur to men of culture and education. It was alike their weakness and their strength that the movement was emphatically a learned movement—a movement originating with those who had outgrown the leading strings which were still necessary to guide the steps of others, and who could look without shrinking at the fact that religion was a subject upon which human reason could, to a very limited extent, exercise its powers. They were intellectually the Liberal Churchmen of the age. They stood between two infallibilities—the infallibility of Calvinism and the infallibility of Rome—not indeed casting off entirely the authority of the past, but, at least in a considerable sphere of thought, asking for evidence and argument at each step which they took, and daring to remain in uncertainty when reason was not satisfied.¹

¹ There is a passage in the conference held in the following year on Montague's books, which seems to me to embody the spirit of the movement more than any other which I have seen. The question asked was

Evidently such a standing-point was not likely to be received with popular applause ; and the difficulty before these men was considerably increased by the fact Necessity of system to the party. that they did not content themselves with merely doctrinal differences. It is a necessity of human nature that for every plunge which it makes forward into the untried sea of free thought, it must attach itself all the more closely in some other direction to the firm ground of orderly systematic belief. Luther, as he struck boldly out from the Church institutions of his day, saved his creation from falling into chaos by clinging with almost convulsive grasp to the institutions of the State. Calvin, in fixing his eyes upon the individual salvation of the man predestined to glory, took care to surround the future saint with the strictest discipline and with the iron bonds of a theology which was for him to be ever unquestioned. In our day those who trust most to their own powers of reason are the loudest in proclaiming the forces of universal law, and in expounding the necessity of acknowledging a fixed order in the universe.

For men like Montague and Laud the order of Rome and the order of Calvinism were alike impossible. Never again Position taken by it. would they bend their necks under either yoke. It was by looking back to the earlier days of the English Reformation, when Calvinism was but stealing in, that they found what they needed. The theology of Cranmer, fixing itself upon the principle that all practices were to be maintained, all doctrines held, which could not be proved false by the authority of Scripture and the custom of the early Church, suited them exactly. It gave them a rational ground on which to stand. It gave employment to minds to which the history, especially the ecclesiastical history, of the past was an attractive

whether General Councils could err. To this Buckeridge and Cosin replied : " All assemblies of men *in sensu divino*, and confederated merely as men, may err in the weightiest matters of faith : but all assemblies of men having sufficient ability of learning to judge, and who with prayer and pious affection endeavour to understand heavenly truth by the rule of God's Word, all such assemblies of men shall not err, because God hath promised the assistance of His Heavenly Spirit to deliver them from fundamental error." *Cosin's Works*, ii. 24.

study. It appealed to the poetic and artistic instincts which were almost smothered under the superincumbent weight of dogmatic theology. It fenced them in with memories of the past, and ceremonial forms in the present. Their life was more sympathetic, more receptive of a higher culture than that of others, but at the same time weaker, and less able to fit them to take the lead in any crisis through which the nation might be called upon to pass, all the more because their ideas were not originally arrived at by independent thought, but partook to a great extent in the weakness which attends the revival of the system of an earlier age. That which in Cranmer was the forward movement of the present, became in Laud a looking back to the dry bones of the past.

It was natural that the outward ceremonialism of the men should attract more notice than that principle of intellectual liberalism which, though yet in its germ in their minds, brings them into connection with modern thought. It was natural, too, that they should be accused of inclining towards Rome.

How far it inclined towards Rome. They attached weight to external acts and ceremonies, which they venerated in common with the Roman Church. Their whole way of regarding the spiritual life of man was, if not Roman, distinctly not Protestant. Luther and Calvin, differing in much, had agreed in this, that the relation between the individual soul and God came first, and that all Church arrangements were secondary matters. The new school of English Churchmen brought the subject of Church arrangements into fresh prominence. Uniformity was to be maintained as the surest preservative of unity. From the cradle to the grave man's life was to be surrounded with a succession of ecclesiastical acts influencing his soul through the gates of the senses. The individual was cared for by the Church. He stepped from the first to the second place.

It is impossible to deny that even the modified permission to men to think as they pleased on matters on which the Church had not pronounced her decision arose rather from a feebleness of speculative energy than from any broad view of the necessity of liberty of thought to the searcher after truth. When they repudiated, as most of them did, the epithet of Arminian which was hurled in their faces by their opponents, they were

guilty of no hypocrisy. They did not much care whether any particular view of predestination were true or false. What they did care for was that men should be honest and virtuous, and live peaceable and orderly lives under the care of the proper authorities in Church and State. If it is true that this view of life deserved to be held in due regard, it is also true that without the stern moral earnestness which was the characteristic of the opposite party, life tends to become like a stagnant pool, breeding all manner of foulness and corruption.

Such a system might be regarded as holding a middle place between Rome and Calvinism; but it might also be regarded as a mere feeble copy of Rome. Those who valued the independent reasoning and the freedom of inquiry upon which it was based would take the more favourable view. Those to whom freedom of inquiry was an object of terror, would have nothing to say to it. They would desert it for the infallibility of Rome, or they would attack it in the name of Calvinism. Between the negation of individual religion and the assertion of individual religion, a compound of free thought and ceremonial observance was likely to have a hard time before it could establish itself in the world.

As yet, however, the ceremonial part of the controversy had hardly engaged the attention of observers. It was with Montague's doctrinal positions that the Commons' committee was principally engaged. However orthodox a committee of the House of Commons might be, it was certain to be influenced by thoughts which would have no weight with a Synod of Dort

July 7.
Report of the
committee. or a Scottish General Assembly. Those who drew up its report did their best to conceal from themselves the fact that they were advising the proscription of certain theological opinions. They said that 'though there be tenets in that first book contrary to the Articles of Religion established by Act of Parliament, yet they think fit for the present to forbear till some more seasonable time to desire a conference with the Lords that course may be taken to repair the breaches of the Church and to prevent the like boldness of private men hereafter.' All direct action against the opinions contained in the book, therefore, was to be postponed for the

time. The author was not to be allowed to escape so easily. It might be doubted whether the House was acting within its powers in dealing with theological belief. Its right to interfere in matters of State could not be doubted. Montague was accordingly accused of dishonouring the late king, of disturbing Church and State, and of treating the rights and privileges of Parliament with contempt.

Of these three charges the first was absolutely ludicrous. To accuse a man of treating James with disrespect by publishing a book of which the late King had expressed his approbation, simply because certain opinions were controverted in it which James had advocated in early life, was not only absurd in itself, but would have led to conclusions which the Commons would have been the first to repudiate. For if a man was to be prosecuted for disagreeing with James on a point of theology, why might he not much more be prosecuted for disagreeing with Charles?

The real weight of the accusation, however, fell upon the second head. The unity of religion which Eliot had so enthusiastically praised had its advantages. Statesmen as well as theologians might look with apprehension on the day when Protestantism was to embark upon the raging waves of internal controversy, and when, as it might be feared, the Jesuits would be enabled to sing triumphant songs of victory whilst their antagonists were fleshing their swords in mutual slaughter. Even if such was not to be the case, the entrance of religious strife would open a sad and dreary perspective of bitterness and wrangling, of seared consciences, and of polemical ability rearing itself aloft in the place which should have been occupied by moral suasion: for it must be acknowledged that, if Montague was far less scurrilous than Milton was a few years later, his tone was by no means calm. He had used expressions which might occasionally give offence. Above all, he had spoken of his adversaries as Puritans, a term which is now generally applied to the whole Calvinistic party, but was then looked upon as a disgraceful epithet, only applicable to those who refused conformity to the Prayer Book.

Montague
accused of
differing
with King
James.

Of sowing
dissension.

The third charge carried the question into the region of law and privilege. Montague had presumed to print his second book before the Commons had concluded their examination of the first, and had attacked Yates and Ward, who, as complainants, were under the protection of the House.

Of treating the House of Commons with contempt.
Debate in the House.

The third charge carried the question into the region of law and privilege. Montague had presumed to print his second book before the Commons had concluded their examination of the first, and had attacked Yates and Ward, who, as complainants, were under the protection of the House.

As soon as the report of the committee had been read, a debate arose in which the charge of differing from King James seems to have been treated with silent contempt. The second charge found more ready acceptance. A small minority indeed argued that Montague's opinions had never been condemned by the Church of England. Even amongst those who scouted this view of the case there appears to have been a feeling that there was no wisdom in approaching so nearly to a theological discussion. Coke, however, had no such hesitation. To him the Common Law was all in all, and he quoted Fleta to prove 'that the civil courts ought to have a care of the peace of the Church.' Others again argued that the complaint was not made 'directly for the doctrine, but for the sedition ;' that the meaning of the Articles was plain, and that they only asked that the law should be put in execution. In the end it was resolved that a committee should be appointed to examine Montague's books, and that when Parliament next met the whole subject should be brought before the Lords. There remained the question of privilege. Sandys indeed, with the support of Sir Humphrey May, took the common-sense view, that there had been no contempt of the House. All that had been done in the former Parliament, they said, had been to refer the case to the Archbishop. As the Archbishop had not thought proper to treat Montague as a delinquent, he had not put him upon his trial, and it was well known that a man not upon his trial was not precluded from replying to his opponents. The House seems to have been divided between its respect for these arguments and its wish not to allow Montague to escape altogether. He was committed to the custody of the serjeant-at-arms, but a hint was given him that he would be allowed to go at liberty upon giving a

bond to the serjeant for his reappearance when the Commons met again.¹

A breathing time was thus afforded to Charles to consider what part he would take in the controversy. The importance of the question before him was more momentous than that of the direction of the war. Whatever

<sup>What was
the King to
do?</sup> might be the opinion of the Commons, it was clearly to the advantage of the nation that the men who thought with Montague should not be condemned to silence, and that there should be room found outside the pale of Rome for those who had revolted against the dogmatic tyranny supported by the House of Commons. For a great statesman like Barneveld the work would have had its attractions, though he would have known that he was treading on dangerous ground, in which a slip might be fatal to himself, even if his cause was certain of ultimate success. Difficult as the task of finding room for differences of opinion was, its difficulty was immeasurably increased by the tone of Montague and his friends. They did not ask for liberty of speech or for equal rights with others. They and they alone were the true Church of England. Their teaching was legal and orthodox, whilst the opinions of their opponents had been cast upon the Church 'like bastards upon the parish where they were born, or vagabonds on the town where they last dwelt.'

Charles made no attempt to save these men from their own exaggerations. His sympathies were entirely with those who resembled himself in their love of art, in their observance of ceremonial order, and in their reverence for the arrangements of Church and State. He listened to Laud as his father never had listened to him. That pushing, bustling divine was convinced, even more clearly than Montague, that his system was the only true system for all men and for all times. Scarcely had Charles ascended the throne when he applied to Laud to draw up a list of the principal clergy, distinguishing those who

¹ The bond was to be given to the serjeant, because it was affirmed by Sir Ed. Coke 'that the House could not take a recognisance.' *Fawsley Debates*, 53. Subsequent practice has decided against Coke. *Hatsell's Precedents*, iv. 276.

were suitable from those who were unsuitable for promotion.
Laud's O. A long catalogue was soon handed in, duly marked
and P. list. with O. and P., the Orthodox as fit for reward, the
Puritan to be treated with neglect. It was the beginning of
a fatal course. Calvinism had too much vitality in England,
and was too thoroughly identified with the struggle against
Rome and Spain, to be borne down by a partial distribution
of Court patronage. The power of the Crown counted still for
much, but its strength had rarely been tried as Charles would
try it, if he attempted to impose his own religious opinions
upon an unwilling nation. *¶*

If religion was Charles's main difficulty it was not his only
one. At present his want of money touched him more nearly.
He saw questions stirred in the Lower House which might
seriously impair even his existing révenue. Ever since the

July 5. days of Henry VI. the duties on exports and imports
Tonnage and known under the name of tonnage and poundage
poundage. had been granted by Parliament for the lifetime of
each successive sovereign in the first session of his reign. This
grant now for the first time met with opposition. The usual
formula was that the supply was offered to provide means for
guarding the seas. Sir Walter Erle, who, as member for
Dorsetshire, would know something of what was passing in the
Channel, reminded the House that during the last few weeks
English vessels had been captured off the Scilly Isles by rovers
from Sallee, and that even the Channel itself was not adequately
guarded. Erle had even more to say than this. In James's
reign certain duties had been levied under the name of preter-
mitted customs, which were alleged by the Crown lawyers to
be included in the Parliamentary grant, a view of the case which
found no favour in the eyes of those who were called upon
Proposal to to pay them. Erle now proposed that in order to
limit the give time for the examination of the point, the grant of
grant to a tonnage and poundage should be limited to one year
year.

Matters were not likely to rest here. Phelips, who suc-
Question of cceeded Erle, carried the debate into another region.
impositions. He moved that the Bill 'might so be passed as not
to exclude the question of other impositions.' The old quarrel

which had been smothered in 1621 and 1624, when the Commons were looking forward to co-operation with the Crown in war, was certain to break out afresh when there was no longer any such prospect. Even if there had been no change in this respect, it is hard to see how the question could have been avoided when the beginning of a new reign opened up the whole subject by the introduction of a new Bill for the grant of tonnage and poundage. Phelps took up a position which was logically unassailable. If the King, he said, possessed the right of imposing duties upon merchandise at his own pleasure, why was Parliament asked to grant that which belonged already to the Crown?¹ In spite of Heath's opposition, the House resolved to grant tonnage and poundage for one year only. There would thus be time to consider the questions which had been raised. The Bill thus drawn was carried up to the House of Lords and was there read once. It is not necessary to suppose

The Bill dropped in the House of Lords. a deliberate intention to defeat it, but neither, it would seem, was there any desire to hurry it on; and the Bill was swept away by the tide of events which brought the session to a hurried close.²

A few days more, and the members of the House would be dispersed to every part of England. With the plague demanding its victims in London alone at the rate of 370 a week, more than a third of the total death-rate,³ the Commons could afford to wait for a more convenient opportunity to discuss the issues raised by Montague's book, or even to settle the vexed question of the impositions. Charles, however, could not afford to wait.

The King's financial difficulties. In the full belief that the Commons would grant him, without hesitation, any sum for which he chose to ask, he had entered into the most extensive engagements with foreign powers. Was he now to acknowledge to

¹ "Kings ever received it as a gift of the subject, and were therewith contented, without charging them with any other way of imposition. For if they had any such power it were altogether unneedful to pass." *Fawsley Debates*, 43. The speech is toned down in the Journals.

² The speeches in the *Fawsley Debates* seem to me to warrant the conclusion that far more than a mere adjustment of rates was at issue.

³ Meade to Stuteville, July 2, *Court and Times*, i. 39.

the King of France and the King of Denmark that he had promised more than he could perform ? Was he to disperse his fleet and send his pressed landsmen to their homes ? And yet this, and more than this, must be done, if no more than a beggarly sum of 140,000*l.* was to find its way into the Exchequer. If on July 4 he had submitted to hard fate, and had consented to end the session, further reflection did not render more durable the rebuff with which he had been met. Who can wonder if he made one more effort to supply his needs ?

The King was at this time at Hampton Court, whether he had fled in hot haste as soon as he learned that the plague had broken out amongst his attendants at Whitehall.¹ Late on the evening of the 7th Buckingham hurried up from York House, assembled his followers, and told them that an additional supply must be asked for the next morning.² It is said that on account of the lateness of the hour many of the leading members of the Court party were absent. At all events when Sir Humphrey May heard, on the following morning, what Buckingham's intentions were, he resolved to keep back the proposed motion till he had remonstrated with the Duke.

For the purpose of conveying this remonstrance May selected Eliot, as one who had stood high in Buckingham's favour, and who was likely to set forth the arguments against the step which the Duke was taking in the most persuasive manner. That Eliot had already seen reasons to distrust his influential patron is likely enough ; but there had been nothing approaching

July 8.
May sends
Eliot to re-
monstrate
with the
Duke. but there had been nothing approaching to a breach between them, and there is no reason to suppose that, at this time, Eliot was inclined to go farther than May, or that, although he could hardly have thought Buckingham capable of taking the lead in the national councils, he had any

¹ Locke to Carleton, July 9, *S. P. Dom.* iv. 29.

² The authority for all this is Eliot's *Negotium Posterorum*. I do not see any reason to suppose that things happened in the main otherwise than he tells them, though his view of the position is evidently coloured by the misconception that the Commons had already done all that the King could reasonably ask, even from Charles's own point of view.

wish to bear hardly on him, or to deprive him of the confidence of his sovereign.

What followed may best be told in Eliot's own words, written with such recollection of the scene as he was able to command after some years had passed.

"Upon this," he writes, speaking of himself in the third person, "he makes his passage and address, and coming to York House finds the Duke with his lady yet in bed. But, notice being given of his coming, the Duchess rose and withdrew into her cabinet, and so he was forthwith admitted and let in.

"The first thing mentioned was the occasion, and the fear that was contracted from that ground. The next was the honour of the King and respect unto his safety ; from both which were deduced arguments of dissuasion. For

Eliot argues with Bucking-
ham.

the King's honour was remembered the acceptation that was made of the two subsidies which were passed and the satisfaction then professed, which the now proposition would impeach either in truth or wisdom. Again, the small number of the Commons that remained, the rest being gone upon the confidence of that overture, would render it as an ambuscade and surprise, which at no time could be honourable towards subjects, less in the entrance of the sovereign. The rule for that was noted. According to the success of the commencement, is the reputation afterwards.¹ The necessity likewise of that honour was observed without which no Prince was great, hardly any fortunate. And on these grounds a larger superstructure was imposed, as occasionally the consequence did require. For his own safety many things were said, some more fit for use than for memory and report. The general disopinion was objected which it would work to him not to have opposed it, whose power was known to all men, and that the command coming by himself would render it as his act, of which imputation what the consequence might be nothing but divinity could judge, men that are much in favour being obnoxious to much envy.

"To these answers were returned, though weak, yet such as

¹ "Ut initia provenient, fama in cæteris est,"

^{Buckingham's answers.} implied no yielding :—That the acceptation which was made of the subsidies then granted was but in respect of the affection to the King, not for satisfaction to his business : that the absence of the Commons was their own fault and error, and their neglect must not prejudice the State : that the honour of the King stood upon the expectation of the fleet, whose design would vanish if it were not speedily set forth. Money there was wanting for that work, and therein the King's honour was engaged, which must outweigh all considerations for himself."

Evidently the arguments of the two men were moving in different planes. Buckingham believed the Commons to have been wrong in refusing to vote larger supplies. Eliot, whatever he may have thought, was content to avoid the real point at issue, and only attempted to show that it would be inexpedient to ask the House to reverse the decision.

^{Buckingham's avowal.} It may have been prudent in Eliot to avoid all mention of the opinion which the members were doubtless passing on

Buckingham's qualifications as a war minister. On the other hand, to ask a man so self-confident as Buckingham to withdraw from a course of action merely on the ground of its inexpediency was to court failure. "This resolution being left," the narrative continues, "was a new way attempted, to try if that might weaken it. And to that end was objected the improbability of success, and if it did succeed, the greater loss might follow it by alienation of the affections of the subjects who, being pleased, were a fountain of supply, without which those streams would soon dry up. But nothing could prevail, there being divers arguments spent in that ; yet the proposition must proceed without consideration of success, wherein was lodged this project,—merely to be denied."

^{Eliot's surprise.} "Merely to be denied." Whatever words Buckingham may have used—and he was open enough of speech—such was the inference which Eliot drew from them. And more too, it seems, was behind, "This secret," Eliot tells us, "that treaty did discover, which drew on others¹ that sup-

¹ i.e. 'This conversation discovered this secret, which led the way to the discovery of other secrets.'

ported it, of greater weight and moment, shewing a conversion of the tide. For the present it gave that gentleman some wonder and astonishment : who, with the seal of privacy closed up those passages in silence, yet thereon grounded his observations for the future, that no respect of persons made him desert his country."

What did Buckingham mean when he proposed to press for additional supply, 'merely to be denied'? That he wished,

^{What did} from pure gaiety of heart, to engage in a struggle ^{Buckingham} of prerogative against the country itself is an idea ^{mean?}

which needs only to be mentioned to be dismissed, especially as there is another interpretation of his words which exactly fits the circumstances of the case.¹ If Buckingham really thought, as there is every reason to suppose that he thought, that he had been scandalously ill-treated by the Commons,—that they had, without raising any open charge against him, deserted him in the midst of a war which he had undertaken on their invitation, he may well have believed himself justified in putting the question once more directly to them, with the distinct prevision that if they refused to help him he would stand better with the nation than if he allowed the war to languish for want of speaking a necessary word. Somehow or other the immediate crisis might be tided over, and the military operations on the Continent postponed. Somehow or another the equipment of the fleet might be completed. A great naval success, the capture of the Mexico fleet, or the destruction of some Spanish arsenal, would work wonders. Whatever blot attached to him through past failures—and Buckingham's failures were always, in his own eyes, the result of accident, his successes the result of forethought—would be wiped away. A second Parliament would gather round Charles of another temper than his first had been. The King who had done great things could ask, without fear of rebuff, for further means to accomplish things greater still.

If this was Buckingham's intention—and his subsequent

¹ It does not follow that he would not have been glad to strengthen the Crown at the expense of the House of Commons, either by increasing its popularity, or by giving it a military force if he had seen his way to do either. See p. 195, note 1.

conduct goes far to show that it was his intention—it is easy to understand how Eliot would have been shocked by the language which he had heard. Viewing, as he did, the House of Commons with almost superstitious reverence, and probably already inclined to doubt Buckingham's qualifications for rule, he must have regarded with extreme dislike both the attempt to deal disingenuously with the House, and the vaunting language in which Buckingham's confidences were doubtless conveyed.

Whatever the exact truth may have been about this conference with Eliot, Buckingham's immediate difficulty was to find a fit exponent of his policy in the House of Commons. Of the Secretaries of State, Conway was in the House of Lords, and Morton was absent on a mission to the Hague. Sir Richard Weston, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, would have been naturally selected to bring forward a financial proposal, but, as he was one of those who had originally objected to the war with Spain, Buckingham may have suspected that, supple as he was, his heart would not be wholly in the matter. May and Heath, whose tact had hitherto been conspicuous in the debates, would evidently be useless as supporters of a proposal of which they were known to disapprove.

The man selected as Buckingham's mouthpiece was Sir John Coke. Having been from the first a leading member of the Navy Commission, Coke had long taken into his hands the control over matters relating to the fleet. He was versed in the details of his office, and would probably in our days have made a very excellent permanent Under-Secretary. As far as he took any interest in politics at all, his principal characteristic was a fixed dislike of everything which savoured of the Papacy.¹ Honourable as he was in all the private relations of life, he had early imbibed

¹ Thus he was one of the instigators of the complaint against Montague in the Conference at York House in 1626, and he did his best in 1628 to lead the House of Commons astray by an attack upon the Jesuits. In later years he opposed the Spanish alliance advocated by Weston, Cottington, and Windebank.

His overtures dis-tasteful to Eliot.

Buckingham badly repre-sented in the House of Commons.

His demand entrusted to Sir J. Coke.

the official view that he was to obey orders, not to criticise them, and he was therefore ready to carry out any policy which approved itself to Buckingham and the King.

As soon as it was known to Buckingham's friends in the House that Eliot's mission had failed, Coke rose. For the

^{Further supply asked} hasty grant of two subsidies made before any minister of state had been heard on behalf of the King, he found for.

a convenient excuse in the eagerness of the House to satisfy his Majesty. He now explained the way in which the subsidies granted in the last Parliament had been expended, said what he could in defence of Mansfeld's failures, and stated that the fleet in preparation would cost 293,000*l.*, or 133,000*l.* more than the subsidies already voted. Besides this 240,000*l.* a year would be needed for Mansfeld, and the same sum for the King of Denmark. Even this, though the needs of the fleet and of the King of Denmark were understated, and the expenditure required for the troops in the Netherlands was passed over in silence, was enough to frighten the House; and Coke went on to throw away whatever chance remained to him of persuading the members, by adding that this expenditure 'could not be supported without more help by Parliament, or else some new way.' After this last phrase, which was sure to grate upon the ears of his hearers, he made an appeal to the magnanimity of the House. "The King," he said, "when he was Prince, borrowed 20,000*l.* for these provisions. The Lord Admiral hath engaged his estate. Other ministers have furnished above 50,000*l.* Shall it be said that these men are left to be undone for their readiness to the public services? Shall we proclaim our own poverty by losing all that is bestowed upon this enterprise, because we cannot go through with it? What shall we say to the honour of the King? But that is not all. Even the establishment of his Majesty in his royal throne, the peace of Christendom, the state of religion, depend upon the fleet."

^{The Crown at issue with the Commons.} Coke's estimates, underrated as they were, were larger than the House cared to face. Even now no attempt was made to convince the Commons that it was wise to enter so extensively upon a Continental war. It

was taken for granted that Charles and Buckingham had been in the right in entering into engagements with Mansfeld and the King of Denmark, and the House was merely asked to provide the means for the necessary expenditure.

If the sixty members or so who still remained at Westminster to represent the Commons, cared to please the King without bringing any apparent responsibility upon Nature of Coke's demand. themselves, the way was made easy before them.

Coke did not ask them actually to vote the subsidies. They were only to express their affection to the business, and to give assurance, by some public declaration, that when they returned they would be willing to relieve his Majesty. They were, however, not so easily entrapped. The whole display of military preparation flashed thus suddenly before their eyes, It falls flat on created astonishment rather than any other feeling. the House, They did not wish to bind their fellow-members to answer a demand which had been kept in the background as long as the House was full. Neither did they like to enter into a contest with the King. Scarcely a word was spoken for or against the motion. Heath, seeing that the discussion, if it once began, would take an angry turn, did the best he could

and is put aside by Heath. for his master by smothering the debate. The House, he said, had already expressed its affection in its previous grant. No man ought to speak but as if the King of Spain were there to hear him. It would be enough if it was made to appear that, whenever the Commons met again, they would bring the hearts of true Englishmen.

In spite of this rebuff Charles kept his temper. To a deputation from the two Houses which carried the petition on religion to Hampton Court, he replied civilly that he The King takes up Montague's case. would shortly give them an answer. He then called Heath aside and inquired about Montague's committal. Montague, he said, was now his chaplain, and he had taken the case into his own consideration. "Montague," replied the Solicitor-General, "did not allege so much for himself. It was hardly known but to very few in the House." "I believe," replied the King, "if they had known it, they would not have proceeded in that manner." He then expressed a

hope that the prisoner would be set at liberty, in which case, he said, he would be ready to give them satisfaction. Montague's committal, Heath said, was not for his opinions, but for his contempt of the House. He then gave an account of all that had taken place. Charles 'smiled, without any further reply.'¹ The House, on the other hand, when it heard what had passed, determined to maintain its position. The recent

July 9.
The Com-
mons main-
tain their
position.

nomination of Montague to a chaplainship looked very like a Court intrigue to screen his conduct from investigation, and the doctrine that the King's servants were responsible to the King alone was not likely to find favour amongst the Commons.

On July 11 the Houses were informed that their labours were to come to an end that day, but that they were to meet

July 11.
The Houses
adjourn to
Oxford.

again shortly to hear more from the King. The Commons then proceeded to the Upper House to hear the Royal assent given to the few Bills which had been passed. The word "shortly" was then explained to them by the Lord Keeper. There was to be an adjournment,

Execution of
the recu-
sancy laws
promised.

not a prorogation. They were to meet again at Oxford on August 1. They would then receive a particular answer to their petition on religion, and in the meantime his Majesty, 'by present execution of the laws, would make a real rather than a verbal answer to their contentment and the contentment of all the kingdom.'²

The Lord Keeper had been an unwilling instrument in pronouncing the King's resolution for the adjournment to Oxford.

The step
taken op-
posed by
Williams.

Williams, with his usual good sense, saw that there was little prospect of success in an attempt to drive the Commons to vote supplies to which they entertained an apparently insurmountable objection. The day before the adjournment he had advised that the Houses

July 10.

should meet, not in August, but at Christmas. As Williams did not hope much from the fleet which was preparing for sea, it was natural for him to make the proposal. To Buckingham it looked very like treachery. "Public necessity,"

¹ *Fawsley Debates*, 62.

² *Ibid.* 67.

he said, “must sway more than one man’s jealousy.”¹ Charles sided with his favourite, and the prescient Lord Keeper was reduced to silence. The Houses dispersed, hardly thanking Charles in their hearts for the modified promise which had been given them, and full of discontent at the prospect of meeting again, to be asked once more for those subsidies which they were so reluctant to grant.

¹ *Hacket*, ii. 14.

CHAPTER LIII.

PENNINGTON'S FLEET.

THE promise made at the adjournment that the penal laws should be put in execution, was a symptom of a change which

July 11. was coming over the minds of the King and his minister. It was easy to suppose that, because Meaning of the promise to execute the penal laws. the Commons cared a great deal about repressing the Catholics, they cared for very little else, and that if only the penal laws were put in execution the House, at its next meeting, would make no more difficulty about supply. Nor was Charles, in consenting to this course, doing any violence to his own wishes. Ever since Buckingham had reported the failure of his mission in France, there had been growing up at Court a carelessness about the value of the French alliance, and an increasing belief that England was being sacrificed to the separate interests of Louis.

To these political grievances was added a personal grievance still more irritating. The dream of domestic happiness which

June. had floated before Charles, in after life the most *Charles's domestic troubles.* uxorious of husbands, was vanishing away. The dispute about the precedence of Madame St. Georges had embittered the early days of his married life. Other troubles were not long in coming. Henrietta Maria was impetuous and indiscreet. "The Queen," wrote one who had seen her, "howsoever little of stature, is of spirit and vigour, and seems of more than ordinary resolution. With one frown, divers of us being at Whitehall to see her, being at dinner, and the room somewhat overheated with the fire and company, she drove us

all out of the chamber. I suppose none but a Queen could have cast such a scowl.”¹ It was a scowl which her husband sometimes experienced as well as her courtiers. He did not pay much respect to her priestly attendants. When she heard mass he directed that no Englishman should be present.² After the Royal pair had been a few days at Hampton Court, a deputation from the Privy Council was sent to instruct the Queen about the regulations which the King wished to be observed in her household. “I hope,” she replied, pettishly, “I shall have leave to order my house as I list myself.” Charles attempted to argue the point with her in private, but the answer which she returned was so rude that he did not venture to repeat it to her own mother.³ She regarded herself as in a foreign land, in which everyone was at war with her. Even the exhortations of Richelieu’s kinsman, the Bishop of Mende, who had accompanied her as the head of her train of ecclesiastics, could not induce her to treat the highest personages of the English nobility with common civility.⁴

Such a misunderstanding between a spirited child and a punctilious young husband ten years older than herself, is only

May.
The English
Catholics. too easy to explain. Nor was the Queen without reason for complaint. She had come to England in the full persuasion that her presence would alleviate the lot of the English Catholics. She had scarcely set foot in the island when she learned that the orders which were to have saved them from the penalties of the law had been countermanded. Is it not probable that if the secrets of those early days of married life could be rendered up, we should hear of the young wife’s stormy upbraiding of the man who had beguiled

¹ Meade to Stuteville, July 2, *Court and Times*, i. 39.

² —— to Meade, June 24, *ibid.* i. 33.

³ Instructions to Carleton, July 12, 16, 26, *Ludlow's Memoirs*, iii. 305.

⁴ “Il seroit apropos que la Reine traite le Roi et les grandes de l'état avec plus de courtoisie, n'ayant personne de quelque qualité que ce soit à qui elle fasse aucun compliment, c'est ce que nous ne pouvons gaigner sur elle, et que peut-être les lettres de la Reine Mère gaigneront.” Deciphered paper from the Bishop of Mende, enclosed in a letter from Ville-aux-Clercs, Aug. ¹⁵₂₅, *King's MSS.* 137, fol. 52

her into taking upon herself the marriage vow by promises which he now found it convenient to repudiate?

At all events the French ambassadors, Chevreuse and Ville-aux-Clercs, who were in England on special business, protested loudly. At first they received nothing but evasive answers. A few days after Parliament met, they were asked to allow the King to hold out hopes to his subjects that he would put the laws in execution, and to shut their eyes if sentence were passed on one or two Jesuits, on the express understanding that the sentence would not be carried into execution.¹ At last the time was come when the fulfilment of Charles's contradictory promises was demanded of him. He would soon find that he must either break his word to his Parliament or his word to the King of France. For the present a way was found by which the difficulty might be postponed for a little time. Effiat was about to return to France,

July 12. as well as Chevreuse and Ville-aux-Clercs. James Liberation of had been in the habit of allowing foreign ambassadors priests. who took leave of him to carry with them large numbers of priests on the understanding that they would not return to England. In imitation of his father's practice, Charles now directed the Lord Keeper to seal pardons for the priests in confinement at the time. Williams, however, objected, and it was only by the King's special command that the pardons were issued. That command was given at the Council held on July 10 to decide upon the adjournment of the Houses.² The way was thus cleared for the announcement made the next day, that the laws would be put in execution. Though there was no real contradiction between the issue of pardon for past offences and the intention to carry out the law in the future, the sight of so many priests coming out of confinement, without any word of explanation being given, was likely to throw doubt on the honesty of the governing powers.

The impossibility of reconciling engagements made in opposite directions weighed no less heavily on Charles in the

¹ Chevreuse and Ville-aux-Clercs to Louis XIII., *June 23, 27.*
July 3, 7.

² Hacket, ii. 14.

matter of the squadron which had been fitted out for the service of the King of France. As early as April 11 the 'Vanguard' and her seven consorts had been ready for sea,¹ but delays had supervened. As soon as the captains and owners of the merchant vessels discovered

April.
*The ships
for Rochelle.*

that they were to be employed against Rochelle, they hung back and did their best to find excuses. One of the captains, Sir Ferdinando Gorges, who was to go as Pennington's Vice-Admiral, kept away from the rendezvous till the end of May, and was only compelled by threats of imprisonment to take his place with the others.²

The exact part taken by Charles and Buckingham in the affair must always be matter for conjecture. It is probably true

*Part taken
by Charles
and Buck-
ingham.*

that when the contract was signed by which the merchant ships were offered to Louis for service against anyone excepting the King of England, the owners had been quieted by assurances that they would not have to fight against the French Protestants.³ At all events, on May 18

*May 18.
Pennington
told that he
would not
have to fight
the Protest-
ants.*

Sir John Coke was employed to write to Pennington to that effect, and this letter of Coke's may be fairly taken as embodying the sentiments of the Lord Admiral, who was already in France with the object of inducing the French Government to make peace with the Rochellese, and whose habit it was to regard as absolutely certain anything which he had strong reasons for desiring. That it would be to his interest that there should be no fighting at Rochelle there could be no doubt whatever. He was still looking hopefully for French co-operation, if not in his projected attack on the Flemish ports, at all events in some way or other in the Continental war. His original plan had been to lend the ships for the purpose of an attack upon Genoa, and nothing would now please him better than to see the original project reverted to. Still the

¹ Effiat to Ville-aux-Clercs, April $\frac{11}{21}$, *Harl. MSS. 4579*, fol. 57.

² Conway to Coke, May 21 (?), *S. P. France. Council Register*, May 29, 31.

³ This was stated by Glanville in his speech at the impeachment of Buckingham.

fleet had been offered to the French to be used against all enemies, and Charles found himself, as he had found himself in the matter of the English Catholics, in a strait between two engagements.

To find an issue from this entanglement Charles had recourse to that double-dealing which was characteristic of him when-

^{May 20.} ever he was driven into a difficulty. Through Con-
^{Charles's} way he conveyed orders to the fleet to get ready
^{double-} dealing. instantly for sea. Through Coke he intimated to Pennington that he was not to give his ships up to the French till he had used them to convoy the Queen to England.¹ His intention was doubtless merely to delay the delivery of the vessels till he heard what turn Buckingham's negotiation had taken.

When Buckingham learned in France, that, though Louis would not join England openly in the war with Spain, he had despatched a messenger to offer peace to the Huguenots, there

^{June 9.} seemed no longer any reason for delay. On June 9 The ships under Pennington sail for Dieppe. Pennington sailed with his eight ships. On the 13th he was at Dieppe. Pennington was an honest sailor, sympathising doubtless with the unwillingness of the

^{June 13.} He finds his instructions unintelligible. above all things, to carry out his instructions. His main difficulty was to know what his instructions were. He knew that by the contract he was bound to serve against the Huguenots if the French Government ordered him to do so. He knew that by Coke's letter he was prohibited from doing anything of the sort. When he arrived at Dieppe

¹ "His Majesty hath been much moved at the delays of Sir F. Gorges, and because it will be the utter overthrow of the voyage if it be not gone away presently, his Majesty hath commanded me to will and require you by all means to hasten it away, or else show the impossibility of it." Conway to Coke, undated, but written on May 20 or 21, *S. P. France*.

"Nevertheless, having received a command from his Majesty by Sir J. Coke to detract the time as much as I could for the wafting over of the Queen, for which service I was appointed, though with privacy, I could not depart without a discharge of that command." Pennington to Conway, May 22, *S. P. Dom.* ii. 83.

he found that every Frenchman whom he met told him that his ships were wanted for an attack upon Rochelle. In the midst of these distracting uncertainties he resolved firmly that he would not allow the command of the squadron to slip out of his hands. When, therefore, he was requested by the French authorities to take three hundred soldiers on board the 'Vanguard' and two hundred on board each of the smaller vessels,

Refuses to
admit
French
soldiers on
board.

he flatly refused compliance. His orders, he said, authorised him only to take the French Admiral on board his own vessel, 'with such convenient train as'

he was able to accommodate, and not to admit into the merchant ships more than 'half of the numbers of each ship's company.'¹

Possibly these orders had been given by Buckingham to enable him to retain a hold upon the vessels. The French, however, refused to accept them on such terms. They had by this time learned enough of the temper of the English sailors to discover that, except under compulsion, they would never fight against their fellow-Protestants. Officers and seamen alike, including Pennington himself, had spoken out their minds on this. The French ministers finding that they could not have their way, wrote to their ambassadors, who were still in England, to urge Buckingham to alter his instructions.²

With Pennington there was nothing to be done. Montmorency, the Admiral of France, came in person to Dieppe to use his influence. Pennington told him that, though he was ready to obey orders from his own Government, he would not go an inch beyond them.

June 26. Montmorency at Dieppe. June 27. The fleet returns to England. He soon conveniently discovered that it was impossible to remain much longer in an open roadstead exposed to the violence of the winds. At midnight on June 27, the whole fleet weighed anchor and took

¹ Pennington to Pembroke, June 15, *S. P. Dom.* iii. 71. Pennington to Coke, June 15, *Melbourne MSS.*

² D'Ocquerre to Pennington, *June 21, S. P. France.* D'Ocquerre to Ville-aux-Clercs, June ²⁰₃₀, *Harl. MSS. 4597, fol. 198.*

refuge in Stokes Bay, leaving it to diplomacy to settle what was next to be done.¹

Charles's first impulse was to assert that Pennington had been in the right, and even to suggest that the ships were not bound to fight against Rochelle;² but it was impossible for him to maintain this view of the case in the face of the French ambassadors, who knew perfectly well that, whatever the letter of the contract might be, there had been a full understanding that the ships were originally offered with the object of overcoming the resistance of the Huguenots. The conclusion was a hard one for him to accept. His feeling that the French had duped him was growing stronger. Just after Pennington arrived in England, however, news reached Charles which promised better things. Gondomar,

^{June 26.} Negotiations between Louis and the Huguenots. who had visited Paris on his way to Brussels, had taken his leave on the 26th without venturing to make any direct overtures to the French Government, and on the same day the deputies of the Huguenots, who had come to treat for peace in consequence of the negotiations opened whilst Buckingham was in France, were formally received by Louis. To Lorkin, who after the return of Carlisle and Holland represented Charles in France in the inferior capacity of agent, the French ministers spoke in the most friendly terms. "Peace will be made," said Richelieu; "assure yourself of that. If only the King of England," said another of the French ministers, "will show that he means to assist the King against his rebels, peace will soon be made."³

According to Richelieu, therefore, a mere demonstration against Rochelle in order to help on that pacification which he and Charles alike desired, was all that was intended. Charles, obliged to trust him to some extent, and yet unwilling to trust him altogether, tried to steer a middle course. He informed Pennington, through Conway, that his proceedings had been

¹ Pennington to Buckingham, June 28; Pennington to Coke, June 29, *Melbourne MSS.*

² Chevreuse and Ville-aux-Clercs to Louis XIII., *June 27, ibid. fol. 207, July 7*.

³ Lorkin to Conway, *June 28, July 8, S. P. France.*

well received on the whole, but that he had been wrong in July 3. divulging the secret that his instructions bound him Pennington's further orders. given rise to fresh demands, he must return to Dieppe, and take sixty Frenchmen on board the 'Vanguard,' and fifty on board each of the other vessels. He was then to sail against any enemy pointed out to him by the King of France.¹

As the number of Frenchmen thus allowed to be taken on board was very similar to that to which the French authorities had already taken objection, renewed protests were made by the ambassadors. At last, on July 10, the Fresh objections of the French. day on which the Council resolved to promise the execution of the penal laws, Conway sent a warrant to Pennington to deliver over the ships to the French, and to take on board as many Frenchmen as the King of France might order him to receive.²

As far as words could go the question might be regarded as settled. It may be that Charles trusted for the moment to Richelieu's assurances that there would be no war with the Protestants; but there were those at Court who were not inclined to put too much trust in the word of the French minister. On

July 11. the 11th Sir John Coke forwarded to Conway, with Statement of the case by Sir J. Coke. evident approval, a protest from the captains and owners of the merchantmen. The French, according to this protest, had threatened to take possession of the ships, and to place the English sailors under French martial law. "And lastly," they said, "for serving against them of our religion, it is very well known that our seamen generally are most resolute in our profession; and these men have expressed it by their common petition that they would rather be killed or thrown overboard than be forced to shed the innocent blood of any

¹ Conway to Pennington, July 3, *S. P. Dom. Addenda*.

² Ville-aux-Clercs and Chevreuse to Buckingham, July $\frac{7}{17}$; the same to Louis XIII., July $\frac{9}{19}$, *Harl. MSS.* 4597, fol. 207 b, 218 b; Conway to Pennington, July 10; Pennington to the King, July 27, *S. P. Dom.* v. 33, 132.

Protestants in the quarrels of Papists, so as they will account any commandment to that end to be in a kind an imposition of martyrdom." Nothing could come of it, as Coke thought, but a quarrel between the two nations, "to which," he said, "if we add the discouragement of our party at home and abroad, the late murmuring against it in Parliament, and the open exclaiming made in the pulpits that this taking part against our own religion is one chief cause of God's hand that now hangeth over us, we can hardly balance these consequences with any interest or assistance we can have from the French."

The difficulty, Coke proceeded to show, lay in the King's promise and in the terms of the contract. It might be argued, he said, that the prohibition to serve against his Majesty included a prohibition to serve against the French Protestants who were his Majesty's allies. But it would perhaps be better ^{hemedy pro-}_{posed by him.} to order Pennington to comply with the French demands, taking care, however, to instruct him that

if he could not 'presently obey this direction by reason of any interruption whatsoever,' he was to 'acquaint his Majesty therewith, that he' might 'give order to remove it, and so take away all excuse for not accomplishing the intended gratification of his dear brother the French king.' In plain English, if the men were mutinous, Pennington was to represent his difficulties to the King. This would take up time, and it would be possible to spin matters out by retorting upon the French that they had not made their payments at the proper day, and had not kept their part of the contract. The blame would thus be thrown upon the French. "Only," added Coke, "some care would be taken after his Majesty's letters written, that Sir Ferdinando Gorges, who . . . purposeth to go aboard his ship to the rest of the fleet, may receive some directions for the carriage of their answers, that Captain Pennington by the unexpected style of his Majesty's letters may not be surprised."¹

It is hardly likely that Coke would have made so startling a suggestion unless he had been well aware that Charles was longing to be off his bargain. That it was well received is

¹ Coke to Conway, July 11, *S. P. Dom.* iv. 40.

evident. But it was perhaps thought too hazardous to entrust either Pennington or Gorges with the secret, and at all events a more suitable person was at hand. Edward Nicholas, the Lord Admiral's secretary, was one of those useful men who are intelligent, busy, and subservient.

*July 15.
Mission of
Nicholas.*

To his pen we owe much information on the debates in the Parliaments in which he sat. When Coke was removed to another sphere, the business of the Admiralty—accounts, orders, information—all passed through his hands. He was now selected as the fittest instrument for a delicate mission, as likely to say and do no more than was necessary, whilst his official position would raise him above suspicion.

Apparently the next move involved a complete surrender to the French. Effiat, who was now leaving England, was to pass through Dieppe on his way home. A letter Orders for the surrender was written to Pennington by Buckingham, ordering of the ships. him to take the ships to Dieppe and there to give them up to the French, allowing them to 'put into them so many men as they shall think good, and dispose of them as' the King of France might direct. He would receive in return security from the French for the restitution of the value of the ships in case of their coming to harm,¹ security which, as Nicholas thought, would be entirely valueless, seeing that it could not be enforced by anything short of war.²

Buckingham, accompanied by Nicholas, went to Rochester to confer with the French ambassadors about the security to

*July 16.
Buckingham at
Rochester.* be given to the owners. He did his best to play a double part. To the Frenchmen he was all courtesy, and offered to do his best to satisfy them.³ At the same time he warned the shipowners not to 'deliver over their

¹ Buckingham to Pennington, July 15, *S. P. Dom.* iv. 59.

² This does not seem conclusive, as it might be given through an English capitalist. But the objection shows what another of Buckingham's *entourage* thought of the surrender of the ships. Nicholas to Buckingham, July 16, *ibid.* iv. 58.

³ Chevreuse and Ville-aux-Clercs to Louis XIII., July $\frac{17}{27}$, *Harl. MSS.* 4597, fol. 220.

ships unless they had security to their content.¹ If, however, Buckingham counted on any dispute between the shipowners and the French on this score he was disappointed. Security was offered to which neither he himself nor any of the ship-owners took exception.²

When Buckingham had first arrived at Rochester he had reiterated his orders to Pennington to deliver up the ships at

July 18. Dieppe.³ The reply which he received must have
Resistance of the crews. have sounded like music in his ears. Pennington was at Stokes Bay with the ships. The captains were away at Rochester with the Duke, and their crews refused to stir till their captains returned. If they would not come, Pennington wrote, he would obey orders, and go with only the 'Vanguard,' though by doing so, he and his ship's crew would be as slaves to the French. The business was too difficult for him to understand, and he hoped a more competent person would be sent to take his place. "Moreover," he added, "your Grace may be pleased to take notice that I have a strange uproar in my ship amongst my own company upon this news of going over again, I having much ado to bring them to it, though I keep all from them, and make them believe we go over upon better terms than formerly."⁴

Pennington's request to be relieved from his troublesome command was at once refused. Buckingham had taken his course, and before he left Rochester to return to the Court, Nicholas had been despatched to Dieppe with secret instructions.

The instructions, as Nicholas set them down long afterwards, were as follows :—

Secret instructions to Nicholas. "To employ my best endeavour to hinder or at least delay the delivery of the ships to the French, but therein so to carry myself as that the ambassador might not discern but that I was sent of purpose, and with full

¹ Statement by Nicholas, 1626 (?), *S. P. Dom.* xliii. 43.

² Burlamachi to Effiat, July 19, *S. P. France*.

³ Buckingham to Pennington, July 16. *S. P. Dom.* iv. 67.

⁴ Pennington to Buckingham, July 18, *S. P. Dom.* iv. 18. Pennington to Coke, July 18, *Melbourne MSS.*

instructions and command, to effect his desire and to cause all the ships to be put into his hands.”¹

On the 19th news arrived from France that terms of peace had been agreed on between the King and the Huguenots.

^{July 19.} Upon this Buckingham wrote to Nicholas acquainting him with what he had heard, and enjoining upon him the duty of doing all that Effiat might ask, though he expressed a hope that the French would no longer need the ships.²

The next day Buckingham had changed his mind. It may be that he wished to wait yet a few days, to see if the news was

^{July 20.} really true. Pembroke, who had been taken into his Secret message to Pennington. confidence, despatched the following message to Pennington :—

“That the letters which Captain Pennington sent the Lord Duke of Buckingham’s grace, to himself and the Lord Conway, was the best news that could come to the Court, and that the King and all the rest were exceeding glad of that relation which he made of the discontent and mutinies of his company and the rest ; and that if such a thing had not fallen out, they should have been constrained to have sent him advice to have brought such thing to pass. If the French should accept of the service of that ship alone without the rest, that he should carry it on fairly with them,³ but still to keep himself master

¹ Account by Nicholas of his employment, *S. P. Dom.* xxvii. 111. This and the statement formerly quoted were probably drawn up at the time of the Duke’s impeachment in 1626. We have a letter written by him to Pennington, May 6, 1626, *S. P. Dom.*, *Addenda*, corroborating these statements, and valuable as appealing to Pennington’s knowledge of the truth See p. 388, note 6.

² “ I having received advice lately from Lorkin that peace is concluded between the Most Christian King and those of the Religion, it may be the Marquis d’Effiat, upon hearing of the same, will easily put an end to all these questions, having not the use expected.” Buckingham to Nicholas, July 19, *S. P. Dom.* iv. 80.

³ In the MS. we have—“to have brought such thing to pass if the French should accept of the service of that ship alone without the rest, and that he should carry it on fairly with them.” The slight alteration above makes sense of it.

of his ship, and if they proceeded so far as to offer to take the possession of her, that then his men should take A mutiny to be got up if necessary. him prisoner and bring away the ship : and that the said Captain Pennington might believe him that he had thus much to deliver, it being the King's will and the rest,¹ that it was far from them that any of his ships should go against any of the Protestants."²

If Pennington had before been anxious to surrender his command, what must have been his feelings when he received instructions in this underhand manner to get up a mutiny on board the King's ship entrusted to his charge?

Pennington, when Pembroke's message reached him, was once more at Dieppe with the 'Vanguard,' having crossed the

July 21. Channel in spite of the murmurs of his men. A Pennington again at Dieppe. day or two later he was followed by the merchantmen, as soon as their captains came on board.³ When the 'Vanguard' arrived, Nicholas was already in the town with Effiat. Pennington who, although he had not been informed of the real nature of Nicholas's mission, was ready to fall back upon any excuse which would cause delay, discovered that he had not sufficient warrant to deliver up the ships. He even refused at first to come on shore to confer with Effiat, and said that he could do nothing till he had fresh authority from England. Nicholas then took up his cue. He wrote to Pennington remonstrating with him, and arranged with Effiat to

July 22. send to England for peremptory orders to the captains to surrender the ships. Much, to his disappointment, Effiat

¹ Of Buckingham, Conway, &c., I suppose.

² Message sent from Pembroke by Edward Ingham, *S. P. Dom.* iii. 120, undated, and calendared June 1 (?) but the date is approximately fixed by the mention of that ship alone, as coming soon after Pennington's letter of July 18. The following letter from Pembroke to Pennington (*S. P. Dom.*, *Addenda*), written on the 20th, gives it to that day : "I must give you many thanks for your respect to me in so freely acquainting me with all particulars that have happened this voyage. You shall receive directions by this bearer from his Majesty and my Lord Admiral how to carry yourself in this business, which I know you will punctually obey. From me you can expect nothing but assurances of my love," &c.

³ Pennington to Nicholas, July 21, *S. P. Dom.* iv. 97.

would not allow him to go on board.¹ At last Pennington consented to land and to confer with Effiat, and in spite of the jealousy of the Frenchman, who did his best to prevent any communication between him and Nicholas, Nicholas contrived to whisper a few words of warning to him, bidding him take heed that he had sufficient warrant for delivering up the ships. He had but a letter from Conway, and, in such a case, the King's signature to a warrant might fairly be demanded.²

Nicholas's next step was to address a letter to the officers and crew of the 'Vanguard.' Would they or would they not either deliver up the ship, or receive three hundred Frenchmen on board?³ The answer was contained in a note from Pennington. "I pray," he wrote, "let me entreat

July 23. Mutiny beginning. you to come aboard, for my people are in a mighty mutiny, and swear they will carry me home perforce.

I know your words will do much amongst them, and I have a great desire to give satisfaction to my Lord Ambassador, so far as I may with safety of my life."⁴ Upon this appeal Nicholas was permitted to go on board. Alike in the 'Vanguard' and the merchant ships he met with opposition. The crew of the 'Vanguard' would take on board 150 unarmed Frenchmen, would carry them to England, 'and there leave the ship to them, so as they may have a good discharge.' The captains of the merchantmen objected to the security agreed

Double language of Nicholas. upon at Rochester, and said that they could not deliver the ships till this point had been better arranged.⁵

Nicholas, in fact, had made use of this visit to do his master's bidding.⁶ To Pennington he repeated the warnings

¹ Pennington to Nicholas, July 21; Nicholas to Pennington, July 22; Nicholas to Buckingham, July 22, *S. P. Dom.* iv. 97, 100, 104, 105.

² Account by Nicholas of his employment, 1626 (?), *S. P. Dom.* xxvii. III.

³ Nicholas to Pennington and the Ship's Company, July 22, *S. P. Dom.* iv. 102.

⁴ Pennington to Nicholas, July 23, *S. P. Dom.* iv. 110.

⁵ Answers to Nicholas, July 23, *S. P. Dom.* iv. 102; *S. P. France.*

⁶ When Buckingham was accused the next year of giving up the ships, Nicholas, who seems to have been quite proud of his part in the transaction, wanted to tell the whole truth. On the 6th of May, 1626, he wrote to Pennington (*S. P. Dom. Addenda*)—“The Vanguard and the six

which he had addressed to him on shore. With the captains he held two languages. Whenever Frenchmen were present, he charged them to give up the ships at once. Whenever he could

merchant ships are come to Stokes Bay, but you are to satisfy the Parliament by whose and what warrant you delivered them up to the French. The masters of the merchants' ships have some of them said that it was by my Lord's command, and by reason of threatening speeches which I used to them by order from my Lord, but this will be, I doubt, disproved by many witnesses, and by some of them when they shall speak on their oaths. It is true that, before the Ambassador or his people, I did often charge them aloud to deliver them over according to my Lord Conway's letter and the King's pleasure ; but I fell from that language when we were private with the masters ; and you may remember how often I told you I had no warrant or order from my Lord for delivery over of those ships, and though I did not wish you to go over into England, yet I think you may well remember I told you, you had not warrant, nor could I give you any to deliver them, and that my Lord was absolutely against the delivery of them. But I pray keep it to yourself until you shall be called on oath and have leave from the King to declare that I told you I came over rather to hinder than further the delivery or loan of those ships."

In the statement already quoted, Nicholas writes, after giving the substance of his instructions :—

" Accordingly when the Vanguard came into the road of Dieppe, and that Captain Pennington sent for me to come aboard, I acquainted the Ambassador with it, and told him if I went to the Captain, I made no doubt but to persuade him to come ashore with me, notwithstanding he was—as the Ambassador had complained to me—so obstinate that he refused to come out of his ship to the Duke de Montmorency, who importuned him there by many kind invitations and noble messages ; but the Ambassador would not permit me to go aboard, but commanded me to write to Captain Pennington to come ashore, which I did as pressing as the Ambassador desired, which took effect. When he was come, the Ambassador interposed still between us, so as I could not have a word in private with him, but was forced to let fall a word now and then as I purposely walked by him, to bid him look well whether he had sufficient warrant to deliver the ships : which I did lest the Ambassador, by importunity or artifice, showing a letter under his Majesty's hand to the French King, which was much more effectual than the warrant from my Lord Conway, should draw a promise or engagement from the Captain to deliver the ships before I should have opportunity privately to advertise him to beware how and on what warrant he did surrender the fortresses of the kingdom into the hands of a foreign prince ; for if the Ambassador should have found him more averse than before, it would have given his Lordship just occasion

speak with them alone he charged them to do nothing of the sort without better warrant.

After this Effiat had but little chance of getting possession of the ships. Nicholas continued to summon Pennington to ^{Continued} do his duty and to surrender the vessels ; but as he resistance. had previously warned him not to take account of any thing which he might write to please the French, his words naturally produced no effect. Pennington excused himself on the ground of the notorious disaffection of his crews. If that were all, Effiat replied, he would place four hundred Frenchmen on

to be jealous of the intent of the instructions I had received from my Lord. And the Captain kept himself very warily from any engagement, and craved time to speak with the other captains and his company before he could promise anything, and so got leave to return to his ship.

“ Afterwards I seemed not forward to go aboard to him, though I much desired it, till the Ambassador wished, and, indeed, pressed me to go and use means to work him and the rest of the captains to effect his desire, and to deliver over the ships with all speed.

“ I told Captain Pennington, as soon as I came aboard his ship and had an opportunity to speak privately with him, that I thought the warrant from the Lord Conway which he showed to me, and whereof I had before seen a copy, was not sufficient for the delivery of the ships.

“ In all the time of my negotiating this business, I never plainly discovered to Captain Pennington what mine instructions were, because I saw he was of himself unwilling to deliver up the ships, and after I had told him I had no warrant for the delivery of them to the French, he was as adverse in it as I could wish him.

“ I told him also I was by the Ambassador pressed often to write what I intended not, and therefore desired him not to be moved with whatsoever letters he should receive from me touching the delivery of the ships until he spake with me. My Lord, after I went over, never wrought (? wrote) to Captain Pennington or myself, but in every material and pressing point concerning delivery of the ships, his Lordship referred us to the instructions his Grace had given me for that service ; and when the Captain came to demand a sight or knowledge of my instructions to warrant the surrender of the ships, I told him I had none.

“ If I used any pressing course or language to the masters of the ships, it was either in the presence of the Ambassador, or some such of his servants as he sent aboard with me, or else when I perceived them far enough from yielding, thereby the better to disguise and keep unsuspected my instructions.”—*S. P. Dom.* xxvii. III.

board to put down the mutiny.¹ As soon as the sailors heard of the threat, they took the matter into their own hands and stood out to sea. "And when," wrote Pennington, "I demanded

^{July 25.} ^{The 'Vanguard' puts to sea.} their reason, they told me that they had rather be hanged at home than part with your Majesty's ship upon these terms. Yet, however they did it without acquainting me, I must confess I knew of it and did connive, otherwise they should never have done it, and I live. For I had rather lose my life than my reputation in my command."² The merchant ships remained at Dieppe, but their captains still refused to surrender them to the French.³

Charles and Buckingham had therefore, at whatever expense to their own honour, succeeded in staving off the immediate surrender of the ships.⁴ At last it seemed that the object of all this trickery was within their grasp. The news

^{Prospects of peace in France.} from France had been growing brighter as each despatch arrived, and there was every reason to believe that the ships might now be safely delivered up

without risk of seeing them employed against the Protestants of Rochelle.

The plea which Buckingham had put up for peace had been seconded by the Constable Lesdiguières, who was in command

^{June.} of the French force which had gone to assist the Duke of Savoy in his attack upon Genoa. Lesdiguières, who knew that it was hopeless to attack Genoa without the command of the sea, longed for the presence of the ships which

¹ Nicholas to Pennington, July 24; Answer from Pennington, July 24; Demands and Answers on board the Vanguard, July 24; Nicholas to Pennington, July 25; Pennington to Nicholas, July 25; Nicholas to Buckingham, July 25, *S. P. Dom.* iv. 106, 115, 117, 119, 120, 122.

² Pennington to the King, July 27, *S. P. Dom.* iv. 132.

³ Demands of Gorges and the Captains, July 27, *S. P. France.*

⁴ When the first news of the difficulties at Dieppe reached Charles, he told Conway to inform Buckingham that he had nothing to change in his former orders. "I must," wrote Conway, "in the duty I owe your Grace say that there is not anything so tender, and to be so dear to you, as the avoiding of that scandal, offence, and hazard of extreme inconstancy, as if his Majesty's ships should fight against those of the Religion." Conway to Buckingham, July 25, *S. P. Dom., Addenda.*

had been seized by Soubise, reinforced if possible by Pennington's English squadron, which had been originally destined for that service.¹ At the French Court, however, there was a strong party which urged Louis to finish with the Huguenots now that he had a chance, whilst the French clergy were ready to offer large sums in support of the holy war.

Richelieu himself wavered—perhaps because he saw that if he was to keep his hold upon the mind of Louis, it was necessary for him to appear to waver. In the beginning of May he had declared that it was impossible to wage war with Spain and the Huguenots at once, and had recommended, though in a somewhat hesitating tone, that peace should be made with Spain, and that the Huguenots should be compelled to submission. In June, when there was a prospect that the Huguenots might be brought to acknowledge their fault, he urged that they should be satisfied as far as possible; but that Fort Louis, at the mouth of the harbour of Rochelle, which had been kept up in defiance of the express words of the last treaty, should not be razed, on the ground that if the fort were destroyed it would look as though the King had granted to rebellion what he had refused to do at the humble petition of his subjects.²

On June 25 the Huguenot deputies arrived at Fontainebleau, and threw themselves at the feet of the King. If they could obtain the concessions which they considered indispensable for their security, they were quite willing to accept them from the Royal favour. Their demeanour seems to have made a favourable impression on Richelieu. If the Royal authority was to be acknowledged as the source of all that was conceded, he would no longer bar the way to peace. In a splendid argument, he urged the advantages of making peace at home and of confirming the religious toleration granted by the Edict of Nantes, in order that France

*June 25.
The Hugue-
not deputies
at Fontaine-
bleau.*

¹ Lesdiguières to Louis XIII., June $\frac{2}{12}$, *S. P. France.*

² The two discourses are printed by M. Avenel (*Lettres de Richelieu*, ii. 77, 98). They are assigned by him to the beginning of May and the middle of June.

might turn her whole attention to war with Spain.¹ Difficulties hindered the final arrangement of peace for some days. At last came news that Soubise had inflicted some loss upon the French admiral who, with the aid of twenty Dutch ships, was guarding the entrance to the harbour of Rochelle. The party of resistance at Court found that to overpower the great sea-

July 15.
Terms of
peace agreed
on, port was not so easy as they thought, and, on July 15, the conditions of peace were mutually agreed on.

and sent to
Rochelle to
be ratified. A form was drawn up in which the King was to engage, out of his Royal goodness, to dismantle Fort Louis within a year. As the deputies had no power to conclude the peace themselves, the conditions were at once forwarded to Rochelle for ratification.²

' Such was the news which had reached Buckingham on the 19th, and had caused him for a moment to think of ordering the delivery of the ships.³ A few days

July 19.
Effect of the
news on
Buck-
ingham. later, Lorkin was able to send better news still. A council had been held at Fontainebleau, and it had been resolved to declare open war against Spain, and to encourage the Duke of Savoy to attack the Milanese. In order that there might be no further danger of disturbance at home, couriers had been despatched to the French commanders in the south of France to order them to abstain from all acts of hostility as soon as the treaty had been ratified by the Huguenots.⁴

That the ratification would follow seemed hardly open to

¹ The anonymous discourse, which is evidently Richelieu's, is now placed at the beginning of July, 1625 (*S. P. France*). A translation with notes will be found in the *Academy* for 1874.

² Lorkin to Conway, June 28 July 15, *S. P. France*. All this is completely ignored in Richelieu's Memoirs.

³ P. 386.

⁴ Lorkin to Buckingham, *S. P. France*. There is no date, but it was received on or just before July 28. See Pembroke to Pennington, *S. P. Dom. Addenda*. The date of July 18 is given in an incorrect copy, *S. P. Dom.* iv. 134. Lorkin's informant was the Abbot of Scaglia, the Savoyard ambassador in Paris I have no doubt of the truth of the story, though, as I have said, Richelieu chose to ignore it all, simply, I believe, because he did not like to acknowledge having furthered a negotiation which afterwards came to nothing.

doubt. At all events neither Charles nor Buckingham doubted it. A formal order was issued to Pennington to take back the

^{July 28.} Final orders to Pennington. 'Vanguard,' and to deliver up the fleet at once, and Buckingham gravely informed him that the King had been extremely offended at his previous delay.

A private letter from Pembroke explained the mystery. "The King," he wrote, "is assured that war will be declared against Spain for Milan, and the peace is made in France for the Religion. Therefore his pleasure is that you peremptorily obey this last direction without reply."¹

Pennington had at last got orders which he could understand. On August 3 he was again at Dieppe, and on the 5th

^{Aug. 5.} Surrender of the 'Vanguard.' the 'Vanguard' was placed in Effiat's hands. Sir Ferdinando Gorges, who was in command of one of the merchant ships, continued to refuse to deliver his vessel till better security for its value had been given, and sailed for England in defiance of Pennington and Effiat alike.

^{Aug. 6.} and of six of the merchantmen. The other six captains submitted more readily. If however, the French got the ships they did not get the men. One only of the whole number consented to accept a service in which they expected to be employed against their fellow-Protestants, and it was believed in England that that one was not long afterwards killed by the accidental explosion of a gun.²

Buckingham therefore had reason to flatter himself that when Parliament met at Oxford he would be able to give a good account of Pennington's fleet. If he could not openly declare the means by which he had kept it so long out of the hands of the French, he could point to the fact that it had not been surrendered till peace had been secured. When the news came that France was at open war with Spain, and that the English vessels were on their way to Genoa, there would be

¹ The King to Pennington, July 28; Buckingham to Pennington, July 28, *S. P. Dom.* iv. 136, 137. Pembroke to Pennington, *ibid. Addenda.*

² Pennington to Nicholas, Aug. 3; Gorges to Buckingham, Aug. 5, *S. P. Dom.* v. 7, 10; Effiat's receipt for the Vanguard, Aug. 5; Agreement for the six ships, *S. P. France.*

little disposition to inquire too narrowly into the original engagement by which the ships had been offered to the King of France.

As far, therefore, as their foreign policy was concerned, Charles and his minister had some ground for the expectation that their proposals would meet with more favourable consideration than they had met with at Westminster. But what was to be done about the English Catholics? The engagements which Charles had severally taken to the King of France and to his own Parliament were so flagrantly in contradiction with one another, that no double-tongued Nicholas could by any possibility help him out of this difficulty. The advice given by Williams was, that, seeing that promises had been made to Louis, Charles should announce to the Commons that the execution and relaxation of the penal laws was entirely a matter for himself to judge of.¹ It is just possible that if Charles, with a really effective French alliance to fall back on, had been able to inform the Houses at the same time that peace had been made in France with the Huguenots, and that there would be no longer any persecution of the Protestants there, he might have stood his ground, even with the House of Commons. On the other hand, if he put the laws in execution to please the Commons he would give deadly offence to Louis, and would probably render all active French co-operation impossible.

By this time the members of the House of Commons were unwillingly preparing to make their way to Oxford. The temper in which they were did not bode much success to the experiment which Charles was about to try. Even Aug. 1. Reassembly at Oxford. the difficulty of obtaining lodgings in a strange place was raised to the dignity of a practical grievance. History was ransacked for instances of unlucky Parliaments which had met at Oxford, whilst no one seems to have thought of the glories of that great assembly which gave birth to the Provisions of Oxford. Worse than all, the plague was already breaking out

¹ *Hacket, ii. 17.* See also the brief of depositions against Williams, June 16, 1637, *S. P. Dom. ccclxi. 101.*

in the town, and there were not a few who shrank from facing that fell disease at a distance from their homes, and in the midsts of a population swollen by so great a concourse.¹

¹ Eliot in his *Negotium* speaks of cases of the plague as already occurring when the Houses were adjourned at Westminster. But the King on the 4th of August expressly stated that this was not the case, and the way in which he ran away from Whitehall may be taken as good evidence that for his own sake he would not fix upon an infected place in which to meet Parliament. On the 5th Whistler said there had then been only six deaths; a small number if the plague had been there more than three weeks.

CHAPTER LIV.

THE FIRST PARLIAMENT OF CHARLES I. AT OXFORD.

ON August 1 Parliament met at Oxford. Upon the motion of Sir Edward Coke it was resolved that a Committee of the whole House should take an account of the expenditure of the subsidies granted in the last Parliament. He doubtless intended that investigation into the past should form the basis of a decision upon the course to be pursued in the future.

If religion had not been first mentioned, the omission was soon repaired. The favours granted to the Catholics on the supplication of the French ambassadors were not likely to pass unnoticed, and Sir Edward Giles held up the copy of a pardon granted to a Jesuit expressed in terms of unusual latitude. The pardon, he observed, bore the date of July 12, the very day after the promise of a real compliance with their petition had been given.

The inevitable inference bore so hardly on persons high in office, if not on the King himself, that for some time no one ventured to speak. At last Eliot rose, ever the first to throw himself into the breach. "I cannot think," he said, "that this pardon we have seen, issued from the King; or, if it did, that he rightly understood it. I cannot believe he gave his pardon to a Jesuit, and that so soon upon his promise unto us." Some one must have abused his confidence. Let the Lord Keeper be asked who gave the warrant for the issue of the pardon. They might then discover who procured it.

Aug. 1.
The assembling of Parliament.

Pardon to a Jesuit complained of.

Eliot's speech.

The ministers present did their best to avert inquiry. Heath truly asserted that the promise of which the pardon was Defence of Heath. the fulfilment had been given before July 11, the date of the King's answer through Williams, and explained it as a concession to the French ambassadors. They had only to wait, he said, till they heard the King's answer to their petition on religion, which was certain to give them satisfaction.

Heath's mode of meeting the difficulty was the more noteworthy as he was known to be possessed of Buckingham's confidence. Buckingham, in fact, was making up his mind, if he had not made it up already, to cast to the winds his engagements to France, and to throw himself upon the popular sympathies of the House, by sacrificing to them the Catholics whom Charles had promised to protect.

He did not see that it was too late ; that a man who plays fast and loose with every principle, and who joins each party when it suits him, is certain to be mistrusted by all parties. // As the members were arriving at Oxford one of the Duke's confidants told Sir Francis Seymour that if the Commons 'would set upon the Lord Keeper, they should be backed by the greatest men in the kingdom.' Seymour answered sharply, "I find nothing in the Lord Keeper but the malice of those great men."¹ Heath's appeal therefore met with but little response in the House. Phelps attacked the practice of complying with the

Answers of Phelps and Marten. demands of foreign ambassadors, although the presence of Charles himself at Madrid had not availed to release a single prisoner from the Inquisition. A

further blow came from Sir Henry Marten, who, old as he was, sat now for the first time in Parliament. As Judge of the Admiralty Court, he was often brought into collision with Buckingham, and he may perhaps have had some cause for complaining of him at this moment. Even in former times, he said, when old ambassadors were employed, England had been more skilled in fighting than in diplomacy. Marten did not go further than this allusion. But his reference to the old ambassadors of former days was understood to imply a reflection

¹ Statement made by Williams to the King, Aug. 14, *Hacket*, ii. 18.

upon the young ambassador who had talked so much and had done so little.¹ The whole discussion finally resulted in a petition to the King, in which the Lords were asked to join.

The first day at Oxford had been devoted to the Catholics. The second was devoted to the holders of new opinions in the

^{Aug. 2.} Church of England. The serjeant-at-arms reported Montague's that Montague had written to say that he was too ill ^{case again.} to surrender on his bond. Coke at once rose to warn the House of its danger. The Britons had been worsted, according to Tacitus, because there had been no unity in their mode of fighting. So it was now in matters of religion. Permission was given 'to every particular man to put out books of all sorts.' He wished that 'none concerning religion might be printed but such as were allowed by Convocation.'²

^{Coke's attack upon liberty of printing.} This was at least plain speaking. It was as well to know what Eliot's magnificent declamation about unity of religion meant in prose. Upon liberty, so far as it implied the right of each man to enjoy freedom of person and property according to the law of the land and the decision of the judges, Coke placed the highest value. For liberty, so far as it meant intellectual freedom, he cared nothing at all. If Charles had possessed a mind of a higher order he might have entered the lists against the legal intolerance of Coke and the dogmatic intolerance of the Calvinistic clergy with a fair prospect of success. If he had failed, at least he would have failed in a noble cause.

¹ Mr. Forster makes Marten draw the contrast himself. "In former times (*Sir J. Eliot*, i. 199), when old ambassadors of wisdom and experience were employed, our treaties had *not* been unsuccessful," &c. The *Negotium*, however, makes Marten say that they had been unsuccessful. "He showed that in former times, when old ambassadors were employed, where wisdom and experience might give a promise for their works, success did prove it not the propriety of their nation," &c.

Success, as I understand it, here means 'the result,' not 'success' in the modern acceptation of the word. 'Propriety' is 'proprietas,' i.e. 'property.'

I may add that Eliot's description of Carlisle which follows, as 'so ceremonious and affected that his judgment and reality were in doubt,' is unfair to Carlisle. But then Eliot had not read Carlisle's despatches.

² *Fawsley Debates*, 69.

Unhappily Charles was not likely to take his stand upon so broad an issue; perhaps the time was not yet come when it was possible for any man to take so high a ground. At Hampton Court he

Heath de-
clares Mon-
tague to be
the King's
chaplain.

had claimed to save Montague from the Commons by declaring him to be his chaplain, and Heath now warned the House against touching a man in his Majesty's service. The challenge was not allowed to pass unquestioned. "All justices of the peace, all deputy-lieutenants," said Alford, "are the King's servants." No man could by any possibility commit a public offence but by colour of public employment and service to the King. If all these were to be freed from Parliamentary inquiry, what would be the condition of future Parliaments?

In spite of the tendency of some speakers to go off upon the merits of Arminianism and the doctrine of the fallibility of Claims of the grace, the leading members had sufficient influence Commons. to keep the point raised by Alford in the foreground. Coke, who was allowed to speak a second time, expressly disclaimed any right in the House to meddle with points of doctrine. They had only to deal with Montague for his contempt of the House. They would inform the Lords of his evil doctrine, and, as the Bishops had seats in the Upper House, such questions might be resolved there. At the last the sentence would come before the King, who might execute or remit it as he thought fit. There were, however, precedents of cases in which Parliament had petitioned the King not to use his prerogative of mercy. Phelps closed the debate by reminding the House that in the last Parliament James had already put forth the claim 'that no servant of his should be questioned.' In the end, the serjeant was ordered to bring Montague to the bar. It was, however, discovered that Montague was really too ill to attend, and the order in consequence remained unexecuted.

The question of the responsibility of the King's officers, when once stirred, was certain to recur sooner or later. Coke Question of responsi- might strive hard to bring the desire of the House bility. to punish Montague within the formulas of the past; but in itself the question of responsibility was the question of sovereignty. If all official persons were liable to the censure of Parliament whether the King liked it or not,

Charles might still have functions to perform which would be eminently useful to the Commonwealth ; but he would not be a sovereign in the sense in which Henry VIII. and Elizabeth had been sovereigns. The impeachment of Middlesex and the threatened impeachment of Montague were the signs of a great change in the relations between the King and the House of Commons. The question was raised because the House had ceased to have confidence in the King ; but the innovation was none the less striking on that account.

As far as the great religious dispute by which men's minds were agitated was concerned, it mattered little whether Montague was the King's chaplain or not. On the very day

View taken of Montague's book by the Bishops friendly to him. on which the Commons were pronouncing strongly against his opinions, the three Bishops by whom those opinions were regarded with the greatest favour,

were writing to Buckingham in their defence. "The Church of England," said Buckeridge, Howson, and Laud, "when it was reformed from the superstitious opinions broached or maintained by the Church of Rome, refused the apparent and dangerous errors, and would not be too busy with every particular school-point. The cause why she held this moderation was because she could not be able to preserve any unity among Christians if men were forced to subscribe to curious particulars disputed in schools." Some of the opinions for which Montague was attacked were 'yet only for schools, and to be left at more liberty for learned men to abound in their own sense, so they keep themselves peaceable and distract not the Church ; and, therefore, to make any man subscribe to school opinions may justly seem hard on the Church of Christ, and was one great fault of the Council of Trent.'

Evidently the Bishops were more liberal than the House of Commons. Beyond the region of dogmatic teaching they saw

Liberal view of the Bishops, a region of mystery into which the eye of reason could hardly pierce, and which might well be reserved for reverent investigation by learned and devout men, whilst it was utterly unsuited for the violent declamation of the popular rhetorician. Unhappily it is by slow steps that the world rises to the height of a great argument. Something

had been done for liberty of thought when dogmatism was restricted by Laud and his fellows ; but what they gave with one hand they took with the other. It is hard for men who look upon a creed from the outside to know by how many ramifications its dry propositions gather vital strength for the moral life of its believers. It was well to say that grace and predestination were fitter subjects for the schools than for the pulpit. But, for all that, the fact remained that there were thousands of men in England who thought otherwise, and who, if they were not to hear of grace and predestination, would find that their whole framework of spiritual thought had broken down. When therefore the Bishops went on to say, that they

^{conjoined with illiber-} could not conceive what use there was ‘of civil go-
vernment in the Commonwealth, or of preaching and
external ministry in the Church, if such fatal opinions

as some which are opposite and contrary to those delivered by Mr. Montague are and shall be publicly taught and main-
tained,’ they were calling upon the King to use his authority to
silence opinions which had by long experience become dear to
many a pious soul from one end of the land to the other. They
were seeking to accomplish by force that which they might
well have striven to accomplish by example. Andrewes, whom
they agreed to reverence, would have taught them a better lesson.

With this difference of opinion on Church doctrine was necessarily connected a difference of opinion on Church govern-

^{Who is to decide on Church questions?} ment. On this head Coke had been somewhat hesi-
tating. He would have had books prohibited by
Convocation. He would have had Montague judged
by the House of Lords because it had Bishops amongst its
members. The view of the three Bishops was clear. “When the
clergy,” they said, “submitted themselves in the time of Henry
VIII., the submission was so made that if any difference, doc-
trinal or other, fell in the Church, the King and the Bishops
were to be judges of it in a National Synod or Convocation ;
the King first giving leave, under his Broad Seal, to handle the
points in difference.”¹

¹ Buckeridge, Howson, and Laud to Buckingham, Aug. 2, *Laud's Works*, vi. 244.

Such was the ground thus early taken up by Laud, and maintained by him through the whole of his career. It was a claim hard to be met if it were once admitted that the clergy were a body separate from the rest of the nation, and able to bind the nation to the perpetual observance of any compact to which it had once assented. If, however, this be not the case—and the whole spirit of English history is opposed to such a view—then Laud was in the wrong. What was temporary in the settlement of Henry VIII. was the position taken by the King as the head of the clergy. What was permanent was that in so doing Henry VIII. represented the state and nation. Just so long as Charles represented the state and nation would Charles and the Bishops be able to lay down the law as to what was to be taught and what was not. Already the Commons were beginning feebly and incoherently to put in their claim to be the representatives of England ; though they had yet to learn that the voice of numbers will not suffice to give permanent supremacy. The question of religious differences was coming to the front. Whoever could most wisely solve it, whether King or Commons, would lead the English nation in the ages which were coming.

Immense as was the ultimate importance of these religious disputes, they did not form the immediate question of the hour. Nevertheless, the feelings roused by the discussions of the first two days were not favourable to Charles's design of drawing fresh

^{Aug. 3.} ~~The fast.~~ subsidies from the Commons. The third day, kept as a fast on account of the plague, was certain to bring with it thoughts and feelings which boded no good to the King who issued pardons to Jesuits and shielded Arminians from punishment.

On August 4 Charles came in from Woodstock, where he was staying, and summoned the Houses to appear before

^{Aug. 4.} ~~The King in Christchurch Hall.~~ him in Christchurch Hall. He had indeed need of all the eloquence he could command. His exchequer was even at a lower ebb than it had been when he opened Parliament in June. It was only with the greatest difficulty that the necessary provisions for the Royal household

had been procured.¹ Now too, as in June, Charles had to balance the advantages of making a clean breast to Parliament, and telling all his plans and all his needs, or of contenting himself with asking only for as much as would be required for the equipment of the fleet, which, as it was to be directed against Spain, was more likely to stir the popular feeling than any combination in Germany.

As usual he did not say much. He again reminded the Houses of their engagement to support him in the war, and His speech. begged them to think of the reputation of the kingdom, even at the risk of danger to their own persons from the plague. His preparations had cost him large sums of money, and it would be better that half the ships should perish at sea than that they should remain at home. In two days, he ended by saying, they should have an answer to their petition on religion.

Charles had dwelt entirely on the fleet. Conway, who followed, took a wider view of the situation. Having said that Conway's 30,000*l.* or 40,000*l.* were wanted to enable the fleet to address. start, he afterwards drew a picture in the background of the Continent in flames, and hinted at the large sums needed for keeping the Protestant forces on foot in Germany and the Netherlands.

There was thus a discrepancy between the smallness of the sum named and the largeness of the expenditure hinted at. To fulfil his engagements, Charles wanted not 40,000*l.* but some 7,000,000*l.* or 8,000,000*l.* at the least. To make up his mind to forego this and to be content with the smaller sum would probably have been his wisest course, and if he had adopted it he might perhaps have avoided summoning Parliament at all. This, however, was precisely what he was unable to bring his mind to. He, therefore, it may be supposed, whilst authorising Conway to mention the fact that no more than 30,000*l.* or 40,000*l.* was needed for the fleet, allowed his greater expenses to be expounded in the hope of stirring the liberality of the Commons to the utmost.²

¹ Conway to Ley, July 24, *S. P. Dom., Addenda.*

² Conway's speech seems to be very fully given in the *Fawsley Debates*,

Originally, it would seem, it had been intended to reserve all further observations for a message which Sir John Coke had been directed to deliver to the Commons in their own House.¹ But it may have been that signs of impatience were seen amongst the members, or that Charles felt that a mistake had

Sir J. Coke called up to the throne. been committed in allowing Conway to say so much without saying it more plainly. At all events, he beckoned Coke to his side, and, after whispering a few words in his ear, sent him into the middle of the hall to do his work at once.

Coke at least did not start with asking for a paltry 40,000*l.* for the fleet. With all possible emphasis he enlarged upon the greatness of the work before them. 600,000*l.* a year would be wanted for Mansfeld and the King of Denmark. He argued that though Mansfeld's armament had not been so successful as could have been wished, it had shown that the King of England was in earnest. The German princes had been encouraged. The Danes had taken the field. The King of France was aiming at Milan, and had made peace with his Huguenot subjects. It now devolved on Parliament to consider whether they would grant his Majesty a fitting supply. Yet, though he had gone thus far, Coke did not venture to ask for all that was needed, but contented himself with reminding those who dreaded such an enormous expenditure of the importance of sending out the fleet. It would not be a constant drain on the nation. When once success had been obtained, that success would help to bear the charge. When the pride of Spain had been quelled, private adventurers could follow to sweep the seas at their own expense. The spirit of the people would be roused, and the whole land would be enriched at the enemy's cost.

Coke's hearers were thus left in uncertainty, an uncertainty which was doubtless shared by the King himself, how much they were really expected to grant. The small sum needed for the fleet was fixed and definite. All else was hazy and impalpable.

73. I gather from it that there is no ground for saying that the King only asked for 40,000*l.* Conway seems simply to have spoken of that sum as that which was immediately needed for the fleet.

¹ Instructions for a message, *S. P. Dom.* v. 14.

The success of the fleet might perhaps enable Charles to dispense with the supplies which he needed for other purposes. His error was that he did not come forward, as Gustavus had come forward in the negotiations of the past winter, with a definite demand which he himself recognised as indispensable. He tried to influence the minds of the members without first making up his own.

Coke was not popular amongst the Commons, and it was felt as a mark of disrespect that they should be addressed in the

Feelings of the Com- King's name by a man who was not a minister of state.

mons. Yet, as far as the fleet was concerned, he seems to

have spoken the whole truth as completely as if he had been a Privy Councillor or a Secretary of State. The Prince of Orange had by this time rejected Morton's proposal for an attack upon the ports of Flanders, and Charles had reverted to his original scheme of sending his fleet to capture the Spanish ships returning from America.¹

The Commons were fairly puzzled. Though Coke named no sum in particular, it seemed as if he had come round again to Conway's 40,000*l.* The wildest conjectures were

Aug. 5. hazarded as to what was really meant. Some thought that the fleet was not to go at all, and that the blame of failure was to be thrown on the House of Commons. Others even thought that a peace had been patched up with Spain. It needed the utmost frankness of explanation on the part of the ministers of Charles to do away with the ill-will caused by the long reticence of the King, followed by the involved and almost unintelligible demands which had been made at the close of the sittings of Westminster, and which were now repeated at Oxford in a form more involved and unintelligible still.

When the House met the next morning, Whistler opened the debate by a proposal which, if it had been met in the spirit in which it was made, might have changed the history of the reign. Let the Commons, he said, ask the opinion of the Lords upon the necessity of

Proposal to confer with the Lords.

¹ The Prince's answer is unknown, as it was given by word of mouth (Morton to Conway, July 13, *S. P. Holland*), but it may be gathered from that officially made by the States-General. Morton and Carleton to Conway, July 4, *S. P. Holland*.

the action proposed. If they could not get satisfaction there, let them go to the King.

Full and complete information upon the intentions of the Government was plainly the only condition upon which the Commons could be justified in acceding to the demands made upon them. It was one of the evils of the new system of government that there was no one in the House of sufficient authority to take upon himself the responsibility of meeting an unexpected proposal. It was probably from instinct rather than from any knowledge of the King's wishes that Sir George More replied, with courtier-like facility, that it was unconstitutional to apply to the Lords on a question of subsidy. May, Weston, and Heath sat silent in their places, and before they had time to receive instructions the debate had taken another turn.

If there was a man in the House who would be consistent with himself in attacking the foreign policy of the Crown that man was

Seymour attacks the foreign policy of the Crown. Sir Francis Seymour, the proposer of the restricted supply which had been granted at Westminster. In itself the fact that the Government had entered into engagements with foreign powers so extensive that it

did not venture directly to ask the Commons for the means of fulfilling them was calculated to give rise to the gravest suspicions, and Seymour, the old opponent of the system of Continental wars, was not likely to treat such suspicions lightly. This meeting of Parliament, he argued, had been the work of those who sought to put dissensions between the King and his people. It was absurd to suppose that it needed a Parliament to procure 40,000*l.* for the fleet. As for the rest that had been said, he had no confidence in the advisers of the Crown. He did not believe that peace had been made in France, and he hoped that English ships would not be used as abettors of the French king's violence against his Huguenot subjects. Then turning to the past, Seymour continued, "We have given three subsidies and three fifteenths to the Queen of Bohemia, for which she is nothing the better. Nothing hath been done. We know not our enemy. We have set upon and consumed our own people." What he wished was that they might now

'do somewhat for the country,' and they would then give his Majesty a seasonable and bountiful supply.

Distrust of Buckingham's capacity, perhaps of his integrity, was imprinted on every word of Seymour's speech. When May rose to answer him, he knew that the whole foreign policy of the Government needed defence. If he could not meet all attacks he was able to tell of much that had been overlooked by Seymour. It was something that the King of Denmark was on the move. It was something that France was no longer in friendship with Spain. May then went on to relate an anecdote from his own personal knowledge. When at the end of Elizabeth's reign Mountjoy had been sent into Ireland and was in great danger of defeat, Sir Robert Cecil had protested beforehand that, if disaster followed, no imputation could be brought against the Government at home. "My Lord Mountjoy," he had said, "cannot complain of us. He hath wanted nothing from hence. If things miscarry, the blame must be somewhere else." The application of the anecdote was obvious. It was the business of the House to vote supplies and to throw the responsibility off their own shoulders.

May had forgotten that the House courted responsibility, and that it was very far from feeling that confidence in Buckingham's powers as a minister which Cecil had in Mountjoy's powers as a soldier. He did not acknowledge that times were changed, and that those who supply the money for war must necessarily ask for a larger share in its management as soon as they have reason to think that the supplies are being squandered or misused. Nor did Edmondes, who followed,
200,000*l.*
asked for by
Edmondes. mend the position of the Government by asking directly for two subsidies and two fifteenths, about 200,000*l.*, a sum far too great for supplying the immediate needs of the fleet, whilst altogether inadequate to meet Charles's engagements on the Continent.¹

¹ Eliot, as is well known, believed that Buckingham wanted to be denied. I am quite unable to take this view of the case after a full consideration of Buckingham's whole proceedings, of which an historian is now able to know much of which Eliot knew nothing. It is likely enough, as

If Seymour had hinted at some things which he could have expressed more clearly if he had thought fit, Phelips, who rose next, was certain to speak out all that was in his heart : and speak out he did. For his part, he told the House, he saw no reason for giving ; but neither was there any reason for leaving the work to which they had been so unexpectedly called. Let them stay to do something to make his Majesty glorious. Those who were now urging them to war—so far at least the person intended was suggested rather than expressed—were those who had been foremost in urging on the Spanish marriage, and who for its sake had broken up the Parliament of 1621, and had thrown members of the House into prison, himself being one of the sufferers, for refusing to hold their tongues.

In the Parliament of 1624 three things had been desired.¹ They had asked that the Prince should marry a Protestant lady, that the Dutch Republic should be supported, and that religion in England should be preserved. Had this been done ? “ What the Spanish articles were,” he said, “ we know. Whether those with France be any better it is doubted. There are visible articles and invisible. Those we may see, but these will be kept from us.”

Then, after touching on the sore of the impositions, and of tonnage and poundage, still levied, though the Lords had not yet passed the Bill, Phelips went to the root of the matter. “ In

I have before said, that he expected to be denied, and that he intended to make use of the impression caused by his being in the right and the Commons in the wrong, when success came. Nor can I see that he only asked for 40,000/. at first. I fancy he simply wanted that at least, and would take as much more as he could get—a frame of mind the very opposite to that of Gustavus, who at once refused to engage in war except on his own terms.

¹ Eliot makes Phelips say that they had been ‘desired and promised.’ Phelips was an impetuous orator, and may have said this. But as it is not true that Charles promised to marry a Protestant lady, I have followed the *Fawsley Debates*, 81, giving Phelips the benefit of the doubt.

It was, indeed, not strictly true that the House had asked for a Protestant marriage. But the desire of the members can hardly have been a matter of doubt, and may have been taken oratorically as equivalent to an actual demand.

the Government," he said plainly, "there hath wanted good advice. Counsels and power have been monopolised." Then, with an allusion to the Parliament which, meeting at Oxford, had wrested authority from Henry III., he said that he did not love the disordered proceedings of Parliaments. In all actions, he cried, 'there is a mixture of good and ill.' So had it been with their forefathers struggling with the prerogative. "Let us," he cried, "avoid that which was ill, but not that which was good. They looked into the disorders of the time, and concluded with the King for a reformation. When kings are persuaded to do what they should not, subjects have been often transported to do what they ought not. Let us not come too near the heels of power; nor yet fall so low as to suffer all things under the name of the prerogative. Let us look into the right of the subject. I will not argue whether the fleet is best to go or stay, whether leagues abroad are apt to support such great actions. The match has not yet brought the French to join with us in a defensive war, or any longer than conduceth to their own ends. The French army, which they say is gone, we hear is upon return. In Germany the King of Denmark hath done nothing. The best way to secure ourselves is to suppress the Papists here. . . Let the fleet go on; and let us not part till his Majesty may see an ample demonstration of our affections. Let us look into the estate and government, and, finding that which is amiss, make this Parliament the reformer of the Commonwealth."

There was more in Phelips's words than even distrust of Buckingham's ability or honesty. Both Buckingham and Charles had failed to recognise the importance of speech. The fact that neither the French alliance nor the intervention in Germany had ever received the approbation of the House of Commons. It was enough for them that they judged this policy to be right, and that they promised to themselves great results in the future from it. They would tell the House what they had done, and ask for the means to carry out their designs, but they would not so far demean themselves as to consult it upon the direction which their policy was to take.

To this Phelips's somewhat ironical answer was decisive. The responsibility must fall upon those by whom that policy had been originated. The Commons would give no support to a course of action which they were unable to understand. They would confine themselves to those internal affairs which were within the compass of their intelligence, and would content themselves with criticising the administration of the laws, and the financial and political arrangements of the Government.

Such a speech was an historical event. If Charles could not make up his mind to discuss with the Commons the policy which he had adopted with such headlong rashness, it was useless for Weston, who followed, to try to persuade them that success might still be looked for if money enough were voted, or to frighten them with a prospect of dissolution by saying that, if they refused to give, 'beyond that day there was no place for counsel.' Nor was the speech of Sir Edward Coke much more to the point, as he contented himself with calling attention to the minor causes of the financial embarrassment of the Treasury, without touching upon the question really at issue.

The House was all the more attentive when Heath, the Solicitor-General, rose to speak, because he had had time to receive instructions from Buckingham since Phelips sat down, and because he was far too able a man, and had too good an acquaintance with the temper of the House, to fail in giving full weight to any concessions which the Government might be disposed to make. He began by placing the engagement of the Parliament of 1624 on its proper footing. The House, he argued, was bound to follow the King unless he propounded anything to which it was impossible to consent. As they were not engaged to everything, let there be no misunderstanding. Let them ask the King against what enemy he was prepared to fight. He was sure that the King was ready to take measures against the Catholics, 'that they might not be able to do hurt.' It had been said that places were filled by men who wanted experience. He was under great obligations to the person to whom allusion had been made, but if there was anything against him he hoped

Speeches of
Weston and
Coke.

Heath's
offers on the
part of the
Government.

that it would be examined in such a way as that the public good might not suffer. Let the blame, if blame there was, light upon the person, not upon the Commonwealth.

Heath had done his best to open the way to a better understanding ; but the speaker who followed him, Edward Alford,¹ struck at once at the weak point in his case, the fact that objection was taken not merely to Buckingham's management of the war, but to the dimensions which the war was assuming in his hands.

<sup>Alford says
the House
never pro-
mised to
recover the
Palatinate.</sup> “ We are not engaged,” he said, “ to give for the recovery of the Palatinate. For when it was in the Act of Parliament, as it was first penned, it was struck out by the order of the House, as a thing unfit to engage the House for the recovery of the Palatinate, and if possible, yet not without great charge and difficulty.”

The full truth was out at last. The House did not mean to support Mansfeld and the King of Denmark, and Buckingham and the King would have to reconcile themselves to the fact.

<sup>Discussions
in the after-
noon.</sup> That afternoon Buckingham's agents were busy amongst the knots of members who were gathering everywhere to discuss the morning's debate. The greater part had already taken sides, the majority against the Court. Some few alone were accessible to influence. Besides the scenes which were passing in the streets or in the members' lodgings, another scene, it can hardly be doubted, was passing in Buckingham's apartments. There were men who wished him well, whilst they disliked his policy, and who were anxious to induce him to give way to the strength of Parliamentary opinion. What was said we do not know, probably shall never know ; but no one who reads with attention the course of the next day's debate can doubt that an effort was being made on the part of his friends to save him from the consequences of his own self-conceit.

The next morning, after a brisk passage on a protection accorded by Conway to a Roman Catholic lady in Dorsetshire,

¹ *Fawsley Debates*, 88, 135.

the great debate was resumed. The course which it took was

^{Aug. 6.} altogether different from that of the preceding day.
 Suggested reconciliation between Buckingham and the House. The 5th had been given up to a conflict between the ministers of the Crown and the men who, in modern political language, would be termed the advanced wing of the Opposition. On the 6th all is changed.

Phelips, Coke, and Seymour are as silent as Weston, Heath, and Edmondes. It looks as if both parties had come to a tacit agreement to allow a body of mediators to declare the terms on which an understanding might yet be effected.

Sir Henry Mildmay, who spoke first, was Master of the King's Jewel House, and was on friendly terms with Buckingham. He proposed that the House should ask what sum would be sufficient to complete the equipment of the fleet, and that that sum should be granted, not by way of subsidy, but by some other mode of collection, apparently in order that it might be at once brought into the Exchequer. Such a course of raising money, he added, being taken in Parliament, will be a Parliamentary course.¹

Mildmay had quietly thrown overboard all the King's Continental alliances. He was followed by Coryton, Eliot's friend, who was ready to supply the King, 'if there was a necessity,' but suggested that the state of the King's revenue should be examined, the question of impositions sifted, and a committee appointed to debate of these things,² 'and especially for religion.'

Eliot followed. It was his last appearance as a mediator. It is plain that he had already ceased as completely as Phelips and Seymour to feel any confidence in Buckingham. The war, he said, 'extendeth to Denmark, Savoy, Germany, and France.' "If he shall deal truly, he is diffident and distrustful of these things, and we have had no fruit yet but shame and dishonour over all the world. This

¹ This speech is substantially the same in the *Journals* and in the *Fawsley Debates*; but see especially the report in the Appendix to the latter, 136.

² "And everyone may contribute his reasons, which may do much good," probably means this. *Fawsley Debates*, 139.

great preparation is now on the way ; he prayeth it may have a prosperous going forth, and a more prosperous return." He did not believe there was any necessity for more money than had been voted at Westminster, and he could not see why, if the seamen were pressed in April and the landsmen in May, the fleet had not been at sea long ago. That the delay had been caused, in part at least, by Buckingham's project of diverting the enterprise to the coast of Flanders, was of course unknown to Eliot. But though he had spoken thus strongly of the proceedings of the Government, he went on to acquit Buckingham of all personal blame about the fleet. If anything had gone wrong it was the fault of the Commissioners of the Navy.

The attack upon the Commissioners called up Sir John Coke, who protested loudly against this imputation upon the office which he held. Strode then followed, supporting¹ Mildmay's proposal that the money should be raised in some other way than by subsidy, by asking how subsidies payable more than a year hence could supply a fleet which was to go out in a fortnight. After a few words from Sir John Stradling, Sir Rich's five Nathaniel Rich, who even more than Mildmay re-propositions. presented in the House that section of the Duke's friends which objected to his late proceedings, rose to put Mildmay's proposal in a more definite form. He proceeded to lay down five propositions, which had probably been accepted by Buckingham the evening before. In the first place, he said, they must ask the King for an answer to their petition on religion. In the second place, his Majesty must declare the enemy against whom he meant to fight, so that the object of the war might be openly discussed, though the special design ought properly to be kept secret. Further, he wished that 'when His Majesty doth make a war, it may be debated and advised by his grave council'—a proposal which in the most courteous terms expressed the general wish that the opinion of others than Buckingham should be heard. Besides these

¹ This at least seems to me to be the obvious interpretation of Strode's question. Mr. Forster, if I understand him rightly (*Sir J. Eliot*, i. 226), regarded it as an argument against the grant of supply.

three demands, Rich asked that the King's revenue should be examined with a view to its increase, and that a permanent settlement of the vexed question of the impositions should be arrived at.¹

Thus far the House had listened to men who, if they were friends of Buckingham, could speak in an independent tone. Other voices were now raised. Before we give more money, said some one, let us take account from Buckingham of the subsidies voted the year before.² Edward Clarke, a man trusted by the Duke as his agent in affairs of questionable propriety, rose to defend his patron. "Bitter invectives," he began, "are unseasonable for this time." There was at once an outcry from

Incident of
Clarke's im-
prisonment. all parts of the House, and Clarke was committed to the custody of the serjeant-at-arms. With this scene ended the day's debate. The House was adjourned at Seymour's motion, in order that at the next sitting they might go into committee on the great business. But the members did not separate before Phelps had expressed his decided approbation of 'the platform of Sir Nathaniel Rich.'³

Rich's
scheme ap-
proved by
Phelps. Thus ended the discussions of this memorable week. That Saturday afternoon pressure was put upon Buckingham to accept the terms offered by Rich, which would then without doubt be adopted by the House. "The advice he had," writes Eliot, "was much to endeavour an accommodation with the Parliament. The errors most insisted on were said to be excusable if retracted. That the disorders of the navy might be imputed to the officers; that the want of counsels might be satisfied by an admission of popular

¹ I would refer those who doubt my view of this debate to what I have said in the Preface to the *Fawsley Debates*, p. xiii.

² This speech, which gave rise to Clarke's unlucky words, is mentioned in a letter from the Bishop of Mende, *King's MSS.* 137, fol. 84.

³ *Fawsley Debates*, 140. Rich is mentioned by Williams in a paper given in to the King on Aug. 14, as one of those who were 'never out my Lord Duke's chamber and bosom.' *Hacket*, ii. 18. There may have been some exaggeration, but unless there had been friendship, Williams would not have said this to the King.

members to the Council Board. The greatest difficulty was conceived to rest in religion and the fleet. For the first, the jealousy being derived from his protection given to Montague ; for the latter, that it had so unnecessary preparation and expense ; and yet in both there might be a reconciliation for himself. Sending the fleet to sea and giving others the command, was propounded as a remedy for the one ; having these reasons to support it, that the design could not be known, nor, if there wanted one, that judged by the success, and the success was answerable but by those that had the action. For the other, it was said that the leaving of Montague to his punishment, and the withdrawing that protection, would be a satisfaction for the present, with some public declaration in the point, and a fair parting of that meeting. That the danger of the time¹ was a great cause of dislike ; that the dislike had ushered in most of those questions that had been raised. Therefore to free them from that danger would dissolve the present difficulties, and facilitate the way to a future temper for agreement. The fleet must needs go forth to colour the preparation, and the return might yield something to justify the work, at least in excuse and apology for himself, by translation of the fault.”²

If this account of the language used to Buckingham has not been distorted in its passage through the medium of other men’s minds, it must have been beyond measure annoying to him. To have it hinted that the fleet which had been for so many months the object of his solicitude was never intended to sail, was not a suggestion to which he was likely to listen with equanimity. The wonder is not that the proposal of referring everything to the Council was ultimately rejected by him, but that he should, even for a moment, have given any hope to his advisers. He was called not merely to admit himself to be incapable of directing the state, by consenting to place himself under the control of a Council reinforced by men who looked upon him with distrust, but to renounce all those long-considered plans which he regarded as of such importance. Already war had broken out in Germany, and the King of Denmark, depending on English promises, was holding

How they
would sound
to Bucking-
ham.

¹ i.e. from the plague.

² Eliot, *Neg. Posterorum.*

out with difficulty against Tilly. From France every post brought news of preparations for war, and a day or two, he firmly believed, would tell the world that the internal struggle with the Huguenots was at an end. Were Buckingham and his master, in the face of one adverse debate, to fling their engagements to the winds? Were they to tell Christian that in building on the word of an English king he had been building on the sand? Were they, by teaching Richelieu that English co-operation was unattainable, to throw France back into the arms of Spain, and to force her to pass once more into the bondage from which she had with such difficulty emancipated herself?¹

What wonder therefore if Buckingham resolved to make one more effort to win the Commons to his side? There was one point at least on which he was ready to give them satisfaction. Neither he nor the King cared really for the principle of religious toleration. They were both of them as ready to execute the penal laws against the Catholics, if anything could be gained by so doing, as they had been to remit the penalties. Yet how could this be done without risk to the French alliance? Would Louis help Charles to recover the Palatinate, if Charles's promise to protect the English Catholics were treated as if it had never been given? That Charles and Buckingham should have found excuses for breaking their engagements is no matter for surprise; but no better proof can be found of their incapacity to understand human nature than the ease with which they persuaded themselves that the King of France would be quite content that the engagements, by which he set such store, should be openly broken.

On Sunday, August 7, there was high debate at Court. From La Vieuville's unguarded language, and from Richelieu's polite phraseology, Buckingham, with Carlisle and Holland to back him, drew the astounding inference that the promise, so solemnly signed

¹ All these considerations arise out of the facts as we know them, and as Buckingham knew them. Eliot's picture of Buckingham is drawn not merely in ignorance of them, but in the belief that things were true which we know to have been untrue.

He determines to make one more effort.

The Catholics to be abandoned.

Aug. 7.
The promise to France explained away.

and attested at Cambridge, had never been anything more than a mere form, adopted with the approval of the French Government to deceive the Pope.¹ For impartial judges it is enough to condemn so monstrous a proposition, that it was now heard of for the first time, and that Charles had already acknowledged by his actions, when his wife was on her way to England, that he considered his engagement to her brother as a reality.

From this time forward it became a cardinal principle at the English Court to disavow all obligation to the King of France in the matter of the Catholics, and to appeal to words spoken in conversation by the French ministers ; as if, even supposing that they had meant all that Buckingham asserted them to mean, they could outweigh an obligation formally contracted. The members of the Privy Council had not a word to say in opposition to Buckingham's view, when the revelation, as they supposed it to be, was suddenly made. Williams, and perhaps Arundel, may have been displeased at the rashness of the affront offered to the King of France, but they were powerless to resist. Of the others, Pembroke and Abbot were probably in communication with the leaders of the Commons, and doubtless shared to a great extent the general dissatisfaction. But whatever their exact feeling may have been, when once Buckingham had, with the King's support, taken his stand it was useless to raise further questions.

On Monday morning therefore Buckingham appeared, radiant with self-confidence, in Christchurch Hall, and the Commons were summoned to hear from his lips a communication from the King. After a short preamble from Williams, the Duke stood up as he had stood up at Whitehall eighteen months before, to answer for the Government which was in reality centred in his person.

First he directed that the King's answer to the petition of

¹ The Bishop of Mende to Richelieu, received Aug. ¹⁹₂₉, *King's MSS.* 137, fol. 84. The meeting of the Council is here by mistake dated Aug. 9, if this is more than a copyist's error. But the 7th is meant, as it is said to have taken place the day before Buckingham's speech at Christchurch.

This view
accepted by
the Council.

Buckingham
in Christ-
church Hall.

religion should be read. All, he said, that the Commons had demanded was fully and freely granted. If they thought that the execution of the penal laws against the Catholics was an object worth striving for, they were to have their wishes.

Buckingham then proceeded to defend his foreign policy. He contrasted the disintegration of the anti-Spanish party in Europe when he came back from Spain with its present condition. "Now," he said, "the Valtelline is at liberty, the war is in Italy; the King of Denmark hath an army of 17,000 foot and 6,000 horse, and commissions out to make them 30,000; the King of Sweden declares himself; the Princes of the Union take heart; the King of France is engaged in a war against the King of Spain, hath peace with his subjects, and is joined in a league with Savoy and Venice. This being the state of things then and now, I hope to have from you the same success of being well construed which then I had; for since that time I have not had a thought, nor entered into any action, but what might tend to the advancement of the business and please your desires. But if I should give ear and credit, which I do not, to rumours, then I might speak with some confusion, fearing not to hold so good a place in your opinion as then you gave me, whereof I have still the same ambition, and I hope to deserve it. When I consider the integrity of mine own soul and heart to the King and State, I receive courage and confidence; whereupon I make this request, that you will believe that if any amongst you, in discharge of their opinion and conscience, say anything that may reflect upon particular persons, that I shall be the last in the world to make application of it to myself; being so well assured of your justice, that without cause you will not fall on him that was so lately approved by you, and who will never do anything to irritate any man to have other opinion of me than of a faithful, true-hearted Englishman."

Then turning to the demand for more counsel and advice, he declared that he had never acted without counsel. All that he had done or proposed to do had been submitted to the

Council of War or to the Privy Council. He himself, when he went to France, had advised the institution of a committee to give advice on foreign affairs. If therefore the Commons thought that he took too much on himself, they were mistaken. The Council which they demanded was already in existence.

Of the suggestion that the fleet was not intended to sail, Buckingham spoke scornfully. "For my part," he said, "I know not what policy my master should have, to set out a fleet with the charge of 400,000*l.* only to abuse the world and lessen his people, and to put you to such hazard. What should my master gain? Would he do an act never to meet with you again? Certainly he would never have employed so great a sum of money but that he saw the necessity of the affairs of Christendom require it; and it was done with an intention to set it out with all the speed that may be."

After touching on other less important points, Buckingham spoke of his plans for the future. "Hitherto," he said, "I have spoken nothing but of immense charge which the kingdom is not well able to bear if it should continue: the King of Denmark, 30,000*l.* a month; Mansfeld's army, 20,000*l.*; the army of the Low Countries, 8,000*l.*; ¹ Ireland, 2,600*l.*; besides twelve ships preparing to second the fleet.

"Make my master chief of this war, and by that you shall give his allies better assistance than if you gave them 100,000*l.* a month. What is it for his allies to scratch with the King of Spain, to win a battle to-day and lose one on the morrow, and to get or lose a town by snatches? But to go with a conquest by land, the King of Spain is so strong, it is impossible to do. But let my master be chief of the war and make a diversion, the enemy spends the more; he must draw from other places, and so you give to them."²

If they wished to know who was their enemy they might name him themselves. Let them put the sword into the King's hands, and he would maintain the war.³

¹ 8,500*l.*, according to the Lord Treasurer. ² i.e. to the King's allies

³ *Lords' Journals*, iii. 479; *Fawsley Debates*, 95.

Declares he
has acted by
counsel.

The neces-
sity of the
fleet.

What was
intended?

They might
name their
enemy.

Buckingham's declaration was followed by a statement by the Lord Treasurer, in which the King's debts and engagements were plainly stated. The main interest of the proceedings, however, lay in the reception which would be accorded to Buckingham's vindication of himself.

The Lord Treasurer's statement. That there was intentional deception about his words it is impossible to imagine. There is a ring of sincerity about them which cannot be mistaken, and those who are best acquainted with the facts will probably acknowledge

Buckingham's sincerity. that he said exactly what, under the circumstances, he might reasonably be expected to say. But it is one thing to hold that he was sincere ; it is another thing to hold that what he said ought

But his statement unsatisfactory. to have given satisfaction. Doubtless it was perfectly true that he had appealed from time to time to the

Privy Council and to the Council of War. But had he done his best to fill the Privy Council with men of independent judgment ? Had he not rather given away places at the Board to men who had risen by obsequiousness rather than by merit ? In politics, as in all other actions of life, one or two questions, decided one way or another, carry with them the settlement of all other points at issue. Buckingham may have asked advice whether the fleet was to sail against Cadiz or Dunkirk, but he had not asked advice whether the secret engagement about the French Catholics should be signed, or whether the King of Denmark should be encouraged to take part in a fresh war in Germany by offers of aid from England.

If Buckingham's defence against the charge of despising counsel was unsatisfactory, his account of his own future designs

His aim probably not clear to himself. was more unsatisfactory still. The Commons wished him to abandon his Continental alliances, and to be content with attacking Spain. It was no matter for surprise that he should be unwilling so lightly to turn his back upon the efforts of the past year ; but when he proceeded to sum up the King's engagements, and allowed the Lord Treasurer to re-state them in fuller detail, it was only natural to expect that he would urge upon the Commons the absolute necessity of furnishing money to enable the King to carry out his undertakings. He did nothing of the sort. He suggested

that if the fleet were successful it would do more good to the common cause than if 100,000*l.* a month were paid to the allies of England on the Continent. By so doing he fell back on the policy of carrying on the war at sea alone, which had been approved by the Commons in 1624, without frankly abandoning his own more far-reaching schemes.

The explanation doubtless is that, whilst Buckingham could not abandon the world of alliances and subsidies in which he had been living and moving during the past year without speaking a word in their favour, his sanguine mind seized upon the chance that the success of the fleet might make all these subsidies unnecessary. After all, why should he not pay Mansfeld and Christian with gold from the mines of Spanish America rather than from the purses of English citizens and landowners? Such a solution would rid him of his difficulty. It would satisfy the King's allies and satisfy the House of Commons as well.

Buckingham's explanation, taken at its best, is fatal to his claims to statesmanship. Either he had promised too much before, or he was asking too little now. Was it likely that it would allay the suspicions which were so rife amongst the Commons?

If Buckingham did not succeed in gaining the good-will of the House of Commons his position would be indeed deplorable. By his cynical disregard of Charles's plighted French protests. word he was alienating a powerful sovereign and an influential Church. As soon as his declaration against the Catholics was known, the Bishop of Mende, who was the Queen's almoner, and Father Berulle pleaded the cause of their co-religionists. The Duke gave them no hope that the promises made at the time of the marriage treaty would be fulfilled; but he made light of Charles's breach of faith. The Catholics, he said, would be moderately dealt with. Their troubles, which would only last for a time, were necessary to give satisfaction to the people. Berulle replied that, as he was about to return to France, he would acquaint his own sovereign with all that he had seen and heard. Buckingham begged him not to put a worse colour on the proceedings in England than they would bear, and repeated his plea of necessity. Only

in this way, he said, could be made sure of the affections of the English people. Berulle was not likely to be satisfied with such an explanation. "If you mean," he said, "to put the laws into execution, I neither can nor will endure it, whatever sauce you may be pleased to add." "Begone!" replied Buckingham angrily, "I know that you are only at home in your breviary and your mass." Simple regard for principle was always unintelligible to Buckingham. He was never able to understand that a shifty accommodation to the mere needs of the present moment rouses more enemies than it conciliates. By his conduct now he was converting the Catholics into enemies, without overcoming the growing distrust of the House of Commons.¹

On Wednesday morning the Lower House was to go into committee on Buckingham's explanation of the King's demands.

Aug. 10.
The King's
message. Before the Speaker left the chair a message from the King had been delivered by Weston, pressing for an immediate answer, which was demanded alike by the necessity of the case and by the danger to the health of the members. If the Commons would vote a supply at once, he would pledge his royal word that they should meet in the winter, and should not separate till they had considered the plans which had been suggested for the reformation of the Commonwealth. He hoped that they would remember that this was the first request which he had ever made to them.

For some time the debate wavered to and fro. There were some who had been carried away by Buckingham's evident zeal in the cause which was their own; but there were others who disliked his assumption of almost regal dignity, and who mistrusted him too much to repose in him the confidence which he required. Even his concession of the execution of the penal laws offended some who had been displeased at the countenance before shown to the recusants. Men whose religion, if of a somewhat narrow and uncharitable nature, was a reality very dear to their hearts, had no respect for the minister who had attempted to prostitute a thing so

¹ Description of the state of the Catholics. *Roman Transcripts.* R.O.

high and holy to considerations of State policy, and had made use of religion to support a tottering policy.¹

Such men, and they were doubtless many, found an apt spokesman in Phelips. He treated the question as altogether one of confidence. Reputation, he said, is a great advantage to a king, but it is not built on every action, but only on such as have a sure ground of advice preceding, and a constant application of good counsel, leaving as little as possible to chance. It was no honour to send forth the fleet, if it was exposed to so hazardous a return. It was easy to say there was necessity. It was for those who had brought the King to such a necessity to take upon themselves the burden of their own counsels. In old days there had been Parliaments which had demanded the reformation of abuses and the dismissal of favourites. "We," he said with striking force, "are the last monarchy in Christendom that retain our original rights and constitutions. Either his Majesty is able to set out this fleet, or it is not fit to go at all. We ought neither to fear nor to contemn our enemy. If we provide to set it out, we must provide to second it too, for without a second it will do nothing but stir a powerful king to invade us."

Everything, as Phelips clearly saw, turned on the question of confidence. Forty thousand pounds might be a little sum for them to give, but it was no light matter to embark on a war with a leader who could not be trusted. Nor was Phelips content with mere declamation. He had a practical solution of the difficulty to recommend. Though Buckingham had declared that the Council of War had authorised his proceedings, not one of its members had come forward to confirm his statement. One of them, Sir Robert Mansell, was a member of the House. Let Mansell be asked 'to declare his knowledge with what deliberation and counsel this design hath been managed.' A committee might also be appointed to inform his Majesty that, though supply would not at once be granted, the House would in due time 'supply all his honourable and well-grounded actions.'²

¹ This seems to have been Eliot's view.

² *Fawsley Debates*, 109; *Commons' Journals*, i. 814.

The King's claim to be judge of the grounds upon which he demanded supply was thus met by the counterclaim of Continuance of the debate. the House to judge the sufficiency of those grounds before they gave the money. Mansell, in spite of the appeal made to him, held his peace, and the debate went on. The King's cause was feebly defended by May. No one had been authorised to join issue with Phelps. Then came Seymour, still more personal in his attack than Phelps, complaining of peculation in high places, and of the sale of honourable preferments at Court.¹

¹ With respect to the alleged speech of Eliot I had better repeat what I have said in the preface to the *Fawsley Debates* :—

"In the first place I shall have to ask my readers to abandon the notion that the great speech prepared by Eliot in conjunction with Cotton for the debate of the 10th of August, was ever really spoken. Mr. Forster was, indeed, perfectly justified in inserting the speech, for not only does it bear throughout the impress of Eliot's mind, but Eliot has inserted it both in the *Negotium* and in his own collection of speeches, and though he does not use his name, he says, after reporting May's speech :—

But the esteem of precedents did remain with those that knew the true value of antiquity, whereof a larger collection was in store to direct the resolution in that case, which thus contained both reason and authority.

"Then after giving the speech in the Eliot, not in the Cotton form, he goes on :—

This inflamed the affection of the House, and pitched it wholly on the imitation of their fathers ; the clear demonstrations that were made of the likeness of the times gave them like reasons who had like interests and freedom. But the courtiers did not relish it, who at once forsook both their reason and their eloquence ; all their hopes consisting but in prayers and some light excuses that were framed, but no more justification was once heard of, in which soft way the Chancellor of the Exchequer did discourse, &c.

"This certainly is strong evidence, and in the face of it Mr. Forster was quite justified in treating with disdain the fact that nothing of this speech is to be found in the Journals. But the Journals do not now stand alone. We have three reports completely independent of one another, but all agreeing in omitting Eliot's speech, and in substituting one spoken by Sir Francis Seymour. If this were all, those who think Eliot's statement enough to counterbalance those of three independent witnesses might still hold that it had not been rebutted. But there is another argument far stronger. Sir Richard Weston, according to all four authorities, followed. He does not even allude to one of the arguments which are supposed to

The debate was kept up for some time longer. Amongst the speakers was Wentworth, who had been re-elected for Yorkshire during the vacation. He had promised to take no part in

have been pouring out from Eliot. He utters no word of remonstrance against his tremendous personal attack upon Buckingham; but he applies himself very closely to Seymour's argument, and carefully answers it. I cannot believe that anyone who will take the trouble of reading Weston's speech, at p. 112, can doubt that Seymour really spoke before him. And if so, where is there any room for Eliot's speech, which is substituted for this in the *Negotium*?

"The two forms of the speech which have come down to us are, as Mr. Forster has pointed out, substantially the same, but the one is the speech of an orator, the other of an antiquary. Mr. Forster argues, that in the case of Cotton's speech, 'some one finding at the same time,' i.e. after 1651, when the speech was published by Howell in his *Cottoni Posthuma*, 'a manuscript copy of the speech purporting to have been spoken by Eliot, was misled by Howell into a marginal indorsement of it as "not spoken but intended by Sir John Eliot,"' and the preservation of the copy in the *Lansdowne MSS.*, so endorsed, adds to the confusion.'

"The argument is probably based upon the fact that, at the head of the speech (*Lansd. MSS.* 491, fol. 138) is written in a different hand from the rest of the paper, 'Sir John Eliot's: this speech was not spoken but intended.' But any argument drawn from the difference of hand-writing falls to the ground when it is observed that this is merely a copy of a heading which was originally at the top of the page, and the greater part of which has been cut off in the process of binding; enough, however, remains to show that the heading was originally in the same writing as the body of the document. My own belief is that it was a copy taken from Cotton's notes at the very time by some one who knew that Eliot intended to use them but did not. For, in after years, who was likely to call to mind the mere intention to deliver a speech, especially as it was known amongst Cotton's friends as his production? In a letter written by Sir S. D'Ewes, on the 4th of February, 1626 (*Ellis*, ser. 1. iii. 214), the writer, speaking of the omission of the King to land on his way to his coronation at Sir R. Cotton's stairs, says:—'I conceived the Duke had prevented that act of grace to be done him, by reason of that piece I shewed you, which began, "Soe long as thou attendedest our master, now with God," framed by him. You may remember how I told you that I doubted him the author, by reason of the style and gravity of it.'

"Curiously enough, the first words here given are not the first words of Cotton's work as it stands in the *Cottoni Posthuma* and the *Lansdowne MSS.* The paper which D'Ewes saw must have omitted the introduction relating to Clerke's censure by the House. On the other hand it was

any personal attack upon the Duke,¹ but he took no interest in his projects, and the slight put upon the House of which he was a member stung him to the quick. "I am not," he said, "against giving, but against the manner." Wentworth did not like to hear the threat that they must either give or adjourn. "The engagement of a former Parliament," he added, "bindeth not this." Not that he seems to have cared much whether the House had confidence in the Duke or not. So far as he was concerned, we may safely conjecture, if the subsidies were to be spent in war with Spain, it mattered little whether Buckingham or some more trusted counsellors were to have the disposal of them. The internal affairs of England were the prime object of his solicitude from the first day on which he opened his mouth in Parliament. "Let us first," he said, "do the business of the Commonwealth, appoint a committee for petitions, and afterwards, for my part, I will consent to do as much for the King as any other."²

Other speakers followed with various opinions, Coke strangely enough suggesting a benevolence as the best way out of the difficulty. As a private man he was ready to give 1,000*l.*, and that willingly, notwithstanding all his crosses. He hoped those of the King's council would

Cotton's, not Eliot's work which he saw. For Eliot began with a verbal difference : 'While thou remainedst in the service of King James.'

"The most probable explanation is that the speech is by Cotton ; that Cotton shrank from making use of it, and that Eliot, catching it up, breathed into it the fire of his own magnificent imagination, and with his pen converted the result of the antiquary's laborious investigation into words inspired with life."

"It is easy to find reasons why, after all, Eliot should have preferred silence. In the first burst of his indignation at finding Buckingham had broken away from his compact, nothing would seem too hard to say. But when it came to the point, we should only be inclined to think more highly of Eliot if he shrank back and refused to strike the first blow."

Since these words were written I have an additional witness to call, and that is no other than Eliot himself. In the notes in his own handwriting which, through Lord St. Germans' kindness, I have before me, Seymour's speech is given, and not a word is said of any speech of Eliot's own.

¹ Wentworth to Weston, *Strafford Letters*, i. 34.

² *Fawsley Debates*, 113; *Eliot Notes*.

do as much. Then at last Mansell rose. Since February, he Mansell says said, he had not been at any debate of the Council he had not approved of War. When the proposition had been made for Bucking- the levy of 10,000 landsmen to go on board the fleet, ham's scheme. he 'thought that proposition to no purpose, being such as would gall the enemy rather than hurt him.' He had a plan of his own which would have been far more useful. Conway had told him that the resolution would admit no debate. The advice of the Council was asked only concerning the arms for 2,000 men. He had answered that he protested against the business itself.

Upon this the committee was adjourned to the next morning. It would be hard for Buckingham to wipe away the Adjourn- impression made by Mansell's words. By this time, ment. too, Pennington and his sailors were back in England. The tale of the delivery of the ships by special orders from Buckingham must have been in every mouth. It was known that the French boasted that they would use them against Rochelle. The unconfirmed assertion of Buckingham that there was peace in France was entirely disbelieved.

Before the debate recommenced on Thursday morning a letter was read from William Legg, a prisoner to the Moorish pirates at Sallee. He was one, he said, of eight hundred Englishmen captured at sea. Enormous ransoms had been demanded, and those who refused or had been unable to pay had been treated with the utmost cruelty. Some of them had been tortured by fire, some were almost starved, and one poor wretch had been compelled to eat his own ears. Witnesses, too, who had escaped from the pirates were actually in attendance. One had been captured but eight leagues from the Land's End. It appeared that great spoil had been committed on the English coast, so that vessels scarcely ventured from port to port. If the West of England cried out against the rovers of Sallee, the East cried out against the Dunkirk privateers. Even the Huguenots of Rochelle had forgotten the respect due to English commerce. They had seized some Bristol ships for service against the King of France, and had turned the sailors adrift on shore without money or provisions.

Indignation was fast coming to a head. It was known that orders given by the Council for the employment of some of the King's ships against the pirates had been countermanded by the Navy Commissioners. It was replied that the Duke had given directions to Sir Francis Steward, one of the commanders of the fleet, to clear the seas of pirates. The answer was that Sir Francis Steward had looked calmly on whilst a capture was being made near the French coast, on the plea that he had no orders to act in foreign waters. At last Seymour spoke out what was in the mind of all. "Let us lay the fault where it is," he said. "The Duke of Buckingham is trusted, and it must needs be either in him or his agents." "It is not fit," cried Phelps, "to repose the safety of the kingdom upon those that have not parts answerable to their places." A committee was appointed to frame a petition embodying these complaints.

For the first time the Duke had been attacked by name. It was a fitting answer to his assumption of almost regal dignity in Christchurch Hall. The man who had assumed to direct all things must bear the responsibility of all things.

When the House at last went into committee, Sir Henry Marten¹ made one more effort to obtain a grant of supply. He, at least, was not likely to make much impression on the House. Rightly or wrongly, it was believed that he was trying to wipe off the offence given by his reference to Buckingham as a young ambassador. He produced so little effect that Seymour, in repeating his advice not to give, did not care to put forward any fresh reasons. After a few more words on both sides, Sir Robert Killigrew advised that the question should not be put. It would be a greater disgrace to the King to be in a minority than to have the whole House against him.²

That afternoon³ the Council met to consider whether the

¹ He, and not Sir J. Coke, is the 'old artist' of the *Negotium*, as appears from what Eliot says, 'Some did imagine that an act of expiation for the former trespass he had done.'

² *Fawsley Debates*, 120.

³ Bishop of Mende to Richelieu, received Aug. ¹⁹₂₉, *King's MSS.* 137, 99. Nethersole to Carleton, Aug. 14, *Fawsley Debates*, 162.

House should be allowed to sit any longer. Once more Williams pleaded hard against the fatal error of opening a new reign with a quarrel with the House of Commons. For once Buckingham was on the same side. Throwing himself on his knees he entreated the King to allow the Parliament to continue ; but Charles was immovable, and the dissolution was irrevocably determined on.

Buckingham's petition was naturally described by his opponents as a mere piece of acting.¹ It may have been so, but it was not in his nature to shrink from opposition. His temper always led him to meet his detractors face to face, certain of the justice of his own cause and of his own ability to defend it. In truth it was Charles's authority as much as Buckingham's which was at stake. The course which the Commons were taking led surely, if indirectly, to the responsibility of ministers to Parliament ; and the responsibility of ministers to Parliament meant just as surely the transference of sovereignty from the Crown to the Parliament.

The next morning, before the fatal hour arrived, an attempt was made by Heath to answer Mansell. The Council of War, he said, had often been consulted. Chichester, who was dead, had left papers to show how far he agreed with the plans proposed. Carew was absent from Oxford ; Harvey had only recently joined the Council ; but Lords Grandison and Brooke, the Sir Oliver St. John and Sir Fulk Greville of earlier days, would come, if they were invited, to tell the House what they knew. As for Mansell, he had a scheme of his own to which no one else would listen, and had consequently refused to attend the Council.

Though this account of what had taken place was very likely true, Heath had not met Mansell's assertion that he had been told that he was not to speak on the scheme itself, but only on its execution. Mansell, who rose in self-defence, did not deny that there had been personal ill-will between himself and Buckingham, but he said that when he laid his own proposal before the Council, he was told that

Heath
replies to
Mansell.

he must go to Buckingham, ‘who only had permission from the King to consider of new propositions.’ To this, which was only what the Commons suspected, no reply was vouchsafed ; the testimony of Brooke and Grandison was neither demanded on one side nor pressed on the other.¹

By this time it was known in the House that they had but a few minutes more to sit. The Black Rod was already at the door to summon them to dissolution. Some wished to petition for delay. But what good would delay do them unless they were prepared to abandon their ground ? “Rumours,” said Phelps, “are no warrant for such a message. Let them go on with business. When they had notice of the King’s pleasure, it was their duty to obey it.”

The House went at once into committee, and adopted a protestation prepared by Glanville, who had taken a prominent part in the debates of the past days. In the following fashion the Commons approached the King :—

^{Proposed petition for delay.} “We, the knights, citizens, and burgesses of the Commons’ House of Parliament, being the representative body of the whole commons of this realm, abundantly comforted in his Majesty’s late gracious answer touching religion, and his message for the care of our healths, do solemnly protest and vow before God and the world with one heart and voice, that we will ever continue most loyal and obedient subjects to our most gracious sovereign King Charles, and that we will be ready in convenient time and in a parliamentary way freely and dutifully to do our utmost endeavour to discover and reform the abuses and grievances of the realm and State, and in the like sort to afford all necessary supply to his Majesty upon his present and all other his just occasions and designs ; most humbly beseeching our ever dear and dread sovereign, in his princely wisdom and goodness, to rest assured of the true and hearty affections of his poor Commons, and to esteem the same—as we conceive it indeed—the greatest worldly reputation and security a just king can have, and to account all such as slanderers of the people’s affections and enemies of the Commonwealth that shall dare to say the contrary.”

¹ *Fawsley Debates*, 122.

The last scene. One last effort was made by Sir Edward Villiers to induce the House to reconsider its determination. "We are under the rod," answered Wentworth, "and we cannot with credit or safety yield. Since we sat here, the subjects have lost a subsidy at sea."¹

The protestation was hurried through the necessary forms. Whilst Black Rod was knocking at the door, some one moved that there should be a declaration 'for the acquitting of those who were likely to be questioned for that which they had spoken.' If anyone was likely to be questioned it was Phelips. But Phelips would hear nothing of it. "There hath been little effect of such declarations," he said. "The last Parliament but one² some went to the Tower, some were banished to Ireland, notwithstanding just acquittals. For my part, if I am questioned, I desire no other certificate but the testimony of my conscience, in confidence whereof I will appeal from King Charles misinformed to King Charles rightly informed."

At last the doors were opened. The Commons were summed to the Upper House, and in a few minutes the first Parliament of Charles I. had ceased to exist.

Such was the end of this memorable Parliament—a Parliament which opened the floodgates of that long contention with the Crown which was never, except for one brief moment, to be closed again till the Revolution of 1688 came to change the conditions of government in England. As far as the history of such an assembly can be summed up in the name of any single man, the history of the Parliament of 1625 is summed up in the name of Phelips. At the opening of the session his hasty advocacy of an immediate adjournment met with little response.

Leadership of Phelips. The House, however, under the pressure of events came gradually round to his side, and at Oxford he virtually assumed that unacknowledged leadership which was all that the traditions of Parliament at that time permitted. It was Phelips who placed the true issue of want of confidence before

¹ The exposure of English commerce to pirates was always a reproach to which Wentworth was extremely sensitive.

² The words "but one" are wanting in the report. *Fawsley Debates*, 127.

the House, and who, by the question which he addressed to Mansell, pointed out the means of testing the value of Buckingham's assertions.

It is not necessary to defend all that was said, still less all that was thought, in the House about Buckingham. No one who has studied the facts of the history in a candid spirit can deny that the speeches of the popular members were full of unfounded suspicions and unreasonable demands. But, for all that, it is impossible to assert that Buckingham could show any sufficient ground for reposing confidence in him. The account which he gave of his proceedings was singularly confused. By his own confession he had entered into engagements which he was unable to meet, and which he did not venture to ask the Commons to assist him in meeting. Besides this, the terrible failure of Mansfeld's expedition, costing thousands of innocent lives, could not be explained away. Nor is Buckingham's a case in which further publicity than he was able to appeal to would present his ability in a better light. For some time he had been occupied in undoing the results of his own mistakes. The engagement about the Catholics and the loan of the ships to the King of France had been mainly his work. The manner in which he had extricated himself from those entanglements was not known to the House of Commons ; but it is known to us ; and we may be sure that if the Commons had known what we know they would have been even more indignant than they were. As it was, the general opinion of moderate Englishmen was probably well expressed by a foreign diplomatist who took Rusdorf's but little interest in the Parliamentary conflict. Since opinion. he had come to England, he said, he had learned the truth of two paradoxes. Under James, he found that it was better to take a bad resolution than none at all ; under Charles, that it was better to give effect to a bad resolution with prudence and ability, than to give effect to a good resolution without forethought and consideration.¹

The attitude which Charles would take towards this declared

¹ Rusdorf to Camerarius, Sept. $\frac{6}{16}$, *Consilia et Negotia*, 69.

want of confidence in his minister would evidently depend upon the amount of confidence which he himself continued to feel in him. Unfortunately there was no chance that his reliance on Buckingham would be shaken. His own mind had nothing originative about it. When once the brilliant schemes of Buckingham had dazzled his understanding, he adopted them as his own, and from that moment all chance of inducing him to abandon them was at an end. He had no power of stepping out of himself to see how his actions looked to other people, especially when, as was certain to be the case, the real objections to his policy were mixed up with offensive imputations which he knew to be unfounded in fact.

The difference of opinion between the King and the House of Commons was thus reduced to a contest for power. The two great elements of the constitution which had worked harmoniously together were brought at last into open conflict. The right of inquiry before subsidies were voted would, if once it were admitted, place the destinies of England in the hands of the House from which subsidies proceeded. Yet it would be a mistake to suppose that either party in the quarrel was grasping at power for its own sake. Charles believed that he was defending a wise and energetic minister against factious opposition. The Commons believed that they were hindering a rash and self-seeking favourite from doing more injury than he had done already. If neither was completely in the right, the view taken by the Commons was far nearer to the truth than the view taken by Charles.

So far as the difference between the King and the House went beyond the mere question of confidence, the Commons stood upon a purely conservative ground. We look in vain amongst their leaders for any sign of openness to the reception of new ideas, or for any notion that the generation in which they lived was not to be as the generation which had preceded it. Their conception of the war was more suited to 1588 than to 1625, and the mazes of European politics formed for them a labyrinth without a thread. In all they had to say about the affairs of the Continent it is

Conservatism of the House.

hard to find a single word which betrays any real knowledge of the wants and difficulties of the Protestants of Germany. In home politics, too, their eyes were equally directed to the past. The form of religion which had grown up under the influence of the Elizabethan struggle with Spain was to be stereotyped. Differences of opinion were to be prohibited, and the Calvinistic creed was to be imposed for ever upon the English nation.

If the temper of the Commons was thus purely conservative, their conservatism was to some extent justified by the nature of the alternative offered to them. Charles's foreign policy was as ignorant as that of the Commons, and far more hazardous. His ecclesiastical policy had hardly yet had time to develop itself ; but signs were not wanting that it would be even more dangerous than that which was secure of the popular favour. If the Commons were ready to proscribe the religious opinions of the few, the men whom the King honoured with his preference were ready to proscribe the religious practices of the many.

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